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At least 811 records · Page 45

Underground Test Area Calendar Year 2014 Annual Sampling Analysis Report Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This report presents the analytical data for the 2014 fiscal year (FY) and calendar year (CY) (October 1, 2013, through December 31, 2014), and an evaluation of the data to ensure that the Sampling Plan’s objectives are met. In addition to samples collected and analyzed for the Sampling Plan, some NNSS wells are monitored by NNSA/NFO to demonstrate compliance with State-issued water discharge permits; with protection of groundwater from ongoing radiological waste disposal activities (compliance wells); and to demonstrate that the onsite drinking water supply is below SDWA maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) (public water system [PWS] wells). While not all sampled locations are required by the Sampling Plan, these samples are relevant to its objectives and are therefore presented herein for completeness purposes. Special investigations that took place in 2014 that are relevant to the Sampling Plan are also presented. This is the first annual report released to support Sampling Plan implementation.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Calendar Year 2017 Underground Test Area Annual Sampling Report Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 1

This report presents the analytical data for the 2017 calendar year (CY) (January 1 through December 31, 2017) and an evaluation of the data to ensure that the Sampling Plan’s objectives are achieved. Data from samples collected in 2016 that were not reported in the UGTA CY 2016 Annual Sampling Analysis Report (DOE/EMNV, 2018b) are presented in Appendix D.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Cyber Security Concerns for Sharing Distributed Antenna Systems

Wireless access to data is a challenge for environments with poor radio frequency coverage such as nuclear power plants. An 802.11 Wi-Fi data network is often not a cost-effective solution not a cost-effective solution due to the requirement for extensive antenna outlays in large nuclear facilities and poor signal penetration due to thick concrete walls. Combining commercial Long-Term Evolution (LTE) with an existing distributed antenna system’s (DAS) resources and infrastructure is an attractive solution due to and lower cost of implementation and likely coverage increases. A 2017 technical report by EPRI has demonstrated that multiple systems such as Land Mobile Radio (LMR) and LTE can be operated using the same DAS and by sharing the leaky coaxial cabling and indoor antenna systems (Reference 1). Since the radio frequency (RF) bands used by the two wireless systems are specified to be non-overlapping, it is believed that the systems are isolated from each other. No extensive analysis has been conducted to determine whether RF signals from one system sharing antennas and coaxial cable can influence another. This paper investigates the assumption of isolation between the two wireless systems and provides recommendations for future needed work to identify specific vulnerabilities and potential mitigations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Implementation and Demonstration of P4 Software for Improving ICS Protocol Visibility and Control [Slides]

No prior enabling funded work applicable to this proposal. Programming Protocol-independent Packet Processors (P4) is an open source, domain-specific programming language for network switching devices. P4 complements traditional Software Defined Networking (SDN) which is primarily concerned with the management of packets (e.g. routing/dropping decisions) rather than how each packet is processed. The introduction of P4 provided new capabilities (e.g. firewall, load balancing, enhanced security) but has primarily been deployed in data centers. This effort investigates ways to expand P4 into other niches such as ICS networks.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Statistical Analysis of Fermilab’s Safety Data

In the past ten months, since the Safety and Security pauses of May 31$^{st}$ and June 29$^{th}$ of 2023, there has been an increase in the number of Total Recordable Counts to the point that there are already more incidents in ten months that at any given year in the past decade. The purpose of this study is to try to determine if this increase could be explained as a statistical fluctuation. We will show that it is very unlikely (essentially 4$\sigma$ unlikely) that the increase is a fluctuation, and therefore there must be a cause. The Safety and Security pauses of the past May and June, and many events thereafter, have been impactful events at Fermilab, so we should feel an obligation to assess their benefit, or detriment, to the safety of our people.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Integral Experiment Execution of Thermal or Epithermal eXperiments using Plutonium with Polyethylene and Iron, IER 519, TEX-Hanford (-Iron), CED-3b

This report documents the execution of experiments and measurements for IER 519, Thermal/Epithermal eXperiments (TEX) for Hanford applications, using plutonium Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) plates moderated by interstitial polyethylene and iron (Fe) absorber plates. Initial hand stack, mass, and dimensional measurements were performed in July 2025. The experiments were completed over three weeks from December 2025 to January 2026 at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) at the Nevada National Security Sites (NNSS). All photos and critical data were provided by NCERC and experimenters in LANL’s NEN-2.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Methods and systems for detection of man-in-the-middle attacks for SCADA communication networks and applications of same

A system for detecting MITM for SCADA communication networks includes secure substation-substation communication links for providing secure and reliable paths to exchange OT data between substations for OT data consistency check; a SIB in each substation for sampling CT and PT measurements to calculate voltage magnitude and phase angle thereof; a S&C server in each substation coupled to the SIB for receiving the voltage magnitude and phase angle from the SIB and obtaining a packet carrying active power flow in transmission lines between two substations and a time stamp; an IDS server placed in a SCADA center for collecting the packet of each substation sent by the S&C server; analyzing the received packet from every adjacent substation; inspecting the payload of the received packet; and triggering an intrusion alarm to a SCADA operator when the power flow is not the same as the payload of the packets.

McCann, Roy A.↗

Data-Driven Unit Commitment Refinement - a Scalable Approach for Complex Modern Power Grids

Integration of renewable generation, which is often intermittent and decentralized, substantially increases the stochasticity and complexity of power grid operations. Future power systems planning will require significant computational capability to evaluate balance between demand and supply under varying conditions, both temporally and spatially. The standard approach for generation unit commitment is to use mixed-integer linear programming to find the optimal generation schedule considering ramping and generator constraints. In the future grid this poses computational scalability challenges because generation and demand are not known with certainty due to stochasticity in weather and complexity of the grid. To address this challenge, we present a data-driven unit commitment approach that can efficiently include stochastic weather impacts and contingency considerations to improve unit commitment. Our approach uses graph-based data analytics techniques on solutions to the security constrained (and possibly stochastic) economic dispatch problem to identify potential improvements to a given unit commitment. Recent breakthroughs in fully-parallel stochastic economic dispatch software allow this approach to be scalably deployed. Simulations on synthetic South Carolina and Texas grids show this method can improve grid reliability with security constraints over a set of contingencies, while also meaningfully lowering total generation cost.

Holt, Timothy↗

Secure hierarchical processing using a secure ledger

Disclosed is a system and method for processing data using blockchain technology. The system includes a memory having programmable instructions stored thereon that, when executed by a processor, cause the system to: authenticate one or more sensors in anticipation of receiving component data; receive component data, upon successful authentication; store the component data locally or to a cloud-based server and/or calculate a root value for the component data; store or embed the root value with the stored component data; condense the component data and link the condensed component data to the stored component data via the root value. The system further includes instructions to log the condensed data, including the root value, to a ledger, and to identify a tag or transaction id corresponding to the logging event for subsequent retrieval of the condensed data using the tag or transaction id.

Zhao, Wenbing↗

Development of a portal monitor for UF6 cylinder verification

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors currently perform periodic inspections at uranium enrichment plants to verify UF6 cylinder enrichment declarations. Measurements are performed with handheld high-resolution sensors on a sampling of cylinders taken to be representative of the facility’s operations. As additional enrichment plans come online to support the expansion of nuclear power, reducing person-days of inspection will take on greater importance. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing a concept to automate the verification of enrichment plant cylinders to enable 100% product-cylinder verification and potentially, mass-balance calculations on the facility as a whole (by also measuring feed and tails cylinders). The Automated Cylinder Enrichment Verification System (ACEVS) would be located at key measurement points and will positively identify each cylinder, measure its mass and enrichment, store the data along with operator inputs in a secure database, and maintain continuity of knowledge on measured cylinders until IAEA inspector arrival. Given the potential for reduced inspector presence, the operational and manpower-reduction benefits of the portal concept are clear. However, it is necessary to assess whether the cylinder portal concept can meet, or potentially improve upon, today’s U-235 enrichment assay performance. PNNL’s ACEVS concept utilizes sensors that could be operated in an unattended mode: moderated He-3 neutron detectors and large NaI(Tl) scintillators for gamma-ray spectroscopy. The medium-resolution NaI(Tl) scintillators are a sacrifice in energy resolution but do provide high collection efficiency for signatures above 1 MeV. The He-3/NaI sensor combination allows the exploitation of additional, more-penetrating signatures than those currently utilized: Neutrons produced from F-19(μ,n) reactions (spawned primarily from U-234 alpha emission) and high-energy gamma rays (extending up to 10 MeV) induced by neutrons interacting in the steel cylinder. These signatures are indirect measures of U-235 that require a relatively stable U-234/U-235 ratio in the product material in order to be useful. The hypothesis of this work is that the U-234/U-235 ratio is sufficiently constant, for the specific facility where the automated system is installed, to rely on neutron and high-energy gamma-ray signatures for indirect measurement of U-235. Further, these highly penetrating signatures can be combined with a modified form of NaI-based 185-keV enrichment measurements to meet target uncertainties for the verification of product cylinders, with the additional benefits of full-volume assay of the cylinder and 100% product-cylinder verification (as opposed to today’s sampling-based approach). This paper focuses on the enrichment measurement aspects of the ACEVS concept: neutron and high-energy gamma-ray signatures, the radiation sensors designed to collect those signatures, and proof-of-principle cylinder measurements and analysis. Preliminary analysis indicates that an automated cylinder verification approach has the potential to meet target uncertainty values for 30B products cylinders (5%), assuming ore-based enrichment feed and a facility-specific calibration. Also described is the additional work needed to more definitively assess the concept’s viability, particularly through a better understanding of the U-234/U-235 ratio variability in modern enrichment plants.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: For Calendar Year 2018 (Revision 0)

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; and CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. The locations of the sites are shown in Figure ES-1. This report covers calender year 2018. The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0101 and are summarized in each CAU-specific section of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. Site inspections are conducted annually at CAUs 90, 91, and 112; semiannually at CAUs 92 and 110; and quarterly at CAU 111. Additional inspections are conducted at CAUs 92 and 111 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 inch in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units, including covers, fences, signs, gates, and locks. At CAUs 110 and 111, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted in addition to the visual inspections. At CAU 110 the site fence, gate, lock and use restriction signs are evaluated. At CAU 111, an ecological survey, direct radiation monitoring, air monitoring, radon flux monitoring, and groundwater monitoring are also conducted. This report will address all monitoring item notes above except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. Revision 6 of Permit NEV HW0101 was issued effective December 10, 2015, and remains in effect until December 10, 2020.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Documentation of the LLNL, TAFB and TSL Micro-Computed-Tomography Systems

This document details the microCT data collection systems in use at the Transportation Security Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Tyndall Air Force Base for homemade explosive characterization. X-ray source, detector, and motional control hardware are specified as well as specimen platforms, containers, and reference material types. Most of the details on the LLNL and Tyndall systems are derived from References 2 and 3. The steps that constitute the raw data processing and CT reconstruction are also recorded. Sources for further information on the processing, and technical subsystems, are given in the Section 3 References.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

A comprehensive guide to CAN IDS data and introduction of the ROAD dataset

Although ubiquitous in modern vehicles, Controller Area Networks (CANs) lack basic security properties and are easily exploitable. A rapidly growing field of CAN security research has emerged that seeks to detect intrusions or anomalies on CANs. Producing vehicular CAN data with a variety of intrusions is a difficult task for most researchers as it requires expensive assets and deep expertise. To illuminate this task, we introduce the first comprehensive guide to the existing open CAN intrusion detection system (IDS) datasets. We categorize attacks on CANs including fabrication (adding frames, e.g., flooding or targeting and ID), suspension (removing an ID’s frames), and masquerade attacks (spoofed frames sent in lieu of suspended ones). We provide a quality analysis of each dataset; an enumeration of each datasets’ attacks, benefits, and drawbacks; categorization as real vs. simulated CAN data and real vs. simulated attacks; whether the data is raw CAN data or signal-translated; number of vehicles/CANs; quantity in terms of time; and finally a suggested use case of each dataset. State-of-the-art public CAN IDS datasets are limited to real fabrication (simple message injection) attacks and simulated attacks often in synthetic data, lacking fidelity. In general, the physical effects of attacks on the vehicle are not verified in the available datasets. Only one dataset provides signal-translated data but is missing a corresponding “raw” binary version. This issue pigeon-holes CAN IDS research into testing on limited and often inappropriate data (usually with attacks that are too easily detectable to truly test the method). The scarcity of appropriate data has stymied comparability and reproducibility of results for researchers. As our primary contribution, we present the Real ORNL Automotive Dynamometer (ROAD) CAN IDS dataset, consisting of over 3.5 hours of one vehicle’s CAN data. ROAD contains ambient data recorded during a diverse set of activities, and attacks of increasing stealth with multiple variants and instances of real (i.e. non-simulated) fuzzing, fabrication, unique advanced attacks, and simulated masquerade attacks. To facilitate a benchmark for CAN IDS methods that require signal-translated inputs, we also provide the signal time series format for many of the CAN captures. Our contributions aim to facilitate appropriate benchmarking and needed comparability in the CAN IDS research field.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Defining a Metric Space of Host Logs and Operational Use Cases

Host logs, in particular, Windows Event Logs, are a valuable source of information often collected by security operation centers (SOCs). The semi-structured nature of host logs inhibits automated analytics, and while manual analysis is common, the sheer volume makes manual inspection of all logs impossible. Although many powerful algorithms for analyzing time-series and sequential data exist, utilization of such algorithms for most cyber security applications is either infeasible or requires tailored, research-intensive preparations. In particular, basic mathematic and algorithmic developments for providing a generalized, meaningful similarity metric on system logs is needed to bridge the gap between many existing sequential data mining methods and this currently available but under-utilized data source. In this paper, we provide a rigorous definition of a metric product space on Windows Event Logs, providing an embedding that allows for the application of established machine learning and time-series analysis methods. We then demonstrate the utility and flexibility of this embedding with multiple use-cases on real data: (1) comparing known infected to new host log streams for attack detection and forensics, (2) collapsing similar streams of logs into semantically-meaningful groups (by user, by role), thereby reducing the quantity of data but not the content, (3) clustering logs as well as short sequences of logs to identify and visualize user behaviors and background processes over time. Overall, we provide a metric space framework for general host logs and log sequences that respects semantic similarity and facilitates a wide variety of data science analytics to these logs without data-specific preparations for each.

Verma, Miki↗