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Hydraulic Conductivity of Geosynthetic Clay Liners to Low-Level Radioactive Waste Leachate

Hydraulic conductivity was evaluated for eight commercially available geosynthetic clay liners (GCLs) permeated with leachate characteristic of low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facilities operated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Two of the GCLs (CS and GS) contained conventional sodium bentonite (Na-B). The others contained a bentonite–polymer mixture (CPL, CPH, GPL1, GPL2, and GPH) or bentonite–polymer composite (BPC). All GCLs (except GPL2 and GPH) were permeated directly with two synthetic LLW leachates that are essentially identical, except one has no radionuclides (nonradioactive synthetic leachate, or NSL) and the other has radionuclides (radioactive synthetic leachate, or RSL). Hydraulic conductivities to RSL and NSL were identical. For the CS and GS GCLs, the hydraulic conductivity gradually increased by a factor of 5–25 because divalent cations in the leachate replaced native sodium cations bound to the bentonite. The CPL, GPL1, and GPL2 GCLs with low polymer loading (1.2–3.3%) had hydraulic conductivities similar to the conventional GCLs. In contrast, hydraulic conductivity of the CPH, GPH, and BPC GCLs with high polymer loading (≥5%) to RSL or NSL was comparable to, or lower than, the hydraulic conductivity to deionized water. Permeation with leachate reduced the swell index of the bentonite in all of the GCLs. A conceptual model featuring pore blocking by polymer hydrogel is proposed to explain why the hydraulic conductivity of bentonite–polymer GCLs to LLW leachates remains low even though the leachate inhibits bentonite swelling.

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Elaborating a First Version of a KIF For The Manche Surface Repository in France - 18060

The concept of a Key Information File developed in the framework of the RK and M international initiative has been tested against the case of the Manche surface repository. Work is still in progress. The aim is to issue a final version before end of year 2018, with the file for the decennial safety assessment update. The KIF will be part of the regulatory required Summary Memory File. Testing the KIF brought several lessons, on the elaboration process of such document, on the adaptation of the KIF concept to a surface repository, on the necessary evolution of the document over time. The Manche repository is the first repository operated by Andra, and the one at its most advanced stage. Therefore, it is de facto a pilot for similar issues encountered on other Andra's repositories. The difficulties encountered, the errors made and analyzed are the basis for improved provisions in other cases. It has been the case for the repository design, when the second surface repository was implemented in the Aube district. It is now the case for the cover design, for monitoring and for memory provisions. (authors)

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Stakeholder-Engaged Structured Decision Making for the Los Alamos Legacy Cleanup Mission - 20501

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) environmental legacy cleanup program requires decisions to be made for environmental remediation, decommissioning and disposal or management of radioactive waste. This legacy cleanup program was established to address groundwater contamination, material disposal areas (MDAs) that have been used to dispose of radioactive and other waste material, and 'aggregate areas' that might produce radioactive or other chemical waste as a result of remediation activities. The LANL site is regulated for environmental concerns under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). However, some parts of LANL, such as material disposal area G (MDA G), have disposed of radioactive waste under DOE Order 435.1, and are subject to other regulations. For example, decommissioning the remote-handled TRU material stored in 33 shafts at MDA G falls under EPA's 40 CFR 191. Collectively, the regulations are all aimed in the same direction of finding the best solution, either through constructs such as 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA), considering balancing factors as opposed to only cost and human health risk, and, under EPA regulations such as RCRA and NEPA, evaluating impact from all chemicals and both human health and ecological endpoints. Despite the basic goals and objectives of the regulations or their guidance, the main challenge is in their implementation. Arguably perhaps, but really in principle, all of these (and similar) regulations are asking for a decision analysis to be performed. Implementation challenges encountered have included lack of understanding of decision analysis in the industry, lack of effective stakeholder engagement in the decision analysis process, and lack of appreciation of the need to separate value judgments from science, the latter leading to developing conservative, or protective, science-based models. Conservative models lead to poor solutions, lack of effective stakeholder engagement leads to long drawn out protracted approaches to finding a solution (which also might never be found with this approach), and lack of understanding of decision analysis and Bayesian statistics causes poor models to be built, which creates unfortunate situations of 'garbage in, garbage out' becoming the basis for decision making. Stakeholder-engaged structured decision making (SDM) is an approach to solving problems that relies on the theory of decision science to involve stakeholders in the decision-making process. This approach incorporates stakeholder values using a scientifically rigorous methodology that separates value judgments from science in a way that helps avoid the pitfalls of biased, protective, or conservative modeling. This approach has its foundation in Keeney's 1992 treatise on value-focused thinking [1]. Keeney advocated a paradigm shift in decision making based on the idea that the standard way of thinking about decisions is backwards. The standard approach of focusing first on identifying alternatives rather than on articulating values results in a reactive approach with the emphasis on mechanics and fixed choices instead of the core values that have meaning to stakeholders. This paradigm shift effectively engages all stakeholders in the decision-making process while using a values focused thinking approach that can lead to the identification of decision opportunities and the creation of better alternatives. The intent is to be proactive and generate solutions that are related directly to values and objectives as identified by stakeholders. There are, perhaps, two overarching reasons why SDM can be used to benefit LANL's environmental legacy cleanup. Some of LANL's remaining waste management and environmental management problems are challenging and complex (for example, the Cr and RDX plumes, and MDAs) and while the traditional approach has, arguably, worked well for relatively simple risk-based problems, it cannot, or should not, be applied to more complex problems if the most effective and efficient solutions are desired. The second reason is cost. This has perhaps become more critical since publication of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that DoE's environmental liability is considered a high-risk concern for the nation [2]. The focus of SDM is on structuring solutions to decision risk problems by first addressing stakeholder and decision maker values and subsequently developing decision objectives and ways to measure those objectives, preference weighting across objectives, identifying decision alternatives that best achieve those values, and characterizing uncertainty in predictions of the measures. Because a complete decision model is created using SDM, it can be evaluated to find the main elements of the model that drive, or predict, the best solution. This approach creates complete decision models that are transparent, traceable, reproducible and technically defensible. The science behind SDM, or decision analysis, is well founded, yet it is not unusual to see ad hoc approaches to decision making implemented under various environmental regulations that are pertinent to the LANL site, including NEPA, RCRA and DOE Order 435.1. Such ad hoc approaches are often not transparent or traceable, and lack reproducibility and technical defensibility. The LANL legacy cleanup program has embarked on using SDM to address the complex problems that remain. Stakeholder meetings have been held, and a prototype version of the stakeholder value system has been developed. Further meetings are expected in the future to address specific project needs. This is a long-term endeavor considering the complex environmental problems faced by DOE EM in Los Alamos (EM-LA), and careful planning, consideration of stakeholder value systems, and engagement with stakeholders throughout the SDM process is expected to lead to a successful endpoint. (authors)

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User Guide for GoldSim Model to Calculate PA/CA Doses and Limits

A model to calculate doses for solid waste disposal at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and corresponding disposal limits has been developed using the GoldSim commercial software. The model implements the dose calculations documented in SRNL-STI-2015-00056, Rev. 0 “Dose Calculation Methodology and Data for Solid Waste Performance Assessment (PA) and Composite Analysis (CA) at the Savannah River Site”.

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Disposal of Large Reactor Components - Rulemaking to Address Funding of Disposal Costs

The paper will explore the current challenges of financing the disposal costs for disposing of large reactor components such as reactor pressure vessel heads and steam generators and the resulting delays in disposal caused by the current regulatory requirements. The paper also will discuss a recent rulemaking petition submitted by EnergySolutions to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission designed to improve the regulatory process by providing a process to permit funds from decommissioning trust funds to be used to fund disposal of large reactor components. If granted, the disposal of these large components could be expedited where reactor licensees have sufficient decommissioning trust funds available. Perspectives on the rulemaking will be addressed. In conclusion: NRC should provide serious consideration to this Petition. There is support in the industry for granting this Petition. As of the date this paper was submitted, there have been no negative comments. Granting this Petition is prudent and consistent with the underlying purpose of 10 C.F.R. 50.82(a)(8) and 10 CFR 20.1406. It provides flexibility without any adverse impact on the public health and safety. It should facilitate the decommissioning process by providing a regulatory framework to allow removing MRCs from sites, resulting in (1) the source term at the site being reduced, (2) the site workers being exposed to less radiation, (3) eliminating an unnecessary regulatory burden as the costs associated with maintaining the MRCs on-site and providing protection to the workers as a result of those components can be avoided, (4) the overall cost to decommission the site being reduced, and (5) more funds being made available to decommission the reactor at the time the reactor ceases operation. Finally, the framework would provide the demonstration by a site-specific decommissioning cost estimate and the associated funding program that adequate funds are available to dispose of these components as well as complete site decommissioning for unrestricted release consistent with the NRC requirements. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Conceptual Evaluation for the Installation of Treatment Capability for Mixed Low Level Waste at the Nevada National Security Site

National Security Technologies, LLC, initiated an evaluation of treatment technologies that they would manage and operate as part of the mixed low-level waste (MLLW) disposal facilities at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The NNSS Disposal Facility has been receiving radioactive waste from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex since the 1960s, and since 2005 the NNSS Disposal Facility has been receiving radioactive and MLLW for disposal only. In accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), all mixed waste must meet land disposal restrictions (LDRs) prior to disposal. Compliance with LDRs is attained through treatment of the waste to mitigate the characteristics of the listed waste hazard. Presently, most generators utilize commercial capacity for waste treatment prior to shipment to the NNSS Disposal Facility. The objectives of this evaluation are to provide a conceptual study of waste treatment needs (i.e., demand), identify potential waste treatment technologies to meet demand, and analyze implementation considerations for initiating MLLW treatment capacity at the NNSS Disposal Facility. A review of DOE complex waste generation forecast data indicates that current and future Departmental demand for mixed waste treatment capacity will remain steady and strong. Analysis and screening of over 30 treatment technologies narrowed the field of treatment technologies to four: • Macroencapsulation • Stabilization/microencapsulation • Sort and segregation • Bench-scale mercury amalgamation The analysis of treatment technologies also considered existing permits, current the NNSS Disposal Facility infrastructure such as utilities and procedures, and past experiences such as green-light and red-light lessons learned. A schedule duration estimate has been developed for permitting, design, and construction of onsite treatment capability at the NNSS Disposal Facility. Treatment capability can be ready in 20 months.

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Communicating with future generations - Major obstacles to overcome - 15009

The Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) is responsible for managing activities related to the disposal of transuranic (TRU) and TRU-mixed waste in the geologic repository at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), 2150 feet (655 meters) below the land surface, at the WIPP, near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 191.14(c) [1] and Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 194.43 [2] require a Passive Institutional Controls program be developed for the WIPP. The primary purpose of the Passive Institutional Controls program is to indicate the location of the repository and the risk it presents to an intruder, thus reducing the likelihood of inadvertent human intrusion into the repository. A plan was put into place during the 1990's with records management and storage, awareness triggers, permanent marker design concepts, including languages, graphics and engineered drawings, plus testing schedules for materials and structures. This work included the thoughts of expert panels and individuals. The plan held up under peer review and met the regulatory requirements. But will it really work? Will future generations a thousand years, two thousand years, or seven thousand years from now really be able to decipher and understand the message? This is the challenge international constructors, operators, and regulators of repositories for the disposal of any hazardous materials must face. It is important to explore the history of language, both written words and graphics; and what we can learn from the past to assist us in communicating with the future. (authors)

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Current Situation for Management of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources in Japan - 13025

As for the Sealed Radioactive Source currently used in Japan, many of them are imported from overseas. The U.S., Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Czech Republic are the main exporting States. Many of disused sealed radioactive sources are being returned to exporting States. The sealed radioactive sources which cannot be returned to exporting States are appropriately kept in the domestic storage facility. So, there are not main problem on the long term management of disused sealed radioactive sources in Japan. However, there are some difficulties on repatriate. One is reservation of a means of transport. The sea mail which conveys radioactive sources owing to reduction of movement of international cargo is decreasing in number. And there is a denial of shipment. Other one is that the manufacturer has already resigned from the work and cannot return disused sealed radioactive sources, or a manufacturer cannot specify and disused sources cannot be returned. The disused sealed radioactive source which cannot be repatriated is a little in term of radioactivity. As for the establishment of national measure of final disposal facility for disused sealed radioactive sources, in Japan, it is not yet installed with difficulty. Since there are many countries for which installation of a final disposal facility for disused sealed radioactive sources is difficult, the source manufacture country should respond positively to return the source which was manufactured and sold in the past. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Waste Shielded Casks Transfer by Funicular from the Surface to Disposal Level in Cigeo - 20007

Andra is completing the detailed engineering phase of Cigeo - the French HLW and ILW-LL DGR. A funicular system is dedicated to the transfer of the waste disposal containers from the surface to the underground infrastructures down the nuclear access ramp. This paper explains the rationale having led to the choice of a funicular and presents the advantages of this system. Main technical components and mechanical performance of the funicular system are then detailed. Lastly, the ongoing two stages qualification testing program managed by Andra (in order to reach a level 6 on the international Technology Readiness Level scale) is discussed. (authors)

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Approach to Quality Assurance for Complex Environmental Modeling - 20407

A strong Quality Assurance (QA) program for complex environmental modeling is essential for regulatory and public acceptance and trust, but it does not have to be onerous. Neptune and Company, Inc. (Neptune) has developed a strong QA program that improves transparency, traceability, reproducibility, and therefore, defensibility and trust. Neptune's QA program has evolved over the past 27 years, transitioning from an ad hoc QA program, to a program that is currently Nuclear Quality Assurance-1 (NQA-1) compliant, and will soon be NQA-1/DOE approved for DOE EM modeling work. In addition, Neptune is a qualified laboratory assessor and qualified auditor for reference materials, a proficiency testing provider, and fully complies with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) QA program. Neptune's President and CEO, Kelly Black, was recently named the Chairperson of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Technical Committee 69, Application of Statistical Methods. A strong QA program has been developed for Neptune's radiological performance assessment (PA) program. Although pieces of their QA program are currently in development, their current program includes document control using Subversion, issue tracking and work flow tracking using JIRA, and transparency and traceability via a system of 'calc sheets' for documentation of all data analysis and modeling combined with 'check print' documentation of QA checking, and rigorous model testing and configuration control. All work is reviewed by an independent subject matter expert who is not associated with the collection and assembly of information, for an internal peer review. The program is enforced with a handful of Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs), Work Instructions, QA Project Plans (QAPPs), and Quality Management Plans (QMPs) that are updated frequently, with required annual training and acknowledgment. In addition, effective communication of modeling approaches and results to clients and stakeholders are integral to their QA program. Many of their models are built using the GoldSim modeling platform, for which their models are well-known for their level of transparency, documentation, and QA traceability. This level of QA is also applied to their process-level models. Neptune has taken some lessons learned from the extremely rigorous QA program required for the Yucca Mountain Project (YMP), and imposed the YMP requirements of complete traceability, transparency, and reproducibility, but avoided the inflexibility of a QA program that likely contributed to the suspect e-mails in 2005 that resulted in loss of trust in the YMP, and in nuclear waste disposal (and nuclear power) in general. There are far too many examples of loss of public trust due to poor QA that could have been easily avoided with a simple and straight-forward QA program combined with stakeholder engagement. The purpose of this paper is to share features of Neptune's Radiological Performance Assessment program QA program, and some of their QA related lessons learned over the past 27 years of QA for complex environmental modeling. (authors)

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Management of disused plutonium sealed sources

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) Offsite Source Recovery Project (OSRP) has been recovering excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources since 1999, including more than 2,400 Plutonium (Pu)-238 sealed sources and 653 Pu-239-bearing sources that represent more than 10% of the total sources recovered by GTRI/OSRP to date. These sources have been recovered from hundreds of sites within the United States (US) and around the world. OSRP grew out of early efforts at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to recover and disposition excess Plutonium-239 (Pu-239) sealed sources that were distributed in the 1960s and 1970s under the Atoms for Peace Program, a loan-lease program that serviced 31 countries, as well as domestic users. In the conduct of these recovery operations, GTRI/OSRP has been required to solve problems related to knowledge-of-inventory, packaging and transportation of fissile and heat-source materials, transfer of ownership, storage of special nuclear material (SNM) both at US Department of Energy (DOE) facilities and commercially, and disposal. Unique issues associated with repatriation from foreign countries, including end user agreements required by some European countries and denials of shipment, will also be discussed.

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Reconstruction of Irradiation History of Am-241/Be Startup Sources for Disposal at WIPP - 18644

The National Nuclear Security Administration, Global Material Security (GMS)/ Off-site Source Recovery Program (OSRP) requires an approved final disposition pathway for sealed neutron startup sources with undocumented or questionable irradiation histories. To obtain approval for WIPP disposal, a reliable method is required to determine yields of transmutation, as well as fission and activation products contained within the source at the time of disposal. This paper presents a method to reconstruct the irradiation history of americium beryllium (Am/Be) reactor startup sources using gamma spectroscopy, ORIGEN modeling and the initial composition of the source. Using this method, measured isotopes in the Am/Be startup sources are related to the WIPP disposal requirements. Maximum allowable measurement uncertainties have been quantified and related to uncertainties in the WIPP required isotopes. Characterization calculations and experimental measurements of irradiated Am/Be sources are discussed. (authors)

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The new Wallula CO{sub 2} project may revive the old Columbia River Basalt (western USA) nuclear-waste repository project

A novel CO{sub 2} sequestration project at Wallula, Washington, USA, makes ample use of the geoscientific data collection of the old nuclear waste repository project at the Hanford Site nearby. Both projects target the Columbia River Basalt (CRB). The new publicity for the old project comes at a time when the approach to high-level nuclear waste disposal has undergone fundamental changes. The emphasis now is on a technical barrier that is chemically compatible with the host rock. In the ideal case, the waste container is in thermodynamic equilibrium with the host-rock groundwater regime. The CRB groundwater has what it takes to represent the ideal case.

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Status of HLW disposal in the USA and rational, progressive, paths forward based upon lessons learned in the USA and abroad since 1973 - 15103

The development of the USA's only candidate (since 1987) HLW-repository at the Yucca Mountain (YM) site, Nevada, was halted by the Obama administration in 2009. Four years later, the Obama administration proposed a new strategy for the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle that would open a consent-based HLW repository 'by 2048'. At the end of 2014, both the YM HLW repository and the new HLW-disposition (storage and disposal) strategy remain on hold due to lack of enabling legislation. With this as background, and based upon our active involvement in, monitoring of, and reporting on HLW management programs in the USA and abroad since 1973, we submit that: 1. Politics, political will, and legal actions and outcomes will continue to govern progress. 2. Public acceptance and sustained support (PASS) may influence politics and political will. 3. PASS is time-dependent and governed by: a. Ideologies; b. Perceived benefits and risks; c. Level and equity of radiation protection provided by applicable regulations; d. Perceived robustness/safety of the proposed disposition concept; and e. Perceived credibility and competency vested in the involved organizations and their respective leaders (= TRUST). We therefore recommend that the USA concurrently pursues at least two, 'centralized' HLW-storage and -disposal solutions based upon best-available relevant knowledge and majority-PASS at facility-host locations. Furthermore, safe(r) and more secure disposal of defense/government-generated HLW could probably commence at least 15 years earlier than 'by 2048' in/at: 1. The YM repository/site. 2. The WIPP repository/site. 3. 'Local' deep boreholes. (authors)

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Uncertainties In Performance Assessments For The Yucca Mountain Site And The Edge-of-Compliance

Numerical performance assessments of deep geologic disposal systems of long-lived radioactive wastes serve as the primary tool for quantitatively assessing projected performance and for making regulatory compliance decisions, both in the U.S. and disposal programs abroad. However there is a significant body of opinion, expressed in the international literature, that the confidence that can be placed on such assessments decreases significantly as the analysis time frames increase into the many hundreds of thousands of years. With the inclusion of highly corrosion resistant metals in the planned waste package designs for the Yucca Mountain (YM) system commercial spent fuel and defense-generated high-level radioactive waste disposal, published projections for the site show doses to the receptor at times extending into the many hundreds of thousands of years. The question of relative confidence in dose projections becomes more important at very long time frames, particularly when the time frame for significant doses increases dramatically reflecting the effects of using highly corrosion resistant materials. To examine uncertainties in performance assessments of the YM disposal system over very long time frames, a site model developed by the U.S. Department of Energy to assess sensitivities in peak dose performance was modified and used to examine the propagation of uncertainties for a hypothetical disposal system. These analyses start with a hypothetical disposal system at the 'edge-of-compliance' at 10,000 years, reflecting the generic repository standard in 40 CFR Part 191. The hypothetical system was poised to give a mean dose of 0.15 milli-sievert/year (15 mrem/yr.) at 10,000 years, by allowing a fixed number of waste packages to 'fail' within the first 5,000 years after closure. By maintaining the number failed waste packages constant over time, the spread in dose estimates over the time to peak dose was calculated for this system perched at the 'edge-of-compliance' at 10,000 years. This hypothetical construct removes waste package performance from the analyses and allows the site model to explore the effects of uncertainties in the natural barrier and site conditions on the dose projections out to the time of peak dose. The sensitivities of these projections to various 'driver' parameters were examined, including infiltration rates, solubility constraints, water chemistry and roof collapse assumptions. Overall, the initial construct showed a one and one-half order of magnitude spread between the 5. and 95. percentiles at 10,000 years, the initial state for the analyses. This spread increased to approximately three and one-half orders of magnitude at peak dose, reflecting the effects of transport and retardation mechanisms on the fixed source term. The model eliminated portions of the transport path from the repository where relatively little retardation would be expected. Travel times were therefore significantly reduced thereby eliminating radioactive decay as an important mechanism in reducing projected doses. Solubility controls appear to be a major source of uncertainties in the dose projections for the model used. These results support the general international consensus that confidence in dose projections over very long time frames does decrease, and illustrates that this conclusion also applies to assessments of the YM projected performance as well. (authors)

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Modeling glass degradation and release of radionuclides from vitrified waste for performance assessment simulations

The release of radionuclides initially encapsulated in a slowly degrading solid waste form and contained in an eventually corroding canister defines the source term for numerical simulations for the assessment of a geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste. While the details of waste degradation, canister corrosion, and dissolution and mobilization of the radionuclides in pore water include complex chemical reaction and transport processes that are coupled to the thermal, hydrological, microbiological, and mechanical conditions in the repository, the source-term model suitable for use in a numerical performance assessment model should be a defensible abstraction of these mechanisms. We developed a radiological source-term model and implemented it into a non-isothermal flow and transport simulator. While the proposed source-term model is applicable to various waste forms, canister systems, and disposal concepts, we specifically considered radionuclide releases from vitrified high-level waste placed in a cylindrical canister disposed in a deep vertical borehole repository. In this model, waste degradation is a function of temperature, and it can be adjusted to evaluate the influence of and propagate uncertainties in pH, passivation reactions, and chemical conditions as well as geometrical factors. The time-dependent, congruent release of safety-relevant radionuclides present in the decaying inventory is then calculated. Finally, the radionuclides are mobilized by diffusive and advective transport according to the thermo-hydraulic conditions prevailing in the near field of the repository, from where they migrate through the geosphere to the accessible environment. We examine the influence of the source-term model’s parameters on performance assessment calculations through sensitivity and uncertainty propagation analyses, identifying influential factors and confirming the upper bound of their impact. These considerations align with the overarching goal of repository design, which is to demonstrate that engineered and natural barriers can collectively delay radionuclide migration for timescales far exceeding human planning, thereby providing multiple, redundant barriers against environmental contamination.

iTOUGH2↗

Analysis of Saltstone Cores Taken from Saltstone Disposal Unit Cell 2A - 17350

At the Savannah River Site, low-level waste is immobilized in cementitious waste form known as saltstone. The saltstone Performance Assessment models the performance of the waste form and other aspects of the Saltstone Disposal Facility over ten thousand years after closure to better understand the transport history of radionuclides and other hazardous constituents in low-level waste. As part of ongoing Performance Assessment Maintenance, Savannah River Remediation (SRR), with Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), designed a sampling and analyses plan to correlate the properties of field-emplaced samples and samples processed and cured in the laboratory. The primary objectives of the Sampling and Analyses Plan are; (1) to demonstrate a correlation between the measured properties of laboratory-prepared, simulant samples (termed Sample Set 3), and the field-emplaced saltstone samples (termed Sample Set 9), and (2) to validate property values assumed for the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF) Performance Assessment modeling. The analysis and property data for Sample Set 9 (i.e. core samples extracted from Saltstone Disposal Unit Cell 2A (SDU2A)) are documented, and where applicable, the results are compared to the results for Sample Set 3. SRNL received, stored and analyzed the samples cored from SDU2A. This paper discusses the results of the SRNL analysis of the SDU2A samples as well as the simulant saltstone samples. (authors)

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Robust disposal concept, uniform regulations, and trust in the messenger; three fundamental building blocks for consent-based HLW-disposal solutions in the USA - 15104

Pending enabling legislation, the USA's HLW-disposal program had been held in political abeyance since 2009 at the crossroads to one or both of the Yucca Mountain candidate (since 1987) HLW-repository in Nevada and/or the consent-based siting of the new HLW-disposal and centralized HLW-storage facilities proposed in 2012; a road not previously travelled. The consent-based siting approach would require the following gap between the reality (A) and the requirement (B) for public trust, acceptance and sustained support (PASS) to be bridged: A. Less than 1% of the general public in any given country fully comprehends the scientific-underpinnings and the projected health risks imposed by a HLW repository. B. More than 50% of the general public in a given geographical area would have to accept to host it from start to end. The following PASS-building blocks, successfully used at the WIPP-site in New Mexico and abroad to get from A to B during the past 30+ years, are thus highly recommended: 1. Defining the consent footprint upon host-county/state boundaries and/or radiation/health-risks and/or to identify/designate the directly affected parties (DAPs). 2. Using databases and lessons-learned by other repository programs to advantage. 3. Presenting the information in terms and/or by examples more readily understood by laypeople, because both their acceptance and opposition/rejection are influenced by: a. The type, number, problems, and status of 'similar' disposal concepts; and b. The level of i. Radiation protection provided by applicable regulations; ii. Involvement and decision-making authority vested in the DAPs; and iii. Their trust in the 'spokesperson/messenger. (authors)

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