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Proliferation resistance assessments during the design phase of a recycling facility as a means of reducing proliferation risks

The sustainability criterion for Gen IV nuclear energy systems inherently presumes the availability of efficient fuel recycling capabilities. One area for research on advanced fuel recycling concerns safeguards aspects of this type of facilities. Since a recycling facility may be considered as sensitive from a non-proliferation perspective, it is important to address these issues early in the design process, according to the principle of Safeguards By Design. Presented in this paper is a mode of procedure, where assessments of the proliferation resistance (PR) of a recycling facility for fast reactor fuel have been performed so as to identify the weakest barriers to proliferation of nuclear material. Two supplementing established methodologies have been applied; TOPS (Technological Opportunities to increase Proliferation resistance of nuclear power Systems) and PR-PP (Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection evaluation methodology). The chosen fuel recycling facility belongs to a small Gen IV lead-cooled fast reactor system that is under study in Sweden. A schematic design of the recycling facility, where actinides are separated using solvent extraction, has been examined. The PR assessment methodologies make it possible to pinpoint areas in which the facility can be improved in order to reduce the risk of diversion. The initial facility design may then be slightly modified and/or safeguards measures may be introduced to reduce the total identified proliferation risk. After each modification of design and/or safeguards implementation, a new PR assessment of the revised system can then be carried out. This way, each modification can be evaluated and new ways to further enhance the proliferation resistance can be identified. This type of iterative procedure may support Safeguards By Design in the planning of new recycling plants and other nuclear facilities. (authors)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Use of natural resource damages settlement funds for watershed protection at the Fernald Preserve, Harrison, Ohio - 15309

The Fernald, Ohio, Site, also called the Fernald Preserve is a former uranium processing plant that underwent extensive remediation pursuant to CERCLA. The Fernald site is managed by the US DOE Office of Legacy Management. US DOE and the Ohio EPA settled a long-standing CERCLA natural resource damage claim against the site in November 2008. As part of the settlement, US DOE paid $13.75 million to compensate for natural resource injury. These settlement funds were appointed for restoration, replacement, or acquisition of equivalent natural resources at or near the Fernald Preserve. Following finalization of a Funds Utilization Plan in February 2010, the Fernald Natural Resource Trustees (composed of US DOE, Ohio EPA, and the US Department of the Interior and known collectively as the Trustees) used a portion of the settlement funds to initiate the Paddys Run Conservation Project. This effort is a means to secure development rights and conservation easements within the Paddys Run watershed. Paddys Run is a third-order stream located on the western side of the Fernald Preserve. The Trustees partnered with Three Valley Conservation Trust to obtain assistance with land acquisition and conservation easement management. Since Fall 2012, more than 1,093 hectares (2,700 acres) have been permanently protected via easement or purchase. The Trustees are also partnering with MetroParks of Butler County, Ohio, to establish a nature preserve on acquired land. The Salamander Run Preserve is situated on 51 hectares (125 acres) of forest and former agricultural land approximately 11 kilometers (7 miles) north of the Fernald site. The land was purchased by Three Valley Conservation Trust and is undergoing ecological restoration using settlement funds. Upon completion, the property will be donated to MetroParks of Butler County, Ohio.(authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Closing nuclear fuel cycle with fast reactors: problems and prospects

The closed nuclear fuel cycle (CNFC) with fast reactors (FR) is the most promising way of nuclear energetics development because it prevents spent nuclear fuel (SNF) accumulation and minimizes radwaste volume due to minor actinides (MA) transmutation. CNFC with FR requires the elaboration of safety, environmentally acceptable and economically effective methods of treatment of SNF with high burn-up and low cooling time. The up-to-date industrially implemented SNF reprocessing technologies based on hydrometallurgical methods are not suitable for the reprocessing of SNF with high burn-up and low cooling time. The alternative dry methods (such as electrorefining in molten salts or fluoride technologies) applicable for such SNF reprocessing have not found implementation at industrial scale. So the cost of SNF reprocessing by means of dry technologies can hardly be estimated. Another problem of dry technologies is the recovery of fissionable materials pure enough for dense fuel fabrication. A combination of technical solutions performed with hydrometallurgical and dry technologies (pyro-technology) is proposed and it appears to be a promising way for the elaboration of economically, ecologically and socially accepted technology of FR SNF management. This paper deals with discussion of main principle of dry and aqueous operations combination that probably would provide safety and economic efficiency of the FR SNF reprocessing. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards:Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working Group. The working group participants were tasked with providing recommendations for facility operators and designers, while promoting the IAEA's objectives of: (1) avoiding costly and time-consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear facilities and (2) providing for more effective and efficient implementation of international safeguards.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Single phase melt processed powellite (Ba,Ca)MoO4 for the immobilization of Mo-rich nuclear waste

Cs is one of the more problematic fission product radionuclides to immobilize due to its high volatility at elevated temperatures, ability to form water soluble compounds, and its mobility in many host materials. The hollandite structure is a promising crystalline host for Cs immobilization and has been traditionally fabricated by solid state sintering methods. This study presents the structure and performance of Ba{sub 1.0}Cs{sub 0.3}A{sub 2.3}Ti{sub 5.7}O{sub 16}; A = Cr, Fe, Al hollandite fabricated by melt processing. Melt processing is considered advantageous given that melters are currently in use for High Level Waste (HLW) vitrification in several countries. This work details the impact of Cr additions that were demonstrated to i) promote the formation of a Cs containing hollandite phase and ii) maintain the stability of the hollandite phase in reducing conditions anticipated for multiphase waste form processing.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Thermal-mechanical modeling of deep borehole disposal of high-level radioactive waste.

Disposal of high-level radioactive waste, including spent nuclear fuel, in deep (3 to 5 km) boreholes is a potential option for safely isolating these wastes from the surface and near-surface environment. Existing drilling technology permits reliable and cost-effective construction of such deep boreholes. Conditions favorable for deep borehole disposal in crystalline basement rocks, including low permeability, high salinity, and geochemically reducing conditions, exist at depth in many locations, particularly in geologically stable continental regions. Isolation of waste depends, in part, on the effectiveness of borehole seals and potential alteration of permeability in the disturbed host rock surrounding the borehole. Coupled thermal-mechanical-hydrologic processes induced by heat from the radioactive waste may impact the disturbed zone near the borehole and borehole wall stability. Numerical simulations of the coupled thermal-mechanical response in the host rock surrounding the borehole were conducted with three software codes or combinations of software codes. Software codes used in the simulations were FEHM, JAS3D, Aria, and Adagio. Simulations were conducted for disposal of spent nuclear fuel assemblies and for the higher heat output of vitrified waste from the reprocessing of fuel. Simulations were also conducted for both isotropic and anisotropic ambient horizontal stress in the host rock. Physical, thermal, and mechanical properties representative of granite host rock at a depth of 4 km were used in the models. Simulation results indicate peak temperature increases at the borehole wall of about 30 C and 180 C for disposal of fuel assemblies and vitrified waste, respectively. Peak temperatures near the borehole occur within about 10 years and decline rapidly within a few hundred years and with distance. The host rock near the borehole is placed under additional compression. Peak mechanical stress is increased by about 15 MPa (above the assumed ambient isotropic stress of 100 MPa) at the borehole wall for the disposal of fuel assemblies and by about 90 MPa for vitrified waste. Simulated peak volumetric strain at the borehole wall is about 420 and 2600 microstrain for the disposal of fuel assemblies and vitrified waste, respectively. Stress and volumetric strain decline rapidly with distance from the borehole and with time. Simulated peak stress at and parallel to the borehole wall for the disposal of vitrified waste with anisotropic ambient horizontal stress is about 440 MPa, which likely exceeds the compressive strength of granite if unconfined by fluid pressure within the borehole. The relatively small simulated displacements and volumetric strain near the borehole suggest that software codes using a nondeforming grid provide an adequate approximation of mechanical deformation in the coupled thermal-mechanical model. Additional modeling is planned to incorporate the effects of hydrologic processes coupled to thermal transport and mechanical deformation in the host rock near the heated borehole.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

An assessment of the attractiveness of material associated with thorium/uranium and uranium closed fuel cycles from a safeguards perspective

This paper reports the continued evaluation of the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with various proposed nuclear fuel cycles. Specifically, this paper examines two closed fuel cycles. The first fuel cycle examined is a thorium fuel cycle in which a pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) is fueled with mixtures of plutonium/thorium and {sup 233}U/thorium. The used fuel is then reprocessed using the THOREX process and the actinides are recycled. The second fuel cycle examined consists of conventional light water reactors (LWR) whose fuel is reprocessed for actinides that are then fed to and recycled until consumed in fast-spectrum reactors: fast reactors and accelerator driven systems (ADS). As reprocessing of LWR fuel has already been examined, this paper will focus on the reprocessing of the scheme's fast-spectrum reactors' fuel. This study will indicate what is required to render these materials as having low utility for use in nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the results of this paper suggest that all reprocessing products evaluated so far need to be rigorously safeguarded and provided high levels of physical protection. These studies were performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE). The methodology and key findings will be presented.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Human Factors and Nuclear Criticality Safety Accidents [Slides]

The agenda for the presentation is as follows: Human Factors; Accident Review (Tokai Mura, Siberian Chemical Combine); Procedures; Accident Review (Los Alamos Waste Recovery); Environmental Distractions; Accident Review (Idaho Fuel Reprocessing); and, Equipment Reliability.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The TRANSCEND Consortium - In-situ Identification of Surface Corrosion Products on Spent Nuclear Fuels - 20276

The management of spent nuclear fuel is a major ongoing concern for the UK owing to the cessation of reprocessing operations at Sellafield and the large, complex inventory arising from Magnox, AGR, PWR and prototype reactors. Retrieval and relocation operations for legacy fuels are imminent and therefore, any models that enhance our understanding of fuel evolution will help mitigate the risks associated with fuel storage and disposal. The TRANSCEND Consortium on nuclear waste management comprises four work packages, within this current paper we provide a summary overview of progress to date and illustrative results from Theme 3: Spent Nuclear Fuels. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Know-how and experience of the decommissioning of the Eurochemic reprocessing plant

Belgoprocess started the industrial decommissioning of the main process building of the former Eurochemic reprocessing plant in 1987. In 2008 the eastern part was torn down and in 2010 the central part of the building was removed. The demolition of the third and last part is planned in 2014. At that point the area will be restored to brown field conditions. During the 25 years of decommissioning the Eurochemic installations a lot of effort has been invested in improving the efficiency. The Belgian decommissioning policy is based on maximizing effort for decontamination with the goal of unconditional release and minimization of nuclear waste. As a result a number of installations have been implemented that reduce the processing costs, increase the output of decontamination and increase the speed of release measurements. - The abrasive blasting installation is used to remove a thin layer from metal components and concrete objects. - The concrete crushing and sampling installation is used as the final measurement before unconditional release of concrete debris. - The concrete spec installation is used to separate the contaminated part from the non contaminated part of concrete debris. As the end of the decommissioning project is approaching the time is right to look back and evaluate the course of the project. Looking back what were the key decisions during the project, what were important milestones and what could or should have been done differently knowing what we know now. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Advanced Process Monitoring Techniques for Safeguarding Reprocessing Facilities

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material are not diverted from these facilities. For large throughput nuclear facilities, it is difficult to satisfy the IAEA safeguards accountancy goal for detection of abrupt diversion. Currently, methods to verify material control and accountancy (MC&A) at these facilities require time-consuming and resource-intensive destructive assay (DA). Leveraging new on-line non destructive assay (NDA) process monitoring techniques in conjunction with the traditional and highly precise DA methods may provide an additional measure to nuclear material accountancy which would potentially result in a more timely, cost-effective and resource efficient means for safeguards verification at such facilities. By monitoring process control measurements (e.g. flowrates, temperatures, or concentrations of reagents, products or wastes), abnormal plant operations can be detected. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing on-line NDA process monitoring technologies, including both the Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor and a spectroscopy-based monitoring system, to potentially reduce the time and resource burden associated with current techniques. The MIP Monitor uses gamma spectroscopy and multivariate analysis to identify off-normal conditions in process streams. The spectroscopic monitor continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major cold flowsheet chemicals using UV-Vis, Near IR and Raman spectroscopy. This paper will provide an overview of our methods and report our on-going efforts to develop and demonstrate the technologies.

process monitoring↗

IER 517: Molybdenum Critical Experiment Design [Slides]

In nuclear fuels, U-Mo metallic fuels are used in new space reactor designs and new research reactor fuels. MITR, MURR, and NBSR reactors plan on converting from different HEU fuels to a U-Mo HALEU fuel. In spend nuclear fuel, 95 Mo is one of the 15 main absorbing fission products in irradiated LWR fuel. This makes it important for criticality safety studies in transportation and reprocessing. In structural materials. Molybdenum is found commonly in alloys that make up the structural materials of nuclear reactors such as type 316 SS. Molybdenum helps to improve high temperature performance and corrosion resistance.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Unlocking the Vault - Accelerated Delivery Through the Application of Innovation and Collaboration - 19011

The Pile Fuel Cladding Silo (PFCS) at Sellafield was built in 1949/50 to receive and store fuel cladding from reprocessing of Windscale Pile fuel; it has been used to store this material and other waste from the UK nuclear programme ever since. The Silo is unsuitable for indefinite storage; this along with uncertainty in the make-up and condition of the inventory combine to rank the facility alongside the most hazardous in Western Europe. Sellafield Ltd, began working with its supply chain partners Bechtel Cavendish Nuclear Solutions (BCNS - a joint venture between Bechtel Inc and Cavendish Nuclear Ltd) in 2012, to execute a suite of projects to create an access route to the waste and a capability to retrieve waste from the silo for the first time ever. However, the challenge of providing this capability, while maintaining ongoing safe storage of the waste, and underpinning future performance of both the silo and the waste packages for many hundreds of years, proved to be too much for traditional Sellafield Ltd delivery models. With both cost and schedule forecasts doubling from initial estimates, a new approach was clearly required. The team recognised that success would require all of the experience and expertise of each organisation working together to a common goal. Therefore, significant effort was expended to build a collaborative team environment into which an innovative approach to both the engineering of what was provided and the delivery methods for doing it could be launched. Focussing on collaborative culture in which innovation and fit for purpose thinking were encouraged has completely rebuilt stakeholder confidence. The project is now almost complete; 17 months ahead of schedule and British Pounds 100 m less than the approved cost. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

With the end of the Cold War, in a dramatically changed security environment, the advances in nonnuclear strategic capabilities along with reduced numbers and roles for nuclear forces has altered the calculus of deterrence and defense, at least for the United States. For many, this opened up a realistic possibility of a nuclear-free world. It soon became clear that the initial post-Cold War hopes were exaggerated. The world did change fundamentally, but it did not become more secure and stable. In place of the old Soviet threat, there has been growing concern about proliferation and terrorism involving nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, global instability and increasingly serious new and emerging threats, including cyber attacks and attacks on satellites. For the United States at least, in this emerging environment, the political rationales for nuclear weapons, from deterrence to reassurance to alliance management, are changing and less central than during the Cold War to the security of the United States, its friends and allies. Nuclear weapons remain important for the US, but for a far more limited set of roles and missions. As the Perry-Schlesinger Commission report reveals, there is a domestic US consensus on nuclear policy and posture at the highest level and for the near term, including the continued role of nuclear arms in deterring WMD use and in reassuring allies. Although the value of nuclear weapons has declined for the United States, the value of these weapons for Russia, China and so-called 'rogue' states is seen to be rising. The nuclear logic of NATO during Cold War - the need for nuclear weapons to counter vastly superior conventional capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact - is today heard from Russians and even some proliferants. Moreover, these weapons present a way for rogues to achieve regional hegemony and possibly to deter interventions by the United States or others. While the vision of a nuclear-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and uncertain. And the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism would remain a concern that was largely unaffected by US and other nuclear-weapon decisions. Conventional capabilities would not disappear and the prospects for warfare could rise. In addition, new problems could arise if rogue states or other non-status-quo powers attempted to take advantage of moves toward disarmament, while friends and allies who are not reassured as in the past could reconsider their options if deterrence declined. To address these challenges, non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorismincluding defenses and consequence management-are priorities, especially in light of an anticipated 'renaissance' in civil nuclear power. The current agenda of the United States and others includes efforts to: (1) Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (2) Strengthen export controls, especially for sensitive technologies, by limiting the development of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and by requiring the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; (3) Establish a reliable supply regime, including the possibility of multilateral or multinational ownership of fuel cycle facilities, as a means to promote nuclear energy without increasing the risks of proliferation or terrorism; (4) Implement effectively UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and (5) Strengthen and institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These and other activities are important in themselves, and are essential to maintaining and strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) bargain by bolstering two of its pillars - nonproliferation and peaceful nuclear energy cooperation. There is no alternative, and little prospect for a better deal.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Laser Intertial Fusion Energy: Neutronic Design Aspects of a Hybrid Fusion-Fission Nuclear Energy System

This study investigates the neutronics design aspects of a hybrid fusion-fission energy system called the Laser Fusion-Fission Hybrid (LFFH). A LFFH combines current Laser Inertial Confinement fusion technology with that of advanced fission reactor technology to produce a system that eliminates many of the negative aspects of pure fusion or pure fission systems. When examining the LFFH energy mission, a significant portion of the United States and world energy production could be supplied by LFFH plants. The LFFH engine described utilizes a central fusion chamber surrounded by multiple layers of multiplying and moderating media. These layers, or blankets, include coolant plenums, a beryllium (Be) multiplier layer, a fertile fission blanket and a graphite-pebble reflector. Each layer is separated by perforated oxide dispersion strengthened (ODS) ferritic steel walls. The central fusion chamber is surrounded by an ODS ferritic steel first wall. The first wall is coated with 250-500 μm of tungsten to mitigate x-ray damage. The first wall is cooled by Li 17 Pb 83 eutectic, chosen for its neutron multiplication and good heat transfer properties. The Li 17 Pb 83 flows in a jacket around the first wall to an extraction plenum. The main coolant injection plenum is immediately behind the Li 17 Pb 83 , separated from the Li 17 Pb 83 by a solid ODS wall. This main system coolant is the molten salt flibe (2LiF-BeF 2 ), chosen for beneficial neutronics and heat transfer properties. The use of flibe enables both fusion fuel production (tritium) and neutron moderation and multiplication for the fission blanket. A Be pebble (1 cm diameter) multiplier layer surrounds the coolant injection plenum and the coolant flows radially through perforated walls across the bed. Outside the Be layer, a fission fuel layer comprised of depleted uranium contained in Tristructural-isotropic (TRISO) fuel particles having a packing fraction of 20% in 2 cm diameter fuel pebbles. The fission blanket is cooled by the same radial flibe flow that travels through perforated ODS walls to the reflector blanket. This reflector blanket is 75 cm thick comprised of 2 cm diameter graphite pebbles cooled by flibe. The flibe extraction plenum surrounds the reflector bed. Detailed neutronics designs studies are performed to arrive at the described design. The LFFH engine thermal power is controlled using a technique of adjusting the 6 Li/ 7 Li enrichment in the primary and secondary coolants. The enrichment adjusts system thermal power in the design by increasing tritium production while reducing fission. To perform the simulations and design of the LFFH engine, a new software program named LFFH Nuclear Control (LNC) was developed in C++ to extend the functionality of existing neutron transport and depletion software programs. Neutron transport calculations are performed with MCNP5. Depletion calculations are performed using Monteburns 2.0, which utilizes ORIGEN 2.0 and MCNP5 to perform a burnup calculation. LNC supports many design parameters and is capable of performing a full 3D system simulation from initial startup to full burnup. It is able to iteratively search for coolant 6Li enrichments and resulting material compositions that meet user defined performance criteria. LNC is utilized throughout this study for time dependent simulation of the LFFH engine. Two additional methods were developed to improve the computation efficiency of LNC calculations. These methods, termed adaptive time stepping and adaptive mesh refinement were incorporated into a separate stand alone C++ library name the Adaptive Burnup Library (ABL). The ABL allows for other client codes to call and utilize its functionality. Adaptive time stepping is useful for automatically maximizing the size of the depletion time step while maintaining a desired level of accuracy. Adaptive meshing allows for analysis of fixed fuel configurations that would normally require a computationally burdensome number of depletion zones. Alternatively, Adaptive Mesh Refinement (AMR) adjusts the depletion zone size according to the variation in flux across the zone or fractional contribution to total absorption or fission. A parametric analysis on a fully mixed fuel core was performed using the LNC and ABL code suites. The resulting system parameters are found to optimize performance metrics using a 20 MT DU fuel load with a 20% TRISO packing and a 300 μm kernel radius operated with a fusion input power of 500 MW and a fission blanket gain of 4.0. LFFH potentially offers a proliferation resistant technology relative to other nuclear energy systems primarily because of no need for fuel enrichment or reprocessing. A figure of merit of the material attractiveness is examined and it is found that the fuel is effectively contaminated to an unattractive level shortly after the system is started due to fission product and minor actinide build up.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Neutron Transport and Nuclear Burnup Analysis for the Laser Inertial Confinement Fusion-Fission Energy (LIFE) Engine

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is currently developing a hybrid fusion-fission nuclear energy system, called LIFE, to generate power and burn nuclear waste. We utilize inertial confinement fusion to drive a subcritical fission blanket surrounding the fusion chamber. It is composed of TRISO-based fuel cooled by the molten salt flibe. Low-yield (37.5 MJ) targets and a repetition rate of 13.3 Hz produce a 500 MW fusion source that is coupled to the subcritical blanket, which provides an additional gain of 4-8, depending on the fuel. In the present work, we describe the neutron transport and nuclear burnup analysis. We utilize standard analysis tools including, the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) transport code, ORIGEN2 and Monteburns to perform the nuclear design. These analyses focus primarily on a fuel composed of depleted uranium not requiring chemical reprocessing or enrichment. However, other fuels such as weapons grade plutonium and highly-enriched uranium are also under consideration. In addition, we have developed a methodology using {sup 6}Li as a burnable poison to replace the tritium burned in the fusion targets and to maintain constant power over the lifetime of the engine. The results from depleted uranium analyses suggest up to 99% burnup of actinides is attainable while maintaining full power at 2GW for more than five decades.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Final Technical Report: Imaging a Dry Storage Cask with Cosmic Ray Muons

The goal of this project is to build a scaled prototype system for monitoring used nuclear fuel (UNF) dry storage casks (DSCs) through cosmic ray muon imaging. Such a system will have the capability of verifying the content inside a DSC without opening it. Because of the growth of the nuclear power industry in the U.S. and the policy decision to ban reprocessing of commercial UNF, the used fuel inventory at commercial reactor sites has been increasing. Currently, UNF needs to be moved to independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs), as its inventory approaches the limit on capacity of on-site wet storage. Thereafter, the fuel will be placed in shipping containers to be transferred to a final disposal site. The ISFSIs were initially licensed as temporary facilities for ~20-yr periods. Given the cancellation of the Yucca mountain project and no clear path forward, extended dry-cask storage (~100 yr.) at ISFSIs is very likely. From the point of view of nuclear material protection, accountability and control technologies (MPACT) campaign, it is important to ensure that special nuclear material (SNM) in UNF is not stolen or diverted from civilian facilities for other use during the extended storage.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Demonstration of Electroreduction Technology to Convert GNF Uranium Oxide Powder to Metal

Global Nuclear Fuel – Americas LLC (GNF) has partnered with Argonne National Laboratory to demonstrate electroreduction of uranium oxides produced by deconversion of UF 6 to uranium metal through the Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN) program under the U.S. Department of Energy to accelerate the domestic production of metallic advanced reactor fuels. Electroreduction of uranium oxide was first demonstrated and patented by Argonne in the early 2000s as a technology to convert used oxide nuclear fuel from light water reactors to metal for further fuel reprocessing. More recently, electroreduction has been proposed as a front-end technology for metallization of uranium oxides produced by deconversion of UF 6 and for scrap recovery of oxide materials. During the electroreduction process, UO 2 powder is contained in a stainless-steel mesh basket with a cathode lead located in the center of the UO 2 bed. The basket is immersed in lithium chloride molten salt electrolyte containing 1 wt% lithium oxide along with a platinum anode and a nickel/nickel oxide (Ni/NiO) reference electrode. Current is applied to the cell between the cathode and anode to reduce the UO 2 to metallic uranium via a solid-state reduction reaction. Oxide ions released from the UO 2 during reduction are transported through the salt to the anode where oxygen gas is evolved. Once reduction is complete, the basket containing the metallicized uranium is removed from the salt and can be processed to remove the salt and consolidate the uranium into an ingot for use in metallic fuel fabrication. This project was performed to provide evidence of the electroreduction technology readiness level for metallization of UO 2 powder, identify and retire technical risks for industrialization of electroreduction, and accelerate the path to commercialization for metallic fast reactor fuel production. To that end, five electroreduction tests were performed with UO 2 provided by GNF and the resulting product was analyzed for the extent of conversion to metal and for impurity contents of the metal product to verify that electroreduction does not introduce impurities that would prevent use of the product in metallic fuel fabrication.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗