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Development of a Nonlinear Time Domain Methodology (Part I)

The ASCE 4-2014 (draft) provides guidance in Appendix B for nonlinear time-domain soil structure interaction (NLSSI) analysis. To accommodate widespread use of NLSSI, it is necessary to develop a methodology, or a set of steps, that produce reasonable results. An NLSSI methodology opens the door to explore additional seismic behaviour at nuclear facilities such as 1) gapping and sliding, 2) inclined seismic waves coupled with gapping and sliding of foundations atop soil, 3) inclined seismic waves coupled with gapping and sliding of deeply embedded structures, 4) soil dilatancy, 5) surface waves, 4) buoyancy, 5) concrete cracking and 6) seismic isolation. This paper documents the NLSSI methodology. At a high level these steps include 1) define soil site parameters, 2) calibrate site-specific nonlinear soil constitutive model, 3) verify performance of time domain absorbing boundaries, 4) build free field soil site, 5) build 3D soil site model using the appropriate parameters 6) define design concrete material properties and develop appropriate concrete constitutive model, 7) build structural model, 8) define appropriate contact and/or friction behaviour, 9) build combined soil-structure model and run time domain models and 10) compare with SHAKE/SASSI results at increasing levels of ground motion. This paper will describe the NLSSI methodology, discuss important NLSSI considerations, and discuss its potential implementation in industry. A second paper, which is Part II, “Development of a Nonlinear Time Domain Methodology Results,” provides results comparing in-structure response from NLSSI with the linear frequency-domain program, SASSI.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Intensity Frontier Instrumentation

The fundamental origin of flavor in the Standard Model (SM) remains a mystery. Despite the roughly eighty years since Rabi asked “Who ordered that?” upon learning of the discovery of the muon, we have not understood the reason that there are three generations or, more recently, why the quark and neutrino mixing matrices and masses are so different. The solution to the flavor problem would give profound insights into physics beyond the Standard Model (BSM) and tell us about the couplings and the mass scale at which the next level of insight can be found. The SM fails to explain all observed phenomena: new interactions and yet unseen particles must exist. They may manifest themselves by causing SM reactions to differ from often very precise predictions. The Intensity Frontier (1) explores these fundamental questions by searching for new physics in extremely rare processes or those forbidden in the SM. This often requires massive and/or extremely finely tuned detectors.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Achieving the Benefits of Safeguards by Design

The overarching driver for developing a formalized process to achieve safeguards by design is to support the global growth of nuclear power while reducing ‘nuclear security’ risks. This paper discusses an institutional approach to the design process for a nuclear facility, for designing proliferation resistance, international safeguards and U.S. national safeguards and security into new nuclear facilities. In the United States, the need exists to develop a simple, concise, formalized, and integrated approach for incorporating international safeguards and other non-proliferation considerations into the facility design process. An effective and efficient design process is one which clearly defines the functional requirements at the beginning of the project and provides for the execution of the project to achieve a reasonable balance among competing objectives in a cost effective manner. Safeguards by Design is defined as “the integration of international and national safeguards, physical security and non-proliferation features as full and equal partners in the design process of a nuclear energy system or facility,” with the objective to achieve facilities that are intrinsically more robust while being less expensive to safeguard and protect. This Safeguards by Design process has been developed such that it: • Provides improved safeguards, security, and stronger proliferation barriers, while reducing the life cycle costs to the operator and regulatory agencies, • Can be translated to any international context as a model for nuclear facility design, • Fosters a culture change to ensure the treatment of ‘nuclear security’ considerations as “full and equal” partners in the design process, • Provides a useful tool for the project manager responsible for the design, construction, and start-up of nuclear facilities, and • Addresses the key integration activities necessary to efficiently incorporate International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards into the design of nuclear facilities. This paper describes the work that has been completed in the development of a Safeguards by Design process for a project, illustrated by flow diagrams based upon the project phases described in U.S. Department of Energy Order 413.3A, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets. The institutionalization of the Safeguards by Design process directly supports the goals of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative and also aligns with goals and objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Other benefits from institutionalizing this Safeguards by Design process are discussed within this paper.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Early Career Paths at Los Alamos National Laboratory

We represent a selection of early career staff at LANL with backgrounds in mathematics. There are many possible paths to a position at LANL. The lab has very active graduate research and postdoctoral programs, and it is not uncommon for graduate students to become postdocs, who can then be “converted” to staff. Conversion from being a postdoc is not the only route to a position at LANL, nor is it a guarantee, but most of us did postdocs here before becoming staff. Being a postdoc here also gives you an idea of whether you’d like living in northern New Mexico, a rugged, beautiful, and somewhat remote area. It is important to say here that citizenship is not a requirement for many of the positions at the lab. The lab historically and currently welcomes investigators from all over the world. LANL offers a broad spectrum of mathematical challenges that are largely problem driven. Particularly to those who feel that academic mathematics can be stove-piped, with a focus on deep but not necessarily broad expertise, the LANL environment gives the flexibility to move and grow in many different directions. The lab encourages a team-based approach to problems, which not only enhances the breadth of our approach to solving problems, but also gives team members access to new fields. From the outside (academia), however, it can be difficult to see how fields map between academia and the lab. This is one of the reasons that having interaction with the lab as a graduate student or postdoc can be helpful in understanding if the environment would be a good match for you. An important advantage of working at the lab is our high visibility both in academia, as well as in industry and the government. Because of its mission-driven projects, LANL, and more broadly the Department of Energy Laboratories, help set research directions that are picked up by researchers in academia. For this reason, many lab staff have worked at LANL for a number of years, then have transferred into academia after having set the agenda for their field of expertise. Below, we will share some of our experiences, opinions, and reflections in order to give the reader a feel for our own early career experiences.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Modernization of Technical Requirements for Licensing of Advanced Non-Light Water Reactors: Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth Adequacy

This document supports the work contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 18-04 “Risk-Informed Performance-Based Technology Inclusive Guidance for Advanced Reactor Licensing Basis Development” Revision 0. NEI 18-04 presents a modern, technology-inclusive, risk-informed, and performance-based (TI-RIPB) process for selection of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs); safety classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and associated risk-informed special treatments; and determination of defense-in-depth (DID) adequacy for non-LWRs. The NEI guidance document provides one acceptable means for addressing the aforementioned topics as part of demonstrating a specific design provides reasonable assurance of adequate radiological protection. This report provides the framework and associated methodology guidelines and discussion for establishing, then evaluating, confirming, and documenting the adequacy of defense-in-depth (DID) for advanced non-light-water reactor technologies. It was developed as part of the Licensing Modernization Project led by Southern Company and cost-shared by the United States Department of Energy and has benefited from considerable NRC formal reviews and public workshops. The methodology converts the DID philosophy into a structured process that is implementable, embraces existing United States and international definitions and philosophies of DID that set the foundation for the process. It builds on the DID framework developed in the Department of Energy Next Generation Nuclear Plant Project and earlier works on this subject. The approach to establishing DID adequacy involves the incorporation of DID attributes into the plant capabilities and programmatic elements of DID. The integrated evaluation of DID adequacy includes both quantitative elements to incorporate risk-informed and performance-based (RIPB) considerations and qualitative elements that address uncertainties and limitations in the quantitative models and supporting data. Demonstration of DID adequacy ensures that there are multiple layers of defense for risk-significant challenges to the design and that the plant capabilities and programs that support each layer are provided in a manner that minimizes dependencies among these layers. The focus of this report is assurance of DID adequacy with respect to protection of the public from radiological exposures resulting from accidental releases of radioactive material. While other hazards are not specifically addressed, this methodology is expected to be beneficial for determining DID adequacy for them as well. Risk-informed evaluation of DID considers the integrated performance of all plant SSCs and associated programs to manage daily operational activities, transients, and accidents, including the evaluation of strategies for accident prevention and mitigation. The RIPB LBE scenario methodology used in this evaluation defines the challenges to the plant safety features included in the plant design basis and beyond, and the scope of all deterministic and probabilistic safety evaluations. By examining event sequences across the whole spectrum of LBEs, a systematic assessment of DID can be accomplished.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Electronic spectra of DyF studied by four-component relativistic configuration interaction methods

The electronic states of the DyF molecule below 3.0 eV are studied using 4-component relativistic CI methods. Spinors generated by the average-of-configuration Hartree-Fock method with the Dirac-Coulomb Hamiltonian were used in CI calculations by the KRCI (Kramers-restricted configuration interaction) program. The CI reference space was generated by distributing 11 electrons among the 11 Kramers pairs composed mainly of Dy [4f], [6s], [6p] atomic spinors, and double excitations are allowed from this space to the virtual molecular spinors. The CI calculations indicate that the ground state has the dominant configuration (4f{sup 9})(6s{sup 2})(Ω = 7.5). Above this ground state, 4 low-lying excited states (Ω = 8.5, 7.5, 7.5, 7.5) are found with dominant configurations (4f{sup 10})(6s). These results are consistent with the experimental studies of McCarthy et al. Above these 5 states, 2 states were observed at T{sub 0} = 2.39 eV, 2.52 eV by McCarthy et al. and were named as [19.3]8.5 and [20.3]8.5. McCarthy et al. proposed that both states have dominant configurations (4f{sup 9})(6s)(6p), but these configurations are not consistent with the large R{sub e}’s (∼3.9 a.u.) estimated from the observed rotational constants. The present CI calculations provide near-degenerate states of (4f{sup 10})(6p{sub 3/2,1/2}), (4f{sup 10})(6p{sub 3/2,3/2}), and (4f{sup 9})(6s)(6p{sub 3/2,1/2}) at around 3 eV. The former two states have larger R{sub e} (3.88 a.u.) than the third, so that it is reasonable to assign (4f{sup 10})(6p{sub 3/2,1/2}) to [19.3]8.5 and (4f{sup 10})(6p{sub 3/2,3/2}) to [20.3]8.5.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Management of water extracted from carbon sequestration projects

Throughout the past decade, frequent discussions and debates have centered on the geological sequestration of carbon dioxide (CO{sub 2}). For sequestration to have a reasonably positive impact on atmospheric carbon levels, the anticipated volume of CO{sub 2} that would need to be injected is very large (many millions of tons per year). Many stakeholders have expressed concern about elevated formation pressure following the extended injection of CO{sub 2}. The injected CO{sub 2} plume could potentially extend for many kilometers from the injection well. If not properly managed and monitored, the increased formation pressure could stimulate new fractures or enlarge existing natural cracks or faults, so the CO{sub 2} or the brine pushed ahead of the plume could migrate vertically. One possible tool for management of formation pressure would be to extract water already residing in the formation where CO{sub 2} is being stored. The concept is that by removing water from the receiving formations (referred to as 'extracted water' to distinguish it from 'oil and gas produced water'), the pressure gradients caused by injection could be reduced, and additional pore space could be freed up to sequester CO{sub 2}. Such water extraction would occur away from the CO{sub 2} plume to avoid extracting a portion of the sequestered CO{sub 2} along with the formation water. While water extraction would not be a mandatory component of large-scale carbon storage programs, it could provide many benefits, such as reduction of pressure, increased space for CO{sub 2} storage, and potentially, 'plume steering.' Argonne National Laboratory is developing information for the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) to evaluate management of extracted water. If water is extracted from geological formations designated to receive injected CO{sub 2} for sequestration, the project operator will need to identify methods for managing very large volumes of water most of which will contain large quantities of salt and other dissolved minerals. Produced water from oil and gas production also typically contains large quantities of dissolved solids. Therefore, many of the same practices that are established and used for managing produced water also may be applicable for extracted water. This report describes the probable composition of the extracted water that is removed from the formations, options for managing the extracted water, the pros and cons of those options, and some opportunities for beneficial use of the water. Following the introductory material in Chapter 1, the report is divided into chapters covering the following topics: (Chapter 2) examines the formations that are likely candidates for CO{sub 2} sequestration and provides a general evaluation of the geochemical characteristics of the formations; (Chapter 3) makes some preliminary estimates of the volume of water that could be extracted; (Chapter 4) provides a qualitative review of many potential technologies and practices for managing extracted water and for each technology or management practice, pros and cons are provided; (Chapter 5) explores the potential costs of water management; and (Chapter 6) presents the conclusions.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

ENDF/B-VIII.0 Testing With AMPX and SCALE

As the new ENDF/B-VIII.0 data has continued development from its initial beta release into the final release version, it has subsequently undergone processing and testing at Oak Ridge National Laboratory with AMPX and SCALE. Each of the beta releases has been processed with AMPX to create both multigroup (MG) and continuous-energy (CE) libraries. The MG libraries were all processed using the SCALE 252-group structure. These libraries were then used with the VALID suite for benchmarking the new data library’s performance against the currently distributed ENDF/B-VII.1 (VII.1)-based SCALE libraries. Here, we compare the MG and CE VALID results for the two current ENDF releases, versions VII.1 and the most recent beta release of ENDF/B-VIII.0 as of this writing (VIII.0.β4). Generally, both the MG and CE VALID aggregate results for VIII.0.β4 compare reasonably well with their VII.1-derived counterparts. As can be expected of any new ENDF release, some of the individual cases have substantially different computed neutron multiplicity (k eff ) values between the two releases, although typically the differences are less than 100 percent-milli (pcm). However, changes to the plutonium cross sections have induced much larger changes in the ratio of the computed k eff to the experimental value (C/E) for thermal spectrum plutonium solution critical systems. This paper details the comparative performance of the VII.1 and VIII.0.β4 data for the broad range of test cases covered by the VALID suite. A companion paper at this conference provides details of the baseline validation of SCALE 6.2, including the first release of the VII.1 data.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Summary on the depressurization from supercritical pressure conditions

When a fluid discharges from a high pressure and temperature system, a 'choking' or critical condition occurs, and the flow rate becomes independent of the downstream pressure. During a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA) of a water reactor the break flow will be subject to this condition. An accurate estimation of the critical flow rate is important for the evaluation of the reactor safety, because this flow rate controls the loss of coolant inventory and energy from the system, and thus has a significant effect on the accident consequences[1]. In the design of safety systems for a super critical water reactor (SCWR), postulated LOCA transients are particularly important due to the lower coolant inventory compared to a typical PWR for the same power output. This lower coolant inventory would result in a faster transient response of the SCWR, and hence accurate prediction of the critical discharge is mandatory. Under potential two-phase conditions critical flow is dominated by the vapor content or quality of the vapor, which is closely related with the onset of vaporization and the interfacial interaction between phases [2]. This presents a major challenge for the estimation of the flow rate due to the lack of the knowledge of those processes, especially under the conditions of interest for the SCWR. According to the limited data of supercritical fluids, the critical flows at conditions above the pseudo-critical point seem to be fairly stable and consistent with the subcritical homogeneous equilibrium model (HEM) model predictions, while having a lower flow rate than those in the two-phase region. Thus the major difficulty in the prediction of the depressurization flow rates remains in the region where two phases co-exist at the top of the vapor dome. In this region, the flow rate is strongly affected by the nozzle geometry and tends to be unstable. Various models for this region have been developed with different assumptions, e.g. the HEM and Moody model [3], and the Henry-Fauske non-equilibrium model [4], and are currently used in subcritical pressure reactor safety design[5]. It appears that some of these models could be reasonably extended to above the thermodynamic pseudo-critical point. The more stable and lower discharge flow rates observed in conditions above the pseudo-critical point suggests that even though SCWR's have a smaller coolant inventory, the safety implications of a LOCA and the subsequent depressurization may not be as severe as expected, this however needs to be confirmed by a rigorous evaluation of the particular event and further evaluation of the critical flow rate. This paper will summarize activities on critical flow models, experimental data and numerical modeling during blowdown from supercritical pressure conditions under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Coordinated Research Project (CRP) on 'Heat Transfer Behaviour and Thermo-hydraulics Code testing for SCWRs'. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

PASER: Options and Perspectives

We briefly review the PASER concept and early experiments as well as ongoing programs. Due to relatively weak single particle interaction, for collective effects to become dominant long interaction regions are required--similar to SASE. In order to overcome this stringent constraint the Active Penning Trap concept was suggested. In the absence of the active medium, this trap confines the electrons in an equivalent mode to the way a cavity confines radiation. As an active medium is incorporated in the trap, its effect is similar to that of inserting it in a cavity - it obviously amplifies the energy of the stored electrons. In case of the trap, electrons get bunched and due to the efficient interaction they gain energy from the medium, therefore, they may escape the trap. This paradigm has the potential of being a very compact optical injector. A promising configuration has been recently proposed (pending approval) and it will be briefly discussed. Its advantage is twofold: the photon energy is almost two orders of magnitude higher than the one employed in the past and the medium is gaseous. A solid-state (Nd:YAG) active Penning trap configuration is in its early testing stages. Preliminary results whereby during one-pass (no trapping) up to 30% increase of dc current was measured is indicative that there is enough energy-transfer in one pass to facilitate a reasonable energy transfer over many round trips. The difficulty associated with the necessity of having the electrons in close proximity to the medium's surface for many round trips is yet to be confronted. With this regard, the former configuration has the significant advantage of not having to confront this obstacle. Future perspectives relying on Penning trap with either gaseous or solid-state active medium are elaborated.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Cable Damage Detection System and Algorithms Using Time Domain Reflectometry

This report describes the hardware system and the set of algorithms we have developed for detecting damage in cables for the Advanced Development and Process Technologies (ADAPT) Program. This program is part of the W80 Life Extension Program (LEP). The system could be generalized for application to other systems in the future. Critical cables can undergo various types of damage (e.g. short circuits, open circuits, punctures, compression) that manifest as changes in the dielectric/impedance properties of the cables. For our specific problem, only one end of the cable is accessible, and no exemplars of actual damage are available. This work addresses the detection of dielectric/impedance anomalies in transient time domain reflectometry (TDR) measurements on the cables. The approach is to interrogate the cable using time domain reflectometry (TDR) techniques, in which a known pulse is inserted into the cable, and reflections from the cable are measured. The key operating principle is that any important cable damage will manifest itself as an electrical impedance discontinuity that can be measured in the TDR response signal. Machine learning classification algorithms are effectively eliminated from consideration, because only a small number of cables is available for testing; so a sufficient sample size is not attainable. Nonetheless, a key requirement is to achieve very high probability of detection and very low probability of false alarm. The approach is to compare TDR signals from possibly damaged cables to signals or an empirical model derived from reference cables that are known to be undamaged. This requires that the TDR signals are reasonably repeatable from test to test on the same cable, and from cable to cable. Empirical studies show that the repeatability issue is the 'long pole in the tent' for damage detection, because it is has been difficult to achieve reasonable repeatability. This one factor dominated the project. The two-step model-based approach is summarized as follows: Step 1, Cable Modeling: Given input-output TDR signals s(n) and x{sub U}(n) for a cable known to be free of damage, system identification algorithms are used to compute a dynamic prediction-error cable model that has output {cflx x}{sub U}(n). The model is declared valid when the innovations e{sub U}(n) = x{sub U}(n) {cflx x}{sub U}(n) satisfy a statistical zero-mean whiteness test. This validated model output is then used as a known reference to which other cables can be compared. Step 2, Cable Testing: The TDR output signal x{sub D}(n) from a cable under test is compared with the model output {cflx x}{sub U}(n) by computing the innovations e{sub D}(n) = x{sub D}(n) {cflx x}{sub U}(n). The innovations are tested using a short-term whiteness test statistic, which employs a statistical confidence interval. If the cable passes the test, this implies that the model is valid and the cable is declared undamaged. If the cable fails the test, this indicates a model mismatch, which means that the cable's dielectric properties have changed; and this implies that the cable is damaged. The test threshold is adjusted to maximize probability of detection and minimize probability of false alarm according to an empirically determined receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. An associated confidence interval on the probability of correct classification is also provided. The effectiveness of the algorithm is demonstrated using measured TDR signals for undamaged and damaged cables. Experimental and algorithmic methods for coping with repeatability issues are presented. The model-based damage detection algorithms have been shown to perform well for some representative examples of real TDR signals acquired using the two-dimensional (2D) mockup fixture. If the damage causes a short circuit, then damage detection performance is generally good to excellent. Examples include the cases demonstrated in this report for cuts and pinholes. If the damage does not cause a short circuit, then damage detection performance is generally poor to fair. Examples include the cases demonstrated in this report for crushes and partial cuts.

42 ENGINEERING↗

ORNL’s Continuing Efforts in Evaluating and Validating TSLs [Slides]

This presentation finds that INS measurements are not as variable based on sample composition, because phonon spectra is a properly of the bulk material. Additionally, INS and transmission measurements are and should be the most significant part of TSL validation, as they are the fundamental quantities used by Monte Carlo neutronics codes. This presentation reasons that relaying solely on theoretical atomistic calculations for TSL evaluation is not enough, they are highly dependent on inter-atomic potentials (which are not the most accurate depending on the quantity trying to be reproduced) and evaluators knowledge and understanding of the material being studied. Finally on Critical benchmarks, while extremely useful for validation of nuclear data at all energies, critical benchmarks are not the best tool to provide a definitive answer on conflicting TSLs. The presentation concludes that INS and transmission measurements need to be the basis of validation of TSLs.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Lawrence Livermore National Security Cost Model Functional Management Assessment

The scope of the Functional Management Assessment of the cost model included a review of the plan and progress of the Cost Model Review Team. The review focused on processes in place to ensure simplicity, compliance with cost accounting standards and indirect cost allocation methodology, and the change management plan. This was intended to be a high-level initial review in order to provide recommendations for a subsequent more comprehensive review. The single document reviewed by the team during the assessment was the Indirect Cost Recovery Model Review, which describes how the indirect rate restructure and new organizational structure have resulted in streamlined charging practices to better understand and strategically manage costs. ISSUE 1: The cost model focuses heavily on rate structure but not on cost management. Significant progress has been made to simplify the rate structure. The number of indirect rates has been reduced from 67 different indirect rates used under the prior contract to 32 rates in the first year of the LLNS contract, with a goal of further reduction to 16 for FY09. The reductions are being recommended by a broad-based Working Group driven by Lab leadership desiring a simplified rate structure that would make it easier to analyze the true cost of overhead, be viewed as equitable, and ensure appropriate use of Service, i.e., operations, Centers. This has been a real challenge due to the significant change in approach from one that previously involved a very complex rate structure. Under this prior approach, the goal was to manage the rates, and rates were established at very detailed levels that would 'shine the light' on pools of overhead costs. As long as rates stayed constant or declined, not as much attention tended to be given to them, particularly with so many pools to review (184 indirect rate pools in FY05). However, as difficult and important as simplifying the rate structure has been, the fundamental reason for the simplification is to make it easier to analyze the true cost of overhead so the costs can be effectively managed. For the current year, the overall the goal of keeping the total cost of an FTE to FY07 levels. This approach reflects the past practice of managing to rates rather than focusing on costs, although streamlined with the more simplified rate structure. Given all the challenges being faced with the contract transition, this was a reasonable interim tactic for dealing with the known cost increases such as fees and taxes. Nonetheless, in order to take full advantage of the opportunities that exist for making sound decisions for further reducing the rates themselves, the Laboratory needs to implement an ongoing and disciplined approach to understanding and managing overhead cost. ISSUE 2: The NIF has a significantly different rate structure than other Laboratory work. Because of its significant size and unique organizational structure as a major construction project, the National Ignition Facility (NIF) has indirect charges that vary from the norm. These variations were reviewed and approved by and disclosed to the NNSA in the Laboratory's past annual Disclosure Statements. In mid-FY 09, NIF will begin transition from a construction line item to an operational center. The reallocation of costs when this occurs could significantly impact the Laboratory's rates and rate structure planning for that transition from a cost- and rate- impact standpoint should begin soon. ISSUE 3: The new rate model must be finalized shortly in order to implement the model beginning in FY 09. As noted in Issue No.1, a Working Group has developed a simplified rate structure for the Lab to use for FY09. The Working Group has evaluated the cost impacts of the simplified rate structure at the major program level and identified a disparate impact in the Safeguards and Security area where a substantial increase in overhead cost allocation may need to be mitigated. The simplified rate structure will need to be approved by the Laboratory Director and issued within the Laboratory to formulate detailed budgets so that operations using the new rates can proceed beginning October 1, 2008. A number of activities should occur over the coming weeks and months to ensure a smooth implementation.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

An Historic Perspective of NPDES Individual Permit for Storm Water Discharges from Solid Waste Management Units at Los Alamos National Laboratory - 18667

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the associated communities of Los Alamos and White Rock are located in Los Alamos County in north-central New Mexico approximately 60 mi north-northeast of Albuquerque and 25 mi northwest of Santa Fe. The 36-mi{sup 2} facility is situated on the Pajarito Plateau, which consists of a series of fingerlike mesas separated by deep east-to-west oriented canyons cut by predominately ephemeral and intermittent streams. The mesa tops range in elevation from approximately 7800 ft. on the flanks of the Jemez Mountains to about 6200 ft. at their eastern termination above the Rio Grande Canyon. The land surrounding the Laboratory is largely undeveloped. Public access to much of the facility is limited for safety and security reasons. Large tracts of surrounding land are held by the U.S. Forest Service (Santa Fe National Forest), the Bureau of Land Management (Bandelier National Monument), the General Services Administration and San Ildefonso Pueblo. Storm water discharges from Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) have been regulated at the LANL since the early 1990's and have evolved into an Individual Stormwater Permit (IP) that may be one of the most complex in the nation. Historically, storm water discharges from SWMUs at LANL were regulated under a nationwide general permit using a watershed based approach requiring a Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan (SWPPP), monitoring at sub-watershed scale 'USGS like' gage stations, and inspection and maintenance of erosion controls. In 2001, the Cerro Grande Fire destroyed many Laboratory structures, residential homes and over 80,000 acres of forested lands in the upper watershed above Los Alamos that significantly changed the local hydrology. Several years later, a Federal Facilities Compliance Agreement (FFCA) was issued by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) that was followed by a Clean Water Act lawsuit filed by concerned citizens, the result of which required more focus on stormwater discharges from individual SWMUs and an IP covering over 400 Sites. The IP contains non-numeric technology-based effluent limitations, coupled with a comprehensive, coordinated inspection and monitoring program, to minimize pollutants in LANL's storm water discharges associated with historical industrial activities from specified Sites. Non-numeric technology-based effluent limitations include minimizing pollutants in discharges through erosion and sedimentation controls, management of run-on and runoff, employee training, inspection and maintenance of controls, annual reporting and public involvement. The IP establishes Target Action Levels (TALs) that are equivalent to New Mexico State water-quality criteria. These TALs are used as benchmarks to determine the effectiveness of control measures implemented under the IP. That is, storm water quality sample results from SWMU discharges are compared with applicable TALs. If one or more sample results exceed a TAL, LANL must take additional corrective action. The TAL results are also confounded by high levels of naturally occurring constituents such as aluminum and gross alpha, and urban constituents such as copper, zinc and PCBs which may not be a source from the regulated SWMU. Due to the remote rugged terrain, security access issues, number of monitoring locations, stringent TALs, reporting requirements and public involvement requirements, this permit is likely one of the most stringent and complex in the country. The Laboratory has implemented this permit in a compliant manner for the past seven years and is anticipating the issuance of a new permit in the next few months. This paper will cover permit requirements related to control measure installations, monitoring, reporting and public involvement as well as process improvements and remaining water quality initiatives such as developing studies to address issues such as discriminating between natural background levels and LANL-related contaminants during the execution of this unique permit. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Current Status of Decommissioning Plans and Chemical Decontamination of Metal Scraps in Chinshan NPP - 19304

The decommissioning of nuclear facilities has become a significantly attractive and worldwide topic due to the end of lifetime of many nuclear power plants within next coming years. In Taiwan, Chinshan nuclear power plant owned by the Taiwan Power Company will be the first candidate to be decommissioned according to the Nuclear Reactor Facilities Regulation Act. The Chinshan nuclear power plant located in New Taipei City has two units of 636 MWe boiling water reactors (BWRs) for the generation of 9 billion kWh of electricity per year. The date of cessation of operation of Unit No. 1 and Unit No. 2 will be December in 2018 and July in 2019, respectively. Based on the Regulations for the Review and Approval of Applications for a Decommissioning Permit of Nuclear Reactor Facilities, Taiwan Power Company have submitted a decommissioning plan of Chinshan nuclear power plant to the authority, Atomic Energy Council (AEC). After the review process, the decommissioning plan of Chinshan nuclear power plant has been permitted by AEC in 2017. Decontamination is generally utilized during the period of decommissioning of nuclear facility in order to minimize the radiation exposure of personnel and the cost of management of radioactive wastes. The successful decontamination also probably provides the benefits of lowering the level of radioactive wastes, facilitating potential releases, permitting the reuse of metals and facilitating the radiation principle of As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) management. Decontamination aims at the removal of radioactive materials from the contaminated surfaces by several technologies such as washing, heating, chemical reaction and mechanical process. The selection of proper decontamination technologies are depended on the requirement of the target materials and the purpose of the decontamination. Chemical decontamination has been proven to be an effective in reducing the radioactivity for metallic materials by using chemical reagents in contact with the contaminated surfaces. During the operation of Chinshan nuclear power plant, chemical decontamination was performed for Unit No.1 and No.2 in 2000 to decontaminate the Reactor Recirculation System (RRS) and Reactor Water Clean-up Systems (RWCU) by using LOMI-NP-LOMI process. Based on the previous experience of chemical decontamination, the dismantled metallic piping is provided as sample by Chinshan nuclear power plant for the evaluation of the feasibility of chemical decontamination. The provided metallic sample is composed of carbon steel with dose rate around 0.2 mSv/hr. In this report, a multistep decontamination process using strongly oxidizing solution and organic acid solution is performed to remove the contaminated oxide layer from the metal surface, and the resulting contact dose rate and decontamination factor (DF) are also shown to discuss the performance in relation to the process control factors. In this paper, the recent progress in decommissioning programs and preliminary results of the decontamination experiment are described to provide usable information regarding the future decommissioning for Chinshan nuclear power plant. (authors)

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A Comparison of RESRAD and GoldSim Models for Assessing Radiological Dose for a RCRA Landfill - 20418

US Ecology Idaho (USEI) operates a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Subtitle C, Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal (TSD) Facility on a 640-acre property in Owyhee County, Idaho. USEI accepts a wide variety of RCRA-exempt low activity radioactive wastes, including naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) and technologically enhanced NORM (TENORM) (USEI 2009). The performance of the landfill with regard to radiological operating permit requirements was previously assessed using a model constructed with the residual radioactivity (RESRAD) computer program, developed by Argonne National Laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). RESRAD supports the evaluation of several environmental transport pathways related to a radionuclide-contaminated soil source term, but it was not conceived as a model for the evaluation of landfill radiological performance. A more comprehensive and realistic model is desired in order to better support submissions to both the State of Idaho's Department of Environmental Quality as well as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. A Performance Assessment (PA) computer model was developed using GoldSim software for the USEI RCRA Subtitle C landfill. The RESRAD computer model was specifically developed for calculating soil cleanup criteria and radiological dose and cancer risk from residual radioactive material in soil. To evaluate site-specific conditions, users may select from among a number of available environmental transport and exposure pathways and modify 'default' parameter values. In GoldSim, a user must construct the model 'from scratch.' However, this modeling is facilitated by a number of specialized elements available in GoldSim to support a radiological mass transport model. These include elements for defining radiological decay and ingrowth, container failure and radiological release, advective and diffusive transport, and other processes. Advantages afforded by the use of RESRAD for modeling radiological dose for a RCRA Subtitle C landfill include ease of use and reasonable flexibility in specifying site-specific conditions. GoldSim allows for considerably more flexibility and site-specificity than RESRAD, including evaluation of potentially relevant environmental transport processes not supported in RESRAD. The probabilistic modeling capabilities of GoldSim also far exceed those of RESRAD. The pros and cons of RESRAD and GoldSim for this modeling problem are explored with a focus on identifying approaches and critical factors in identifying the appropriate platform. The capabilities of RESRAD and GoldSim for mathematically modeling the disposal system will be contrasted and compared. For example, the existing RESRAD radiological safety assessment evaluated potentially complete exposure pathways related to infiltration to groundwater and upwards diffusion of radon. Additional transport pathways identified in the USEI Idaho facility Conceptual Site Model include deposition of radon decay products in cover material, root uptake of radionuclides in disposed wastes by native plants, and mixing of cover material by burrowing animals. Results of the two models and how the different transport and dose pathways affect results will be discussed. (authors)

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Toward Trustworthy Autonomous Science: A Two-Year Community Roadmap

One year ago, the AISLE roadmap argued that autonomous laboratories operated as isolated islands and proposed a grassroots network organized around five critical dimensions. The field has since moved faster than that roadmap anticipated: multi-agent systems have produced experimentally validated hypotheses, self-driving laboratories have grown more interoperable and orchestrated, reasoning-trained and domain foundation models have raised the capability ceiling, and the Genesis Mission has placed autonomous experimentation at the center of U.S. federal science strategy, with industry emerging as a primary actor. Progress has met a sobering counter-current, including a corrected flagship discovery result, benchmarks showing that agents which rival experts on closed-ended questions still complete only a fraction of open-ended research, and fabricated citations surfacing at leading venues. We read this as the defining tension of the field: producing a candidate discovery is no longer the hard part, but verifying it is, and this asymmetry now limits autonomous science more than raw model capability. Accordingly, we update the roadmap around seven dimensions, revisiting the original five and elevating two former cross-cutting concerns, trust, verification, and reproducibility, and safety, security, and governance, to first-class status. We assess the original milestones (M1 through M14) as achieved, partially achieved, reframed, or open, add four new milestones (M15 through M18) for the elevated dimensions, and scope the path forward to a two-year horizon, with the first year concentrating on interfaces, protocol adoption, and the scaffolding of verification, and the second targeting federation, zero-trust coordination, and governance. Throughout, we position the grassroots network as the interoperability fabric that lets national programs, international initiatives, and commercial platforms connect rather than re-silo.

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As Permanent as Practicable: The reality of Permanent Markers - 16191

The regulatory requirements in the United States do not require any specific time frame for the duration of permanent marker systems to inform future generations of the presence of deep geologic nuclear waste repositories. The requirement is for markers to be 'as permanent as practicable'. For the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico, the U.S. Department of Energy chose a 10,000 year Passive Institutional Controls program goal. Passive Institutional Controls are to be designed prior to facility closure and implemented prior to the completion of the Active Institutional Controls program. Nuclear waste repositories across the world are actively developing marker and message systems, as required by their own regulations, for time frames either specified in those regulations or to be proposed to the regulator by the implementing organization. Time frames may be based upon the radioactive characteristics of the various isotopes being disposed of in the repository under consideration, or they may be based on some utility function that balances investment, practicability and risk. Scientifically, there are a number of time frames that make sense. However, an important determinant of effectiveness that has not been taken into consideration is the impact of the human connection, the receiver of the message. The major obstacle that the permanent marker systems need to overcome is the impact that humans will have over time. Historically, no monument has ever survived more than a few thousand years when humans come in contact with it. No matter what size of monument or topic the monument represents, humans have a history of destroying monuments beginning just a few generations after the monument's construction. The only way to ensure that a monument system can endure long time frames is to isolate it from humans. Eliminating contact with humans for whom the messages are meant defeats the very purpose of having an informative marker and message system. A more reasonable and historically supported time frame of 1,000 years would assure that no unreasonable cost would be incurred by current generations. Future generations could decide to continue maintaining the message, or not; and the likelihood of destruction of the markers by subsequent generations would be reduced since the knowledge of the markers and messages would have been transmitted within a more reasonable time frame over which language continuity, for example, would likely be manageable. Future preservation of the marker system and future human actions cannot be controlled, but the goal is to build a marker and message delivery system that reduces the likelihood of inadvertent future human disturbance of a deep geologic repository. This is the typical regulatory requirement on future information systems. Regulators who insist on an extremely long time frame for marker effectiveness should consider the historical realities of 'permanent' markers and monuments and propose a more reasonable time frame. Perhaps it would be more practicable to require 1,000 years for informing future generations and then allow them to determine what they wish to do to protect the future for another, perhaps similar, period of time. (authors)

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