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842 records · Page 47

NASA Tech Briefs, September 2007

Topics covered include; Rapid Fabrication of Carbide Matrix/Carbon Fiber Composites; Coating Thermoelectric Devices To Suppress Sublimation; Ultrahigh-Temperature Ceramics; Improved C/SiC Ceramic Composites Made Using PIP; Coating Carbon Fibers With Platinum; Two-Band, Low-Loss Microwave Window; MCM Polarimetric Radiometers for Planar Arrays; Aperture-Coupled Thin-Membrane L-Band Antenna; WGM-Based Photonic Local Oscillators and Modulators; Focal-Plane Arrays of Quantum-Dot Infrared Photodetectors; Laser Range and Bearing Finder With No Moving Parts; Microrectenna: A Terahertz Antenna and Rectifier on a Chip; Miniature L-Band Radar Transceiver; Robotic Vision-Based Localization in an Urban Environment; Programs for Testing an SSME-Monitoring System; Cathodoluminescent Source of Intense White Light; Displaying and Analyzing Antenna Radiation Patterns; Payload Operations Support Team Tools; Space-Shuttle Emulator Software; Soft Real-Time PID Control on a VME Computer; Analyzing Radio-Frequency Coverage for the ISS; Nanorod-Based Fast-Response Pressure-Sensitive Paints; Capacitors Would Help Protect Against Hypervelocity Impacts; Diaphragm Pump With Resonant Piezoelectric Drive; Improved Quick-Release Pin Mechanism; Designing Rolling-Element Bearings; Reverse-Tangent Injection in a Centrifugal Compressor; Inertial Measurements for Aero-assisted Navigation (IMAN); Analysis of Complex Valve and Feed Systems; Improved Path Planning Onboard the Mars Exploration Rovers; Robust, Flexible Motion Control for the Mars Explorer Rovers; Solar Sail Spaceflight Simulation; Fluorine-Based DRIE of Fused Silica; Mechanical Alloying for Making Thermoelectric Compounds; Process for High-Rate Fabrication of Alumina Nanotemplates; Electroform/Plasma-Spray Laminates for X-Ray Optics; An Automated Flying-Insect Detection System; Calligraphic Poling of Ferroelectric Material; Blackbody Cavity for Calibrations at 200 to 273 K; KML Super Overlay to WMS Translator; High-Performance Tiled WMS and KML Web Server; Modeling of Radiative Transfer in Protostellar Disks; Composite Pulse Tube; Photometric Calibration of Consumer Video Cameras; Criterion for Identifying Vortices in High- Pressure Flows; Amplified Thermionic Cooling Using Arrays of Nanowires; Delamination-Indicating Thermal Barrier Coatings; Preventing Raman Lasing in High-Q WGM Resonators; Procedures for Tuning a Multiresonator Photonic Filter; Robust Mapping of Incoherent Fiber-Optic Bundles; Extended-Range Ultrarefractive 1D Photonic Crystal Prisms; Rapid Analysis of Mass Distribution of Radiation Shielding; Modeling Magnetic Properties in EZTB; Deep Space Network Antenna Logic Controller; Modeling Carbon and Hydrocarbon Molecular Structures in EZTB; BigView Image Viewing on Tiled Displays; and Imaging Sensor Flight and Test Equipment Software.

Source record↗

Lunar Base Construction Overview

Previous lunar missions and campaigns have been restricted to using robotic landers and lunar orbiting satellites as well as sortie type of operations using astronaut crews (NASA Apollo program). Now, the next phase of lunar exploration has begun under NASA’s Artemis program and there has been an international response where other nations such as China, Russia, India, Canada, Japan and the European Union of nations, have all expressed interest in either collaborating or competing with NASA on the Moon. This next phase has an over arching goal of achieving a permanent human presence on the Moon via sustainable methods. A lunar base with human occupancy will require infrastructure to provide shelter, utilities, landing/launch pads, roads, communications, power and all the other necessities to sustain human life and protect equipment. Since human biology is not well suited for surviving in the lunar environment, there will be many forms of automated equipment, autonomy and robotic helpers that will minimize the amount of Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) required by the crew. This will mean that the radiation dosage received by the crew will stay within acceptable and safe career doses. Radiation shielding via the use of regolith can also mitigate radiation dangers. The required infrastructure must be constructed, but the mass and logistics of bringing all the construction materials from Earth are prohibitive, which makes the necessary construction difficult to achieve. In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) aims to solve this challenge by sourcing construction materials locally or “in-situ”. This means that their transportation can be completely eliminated, resulting in large cost savings by avoiding the launch out of Earth’s deep gravity well and subsequent trans lunar injection, lunar orbit capture and landing. This paper will give an overview of the required construction tasks and related equipment that will be required to robotically build a lunar base using in-situ resources. It will also organize these tasks into logical groupings so that technology development and implementation can be pursued within a framework that can be referenced by all involved.

Lunar Base↗

Lunar Base Construction Planning

Previous lunar missions and campaigns have been restricted to using robotic landers and lunar orbiting satellites as well as sortie type of operations using astronaut crews(NASA Apollo program).Now, the next phase of lunar exploration has begun under NASA’s Artemis program and there has been an international response where other nations such as China, Russia, India, Canada, Japan and theEuropean Union of nations, have all expressed interest in either collaborating or competing with NASA on theMoon. This next phase has an overarching goal of achieving a permanent human presence on theMoon via sustainable methods. A lunar base with human occupancy will require infrastructure to provide shelter, utilities, landing/launch pads, roads, communications, power and all the other necessities to sustain human life and protect equipment.Since human biology is not well suited for surviving in the lunar environment, there will be many forms of automated equipment, autonomy and robotic helpers that will minimize the amount of Extra-Vehicular Activity(EVA) required by the crew. This will mean that the radiation dosage received by the crew will stay within acceptable and safe career doses. Radiation shielding via the use of regolith can also mitigate radiation dangers.The required infrastructure must be constructed, but the mass and logistics of bringing all the construction materials from Earth are prohibitive, which makes the necessary construction difficult to achieve.In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) aims to solve this challenge by sourcing construction materials locally or “in-situ”. This means that their transportation can be completely eliminated, resulting in large cost savings by avoiding the launch out of Earth’s deep gravity well and subsequent trans lunar injection, lunar orbit capture and landing. This paper will give ahistorical review and current status of lunar construction planning and a high level introduction to the required infrastructure and construction equipment that will be required to robotically build a lunar base using in-situ resources.It will also organize these tasks into logical groupings so that technology development and implementation can be pursued within a framework that can be referenced by all involved.

Lunar↗

Enhanced Formation Flying for the Earth Observing-1 (EO-1) New Millennium Mission

With scientific objectives for Earth observation programs becoming more ambitious and spacecraft becoming more autonomous, the need for new technical approaches on the feasibility of achieving and maintaining formations of spacecraft has come to the forefront. The trend to develop small low cost spacecraft has led many scientists to recognize the advantage of flying several spacecraft in formation, an example of which is shown in the figure below, to achieve the correlated instrument measurements formerly possible only by flying many instruments on a single large platform. Yet, formation flying imposes additional complications on orbit maintenance, especially when each spacecraft has its own orbit requirements. However, advances in automation proposed by GSFC Codes 550 and 712 allow more of the burden in maneuver planning and execution to be placed onboard the spacecraft, mitigating some of the associated operational concerns. The purpose of this analysis is to develop the fundamentals of formation flying mechanics, concepts for understanding the relative motion of free flying spacecraft, and an operational control theory for formation maintenance of the Earth Observing-1 (EO-l) spacecraft that is part of the New Millennium. Results of this development can be used to determine the appropriateness of formation flying for a particular case as well as the operational impacts. Applications to the Mission to Planet Earth (MTPE) Earth Observing System (EOS) and New Millennium (NM) were highly considered in analysis and applications. This paper presents the proposed methods for the guidance and control of the EO-1 spacecraft to formation fly with the Landsat-7 spacecraft using an autonomous closed loop three axis navigation control, GPS, and Cross link navigation support. Simulation results using various fidelity levels of modeling, algorithms developed and implemented in MATLAB, and autonomous 'fuzzy logic' control using AutoCon will be presented. The results of these analysis on the ability to meet mission and formation flying requirements will be presented.

Folta, David↗

Acceptability of Flight Deck-Based Interval Management Crew Procedures

The Interval Management for Near-term Operations Validation of Acceptability (IM-NOVA) experiment was conducted at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Langley Research Center (LaRC) in support of the NASA Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) Airspace Systems Program's Air Traffic Management Technology Demonstration - 1 (ATD-1). ATD-1 is intended to showcase an integrated set of technologies that provide an efficient arrival solution for managing aircraft using NextGen surveillance, navigation, procedures, and automation for both airborne and ground-based systems. The goal of the IM-NOVA experiment was to assess if procedures outlined by the ATD-1 Concept of Operations, when used with a minimum set of Flight deck-based Interval Management (FIM) equipment and a prototype crew interface, were acceptable to and feasible for use by flight crews in a voice communications environment. To investigate an integrated arrival solution using ground-based air traffic control tools and aircraft automatic dependent surveillance broadcast (ADS-B) tools, the LaRC FIM system and the Traffic Management Advisor with Terminal Metering and Controller Managed Spacing tools developed at the NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) were integrated in LaRC's Air Traffic Operations Laboratory. Data were collected from 10 crews of current, qualified 757/767 pilots asked to fly a high-fidelity, fixed based simulator during scenarios conducted within an airspace environment modeled on the Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) Terminal Radar Approach Control area. The aircraft simulator was equipped with the Airborne Spacing for Terminal Area Routes algorithm and a FIM crew interface consisting of electronic flight bags and ADS-B guidance displays. Researchers used "pseudo-pilot" stations to control 24 simulated aircraft that provided multiple air traffic flows into DFW, and recently retired DFW air traffic controllers served as confederate Center, Feeder, Final, and Tower controllers. Pilot participant feedback indicated that the procedures used by flight crews to receive and execute interval management (IM) clearances in a voice communications environment were logical, easy to follow, did not contain any missing or extraneous steps, and required the use of an acceptable level of workload. The majority of the pilot participants found the IM concept, in addition to the proposed FIM crew procedures, to be acceptable and indicated that the ATD-1 procedures can be successfully executed in a near-term NextGen environment.

Murdock, Jennifer L.↗

Ontolology Negotiation Between Scientific Archives

This paper describes an approach to ontology negotiation between information agents. Ontologies are declarative (data driven) expressions of an agent's "world": the objects, operations, facts, and rules that constitute the logical space within which an agent performs. Ontology negotiation enables agents to cooperate in performing a task, even if they are based on different ontologies. 'Me process allows agents to discover ontology conflicts and then, though incremental interpretation, clarification, and explanation, establish a common basis for communicating with each other. The need for ontology negotiation stems from the proliferation of information sources and of agents with widely varying specialty expertise. The unmanageability of massive amounts of web-based information is already becoming apparent. It is starting to have an impact on professions that rely on distributed archived information. If the expansion continues at its present rate without an ontology negotiation process being introduced, there will soon be no way to ensure the accuracy and completeness of information that scientists obtain from sources other than their own experiments. Ontology negotiation is becoming increasingly recognized as a crucial element of scalable agent technology. This is because agents, by their very nature, are supposed to operate with a fair amount of autonomy and independence from their end-users. Part of this independence is the ability to enlist other agents for help in performing a task (such as locating information on the web). The agents enlisted for help may be "owned" by a different end-user or organization (such as a document archive), and there is no guarantee that they will use the same terminology or understand the same concepts (objects, operators, theorems, rules) as the recruiting agent. For NASA, the need for ontology negotiation arises at the boundaries between scientific disciplines. For example: modeling the effects of global warming might involve knowledge about imaging, climate analysis, ecology, demographics, industrial economics, and biology. The need for ontology negotiation also arises at the boundaries between scientific programs. For example, a Principal Investigator may want to use information from a previous mission to complement downloads from the instruments currently deployed.

Bailin, Sidney C.↗

Air Traffic Management Technology Demostration Phase 1 (ATD) Interval Management for Near-Term Operations Validation of Acceptability (IM-NOVA) Experiment

The Interval Management for Near-term Operations Validation of Acceptability (IM-NOVA) experiment was conducted at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Langley Research Center (LaRC) in support of the NASA Airspace Systems Program's Air Traffic Management Technology Demonstration-1 (ATD-1). ATD-1 is intended to showcase an integrated set of technologies that provide an efficient arrival solution for managing aircraft using Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) surveillance, navigation, procedures, and automation for both airborne and ground-based systems. The goal of the IMNOVA experiment was to assess if procedures outlined by the ATD-1 Concept of Operations were acceptable to and feasible for use by flight crews in a voice communications environment when used with a minimum set of Flight Deck-based Interval Management (FIM) equipment and a prototype crew interface. To investigate an integrated arrival solution using ground-based air traffic control tools and aircraft Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) tools, the LaRC FIM system and the Traffic Management Advisor with Terminal Metering and Controller Managed Spacing tools developed at the NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) were integrated into LaRC's Air Traffic Operations Laboratory (ATOL). Data were collected from 10 crews of current 757/767 pilots asked to fly a high-fidelity, fixed-based simulator during scenarios conducted within an airspace environment modeled on the Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) Terminal Radar Approach Control area. The aircraft simulator was equipped with the Airborne Spacing for Terminal Area Routes (ASTAR) algorithm and a FIM crew interface consisting of electronic flight bags and ADS-B guidance displays. Researchers used "pseudo-pilot" stations to control 24 simulated aircraft that provided multiple air traffic flows into the DFW International Airport, and recently retired DFW air traffic controllers served as confederate Center, Feeder, Final, and Tower controllers. Analyses of qualitative data revealed that the procedures used by flight crews to receive and execute interval management (IM) clearances in a voice communications environment were logical, easy to follow, did not contain any missing or extraneous steps, and required the use of an acceptable workload level. The majority of the pilot participants found the IM concept, in addition to the proposed FIM crew procedures, to be acceptable and indicated that the ATD-1 procedures could be successfully executed in a nearterm NextGen environment. Analyses of quantitative data revealed that the proposed procedures were feasible for use by flight crews in a voice communications environment. The delivery accuracy at the achieve-by point was within +/-5 sec, and the delivery precision was less than 5 sec. Furthermore, FIM speed commands occurred at a rate of less than one per minute, and pilots found the frequency of the speed commands to be acceptable at all times throughout the experiment scenarios.

Kibler, Jennifer L.↗

Method for Tracking and Communicating Aggregate Risk Through the Use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) Tools

Large, complex projects can identify a significant number and variety of risks, throughout the project life cycle. These risks are analyzed, mitigated, closed or accepted as independent uncertainties. Once closed or accepted, it is easy for projects to lose awareness of their impact. In reality, each of these risks contributes some amount to the overall risk posture of the project. The ability to track and effectively communicate this aggregate risk has represented a challenge to project management. There have been previous attempts to create a schema to communicate the aggregate effect of risks, without notable success. Most of these attempts have centered on some additive metric derived from the scoring of likelihood and consequence values. This, in and of itself, is a logical approach, but all too often the scores were then aggregated to a level where all context was lost. One weakness has been a lack of attempt to create linkages or logical groups of the risks upon which useful aggregation could then occur. The overall move to model-based (systems) engineering (MBSE) has opened up a vast frontier of opportunities to better integrate all project data. MBSE provides an underlying layer that links data items to each other. Objectives link to requirements, which then link to functions, functions to physical architecture items, and so on, as far down as projects want to model. While it started with a focus on modeling requirements based on things like use cases, efforts are now underway to integrate safety and mission assurance (S&MA) information and analyses, such as risks. This effort, called Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA), is yielding models that are more useful and are a more accurate representations of the systems. MBSE models, with this ability to link related items, provide a new means of tracking and communicating aggregate risks. In the proposed method, risks are added into the models as distinct items, having attributes that communicate a scoring derived from the likelihood and consequence values as charted on the standard NASA 5x5 risk matrix. Like earlier efforts, each box in the 5x5 has an associated scoring, which may include both a current score and potential post-mitigation/control score. The risk items are then linked to elements of the model, such as system objectives/goals, requirements, functions, or physical architecture items, with "Risk to" relationships. These risks will then be communicated by use of reports generated from the model, detailing all risks and/or hazards linked to model elements. These reports can include aggregate impacts, including a current scoring and potential future state scoring based on the planned mitigations and/or controls. These reports will show all risks, open, accepted, and closed, linked to project objectives or requirements. When run as part of an upcoming risk acceptance discussion, these reports will serve to remind the team of all previous risks that relate to the effected portion of the system. When included as part of periodic program or project reviews, risk reviews, and safety reviews, this method can improve the overall understanding of the system's true risk posture. This proposed method takes full advantage of the advances that modern modeling techniques provide, with a minimal investment of additional time. Utilizing the model environment also enables a near constant access to current state of aggregate risks.

model based mission assurance↗

GMI-IPS: Python Processing Software for Aircraft Campaigns

NASA's Atmospheric Tomography Mission (ATom) seeks to understand the impact of anthropogenic air pollution on gases in the Earth's atmosphere. Four flight campaigns are being deployed on a seasonal basis to establish a continuous global-scale data set intended to improve the representation of chemically reactive gases in global atmospheric chemistry models. The Global Modeling Initiative (GMI), is creating chemical transport simulations on a global scale for each of the ATom flight campaigns. To meet the computational demands required to translate the GMI simulation data to grids associated with the flights from the ATom campaigns, the GMI ICARTT Processing Software (GMI-IPS) has been developed and is providing key functionality for data processing and analysis in this ongoing effort. The GMI-IPS is written in Python and provides computational kernels for data interpolation and visualization tasks on GMI simulation data. A key feature of the GMI-IPS, is its ability to read ICARTT files, a text-based file format for airborne instrument data, and extract the required flight information that defines regional and temporal grid parameters associated with an ATom flight. Perhaps most importantly, the GMI-IPS creates ICARTT files containing GMI simulated data, which are used in collaboration with ATom instrument teams and other modeling groups. The initial main task of the GMI-IPS is to interpolate GMI model data to the finer temporal resolution (1-10 seconds) of a given flight. The model data includes basic fields such as temperature and pressure, but the main focus of this effort is to provide species concentrations of chemical gases for ATom flights. The software, which uses parallel computation techniques for data intensive tasks, linearly interpolates each of the model fields to the time resolution of the flight. The temporally interpolated data is then saved to disk, and is used to create additional derived quantities. In order to translate the GMI model data to the spatial grid of the flight path as defined by the pressure, latitude, and longitude points at each flight time record, a weighted average is then calculated from the nearest neighbors in two dimensions (latitude, longitude). Using SciPya's Regular Grid Interpolator, interpolation functions are generated for the GMI model grid and the calculated weighted averages. The flight path points are then extracted from the ATom ICARTT instrument file, and are sent to the multi-dimensional interpolating functions to generate GMI field quantities along the spatial path of the flight. The interpolated field quantities are then written to a ICARTT data file, which is stored for further manipulation. The GMI-IPS is aware of a generic ATom ICARTT header format, containing basic information for all flight campaigns. The GMI-IPS includes logic to edit metadata for the derived field quantities, as well as modify the generic header data such as processing dates and associated instrument files. The ICARTT interpolated data is then appended to the modified header data, and the ICARTT processing is complete for the given flight and ready for collaboration. The output ICARTT data adheres to the ICARTT file format standards V1.1. The visualization component of the GMI-IPS uses Matplotlib extensively and has several functions ranging in complexity. First, it creates a model background curtain for the flight (time versus model eta levels) with the interpolated flight data superimposed on the curtain. Secondly, it creates a time-series plot of the interpolated flight data. Lastly, the visualization component creates averaged 2D model slices (longitude versus latitude) with overlaid flight track circles at key pressure levels. The GMI-IPS consists of a handful of classes and supporting functionality that have been generalized to be compatible with any ICARTT file that adheres to the base class definition. The base class represents a generic ICARTT entry, only defining a single time entry and 3D spatial positioning parameters. Other classes inherit from this base class; several classes for input ICARTT instrument files, which contain the necessary flight positioning information as a basis for data processing, as well as other classes for output ICARTT files, which contain the interpolated model data. Utility classes provide functionality for routine procedures such as: comparing field names among ICARTT files, reading ICARTT entries from a data file and storing them in data structures, and returning a reduced spatial grid based on a collection of ICARTT entries. Although the GMI-IPS is compatible with GMI model data, it can be adapted with reasonable effort for any simulation that creates Hierarchical Data Format (HDF) files. The same can be said of its adaptability to ICARTT files outside of the context of the ATom mission. The GMI-IPS contains just under 30,000 lines of code, eight classes, and a dozen drivers and utility programs. It is maintained with GIT source code management and has been used to deliver processed GMI model data for the ATom campaigns that have taken place to date.

Damon, M. R.↗

Toward Synthesis, Analysis, and Certification of Security Protocols

Implemented security protocols are basically pieces of software which are used to (a) authenticate the other communication partners, (b) establish a secure communication channel between them (using insecure communication media), and (c) transfer data between the communication partners in such a way that these data only available to the desired receiver, but not to anyone else. Such an implementation usually consists of the following components: the protocol-engine, which controls in which sequence the messages of the protocol are sent over the network, and which controls the assembly/disassembly and processing (e.g., decryption) of the data. the cryptographic routines to actually encrypt or decrypt the data (using given keys), and t,he interface to the operating system and to the application. For a correct working of such a security protocol, all of these components must work flawlessly. Many formal-methods based techniques for the analysis of a security protocols have been developed. They range from using specific logics (e.g.: BAN-logic [4], or higher order logics [12] to model checking [2] approaches. In each approach, the analysis tries to prove that no (or at least not a modeled intruder) can get access to secret data. Otherwise, a scenario illustrating the &tack may be produced. Despite the seeming simplicity of security protocols ("only" a few messages are sent between the protocol partners in order to ensure a secure communication), many flaws have been detected. Unfortunately, even a perfect protocol engine does not guarantee flawless working of a security protocol, as incidents show. Many break-ins and security vulnerabilities are caused by exploiting errors in the implementation of the protocol engine or the underlying operating system. Attacks using buffer-overflows are a very common class of such attacks. Errors in the implementation of exception or error handling can open up additional vulnerabilities. For example, on a website with a log-in screen: multiple tries with invalid passwords caused the expected error message (too many retries). but let the user nevertheless pass. Finally, security can be compromised by silly implementation bugs or design decisions. In a commercial VPN software, all calls to the encryption routines were incidentally replaced by stubs, probably during factory testing. The product worked nicely. and the error (an open VPN) would have gone undetected, if a team member had not inspected the low-level traffic out of curiosity. Also, the use secret proprietary encryption routines can backfire, because such algorithms often exhibit weaknesses which can be exploited easily (see e.g., DVD encoding). Summarizing, there is large number of possibilities to make errors which can compromise the security of a protocol. In today s world with short time-to-market and the use of security protocols in open and hostile networks for safety-critical applications (e.g., power or air-traffic control), such slips could lead to catastrophic situations. Thus, formal methods and automatic reasoning techniques should not be used just for the formal proof of absence of an attack, but they ought to be used to provide an end-to-end tool-supported framework for security software. With such an approach all required artifacts (code, documentation, test cases) , formal analyses, and reliable certification will be generated automatically, given a single, high level specification. By a combination of program synthesis, formal protocol analysis, certification; and proof-carrying code, this goal is within practical reach, since all the important technologies for such an approach actually exist and only need to be assembled in the right way.

Schumann, Johann↗

Measuring Input Thresholds on an Existing Board

A critical PECL (positive emitter-coupled logic) interface to Xilinx interface needed to be changed on an existing flight board. The new Xilinx input interface used a CMOS (complementary metal-oxide semiconductor) type of input, and the driver could meet its thresholds typically, but not in worst-case, according to the data sheet. The previous interface had been based on comparison with an external reference, but the CMOS input is based on comparison with an internal divider from the power supply. A way to measure what the exact input threshold was for this device for 64 inputs on a flight board was needed. The measurement technique allowed an accurate measurement of the voltage required to switch a Xilinx input from high to low for each of the 64 lines, while only probing two of them. Directly driving an external voltage was considered too risky, and tests done on any other unit could not be used to qualify the flight board. The two lines directly probed gave an absolute voltage threshold calibration, while data collected on the remaining 62 lines without probing gave relative measurements that could be used to identify any outliers. The PECL interface was forced to a long-period square wave by driving a saturated square wave into the ADC (analog to digital converter). The active pull-down circuit was turned off, causing each line to rise rapidly and fall slowly according to the input s weak pull-down circuitry. The fall time shows up as a change in the pulse width of the signal ready by the Xilinx. This change in pulse width is a function of capacitance, pulldown current, and input threshold. Capacitance was known from the different trace lengths, plus a gate input capacitance, which is the same for all inputs. The pull-down current is the same for all inputs including the two that are probed directly. The data was combined, and the Excel solver tool was used to find input thresholds for the 62 lines. This was repeated over different supply voltages and temperatures to show that the interface had voltage margin under all worst case conditions. Gate input thresholds are normally measured at the manufacturer when the device is on a chip tester. A key function of this machine was duplicated on an existing flight board with no modifications to the nets to be tested, with the exception of changes in the FPGA program.

Kuperman, Igor↗

Accomplishments of the Advanced Reusable Technologies (ART) RBCC Project at NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center

The focus of the NASA / Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Advanced Reusable Technologies (ART) project is to advance and develop Rocket-Based Combined-Cycle (RBCC) technologies. The ART project began in 1996 as part of the Advanced Space Transportation Program (ASTP). The project is composed of several activities including RBCC engine ground testing, tool development, vehicle / mission studies, and component testing / development. The major contractors involved in the ART project are Aerojet and Rocketdyne. A large database of RBCC ground test data was generated for the air-augmented rocket (AAR), ramjet, scramjet, and ascent rocket modes of operation for both the Aerojet and Rocketdyne concepts. Transition between consecutive modes was also demonstrated as well as trajectory simulation. The Rocketdyne freejet tests were conducted at GASL in the Flight Acceleration Simulation Test (FAST) facility. During a single test, the FAST facility is capable of simulating both the enthalpy and aerodynamic conditions over a range of Mach numbers in a flight trajectory. Aerojet performed freejet testing in the Pebble Bed facility at GASL as well as direct-connect testing at GASL. Aerojet also performed sea-level static (SLS) testing at the Aerojet A-Zone facility in Sacramento, CA. Several flight-type flowpath components were developed under the ART project. Aerojet designed and fabricated ceramic scramjet injectors. The structural design of the injectors will be tested in a simulated scramjet environment where thermal effects and performance will be assessed. Rocketdyne will be replacing the cooled combustor in the A5 rig with a flight-weight combustor that is near completion. Aerojet's formed duct panel is currently being fabricated and will be tested in the SLS rig in Aerojet's A-Zone facility. Aerojet has already successfully tested a cooled cowl panel in the same facility. In addition to MSFC, other NASA centers have contributed to the ART project as well. Inlet testing and parametrics were performed at NASA / Glenn Research Center (GRC) and NASA / Langley Research Center (LaRC) for both the Aerojet and Rocketdyne concepts. LaRC conducted an Air-Breathing Launch Vehicle (ABLV) study for several vehicle concepts with RBCC propulsion systems. LaRC is also performing a CFD analysis of the ramjet mode for both flowpaths based on GASL test conditions. A study was performed in 1999 to investigate the feasibility of performing an RBCC flight test on the NASA / Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) SR-71 aircraft. Academia involvement in the ART project includes parametric RBCC flowpath testing by Pennsylvania State University (PSU). In addition to thrust and wall static pressure measurements, PSU is also using laser diagnostics to analyze the flowfield in the test rig. MSFC is performing CFD analysis of the PSU rig at select test conditions for model baseline and validation. Also, Georgia Institute of Technology (GT) conducted a vision vehicle study using the Aerojet RBCC concept. Overall, the ART project has been very successful in advancing RBCC technology. Along the way, several major milestones were achieved and "firsts" accomplished. For example, under the ART project, the first dynamic trajectory simulation testing was performed and the Rocketdyne engine A5 logged over one hour of accumulated test time. The next logical step is to develop and demonstrate a flight-weight RBCC engine system.

Nelson, Karl W.↗

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

Pre-Mission Input Requirements to Enable Successful Sample Collection by a Remote Field/EVA Team

This paper is intended to evaluate the sample collection process with respect to sample characterization and decision making. In some cases, it may be sufficient to know whether a given outcrop or hand sample is the same as or different from previous sampling localities or samples. In other cases, it may be important to have more in-depth characterization of the sample, such as basic composition, mineralogy, and petrology, in order to effectively identify the best sample. Contextual field observations, in situ/handheld analysis, and backroom evaluation may all play a role in understanding field lithologies and their importance for return. For example, whether a rock is a breccia or a clast-laden impact melt may be difficult based on a single sample, but becomes clear as exploration of a field site puts it into context. The FINESSE (Field Investigations to Enable Solar System Science and Exploration) team is a new activity focused on a science and exploration field based research program aimed at generating strategic knowledge in preparation for the human and robotic exploration of the Moon, near-Earth asteroids (NEAs) and Phobos and Deimos. We used the FINESSE field excursion to the West Clearwater Lake Impact structure (WCIS) as an opportunity to test factors related to sampling decisions. In contract to other technology-driven NASA analog studies, The FINESSE WCIS activity is science-focused, and moreover, is sampling-focused, with the explicit intent to return the best samples for geochronology studies in the laboratory. This specific objective effectively reduces the number of variables in the goals of the field test and enables a more controlled investigation of the role of the crewmember in selecting samples. We formulated one hypothesis to test: that providing details regarding the analytical fate of the samples (e.g. geochronology, XRF/XRD, etc.) to the crew prior to their traverse will result in samples that are more likely to meet specific analytical objectives than samples collected in the absence of this premission information. We conducted three tests of this hypothesis. Our investigation was designed to document processes, tools and procedures for crew sampling of planetary targets. This is not meant to be a blind, controlled test of crew efficacy, but rather an effort to recognize the relevant variables that enter into sampling protocol and to develop recommendations for crew and backroom training in future endeavors. Methods: One of the primary FINESSE field deployment objectives was to collect impact melt rocks and impact melt-bearing breccias from a number of locations around the WCIS structure to enable high precision geochronology of the crater to be performed [1]. We conducted three tests at WCIS after two full days of team participation in field site activities, including using remote sensing data and geologic maps, hiking overland to become familiar with the terrain, and examining previously-collected samples from other islands. In addition, the team members shared their projects and techniques with the entire team. We chose our "crew members" as volunteers from the team, all of whom had had moderate training in geologic fieldwork and became familiar with the general field setting. The first two tests were short, focused tests of our hypothesis. Test A was to obtain hydrothermal vugs; Test B was to obtain impact melt and intrusive rock as well as the contact between the two to check for contact metamorphism and age differences. In both cases, the test director had prior knowledge of the site geology and had developed a study-specific objective for sampling prior to deployment. Prior to the field deployment, the crewmember was briefed on the sampling objective and the laboratory techniques that would be used on the samples. At the field sites (Fig. 2), the crewmember was given 30 minutes to survey a small section of outcrop (10-15 m) and acquire a suite of three samples. The crewmember talked through his process and the test director kept track of the timeline in verbal cues to the crewmember. At the conclusion, the team member conducting the scientific study appraised the samples and train of thought. Test C was a 90-minute EVA simulation using two crewmembers working out of line-of-sight in communication with a science backroom. The science objectives were determined by the science backroom team in advance using a Gigapan image of the outcrop (Fig. 1). The science team formulated hypotheses for the outcrop units and created sampling objectives for impact-melt lithologies; the science team turned these into a science plan, which they communicated to the crew in camp prior to crew deployment. As part of the science plan, the science team also discussed their sample needs in depth with the crewmembers, including laboratory methods, objectives, and samples sizes needed. During the deployment, the two crewmembers relayed real-time information to the science backroom by radio with no time delay. Both the crew and science team re-evaluated their hypotheses and science plans in real-time. Discussion: Upon evaluation, we found that the focused tests (Tests A and B) were successful in meeting their scientific objectives. The crewmember used their knowledge of how the samples were to be used in further study (technique, sample size, and scientific need) to focus on the sampling task. The crewmember was comfortable spending minimal time describing and mapping the outcrop. The crewmember used all available time to get a good sample. The larger test was unsuccessful in meeting the sampling objectives. When the crewmembers began describing the lithologies, it was quickly apparent that the lithologies were not as the backroom expected and had communicated to the crew. When the outcrop wasn't as expected, the crew members instinctively switched to field characterization mode, taking significant time to characterize and map the outcrop. One crew member admitted that he "kind of lost track" of the sampling strategy as he focused on the basic outcrop characterization. This is the logical first step in a field geology campaign, that a significant amount of time must be spent by the crew and backroom to understand the outcrop and its significance. Basic field characterization of an outcrop is a focused activity that takes significant time and training [2, 3]. Sampling of representational lithologies can be added to this activity for little cost [4]. However, we have shown that identification of unusual or specific samples for laboratory study also takes significant time and knowledge. We suggest that sampling of this type be considered a separate activity from field characterization, and that crewmembers be trained in sampling needs for different kinds of studies (representative lithologies vs. specialized samples) to acquire a mindset for sampling similar to field mapping. Sampling activities should be given a significant amount of specifically allocated time in scheduling EVA activities; and in the better case, that sampling be done as a second activity to a previously studied outcrop where both crew and backroom are comfortable with its context and characteristics. Our hypothesis posited that crewmember knowledge of how the samples would be used upon return would aid them in choosing relevant samples. Our testing bore this hypothesis out to some extent. We therefore recommend that crewmember training should include exposure to the laboratory techniques and analyses that will be used on the samples to foster this knowledge. There is also the potential for increasing crewmember contextual knowledge real-time in the field through the introduction of in situ geochemical technologies such as field portable XRF. The presence of field portable geochemical technology could enable the astronauts to interrogate the samples for K abundance real-time, ensuring they could collect valuable and dateable samples [5]. Though simulations such as these can teach us a fair bit about decision making processes and timeline building, one EVA participant noted that when he wasn't collecting "real" samples, he wasn't at his best. This effect suggests that higher-fidelity studies involving truly remote participants conducting actual scientific studies merit further attention to capture lessons for application to future crew situations.

sample collection↗