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EXPERT PANEL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ASSESSMENT OF FY2008 CORROSION AND STRESS CORROSION CRACKING SIMULANT TESTING PROGRAM

The Expert Panel Oversight Committee (EPOC) has been overseeing the implementation of selected parts of Recommendation III of the final report, Expert Panel workshop for Hanford Site Double-Shell Tank Waste Chemistry Optimization, RPP-RPT-22126. Recommendation III provided four specific requirements necessary for Panel approval of a proposal to revise the chemistry control limits for the Double-Shell Tanks (DSTs). One of the more significant requirements was successful performance of an accelerated stress corrosion cracking (SCC) experimental program. This testing program has evaluated the optimization of the chemistry controls to prevent corrosion in the interstitial liquid and supernatant regions of the DSTs.

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Validation Study for Crediting Chlorine in Criticality Analyses for Spent Nuclear Fuel Disposition

Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management practices in the United States rely on dry storage systems that include both canister- and cask-based systems. The United States Department of Energy Used Fuel Disposition Campaign is examining the feasibility of direct disposal of dual-purpose (storage and transportation) canisters (DPCs) in a geological repository. One of the major technical challenges for direct disposal is the ability to demonstrate the subcriticality of the DPCs loaded with SNF for the repository performance period (e.g., 10,000 years or more) as the DPCs may undergo degradation over time. Specifically, groundwater ingress into the DPC (i.e., flooding) could allow the system to achieve criticality in scenarios where the neutron absorber plates in the DPC basket have degraded. However, as was shown by Banerjee et al., some aqueous species in the groundwater provide noticeable reactivity reduction for these systems. For certain amounts of particular aqueous species (e.g., chlorine, lithium) in the groundwater, subcriticality can be demonstrated even for DPCs with complete degradation of the neutron absorber plates or a degraded fuel basket configuration. It has been demonstrated that chlorine is the leading impurity, as indicated by significant neutron absorption in the water that is available in reasonable quantities for the deep geological repository media under consideration. This paper presents the results of an investigation of the available integral experiments worldwide that could be used to validate DPC disposal criticality evaluations, including credit for chlorine. Due to the small number of applicable critical configurations, validation through traditional trending analysis was not possible. The bias in the eigenvalue of the application systems due only to the chlorine was calculated using TSURFER analysis and found to be on the order of 100 percent mille (1 pcm = 10 -5 k eff ). This study investigated the design of a series of critical configurations with varying amounts of chlorine to address validation gaps. Such integral experiments would support the crediting of the chlorine neutron-absorption properties in groundwater and the demonstration of subcriticality for DPCs in deep geologic repositories with sufficient chlorine availability.

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Opportunities for Cost Effective Disposal of Radioactively Contaminated Solid Waste on the Oak Ridge Reservation, Oak Ridge, TN - 13045

Department of Energy (DOE) requirements for the release of non-real property, including solid waste, containing low levels of residual radioactive materials are specified in DOE Order 458.1 and associated guidance. Authorized limits have been approved under the requirements of DOE Order 5400.5, predecessor to DOE Order 458.1, to permit disposal of solid waste containing low levels of residual radioactive materials at solid waste landfills located within the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR). Specifically, volumetric concentration limits for disposal of solid waste at Industrial Landfill V and at Construction/Demolition Landfill VII were established in 2003 and 2007, respectively, based on the requirements in effect at that time, which included: an evaluation to ensure that radiation doses to the public would not exceed 25 mrem/year and would be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), with a goal of a few mrem/year or less (in fact, these authorized limits actually were derived to meet a dose constraint of 1 mrem/year); an evaluation of compliance with groundwater protection requirements; and reasonable assurance that the proposed disposal is not likely to result in a future requirement for remediation of the landfill. Prior to approval as DOE authorized limits, these volumetric concentration limits were coordinated with the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) and documented in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the TDEC Division of Radiological Health and the TDEC Division of Solid Waste Management. These limits apply to the disposal of soil and debris waste generated from construction, maintenance, environmental restoration, and decontamination and decommissioning (D and D) activities on the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation. The approved site-specific authorized limits were incorporated in the URS/CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) waste profile system that authorizes disposal of special wastes at either of the RCRA Subtitle D landfills. However, a recent DOE assessment found that implementation of the site-specific authorized limits for volumetrically contaminated waste was potentially limited due in part to confusion regarding the applicability of volumetric concentration limits and/or surface activity limits to specific wastes. This paper describes recent efforts to update the authorized limits for Industrial Landfill V and Construction/Demolition Landfill VII and to improve the procedures for implementation of these criteria. The approved authorized limits have been evaluated and confirmed to meet the current requirements of DOE Order 458.1, which superseded DOE Order 5400.5 in February 2011. In addition, volumetric concentration limits have been developed for additional radionuclides, and site-specific authorized limits for wastes with surface contamination have been developed. Implementing procedures have been revised to clarify the applicability of volumetric concentration limits and surface activity limits, and to allow the use of non-destructive waste characterization methods. These changes have been designed to promote improved utilization of available disposal capacity of the onsite disposal facilities within the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation. In addition, these changes serve to bring the waste acceptance requirements at these DOE onsite landfills into greater consistency with the requirements for commercial/ public landfills under the TDEC Bulk Survey for Release (BSFR) program, including two public RCRA Subtitle D landfills in close proximity to the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation. (authors)

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Automated Groundwater Monitoring of Uranium at the Hanford Site, Washington - 13116

An automated groundwater monitoring system for the detection of uranyl ion in groundwater was deployed at the 300 Area Industrial Complex, Hanford Site, Washington. The research was conducted to determine if at-site, automated monitoring of contaminant movement in the subsurface is a viable alternative to the baseline manual sampling and analytical laboratory assay methods currently employed. The monitoring system used Arsenazo III, a colorimetric chelating compound, for the detection of the uranyl ion. The analytical system had a limit of quantification of approximately 10 parts per billion (ppb, μg/L). The EPA's drinking water maximum contaminant level (MCL) is 30 ppb [1]. In addition to the uranyl ion assay, the system was capable of acquiring temperature, conductivity, and river level data. The system was fully automated and could be operated remotely. The system was capable of collecting water samples from four sampling sources, quantifying the uranyl ion, and periodically performing a calibration of the analytical cell. The system communications were accomplished by way of cellular data link with the information transmitted through the internet. Four water sample sources were selected for the investigation: one location provided samples of Columbia River water, and the remaining three sources provided groundwater from aquifer sampling tubes positioned in a vertical array at the Columbia River shoreline. The typical sampling schedule was to sample the four locations twice per day with one calibration check per day. This paper outlines the instrumentation employed, the operation of the instrumentation, and analytical results for a period of time between July and August, 2012. The presentation includes the uranyl ion concentration and conductivity results from the automated sampling/analysis system, along with a comparison between the automated monitor's analytical performance and an independent laboratory analysis. Benefits of using the automated system as an alternative to traditional sample collection and analysis includes the following: - Field observations that provide more characterization information than is possible using traditional monitoring methods. - Potentially significant reductions in labor and analytical costs if traditional methods are complemented by automated systems. - The reduced cost of acquiring samples will allow for more frequent collection of samples that may be automatically introduced into real-time graphical flux programs allowing site managers to observe the changes in contaminant concentrations during remediation projects and across discrete river stage events. (authors)

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Corrosion Control during Closure Activities at the Savannah River Site - 13514

Liquid radioactive wastes from the Savannah River Site (SRS) separation process are stored in large underground carbon steel tanks. Until the waste is removed from storage, transferred, and processed, the materials and structures of the tanks must maintain a confinement function by providing a barrier to the environment and by maintaining acceptable structural stability during normal service and design basis events (e.g., earthquake conditions). A corrosion control program is in place to ensure that degradation of the steel does not impact the structural and leak integrity functions of these waste tanks. The SRS is currently retrieving waste from older waste tanks and processing the waste through the vitrification for long term stabilization. The retrieval processes prepare the tanks for ultimate closure (i.e., grouting) by removing sludge by mechanical and/or sluicing methods, dissolving salt cake by adding water, and chemical cleaning of the residual sludge with oxalic acid. Each of these retrieval methods will result in waste chemistry that does not meet the requirements of the current corrosion control program. Given the short-term exposure and limited remaining service life for the tanks in which retrievals are being performed, an assessment of the need for corrosion controls in these tanks was performed. The assessment reviewed the corrosion rates in the more aggressive environments and the postulated loads on the structure during the closure activities. The assessment concluded that the current corrosion control program may be suspended for a short period of time while final retrieval of the waste is performed. (authors)

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Conceptual Design for a Short-Lived Low- and Intermediate-Level Waste Repository at the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Center, Baghdad, Iraq - 17189

The European Commission under their Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) has initiated a project supporting Iraq's efforts for the safe disposal of short lived low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (SL-LILW) arising from the decommissioning of Iraqi nuclear installations. The INSC project includes both the development of an initial conceptual level basic design and preliminary safety assessment (PSAR) report and the subsequent detailed engineering design and supporting intermediate safety assessment report (ISAR). The project is being executed by a Consortium led by NUKEM Technologies Engineering Services GmbH and joined by DBE Technology GmbH of Germany; JAVYS a.s. of Slovakia and MCM Environmental Services Ltd of the United Kingdom. The current paper focuses on the development of the conceptual level basic design. In previous decades Iraq had a significant nuclear program which encompassed ten nuclear sites spread out across the country. The largest site was located at the Al-Tuwaitha site near Baghdad where 18 nuclear facilities were located. The facilities suffered significant damage from bombing and subsequent looting during the first Gulf War in 1991. Currently, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) is the radioactive waste management operator in Iraq and also the license holder for the ten Iraqi nuclear sites, all of them heavily damaged. Because of the ongoing security concerns in Iraq MoST has selected the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Center as the preferred and best suited location for development of an SL-LILW repository. As an initial step in development of the conceptual design various repository design options for the site were examined and assessed. The assessment considered similar facilities that have been implemented internationally. At the conclusion of the assessment and in conjunction with the Iraqi Beneficiaries from MoST, a near-surface vault design was selected for the facility. The design of the facility relies on experience gained from existing low-level waste repositories at Centre de l'Aube in France and the El Cabril solid radioactive waste disposal facility in Spain as well as on more recent experience gained in the design of the Bulgaria National Disposal Facility (NDF) under construction near the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. Similar to these reference designs, the concept for the Al Tuwaitha Disposal Facility (ATDF) will rely on a series of reinforced concrete vaults into which containerised waste will be placed. Each vault will consist of two chambers designed specifically to hold the waste. Central drainage points in each waste chamber will lead to an infiltration water collection system designed to detect any failures in the waste containment. Each disposal vault will be sealed after filling by installation of a reinforced concrete closure slab. Once all of the waste has been disposed of the site will be decommissioned and a multilayer protective cover will be installed over the sealed disposal vaults. The multilayer cover will act to further isolate the waste from the environment by limiting the access of water to the waste. Due in part to the presence of shallow groundwater at the site and to avoid potential damage to the facility by flooding from the nearby Tigris River the concept for the Al Tuwaitha Disposal Facility requires construction of the disposal vaults on a raised platform several meters above ground level. Construction of this platform will be integrated into the conceptual safety design and materials will be selected which further enhance the isolation function of the disposal system by hindering or delaying the release of radionuclides to the environment. The infiltration water collection system, which will be constructed in a specifically designed accessible gallery embedded and fully integrated into the platform, will provide access to inspection points located beneath each disposal chamber. The ATDF when completed will be a further demonstration of the adaptability of the disposal vault concept for use in isolating SL-LILW from the environment. (authors)

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Double-Shell Tank Primary Bottom Inspection Development - 19067

Double-Shell Tank (DST) integrity at Hanford is maintained with a variety of activities such as ultrasonic and visual inspections, chemistry controls, corrosion monitoring and structural analyses methods [1]. A pressing need for the Double-Shell Tank Integrity Program is the ability to inspect the bottom of the tanks. Though the DSTs' annulus spaces (the space between the internal and external tank walls) have been inspected visually since 1992 and with Ultrasonic Testing (UT) since 1996, WRPS has been unable to conduct inspections of the tank bottoms due to limitations of available technology, omitting about 40 percent of the tank surface below the maximum fill level from routine inspection. Visual inspections of the tank annulus have been conducted up to five times in some DSTs and the annulus space for all of the DSTs has been inspected twice with UT. The annulus region includes the walls of the primary tank and secondary liner along with accessible portions of the secondary liner bottom. Due to the lack of under-tank inspection technology, degradation of the primary tank bottom in Tank AY-102 was undetected until the tank leaked into its annulus space, confirmed in 2012 [2]. Since that time, WRPS has been working with the nondestructive examination community and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to evaluate potential technologies to conduct these challenging remote inspections. Recent work has included the development, testing, and deployment of several remote visual inspection technologies to observe the condition of the primary tank bottom of the DSTs by leveraging air distribution slots in the refractory pad on which it rests. Robotic solutions to conduct this inspection were developed with a detailed understanding of the physical configuration and operational logistics. Understanding and subsequent communication of these details to vendors within the robotics and nondestructive examination community was a critical component to the successful production of these new tools. In total, two remote visual inspection tools were produced by two vendors. The first tool was designed to leverage existing ultrasonic testing magnetic wall crawler technology in use within the double-shell tank annuli at Hanford. This resulted in a cost savings, immediate familiarization with the equipment, and a more streamlined shop to field experience. The second tool was developed from the ground up, and represents a more tailored and purpose-built solution to the problem. While costlier and more complex, it is also more versatile and capable of future growth or adaptation. Initial design of both tools began in early FY17 with fabrication and testing completed in early FY18. The tools were designed to be deployed alongside existing inspection operations and expand coverage. Development of visual inspection tools to evaluate the primary tank bottom region of the double-shell tanks was planned as the first stage of inspection. Continued development of volumetric sensors and incorporation of these inspection tools into Hanford's ongoing Double-Shell Tank Integrity Program are the next steps, continuously seeking to expand understanding of asset integrity and remaining useful life. (authors)

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Annual Groundwater Monitoring Report (Calendar Year 2014)

Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) is a government-owned/contractor-operated laboratory. Sandia Corporation (Sandia), a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, manages and operates SNL/NM for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The DOE/NNSA Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at the site. Sandia conducts two types of groundwater surveillance monitoring at SNL/NM: (1) on a site-wide basis as part of the SNL/NM Long-Term Stewardship (LTS) Program’s Groundwater Monitoring Program (GMP) Groundwater Surveillance Task and (2) as site-specific groundwater monitoring at LTS/Environmental Restoration (ER) Operations sites with ongoing groundwater investigations. This Annual Groundwater Monitoring Report summarizes data collected during groundwater monitoring events conducted at GMP locations and at the following SNL/NM sites through December 31, 2014: Burn Site Groundwater Area of Concern (AOC); Chemical Waste Landfill; Mixed Waste Landfill; Solid Waste Management Units 8/58, 49, 68, 116, 149, and 154; Technical Area-V Groundwater AOC; and the Tijeras Arroyo Groundwater AOC. Environmental monitoring and surveillance programs are required by the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) and DOE Order 436.1, Departmental Sustainability , and DOE Order 231.1B, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting .

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Neutron Residual Stress Mapping for Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Canister Weldment

Many radioactive materials within the nuclear fuel cycle present a significant hazard. Such materials include spent nuclear fuel, high-level waste, legacy waste and other nuclear materials that have no current outlet than storage. These materials are often held in long-term storage as an interim stage within their lifecycle. Lifecycles can include reuse or disposal. Safety and security of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) interim storage installations are very important, due to a great concentration of fission products, actinides and activation products. Stress corrosion cracking of interim storage containers has been identified as a high priority data gap by the Department of Energy. However, little has been done with regards to the canister weld material properties and their impact on stress corrosion, until recently from Sandia National Laboratory canister mockup program. Furthermore, because no post-weld heat treatment was required, the associated high tensile residual stress within these canister welds can drive the initiation and growth of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) cracks. In this work, we carried out in-situ neutron residual stress mapping on a weld plate sectioned from Sandia mock-up canister wall. Significant residual stress profiles were identified from the received longitudinal weld sample. The details of the weldment residual stress program development at ORNL are presented in this progress report. The generated residual stress profile from neutron diffraction technique is similar to that of Sandia residual stress data obtained from the deep hole drilling approach.

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End of FY10 report - used fuel disposition technical bases and lessons learned : legal and regulatory framework for high-level waste disposition in the United States.

This report examines the current policy, legal, and regulatory framework pertaining to used nuclear fuel and high level waste management in the United States. The goal is to identify potential changes that if made could add flexibility and possibly improve the chances of successfully implementing technical aspects of a nuclear waste policy. Experience suggests that the regulatory framework should be established prior to initiating future repository development. Concerning specifics of the regulatory framework, reasonable expectation as the standard of proof was successfully implemented and could be retained in the future; yet, the current classification system for radioactive waste, including hazardous constituents, warrants reexamination. Whether or not consideration of multiple sites are considered simultaneously in the future, inclusion of mechanisms such as deliberate use of performance assessment to manage site characterization would be wise. Because of experience gained here and abroad, diversity of geologic media is not particularly necessary as a criterion in site selection guidelines for multiple sites. Stepwise development of the repository program that includes flexibility also warrants serious consideration. Furthermore, integration of the waste management system from storage, transportation, and disposition, should be examined and would be facilitated by integration of the legal and regulatory framework. Finally, in order to enhance acceptability of future repository development, the national policy should be cognizant of those policy and technical attributes that enhance initial acceptance, and those policy and technical attributes that maintain and broaden credibility.

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Inspection Technology Advancements for Hanford Double Shell Tank Integrity Verification - 16150

The Hanford double-shell tanks (DSTs) were constructed in southeastern Washington State between 1968 and 1986 to store nuclear waste. Most of the tank waste came from the Hanford nuclear weapons program, which has been stopped for more than 25 years. The tanks will be needed for many years to come until suitable vitrification and permanent storage solutions are developed. These tanks are nominally 45 ft. deep from the dome peak to the floor. The inner tank is nominally 75 ft. dia. and the outer tank is nominally 80 ft. dia., leaving a 2.5 ft. annulus between the two side tank walls. The waste management program (under direction of Washington River Protection Solutions, WRPS) manages inspections of these DSTs from the annulus to justify their continued safe service and to avoid the high cost of new replacement tanks. Over time, the Hanford Tank Farm contractors, currently WRPS, have increased their ultrasound inspections of these tanks. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has worked with the Hanford Tank Farm contractors for more than 15 years to advance applicable tank nondestructive inspection technology for improved performance and cost reduction. Past, present, and planned technology advancements are addressed in this paper, including tank wall ultrasonic testing examination, extreme value statistical analysis, phased array for the tank wall, transmit/receive tandem synthetic aperture focusing technique knuckle examination, and electromagnetic acoustic transducer screening of the tank wall including mill-scale compensation. (authors)

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Field Test to Evaluate Deep Borehole Disposal.

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has embarked on the Deep Borehole Field Test (DBFT), which will investigate whether conditions suitable for disposal of radioactive waste can be found at a depth of up to 5 km in the earth’s crust. As planned, the DBFT will demonstrate drilling and construction of two boreholes, one for initial scientific characterization, and the other at a larger diameter such as could be appropriate for waste disposal (the DBFT will not involve radioactive waste). A wide range of geoscience activities is planned for the Characterization Borehole, and an engineering demonstration of test package emplacement and retrieval is planned for the larger Field Test Borehole. Characterization activities will focus on measurements and samples that are important for evaluating the long-term isolation capability of the Deep Borehole Disposal (DBD) concept. Engineering demonstration activities will focus on providing data to evaluate the concept’s operational safety and practicality. Procurement of a scientifically acceptable DBFT site and a site management contractor is now underway. The concept of deep borehole disposal (DBD) for radioactive wastes is not new. It was considered by the National Academy of Science (NAS 1957) for liquid waste, studied in the 1980’s in the U.S. (Woodward–Clyde 1983), and has been evaluated by European waste disposal R&D programs in the past few decades (for example, Grundfelt and Crawford 2014; Grundfelt 2010). Deep injection of wastewater including hazardous wastes is ongoing in the U.S. and regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 2001). The DBFT is being conducted with a view to use the DBD concept for future disposal of smaller-quantity, DOE-managed wastes from nuclear weapons production (i.e., Cs/Sr capsules and granular solid wastes). However, the concept may also have broader applicability for nations that have a need to dispose of limited amounts of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors. For such nations the cost for disposing of volumetrically limited waste streams could be lower than mined geologic repositories.

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Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

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Lessons Learned from Site Selection Efforts for Deep Geological Disposal

This report discusses international experiences from site selection of deep geological repositories (DGR) for radioactive waste disposal. Based on experiences from three countries with recent or ongoing site selections, the report describes different site selection approaches and summarizes lessons learned. The German and Swiss programs are two slightly different examples of one end of the spectrum of potential siting approaches: Starting with the entire country, a technically based downselection is performed to select the repository site. The Canadian program is an example of the other end of the spectrum: Here, the program started with an extensive engagement program with Canadians to collaboratively develop a socially acceptable and technically sound national approach for the long-term management of used nuclear fuel. This was followed by the launch of a collaboratively developed consent-based siting process designed to seek an informed and willing host with suitable sites, considering both technical and community well-being site requirements.

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Optimal management program for asbestos containing building materials to be available in the event of a disaster

Highlights: • The safe management of asbestos is a matter of considerable importance. • There is a lack of literature concerning the development of a program for ACBMs. •A management program for the optimal disposal of ACBMs has been developed. • This program is also available in the event of a post-disaster. - Abstract: The safe management and disposal of asbestos is a matter of considerable importance. A large number of studies have been undertaken to quantify the issue of waste management following a disaster. Nevertheless, there have been few (if any) studies concerning asbestos waste, covering the amount generated, the cost of disposal, and the degree of hazard incurred. Thus, the current study focuses on developing a program for the management of Asbestos Containing Building Materials (ACBMs), which form the source of asbestos waste in the event of a disaster. The study will also discuss a case study undertaken in a specific region in Korea in terms of: (1) the location of ACBM-containing buildings; (2) types and quantities of ACBMs; (3) the cost of ACBM disposal; (4) the amount of asbestos fiber present during normal times and during post-disaster periods; (5) the required order in which ACBM-containing buildings should be dismantled; and (6) additional greenhouse gases generated during ACBM removal. The case study will focus on a specific building, with an area of 35.34 m{sup 2}, and will analyze information concerning the abovementioned points. In addition, the case study will focus on a selected area (108 buildings) and the administrative district (21,063 buildings). The significance of the program can be established by the fact that it visibly transmits information concerning ACBM management. It is a highly promising program, with a widespread application for the safe management and optimal disposal of asbestos in terms of technology, policy, and methodology.

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Performance Confirmation Strategies for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - A Historical Perspective from an Operating Disposal Facility - 12248

Performance confirmation is an important element of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) program. Performance confirmation was first used during the early WIPP site characterization phase to focus experimental activities that address the development of probabilistic repository performance models and to address stakeholder assurance needs. The program is currently used to analyze the conditions of the repository and its surroundings to ensure that the basis for the repository's long-term radioactive waste containment predictions is valid. This basis is related to the parameters, assumptions, conceptual and numerical models that are used to predict or validate the potential radioactive waste containment performance of the system. The concept of performance confirmation for the WIPP is one that has evolved since the first repository work was initiated decades ago and plays an important role in assuring adequate repository performance both now and in the long-term. The WIPP mission has progressed from a pilot project to an operational disposal facility and will progress to eventual site closure when disposal operations are completed. Performance confirmation is an important part of each of these progressions. The concept of disposing radioactive waste in a geologic repository today involves a complete understanding of many technical, political, regulatory, societal and economic elements. Many of these elements overlap and solving all relevant issues necessary to site, operate and decommission a disposal facility should be done with knowledge of each element's requirements and impacts. Performance confirmation is one tool that can help to coordinate many of these elements into a program that actively investigates what is thought to be adequately understood about the system and what information is lacking. A performance confirmation program is used to determine ways to challenge and verify those areas that are thought to be understood and to find ways to understand those areas that are not well understood. Performance confirmation programs have been used twice at WIPP, first during site characterization and PA development and later in a Compliance Monitoring program. At first, only certain technical aspects of the system were deemed important because it was a scientifically-based, government project. Early site characterization work was design to gather information about the geology and hydrology of the area and the mechanical properties of the natural barrier. The information would be used in a PA to determine the long-term containment performance of the disposal system. A performance confirmation element was used to identify the sensitive elements of the system that were certain, well understood or justified and those that were not. It identified experimental and analytical programs that could be used to reduce uncertainty, confirm sensitive assumptions and provide useful data. This performance confirmation program provided data to justify the adequacy of the information used in PA to demonstrate compliance with EPA's containment requirements. Performance confirmation will continue to be used in the post-closure period for at least 30 years and likely up to the end of the 100-year institutional controls period. As the technical basis for the repository matures throughout the operational period, the currently planned post-closure monitoring program will need to be reassessed prior to implementation. However, the intent of the program will be the same as it was for the previous programs, to ensure the ultimate goal of the repository. This goal is to safely isolate waste from the accessible environment and ensure public and environmental safety. (authors)

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THE MISSION AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS FROM DOE’S FUEL CYCLE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (FCRD) ADVANCED FUELS CAMPAIGN

The mission of the Advanced Fuels Campaign (AFC) is to perform Research, Development, and Demonstration (RD&D) activities for advanced fuel forms (including cladding) to enhance the performance and safety of the nation’s current and future reactors, enhance proliferation resistance of nuclear fuel, effectively utilize nuclear energy resources, and address the longer-term waste management challenges. This includes development of a state of the art Research and Development (R&D) infrastructure to support the use of a “goal oriented science based approach.” AFC uses a “goal oriented, science based approach” aimed at a fundamental understanding of fuel and cladding fabrication methods and performance under irradiation, enabling the pursuit of multiple fuel forms for future fuel cycle options. This approach includes fundamental experiments, theory, and advanced modeling and simulation. One of the most challenging aspects of AFC is the management, integration, and coordination of major R&D activities across multiple organizations. AFC interfaces and collaborates with Fuel Cycle Technologies (FCT) campaigns, universities, industry, various DOE programs and laboratories, federal agencies (e.g., Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC]), and international organizations. Key challenges are the development of fuel technologies to enable major increases in fuel performance (safety, reliability, power and burnup) beyond current technologies, and development of characterization methods and predictive fuel performance models to enable more efficient development and licensing of advanced fuels. Challenged with the research and development of fuels for two different reactor technology platforms, AFC targeted transmutation fuel development and focused ceramic fuel development for Advanced LWR Fuels.

AFC Mission↗

Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site (Rev.3)

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, requires that performance assessments (PAs) and composite analyses (CAs) for low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facilities be maintained by the responsible field office. This plan describes the activities performed to maintain the PA and the CA for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The plan is based on DOE Order 435.1 Radioactive Waste Management (DOE 2007), DOE Manual 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual (DOE 2011), and DOE Standard DOE-STD-5002-2017, Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation (DOE 2017). The facility’s Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) specifies conditions for the continuing operation of a LLW facility. The DAS is issued based on a review of the facility's PA, CA, the maintenance plan, preliminary closure plan, and preliminary monitoring plan. The DAS specifies the limits and conditions on construction, design, operations, and closure of the low-level waste facility based on these reviews. The Maintenance Plan uses an Unreviewed Disposal Question (UDQ)/Unreviewed Composite Analysis Question (UCAQ) change control process to identify, evaluate, and control planned or discovered changes affecting the PA, CA, DAS, or other documents composing the Radioactive Waste Management Basis (RWMB). The UDQ/UCAQ process uses the PA and CA GoldSim models to calculate updated results, assess the significance of changes, and to assess the need to revise the PA, CA, or DAS. In addition to the change control process, the Maintenance Plan requires an annual review of all changes and an annual assessment of the need to revise RWMB documents, plans, and programs. The cumulative effect of all changes is assessed annually by preparing a revised PA and CA baseline model that is used to update PA and CA results. The updated results are used to assess compliance with the PA performance objectives and the CA dose constraint, and to assess the need to revise the PAs, CAs, and other documents, plans, and programs supporting the RWMB. An Annual Summary Report documenting the results and conclusions of the annual review is prepared and submitted to DOE.

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