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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2015

Computational scheme for burnup credit applied to long term waste disposal - 14448

The application of burnup credit (BUC) to criticality safety evaluations (CSE) of geological repositories for long term disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is under consideration in Switzerland. Therefore, in collaboration with the national waste management organization, PSI is conducting research towards the development of a BUC methodology tailored for Swiss specific applications. As part of this research, a computational sequence from the in-core burnup phase, through the interim storage, until final disposal is being established. The tools selected for this methodology, referred to as BUCSS-R (Burnup Credit System for Swiss reactors and Repositories), are CASMO for the in-core fuel depletion, the decay module of SERPENT for the decay calculations, and MCNP for the criticality calculations. In connection to BUCSS-R, a computational interface to validated reference core models of the Swiss reactors is being developed. The purpose is to apply reconstructed depletion histories based on real core operation conditions with CASMO assembly calculations, to transfer the pin wise nuclide compositions at discharge to the subsequent SERPENT decay calculations, and afterwards to the final MCNP criticality calculations. An objective of this paper is to present the elements of the BUCSS-R methodology, and to show a first application to so-called bounding analyses of a preliminary Swiss disposal canister design loaded with fuel assembly types operated in a Swiss PWR reactor. The rationale for these bounding analyses is that before starting the integration of methodologies for bias and uncertainty quantifications, the span of the k-eff variation between fresh and burnt fuel loadings should first be quantified in a realistic manner. The obtained results are reported in this paper together with studies performed in order to evaluate the effects from burnup levels and nuclides credit at flooded conditions on the k-eff values. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Evaluation of Neutron Absorber Panels from Zion Spent Fuel Pool

In spent fuel pools (SFPs), fixed neutron absorber materials are used to increase storage capacity while maintaining criticality safety margins. BORAL{sup R} is a commonly used neutron absorber material for both wet (SFPs) and dry storage (casks). The specific questions surrounding fixed neutron absorber materials include the following: 1. What are the conditions of the neutron absorber panels in SFPs? Is there any gross degradation that could cause potential concern for criticality safety of the pools? 2. Is the coupon monitoring approach adequate for monitoring the conditions of the panels as part of an aging management program? 3. For plants that do not have coupons, do current in situ measurement approaches provide accurate results? Could such in situ approaches be used as an alternative monitoring approach? In order to shed light on these technical questions using actual plant data, EPRI initiated the Zion comparative analysis project at the decommissioning Zion Nuclear Power Plant in late 2014. An overview of the Zion plant, SFP, and project was described in a previous publication. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Summary of Consolidated Interim Storage Advantages and Disadvantages from an Integrated Systems Perspective from Prior Reports and Studies

The question of whether centralized storage of civilian spent nuclear fuel (SNF) should be part of the federal waste management system as an intermediate step before permanent disposal has been debated for more than four decades. Centralized storage facilities were included as a potential component of the U.S. spent fuel management system in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), but these facilities were not identified as being essential. When the NWPA was passed, it was expected that a permanent repository would be available around the turn of the century to meet the commitments that were made to start accepting waste by that time. For a number of reasons, a permanent repository was not available at that stage. This report summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of including an ISF as part of an integrated waste management system that have been identified in numerous analyses of the impacts of a consolidated interim storage facility (ISF), previously discussed as monitored retrievable storage, the form of ISF authorized in the NWPA) by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and independent groups. Storing SNF before disposal is a functional requirement for an integrated waste management system. As described below, the studies reviewed in this report have identified a range of benefits that could be obtained by adding a consolidated ISF to the waste management system, including (1) earlier acceptance of fuel by the federal government, (2) reduction in the number of unintended long-term storage sites, (3) added system flexibility and opportunity for better integration, and (4) near-term development and demonstration of institutional and technical infrastructures for large-scale management of SNF. At the same time, these studies have identified potential drawbacks to deployment of an ISF, including (1) potential adverse impacts on development of a repository, (2) additional transportation of SNF, and (3) a large upfront economic investment to establish the consolidated storage capability. In general, the studies that have considered the positive and negative impacts of consolidated storage most comprehensively have concluded that in light of these considerations, the benefits of including an ISF as part of an integrated waste management system can outweigh any real or perceived disadvantages.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Consolidated Interim Storage Advantages and Disadvantages from Prior Reports and Studies

The question of whether centralized storage of civilian spent nuclear fuel (SNF) should be part of the federal waste management system as an intermediate step before permanent disposal has been debated for more than four decades. Since the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) [1] was enacted, the need for interim storage facilities (ISFs) as part of the federal waste management system has been analyzed and documented in numerous reports and studies. This presentation summarizes the advantages and disadvantages, as described in those reports, of incorporating an ISF into the waste management system.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2014

A Structural Integrity Evaluation of the Tank Farm Waste Transfer System

Radioactive supernate, salt, and/or sludge wastes (i.e., high level wastes) are confined in 45 underground storage tanks at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The waste is transported between tanks within and between the F and H area tank farms and other facilities on site via underground and a limited number of aboveground transfer lines. The Department of Energy - Savannah River Operations Office (DOE-SR) performed a comprehensive assessment of the structural integrity program for the Tank Farm waste transfer system at the SRS. This document addresses the following issues raised during the DOE assessment

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Preparation of Waste Fingerprints for the Miscellaneous Beta Gamma Waste Feeds to the Box Encapsulation Plant at Sellafield - 16080

There are a number of legacy pond and silo storage facilities on Sellafield Site that contain a broad range of ILW arising from the early Windscale Pile and Magnox Fuel Reprocessing Programmes. The waste comprises of solid Miscellaneous Beta Gamma Waste (MBGW) from operations (including filters, containerised waste, thermocouple wire, support struts, pumps, soft wastes) and associated sludges that have arisen from the corrosion of the fuel, Magnox Swarf cladding and the MBGW. It is intended to retrieve and package this waste to meet the requirements of interim storage and final disposal in the Box Encapsulation Plant (BEP) at Sellafield. As part of this process each package must be assigned a realistic and justifiable radionuclide and material inventory. These inventories can either be assigned by radiometric measurements including the associated errors or developed by fundamental data underpinning these assessments and a 'chain of custody' approach of knowing where the waste has been and how it has evolved. The subject of this paper is concerned with the development of the waste fingerprints for these legacy waste streams. As the wastes have arisen over a ∼70 year period there have been an assortment of different working practices and developments in equipment design that have led to significant variations in the waste condition and its composition. During storage the waste items have become mixed, corroded and sludge deposits have arisen. Because of this, and that early consignment records are either incomplete or missing, the task of assigning material and radionuclide fingerprints has been very challenging. In addition, to comply with regulatory requirements the inventory assignment has to be sufficiently robust to meet the processing envelope of the encapsulation process i.e. to allow controls to be made on the amounts of reactive materials (e.g. aluminium, Magnox and uranium) that can be processed within each product and allow identification of excluded items from being consigned from the donor plants. Also, as the waste comprises actinides, fission and activation products it was noted that whilst the UK standard inventory code FISPIN10 predicts the actinides and fission products well, there was a significant discrepancy in the prediction of activation products when compared with those predicted by the specialised fusion code FISPACT. It should be noted that the use of FISPACT to predict actinides and fission products is not recommended. To address these issues, - position statements were produced for each of the waste streams that would be consigned to BEP; - gaps within the data were assessed and where possible inactive trial work was identified to address it; - material and radionuclide fingerprint justification documents were developed from the position statements based upon available data, the experimental work and justified assumptions; - where FISPIN runs were required, these were run with a modified activation data library based on the European Activation File 2010 (EAF2010) to model the activation products. This paper summarises the BEP process, discusses examples of how the material and radionuclide waste stream fingerprints have been justified by revisiting the sample data, original consignment records, engineering drawings and recent remotely operated vehicle (ROV) pond surveys and making reasoned assumptions based on operational practices and non-active experimental work. Incorporation of the EAF2010 library within the FISPIN code has offered significant benefits to BEP and indeed other plants processing mixed fission and activated wastes as it allows comparable predictions of activation products compared with that made by FISPACT and for the plant to maintain one data processing stream rather than two if it had to utilise both modelling codes. This work will underpin the inventory submission in support of the Interim Letter of Compliance (ILoC) to Radioactive Waste Management Limited (RWM). The process of examining the original records, plant operation schedules and engineering drawings has enabled removal of some of the pessimisms that have been made in previous assessments. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

RCRA Part B Permit Application Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) for Waste Management Activities at the NNSS Hazardous Waste Storage Unit (HWSU)

This volume of the permit application by the DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) focuses on the Area 5 Hazardous Waste Storage Unit (HWSU). The HWSU was established to support testing, research, and remediation activities at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), a large-quantity generator of hazardous waste. The HWSU, located adjacent to the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC), is a prefabricated, rigid steel-framed, roofed shelter used to store hazardous nonradioactive waste generated on the NNSS. No offsite-generated wastes are managed at the HWSU. Waste managed at the HWSU includes the following: Flammables/Combustibles, Acid Corrosives, Alkali Corrosives, Oxidizers/Reactives, Toxics/Poisons, and Other Regulated Materials (ORMs). A list of regulated waste codes accepted for storage at the HWSU is provided in this volume. Hazardous wastes are stored at the HWSU in containers that are compliant with U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations and compatible with the stored waste. Waste packages (e.g., drums) without inner closed containers of waste remain closed except during inspection or sampling. Transfer of uncontainerized waste between waste packages at the HWSU is prohibited. Closed inner containers may be transferred or consolidated into larger waste packages, and small closed containers may be placed into larger containers. Containers are stored on secondary containment pallets, and the unit is inspected monthly. For safety and security reasons, some of the contents of the full application are not available for public viewing. This public version of the application contains most, but not all, of the contents as submitted to the regulatory agencies.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Modeling the Drying of a Mock Used Fuel Assembly with COBRA-SFS Cycle-4 - 18597

The processing and storage of nuclear fuel is an ever increasingly pressing issue. Around 70,000 tons of used fuel are currently in either dry or wet storage on site at nuclear power plants or at specified spent fuel storage facilities. Additionally, about 2,000 tons are added to that sum each year. To promote retrievability, limit degradation in the canister, and reduce potential for hydrogen generation, spent fuel that is initially in wet storage must be dried before moving to dry cask storage. Therefore, this research seeks to use a mock used fuel storage cask to replicate the conditions in the industry during the drying process of fuel being moved from storage pools. To simulate this, a mock storage cask has been constructed to closely resemble those used in industry such that any areas that tend to retain water are replicated effectively. It is able to hold one mock used fuel assembly. The assembly used is an AREVA 10A 10 x 10 assembly with 78 rods filled with depleted uranium, 12 heater rods to simulate decay heat, a 3 x 3 BWR water channel, and one interchangeable rod position for tests such as a simulated failed fuel rod, BWR water rod, and PWR guide tube tests. The industry standard procedure is used in drying the assembly which involves stepping the system pressure down and holding for certain periods until reaching 3 torr and holding for 30 minutes. This is believed to sufficiently dry the assembly. The goal is to record data throughout these tests that can provide the industry with a greater understanding of how well the process works. This data will also be used to develop and validate a computer model of the drying process. Mechanistic models are currently under development. Reduced order models are being investigated for incorporation into current related engineering codes such as COBRA-SFS. COBRA-SFS is a member of the COBRA family of codes which is mainly used in the evaluation of thermal hydraulic systems containing spent nuclear fuel. However, it does not currently have the capability to account for processes such as evaporation encountered during drying operations. Therefore, those physical models are to be added to the source code. At present a model of the experiment has been created using the COBRA-SFS Cycle-4 code. A number of steady state models along with transient models have been developed and presented. Each of these yield valuable results for comparison with the experiments conducted. In addition to comparison with experimental results, the data collected from COBRA-SFS is compared with that which has been generated from other computer models which utilize computational fluid dynamics. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Supplemental Environmental Baseline Survey for Proposed Land Use Permit Modification for Expansion of the Dynamic Explosive Test Site (DETS) 9940 Main Complex Parking Lot

The “subject property” is comprised of a parcel of land within the Kirtland Military Reservation, Bernalillo County, New Mexico, as shown on the map in Appendix B of this document. The land requirement for the parking lot addition to the 9940 Main Complex is approximately 2.7 acres. The scope of this Supplemental Environmental Baseline Survey (SEBS) is for the parking lot addition land transfer only. For details on the original 9940 Main Complex see Environmental Baseline Survey, Land Use Permit Request for the 9940 Complex PERM/0-KI-00-0001, August 21, 2003, and for details on the 9940 Complex Expansion see Environmental Baseline Survey, Proposed Land Use Permit Expansion for 9940 DETS Complex, June 24, 2009. The 2.7-acre parcel of land for the new parking lot, which is the subject of this EBS (also referred to as the “subject property”), is adjacent to the southwest boundary of the original 12.3- acre 9940 Main Complex. No testing is known to have taken place on the subject property site. The only activity known to have taken place was the burial of overhead utility lines in 2014. Adjacent to the subject property, the 9940 Main Complex was originally a 12.3-acre site used by the Department of Energy (DOE) under a land use permit from the United States Air Force (USAF). Historical use of the site, dating from 1964, included arming, fusing, and firing of explosives and testing of explosives systems components. In the late 1970s and early 1980s experiments at the 9940 Main Complex shifted toward reactor safety issues. From 1983 to 1988, fuel coolant interaction (FCI) experiments were conducted, as were experiments with conventional high explosives (HE). Today, the land is used for training of the Nuclear Emergency Response community and for research on energetic materials. In 2009, the original complex was expanded to include four additional 20-acre areas: 9940 Training South, 9940 Training East, T-Range 6, and Training West Landing Zone. The proposed use of the subject property is for the purpose of adding a parking lot to serve the increase in customer vehicles that is occurring as the 9940 Main Complex is more heavily utilized, and as the 2009 Expansion areas come online as operational training facilities. The subject property would be used only for parking, not for testing or training activities. The parking lot would have a gravel surface. Current and future work at the 9940 Main Complex involves arming, fuzing, and firing of explosives and the testing of explosive systems components in both terrestrial and aquatic settings. It also involves specialized training activities for a variety of first responder customers, both DOE and non-DOE agencies. The approach was to perform a document search, supplemented by a visual site inspection, to identify potential environmental contamination associated with the property. Factors evaluated included hazardous substances; petroleum products and derivatives; environmental restoration sites; areas of concern; storage tanks; oil/water separators; grease traps; wash racks; waste tanks; pesticides; military munitions/ordnance; medical or bio-hazardous waste; radioactive waste; solid/municipal waste; indoor air quality; groundwater; wastewater treatment, collection, and disposal/discharge; drinking water quality; utilities; asbestos; polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs); radon; lead-based paint; cultural resources; floodplains; and natural/biological resources. Each of these factors is evaluated separately in Section 5, Findings for Subject Property. The property categorization for this subject property would be considered Category 1- “An area or real property where no storage, release, or disposal of hazardous substances or petroleum products or their derivatives has occurred into the environment or structures or disposed on the subject property (including no migration of these substances from adjacent properties).” There appears to be sufficient information to categorize the subject property and it appears that no further effort needs to be made to obtain additional information. There are no findings of an adverse nature on the subject property itself or from adjacent properties. It is recommended that the proposed transfer of the subject property from the USAF to DOE proceed.

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DOE OSTI2015

Radiometric characterization process for locating radioactivity hold-up and measuring non-uniformly distributed sources - 15342

A novel approach to facility radiometric characterization for non-uniformly distributed radiation sources has been developed by ANTECH and is currently being employed at the Argonne National Laboratory. It is being applied to the measurement of a wide range of objects and the interiors and contents of laboratories and buildings. The integrated non destructive assay measurement process involves the use of a scanning spectroscopic gamma ray camera as well as high purity Germanium detectors with different collimators and hence differing detector fields of view to measure and quantify non-uniformly distributed sources of radioactivity in laboratory equipment, glove boxes, storage tanks, pipework and general laboratory objects and process components. The purpose of the radiometric characterization is to quantify radiation sources and radioactive contamination levels in facilities containing nuclear material and to ensure compliance with facility characterization requirements and for decontamination and decommissioning planning and execution. The integrated measurement process also involves automated data capture and processing software and a database with which both measurement instrument operators and subject matter expert analysts can interact. An appropriate measuring instrument (gamma camera, scintillation detector, high purity Germanium detector system, neutron detector or alpha-beta counter) records the measurement data and the measurement site is recorded in a photograph. All of the data relevant to the measurement (or set of measurements for a particular object) are recorded in the database including measured gamma ray spectra, equipment description and relevant calibration, measurement site photograph and measurement descriptive data. Once data analysis protocols are established for specific geometries and measurement situations they can be applied to the measured data in a partially automated manner, reducing analysis and transcription errors. In addition to measurements and data analysis the process also utilises radiometric modelling computer codes including MicroShield and Monte Carlo Neutrons Photons in order to perform model calculations where appropriate. In a typical measurement, the ANTECH RadSearch spectroscopic gamma camera is utilized to find areas of concentrated activity so that these areas can be measured and calculated separately from areas with diffuse contamination. The use of the gamma camera in scanning mode helps to ensure that the assay does not overestimate the detected radiation source, which is a frequent consequence of using standard far field geometry and attenuation analysis codes that assume uniformity of both density and radioactive source distribution. Once the hot spots are identified, high purity Germanium detector measurements are made using various collimators with wide or narrow fields of view as required. These measurements are then processed through a semi-automatic calculation process assuming an appropriate source configuration as identified by RadSearch. These source configurations include point sources, line sources or surface sources. The Generalized Geometry Hold-up algorithms are employed to determine an estimate of the activity of the various sources that are identified in a measurement. The ANTECH integrated measurement process provides an automated calculation procedure where the analyst can select the source type, geometry and appropriate input data, and then the software calculates the activity by radionuclide for all sources identified in the measurement. The measurement and analysis process is controlled under the ANTECH ISO9001: 2008 Quality Assurance System and managed by a site specific Quality Assurance Plan. Both Argonne National Laboratory and Department of Energy technical reviewers have vetted the Integrated Measurement and Analysis Process. The application of the measurement and analysis process is described and measurement examples are provided. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2017

The Off-Site Source Recovery Program Capabilities in Recovering Transuranic Sealed Sources - 17599

Over the past 16 years, the mission of the Off-Site Source Recovery Program (OSRP) has been recovering disused radioactive sealed sources in the interest of national security, public health and safety. This program, which is sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Global Material Security's Office of Radiological Security, is managed at Los Alamos National Laboratory and Idaho National Laboratory and has recovered sources worldwide. To date, OSRP has recovered more than 38,000 sources from over 1,300 locations worldwide. Since its inception, OSRP has grown from recovering only sealed sources containing one transuranic (TRU) isotope, Pu-239, in the early days of the program, to recovering sealed sources containing several other TRU and non-TRU isotopes. Primarily, OSRP's mission includes Pu-238, Pu-239, Am-241, Cf-252, Cm-244, Sr-90, Cs-137, Co-60, Ir-192 and Ra-226 sources that are US-origin, defense related and not commercially disposable. Over the lifetime of this program the types of recoveries performed have expanded from a single site to multi-site round-up recoveries. An additional approach, referred to as self-ship recoveries, is also used in cases where only a few sources may be present at a licensee's site. In these situations, the licensee ships their source(s) to an OSRP staging facility for ultimate consolidation and disposal. OSRP recovers sources from many types of licensees, with the majority of sources being removed from industry, universities and hospitals. These include sealed sources used in industrial radiological devices like moisture-density gauges and thickness gauges, medical devices such as blood irradiators and radiotherapy devices and sealed sources from nuclear power plants, among others. The recovery and management of sealed sources is a complex process covering multidisciplinary areas, including source construction, characteristics of the radioactive material, source packaging and transportation per DOT regulations, safe and secure storage, and final disposition per waste acceptance criteria of repository sites. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2019

Risk perception and social representation on radioactive waste: a case study with students of IPEN

Proper management of radioactive waste in teaching and research laboratories involves not only techniques and procedures for the treatment, storage and disposal of these materials but also the responsibility of all those who handle them. Responsibility begins with with methods that generate less waste and with the correct segregation of contaminated materials prior to disposal, In this context, the present study aimed to know, identify, understand and analyze the perception of risk and social representations about radioactive waste and its management by students and researchers of the Nuclear and Energy Research Institute. According to Renn (1992), two of the approaches to risk perception are cultural and sociological, which served as the basis to the present study. Within this analysis, the concept of risk is understood as a phenomenon and, therefore, the phenomena experienced by the individuals are related to their life histories, social relations, religious beliefs and academic formation, elements that interfere in the perception of risk. The method used to collect data was free evocation, with participants receiving the following instructions: 'Please write five words that pop up into your mind when you listen to the words radioactive waste and, sequentially, write a sentence using these words'. All participants received instructions of the voluntary character of the participation and of the confidentiality of the data. A total of 73 students and researchers were interviewed, including scientific initiation, masters degree, doctorate and postdoctoral researchers. 353 words were mentioned, of which 209 were different from each other. After analyzing the sentences, the words were inserted in 12 categories and later analyzed in the software INVOCADO, which provides a diagram with the possible structure of the social representations of the group studied. The analysis of the four-quadrants and their categories, as well as the mentioned words that compose them, are therefore consistent with the universe of the public analyzed. While it is not the totality of students dealing with radioactive materials, in general these individuals understand the importance of technology and that the adoption of safe practices ensures the successful development of research. Future developments: Analyze quantitatively and qualitatively the other questions of the questionnaire. Analyze the data and information obtained from the participant observation, which consisted of a follow-up of three students in their laboratory practices. Propose to the institute a manual of good practices that can be used by the students in their laboratory practices.

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DOE OSTI2021

Technical Basis for Extended Dry Storage of Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel

This report addresses previously identified technical knowledge and technology gaps and presents the key findings of the multiyear, EMTD-funded research efforts with the goal of evaluating whether ASNF can be safely stored dry for many decades and whether changes to existing ASNF management practices are appropriate. The findings formulate the technical basis for the extended dry storage of ASNF, leading to the main conclusion: All completed work to close the identified knowledge gaps on extended (>50 years) ASNF dry storage supports the conclusion that extended ASNF dry storage is both safe and viable.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

L-Basin microbial monitoring program - evaluation of 20 years of monitoring

This report summarizes the results from over 20-years’ of activities for microbial monitoring of the bulk water, floc analysis, and test coupon surfaces for the Savannah River Site L Basin. The Microbial Monitoring Program provides important information for the characterization of overall water quality as it impacts the continued safe storage of spent nuclear fuel in L Basin. The potential impacts to fuel storage are: 1) microbial-influenced corrosion of the fuel; and 2) biofouling of the fuel storage systems.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Validation of Non-Invasive Waste Assay System (Gamma Box Counter) Performance at AECL Whiteshell Laboratories - 13136

Low-level radioactive waste (LLW) in solid form, resulting from decommissioning and operations activities at AECL's Whiteshell Laboratories (WL), is packaged in B-25 and B-1000 standard waste containers and characterized before it is shipped to an on-site interim storage facility, pending AECL decisions on long term management of its LLW. Assay of the waste packages before shipment contributes to an inventory of the interim storage facility and provides data to support acceptance at a future repository. A key characterization step is a gamma spectrometric measurement carried out under standard conditions using an automated, multi-detector Waste Assay System (WAS), purchased from Antech Corporation. A combination of ORTEC gamma acquisition software and custom software is used in this system to incorporate multiple measurements from two collimated high-resolution detectors. The software corrects the intensities of the gamma spectral lines for geometry and attenuation, and generates a table of calculated activities or limits of detection for a user-defined list of radioisotopes that may potentially be present. Validation of WAS performance was a prerequisite to routine operation. Documentation of the validation process provides assurance of the quality of the results produced, which may be needed one or two decades after they were generated. Aspects of the validation included setting up a quality control routine, measurements of standard point sources in reproducible positions, study of the gamma background, optimization of user-selectable software parameters, investigation of the effect of non-uniform distribution of materials and radionuclides, and comparison of results with measurements made using other gamma detector systems designed to assay bulk materials. The following key components of the validation process have been established. A daily quality control routine has been instituted, to verify stability of the gamma detector operation and the background levels. A test box containing plywood (specific gravity 0.5) with holes for reproducible positioning of known point sources has been constructed and used in several configurations. Gamma spectra have been processed multiple times with user-adjustable parameters set to a variety of values to gain agreement on the most appropriate settings. A similar optimization process was followed with the custom software provided by the instrument manufacturer to reach agreement on the most stable settings for reliable results. Measurements made with the Canberra In-Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) instrument were compared with the WAS results as part of an estimate of instrument precision and accuracy. The validation report will conclude with recommendations for the configuration, appropriate use and limitations of the Waste Assay System. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

New approaches for MOX multi-recycling

Due to its low fissile content after irradiation, Pu from used MOX fuel is considered by some as not recyclable in LWR (Light Water Reactors). The point of this paper is hence to go back to those statements and provide a new analysis based on AREVA extended experience in the fields of fissile and fertile material management and optimized waste management. This is done using the current US fuel inventory as a case study. MOX Multi-recycling in LWRs is a closed cycle scenario where U and Pu management through reprocessing and recycling leads to a significant reduction of the used assemblies to be stored. The recycling of Pu in MOX fuel is moreover a way to maintain the self-protection of the Pu-bearing assemblies. With this scenario, Pu content is also reduced repetitively via a multi-recycling of MOX in LWRs. Simultaneously, {sup 238}Pu content decreases. All along this scenario, HLW (High-Level Radioactive Waste) vitrified canisters are produced and planned for deep geological disposal. Contrary to used fuel, HLW vitrified canisters do not contain proliferation materials. Moreover, the reprocessing of used fuel limits the space needed on current interim storage. With MOX multi-recycling in LWR, Pu isotopy needs to be managed carefully all along the scenario. The early introduction of a limited number of SFRs (Sodium Fast Reactors) can therefore be a real asset for the overall system. A few SFRs would be enough to improve the Pu isotopy from used LWR MOX fuel and provide a Pu-isotopy that could be mixed back with multi-recycled Pu from LWRs, hence increasing the Pu multi-recycling potential in LWRs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2014

ARIES Oxide Production Program: Monthly Report - May 2014

A summary of the accomplishments, milestones, financial summary, project performance and issues facing the ARIES Oxide Production Program for the end of May 2014 is presented in this Executive Summary.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗