NNSA-IAEC 2021 Workshop Science Area V – Environmental ISR Subsurface Science & Waste Management NORTHEASTERN NEGEV DESERT SUBSURFACE F&T PROCESS MODEL DEVELOPMENT
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Abstract not provided.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
In April 2009, the Department of Energy (DOE) Richland Operations Office (RL) was allocated $1.6 billion (B) in ARRA funding to be applied to cleanup projects at the Hanford Site. DOE-RL selected projects to receive ARRA funding based on 3-criteria: creating/saving jobs, reducing the footprint of the Hanford Site, and reducing life-cycle costs for cleanup. They further selected projects that were currently covered under regulatory documents and existing prime contracts, which allowed work to proceed quickly. CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) is a prime contractor to the DOE focused on the environmental cleanup of the DOE Hanford Site Central Plateau. CHPRC was slated to receive $1.36B in ARRA funding. As of January, 2010, CHPRC has awarded over $200 million (M) in subcontracts (64% to small businesses), created more that 1,100 jobs, and touched more than 2,300 lives - all in support of long-term objectives for remediation of the Central Plateau, on or ahead of schedule. ARRA funding is being used to accelerate and augment cleanup activities already underway under the baseline Plateau Remediation Contract (PRC). This paper details challenges and accomplishments using ARRA funding to meet DOE-RL objectives of creating/saving jobs, expediting cleanup, and reducing lifecycle costs for cleanup during the first months of implementation.
Based on high disposal and low recycling rates of electronic waste (e-waste) and continued exportation to developing countries, reliance on municipal responsibility for e-waste management has been unsuccessful in the United States. This case study examines Maine's program, which was the first US state to mandate producer responsibility for recycling household e-waste. Maine's program established a shared cost responsibility among producers, municipalities, and consumers. The study found that Maine's program resulted in a significant reduction in disposal and a corresponding increase in environmentally sound recycling. In the first 3 years of the program, 6.406 million kg of household e-waste was collected and recycled for a population of 1.32 million. The new program, implemented in 2006, increased the number of e-waste items collected and recycled by 108% in the first year, 170% in the second year, and 221% in the third year. The program decreased direct economic costs to municipalities and households because of the shared cost approach and for the first time established costs for producers. There was no empirical evidence indicating that producers have or will improve the recyclability of electronic products to reduce recycling costs. While other weaknesses were that found potentially limit the adoption of Maine's program, its positive aspects warrant consideration by other governments.
The performance assessment process and incorporated input assumptions for four active and one planned DOE disposal sites were analyzed using a systems approach. The sites selected were the Savannah River E-Area Slit and Engineered Trenches, Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility, Idaho Radioactive Waste Management Complex, Oak Ridge Environmental Management Waste Management Facility, and Nevada National Security Site Area 5. Each disposal facility evaluation incorporated three overall system components (1) site characteristics (climate, geology, geochemistry, etc.), (2) waste properties (waste form and package), and (3) engineered barrier designs (cover system, liner system). Site conceptual models were also analyzed to identity the main risk drivers and risk insights controlling performance for each disposal facility. (authors)
Management of irradiated fuel is an important component of commercial nuclear power production. Although it is broadly agreed that the disposition of some fraction of the fuel in geological repositories will be necessary, there is a range of options that can be considered that affect exactly what fraction of material will be disposed in that manner. Furthermore, until geological repositories are available to accept commercial irradiated fuel, these materials must be safely stored. Temporary storage of irradiated fuel has traditionally been conducted in storage pools, and this is still true for freshly discharged fuel. Criticality control technologies have led to greater efficiencies in packing of irradiated fuel into storage pools. With continued delays in establishing permanent repositories, utilities have begun to move some of the irradiated fuel inventory into dry storage. Fuel cycle options being considered worldwide include the once-through fuel cycle, limited recycle in which U and Pu are recycled back to power reactors as mixed oxide fuel, and advance partitioning and transmutation schemes designed to reduce the long term hazards associated with geological disposal from millions of years to a few hundred years. Each of these options introduces specific challenges in terms of the waste forms required to safely immobilize the hazardous components of irradiated fuel.
The most important factor undercutting optimal waste management in the nuclear industry is developing a clear picture of the radioactivity content of the waste and its impact on waste disposal cost. For almost 35 years since the publishing of 10CFR61, waste characterization has relied on building its basis from samples collected from the final waste product as it is drawn from service or as it is packaged for disposal. This practice of sampling the product after it was collected continues to be followed to this day; 35 years after the publication of 10CFR61. This process, as it is followed, relies on minimum information and plant knowledge to formulate the characterization. While 10CFR61 and additional guidance documents promote the approach of using anticipated and statistically based scaling factors in addition to using data collected over time and a finite grouping of waste streams encompassing plant wastes, this guidance is often ignored in favor of using the earlier fallback options in the case of a limited sample base. The fallback allows the use of a final sample drawn from the waste when other data was not sufficiently available to be aligned to develop meaningful statistics. The determination of representativeness is obviated by the single sample resulting in a new waste stream being declared with every package. The sample used without statistical corroboration often is not representative. It would be unexpected if that sample were actually representative of anything more than itself. This paper discusses viable options for developing the basis for characterization through direct process monitoring to follow the accumulation of activity at the point of generation relying on hundreds of measurements being collected on a daily and weekly basis that can provide a much more reliable result along with significant cost savings. Direct monitoring of the accumulation of activity in process streams generating solid radwaste, including demineralizers and filter streams, is a more precise approach. Nearly all of these streams are monitored by plant chemistry on a regular schedule to maintain water quality and track fuel performance. The discussion in this paper will focus on resin bed tracking and how process knowledge drawn from routinely collected chemistry data can be brought together to form a consistent and precise solid waste radioactivity inventory. Some of the specific points covered in the paper include application and expansion of the fission product release computer program 3R-STAT, the importance of the spent fuel pool in radioactivity generation and its influence on the overall source term, and results from sample measurements collected over several years to corroborate using direct process measurements for the primary characterization basis. (authors)
A finite-element model was developed to evaluate mechanisms contributing to positive pore pressures measured with sealed pressure transducers in the geological buffer beneath the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility, a composite-lined mixed waste disposal facility operated by the US Department of Energy. The geological buffer is a 3-m-thick engineered fine-textured layer directly beneath the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility's composite liner, and above the groundwater table. The model accounts for changes in pore water pressure resulting from (i) loading imposed by waste placed on the overlying liner, (ii) moistening of the geological buffer due to equilibration with the underlying geological materials, and (iii) fluctuations in the elevation of the underlying groundwater table. Pore water pressures predicted by the model are in good agreement with pore water pressures measured in the field. The predictions confirm that positive pore water pressures recorded by the sealed pressure transducers in the geological buffer are excess pore water pressures induced by the vertical normal stress imposed by waste placed on the liner, and are not due to a rise in the groundwater table. Simulations also showed that two additional years of filling would further increase the pore water pressure without any change in elevation of the groundwater table. The geological buffer remained unsaturated during the simulation, with a B-coefficient (parameter indicative of the degree of saturation) similar to that computed from the field-measured pore water pressures and waste filling records. Larger increases in pore water pressure were observed when the geological buffer was assumed to have higher initial saturation, as was observed in the field data. Incorporating seasonal fluctuations in the groundwater table beneath the geological buffer in the model resulted in predictions of small seasonal oscillation in the pore water pressure at the measurement location, similar to seasonal oscillations observed in the field. Predictions made with the model indicate that the dissipation of the excess pore water pressures will occur over decades due to the low hydraulic conductivity of the geological buffer material. (authors)
The purpose of this study was to examine the strategies intended to mitigate the temporary storage restrictions for Low-Level radioactive waste at the Western Waste Management Facility to enable continued accommodation of waste generation rates, and to recover storage capacity from 2018-2023 to optimize long-term sustainability for radioactive waste management. The management options considered were based on existing waste processing technologies and programs available at the Western Waste Management Facility, in combination with third party volume-reduction services. Completed analysis measured the consumption of Low-Level Waste storage space as influenced by the projected volumes from nuclear generating stations, and the various processing scenarios developed; such as reducing the volume of surplus processable waste on-site, and the reduction of specific waste streams previously considered to be non-processable. Results from the quantitative analysis indicated which strategies will be most effective for minimizing waste volumes for long-term storage and for recovering low-level storage space at the Western Waste Management Facility. The strategic path forward is presented in short- to long-term management objectives. Results from this study will contribute to the waste stream planning and management of major reactor refurbishment projects and to the technological advancements and innovation of radioactive waste processing and minimization. With further understanding of the refurbishment-specific waste types and volumes, it is expected that Nuclear Waste Management and the nuclear generating stations will achieve increasingly improved minimization results with the progression of each refurbished reactor. (author)
Highlights: • We systematically review scientific literature about health-care waste management. • We identify and discuss gaps, trends, efforts, and key-factors. • We suggest areas for improvement and best practices reported in literature. • We include recommendations for policy makers, practitioners and researchers. • We promote a holistic and harmonized approach to health-care waste management. - Abstract: The sustainable management of waste requires a holistic approach involving a range of stakeholders. What can often be difficult is to understand the manner in which different types of stakeholder networks are composed and work, and how best to enhance their effectiveness. Using social network analysis and stakeholder analysis of healthcare waste management stakeholders in the case study region of the Gaza Strip, this study aimed to understand and examine the manner in which the networks functioned. The Ministry of Health was found to be the most important stakeholder, followed by municipalities and solid waste management councils. Some international agencies were also mentioned, with specific roles, while other local institutions had a limited influence. Finally while health-care facilities had a strong interest in waste management, they were generally poorly informed and had limited links to each other. The manner in which the networks operated was complicated and influenced by differences in perception, sharing of information, access to finance and levels of awareness. The lack of a clear legal framework generated various mistakes about roles and responsibilities in the system, and evidently regulation was not an effective driver for improvement. Finally stakeholders had different priorities according to the waste management issues they were involved with, however segregation at the source was identified as a key requirement by most. Areas for improving the effectiveness of the networks are suggested. The analysis utilized an innovative methodology, which involved a large number of stakeholders. Such an approach served to raise interest and awareness at different levels (public authorities, health providers, supporting actors, others), stimulate the discussion about the adoption of specific policies, and identify the effective way forward.
The Chinshan Nuclear Power Plant, which consists of two BWR units and was owned by Taiwan Power Company (TPC), has an electrical output of 636 MWe for each unit. Unit No. 1 and Unit No. 2 were licensed till December 2018 and July 2019, respectively. According to regulations of decommissioning in Taiwan, decontamination and dismantling of a NPP should be completed within 25 years. Therefore, TPC had started compiling the decommissioning plans (DP, 17 chapters) with INER, national engineering companies and international consultants since 2012. The DP of Chinshan NPP has been approved by the regulator, Atomic Energy Council (AEC), in the end of June, 2017. There are 17 chapters in the decommissioning plans, which deal with all aspects of safety-related considerations during the decommissioning period, such as spent fuel management, waste management, personnel/workers planning, schedules/working items, environmental management and monitoring. Those items are discussed in detail in this paper in accordance with the approved DP. The implementation of decommissioning will be started while the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is still under approval by EPA, which is expected to be completed in the end of 2018 or the mid of 2019. Once the decommissioning be started, all dismantling, decontamination, management teams, and preparation would be kicked off simultaneously in a very short period of time. In this paper, the planning assumptions, strategies from INER and TPC, management of radioactive waste, conversion of Turbine Building and detailed description of turbine-generator set are discussed. For the Turbine Building dismantling, inventories of equipment, cutting technology determination, storage logistics, container options and radwaste treatment and reduction would be important factors to be evaluated in the beginning. Afterwards, WBS (work breakdown structure) would be determined and be the basis for working bids, construction of a new storage warehouse, an incinerator and a super high pressure compactor. This preliminary engineering planning would be applied in the decommissioning of Chinshan NPP for the first time and be duplicated in Kuosheng NPP and Maanshan NPP in Taiwan as well. (authors)
Newcomer countries expected to develop new nuclear power programs by 2030 are being encouraged by the International Atomic Energy Agency to explore the use of shared facilities for spent fuel storage and geologic disposal. Multinational underground nuclear parks (M-UNPs) are an option for sharing such facilities. Newcomer countries with suitable bedrock conditions could volunteer to host M-UNPs. M-UNPs would include back-end fuel cycle facilities, in open or closed fuel cycle configurations, with sufficient capacity to enable M-UNP host countries to provide for-fee waste management services to partner countries, and to manage waste from the M-UNP power reactors. M-UNP potential advantages include: the option for decades of spent fuel storage; fuel-cycle policy flexibility; increased proliferation resistance; high margin of physical security against attack; and high margin of containment capability in the event of beyond-design-basis accidents, thereby reducing the risk of Fukushima-like radiological contamination of surface lands. A hypothetical M-UNP in crystalline rock with facilities for small modular reactors, spent fuel storage, reprocessing, and geologic disposal is described using a room-and-pillar reference-design cavern. Underground construction cost is judged tractable through use of modern excavation technology and careful site selection. (authors)
Demolition of the K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plant required establishing a non-credible risk of inadvertent criticality because a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) could not be reliably maintained operable as the building was being torn down. Preparation for, and demolition of, the facility was a multi-year long effort with significant changes in approach. The most significant change was to demolish the facility with as much of the process gas equipment and piping left in the facility as possible, rather than removing all process gas equipment and piping from the facility prior to demolishing the building structure only. The contractor had to adapt their approach to accommodate these changes. The normal approach to demolition was to remove all process gas equipment and piping prior to demolition, using Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) controls based on the double contingency principle, while CAAS coverage was intact. Then, the building structure was demolished with no requirement for a CAAS. This was the method used to demolish the K-33 Building, for example. In the case of K-25 demolition, all equipment and piping that met the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) disposal cell Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) was left in the building and removed as part of the building demolition process. This resulted in significant quantities of fissionable material remaining in the building and being handled during demolition. The NCS Organization worked closely with several groups during preparation activities. A Data Management organization was established to specifically identify every piece of process gas equipment and piping in the facility so that it could be accounted for and characterized. Deactivation and Decommissioning (D and D) personnel conducted internal visual inspections, by remote camera, of all process gas equipment and piping larger than 3' diameter, to reveal any large deposits that would require removal. Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) of the vast majority of equipment and piping was required to quantify the amount of fissionable material remaining. Finally, all process gas equipment and piping larger than 3'' diameter was internally filled with foam, which was credited by NCS with immobilizing the remaining fissionable material such that large migration and accumulation could not occur during demolition activities. NCS personnel worked closely with all of these groups in order to acquire the data and information needed to establish a non-credible risk of inadvertent criticality during building demolition. Good communication and a close working relationship between NCS, the various D and D/characterization personnel, and the Department of Energy (DOE) ensured the success of the modified approach to building demolition. The same successful approach is currently underway in the K-27 Building as well. (authors)
Building K-33 was constructed in 1954 as the final section of the five-stage uranium enrichment cascade at the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant (ORGDP). The two original building (K-25 and K-27) were used to produce weapons grade highly enriched uranium (HEU). Building K-29, K-31, and K-33 were added to produce low enriched uranium (LEU) for nuclear power plant fuel. During ORGDP operations K-33 produced a peak enrichment of 2.5%. Thousands of tons of reactor tails fed into gaseous diffusion plants in the 1950s and early 1960s introducing some fission products and transuranics. Building K-33 was a two-story, 25-meters (82-feet) tall structure with approximately 30 hectare (64 acres) of floor space. The Operations (first) Floor contained offices, change houses, feed vaporization rooms, and auxiliary equipment to support enrichment operations. The Cell (second) Floor contained the enrichment process equipment and was divided into eight process units (designated K-902-1 through K-902-8). Each unit contained ten cells, and each cell contained eight process stages (diffusers) for a total of 640 enrichment stages. 1985: LEU buildings were taken off-line after the anticipated demand for uranium enrichment failed to materialize. 1987: LEU buildings were placed in permanent shutdown. Process equipment were maintained in a shutdown state. 1997: DOE signed an Action Memorandum for equipment removal and decontamination of Buildings K-29, K-31, K-33; BNFL awarded contract to reindustrialize the buildings under the Three Buildings D&D and Recycle Project. 2002: Equipment removal complete and effort shifts to vacuuming, chemical cleaning, scabbling, etc. 2005: Decontamination efforts in K-33 cease. Building left with significant 99 Tc contamination on metal structures and PCB contamination in concrete. Uranium, transuranics, and fission products also present on building shell. 2009: DOE targets Building K-33 for demolition. 2010: ORAU contracted to characterize Building K-33 for final disposition at the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) in Oak Ridge. ORAU collected 439 samples from May and June. LATA Sharp started removing transite panels in September. 2011: LATA Sharp began demolition in January and expects the last waste shipment to EMWMF in September. Approximately 237,000 m 3 (310,000 yd 3 , bulked) of waste taken to EMWMF in 23,000 truckloads expected by project completion.