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Development of Remote Cutting Tools for use at ATR - 20438

As a result of years of operations of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at the Idaho National Lab (INL), the ATR canal has become congested due to the storage of materials including waste consisting of highly irradiated remote handled (RH) metals. In order to support its continuing nuclear mission the ATR requires canal space to support fuel storage and future core internal change out (CIC) components. INL staff determined that the canal must be cleaned out and waste removed to efficiently utilize the valuable canal floor space. It was determined that a methodology for processing, packaging, characterizing, and removing current and future irradiated hardware from the ATR canal is needed. Orano Federal Services (OFS) and its subcontractor Babcock Services Inc. (BSI) were selected to provide remote tooling in order to safely and efficiently size reduce the material currently stored in the ATR canal. INL developed detailed requirements that established the design and performance requirements for the tooling. Orano TN and BSI had recently successfully completed similar tasks in clearing highly activated materials from spent fuel pools and canals at commercial nuclear plants. That experience directly translated into a proven approach that could be used at the ATR thereby saving time and money and lowering risks. Based on BSI's demonstrated proficiency in the design and deployment of remote size reduction specialty tooling at comparable commercial facilities, Orano Federal Services was confident that a solution to INL's requirements could be delivered. The tooling had to be designed to be compatible with the operational requirements of the ATR canal as well as the functionality needed by the facility operators that will use the equipment. Some of the major design requirements and functions of the equipment included remote operations, capability to shear highly irradiated sections of aluminum and steel tubing, pipe, and components ranging in size from 0.6 cm to 16.5 cm diameter into 1.5 m -1.8 m lengths, utilizing buoyancy compensation to assist with underwater operations, and use commercially available existing technology and components as much as practical. The design team evaluated and selected commercially available equipment that could be modified to meet the design and performance specifications. In addition, a waste sizing table (WST) was designed and fabricated to further ensure the size reduction equipment would perform as expected and give the facility operators a stable and usable remote, underwater work platform. After successful development of the tooling, a mock up test and operator training was conducted to ensure the tooling performed as expected and met the requirements of INL. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Remediation Guidance for Major Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack

This document provides general guidelines for airport managers, local officials, and other stakeholders for developing a response and recovery plan for a major airport following the release of a biological warfare agent, with specific guidance for remediation. San Francisco International Airport was selected as the example airport during development of the guidance to illustrate specific details. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis was selected as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the agents most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The focus of the guidance is on cleanup and disposal activities associated with the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance Phases that are defined herein. Activities associated with the Notification and First-Response Phases are brieÀy discussed in Appendixes A and B, respectively. In addition to the main text of this Remediation Guidance document and associated appendixes, a data supplement was developed specifically for San Francisco International Airport. Requests for the data supplement must be made directly to the Emergency Planning Operations Division of San Francisco International Airport. This document does not describe public health responses to release of a biological warfare agent. If laboratory analytical results confirm the presence of a biological agent, the responsible public health agency involved in the response will commence appropriate public health actions, such as treatment (CDC 2004) and decontamination of potentially contaminated individuals, distribution of prophylaxis, and medical examinations. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site for more information on emergency public health responses (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). Effective communication with the media and the public is an essential component of airport remediation and recovery. Whereas such communication is beyond the scope of this document, many helpful resources are available. (See Section 1.1 for more information.) The concept of operations described in this document for cleanup of a Bacillus anthracis release at a major airport conforms to the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2008) and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). In most cases, a Unified Command would be formed to direct the cleanup process jointly and to take ultimate responsibility for all cleanup decisions. The Unified Command would likely include the Airport Manager or Airport Emergency Operations Manager, representatives from state and local public health and emergency management agencies, and Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Unified Command and Incident Command Staff would ideally be co-located in an Incident Command Post in an uncontaminated area of the airport. If a release is large or complex, co-location of all key players may not be possible. If a major incident is declared, a Principal Federal Official may be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal support to the Unified Command. In some facilities and jurisdictions, additional response plans or procedures (such as BioWatch or other emergency response plans, procedures, or protocols) may govern notification and first response. Facility personnel, responders, and emergency management coordinators should be aware of all applicable plans and procedures and how to implement them. Cleanups following the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the U.S. pre-dated the NRF and NIMS and did not make use of a NIMS Incident Command System as we know it today. Most Incident Commanders for the larger of those cleanups chose to convene a Technical Working Group (TWG) of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, outside experts to advise in developing sampling and decontamination plans. Most of the Incident Commanders also convened a separate Environmental Clearance Committee (ECC) to independently review pre- and post decontamination sampling data as well as data on decontamination parameters, to evaluate whether the decontamination was effective, and to add credibility regarding a decision that decontaminated areas may be reoccupied. Use of such specialized technical expertise is strongly recommended, although it would now operate within the construct of the NIMS Incident Command System. The TWG, if convened, would act in an advisory capacity to the Environmental Unit within the Planning Section. Likewise, the ECC, if convened, would provide independent peer review of products and recommendations by the Environmental Unit. For maximum impartiality, the ECC could also provide recommendations directly to the Unified Command. Cleanup activities commence with site characterization. The principal goal of characterization is to define the extent of contamination and to gather information needed to design the decontamination approach. Initial sampling data collected by first responders are assessed to approximate the location(s) of contamination. Confirmation of the agent type and viability is obtained from a Laboratory Response Network laboratory. Additional characterization data are collected to determine the extent of contamination and where decontamination actions are needed. Areas suspected of being contaminated are contained and isolated to the degree possible to prevent further movement of an agent to uncontaminated areas or the environment, and to reduce the potential for future exposure from the agent or fumigant, if fumigation is needed. Agent air monitoring in areas adjacent to the contained contamination zones is done to ensure the protection of remediation personnel and to monitor any release from the contained zones. Various sampling approaches are considered. For example, wipe samples can be used to sample hard, nonporous surfaces. Swab samples can be used to sample nooks, crannies, joints, and seams. Appendix I is a template for preparing an incident-specific, operational characterization plan. Upon completion of the characterization plan, an internal review is initiated. Upon approval of the plan by the Unified Command, characterization commences. The Site Safety Officer develops a Health and Safety Plan to ensure that coordinated health and safety measures are in place for all responding personnel. This plan describes physical, chemical, and biological hazards at the site, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination procedures, and emergency procedures to be used by sampling and remediation personnel. An incident-specific Remediation Action Plan is developed, which describes the decontamination methods to be used and other details, including waste disposal. Under NIMS, this overall plan, as well as other plans described below, are implemented through a series of standardized, shorter-term Incident Action Plans, which describe specific activities that will take place during a shift or a day. The template in Appendix J is designed to facilitate preparation of the Remediation Action Plan. If fumigation will be done, a Sampling and Analysis Plan will be needed, as well as an Ambient Air Monitoring Plan, which can be a component of the Remediation Action Plan. These three plans are needed to obtain a crisis exemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for authorized use of an unregistered sterilant or pesticide during cleanup. If pesticide products become registered for inactivation of B. anthracis in the future, the three plans will likely be required by the product’s labeling, but the plans would no longer be submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval; rather, the Incident Commander would approve them. If fumigation is used, an Emergency Response Plan is also recommended, although such a plan is not required for a crisis exemption. For some nonpersistent biological warfare agents, natural attenuation may be an adequate decontamination option. In cases where contamination is not extensive or an agent is not persistent, application of surface decontaminants or other methods of medical infection control may be effective. For extensive contamination by persistent agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, fumigation may be necessary. In those cases, the Decontamination Phase commences with source reduction, such as pre-cleaning surfaces to reduce the contaminant load. To expedite cleanup and prevent costs from escalating unnecessarily, a cost–benefit analysis should be incorporated in the decision process related to retention versus disposal of facility items and materials. Certain materials and structural components can be decontaminated for reuse, but it may not be feasible or cost-effective to decontaminate other items. Those items must be pre-treated, packaged (with the package decontaminated externally), and removed for disposal as waste. Site preparation includes sealing openings to prevent leaks and setting up equipment. Decontamination reagents and delivery systems are selected, and pre-testing all systems is done before carrying out chemical treatment(s). The important choice of decontamination technologies depends on characteristics of the agent, the nature and extent of contamination, and other site parameters identified during characterization. Decontamination-related decisions can have a major impact on waste-disposal costs, and it is necessary to develop a disposal plan that identifies a means of disposal, necessary approvals, transportation, and other details. A clearance strategy is developed to ensure that after decontamination, the risk of exposure to residual contamination is negligible. A clearance sampling plan is developed, which sets clearance criteria, specifies how to determine whether the criteria have been met, and describes how and where to collect clearance samples after decontamination. In most cases, clearance sampling includes both surface and aggressive air samples. Appendix K is a clearance plan template that identifies the types of required information. To determine whether the decontaminated area may be reoccupied, the Environmental Unit (and the ECC separately, if one is convened) evaluates the results of clearance samples. For the anthrax incidents to date, and given methods that have been used, cleanup was considered successful only when there was no growth of B. anthracis cultured from any environmental samples taken after decontamination. Other factors that will be considered include the decontamination process parameters (e.g., temperature, relative humidity, decontaminant concentration, and contact time) and the results from post-decontamination culture of biological indicators that may have been used during fumigation or sterilization processes. From such an evaluation the Environmental Unit or ECC, or both, recommend whether the area may be reoccupied, or whether further decontamination is necessary. The UC makes the final decision that a facility is appropriately decontaminated for reoccupancy. The facility owner or responsible public health agency makes the final decision to reopen a decontaminated facility. A theme that is emphasized throughout this document is that many activities can greatly reduce the time required to restore airport operations if those activities are conducted prior to an actual release of biological warfare agent. A summary of specific resources (such as Federal, state, and local agency contacts; contractors; prospective team members; subject-matter experts; laboratory facilities; and other entities) that should be identified in advance by airport officials is provided in each pertinent section of this document, and summary contact lists of such resources are provided in Appendix L. A summary of overall pre-planning actions that should be completed by airport officials is presented at the end of this document.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Evaluation of Spent Fuel Disposition in Crystalline Rocks: FY18 Progress Report

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Spent Fuel Waste Disposition (SFWD) established in fiscal year 2010 (FY10) the Spent Fuel Waste Science & Technology (SFWST) Program (formerly the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign - UFDC) program to conduct the research and development (R&D) activities related to storage, transportation and disposal of used nuclear fuel and high level nuclear waste. The Mission of the SFWST is: To identify alternatives and conduct scientific research and technology development to enable storage, transportation and disposal of used nuclear fuel and wastes generated by existing and future nuclear fuel cycles. The work package of Crystalline Disposal R&D directly supports the following SFWST objectives: Develop a fundamental understanding of disposal system performance in a range of environments for potential wastes that could arise from future nuclear fuel cycle alternatives through theory, simulation, testing, and experimentation. ; Develop a computational modeling capability for the performance of storage and disposal options for a range of fuel cycle alternatives, evolving from generic models to more robust models of performance assessment. The objective of the Crystalline Disposal R&D control account is to advance our understanding of long-term disposal of used fuel in crystalline rocks and to develop necessary experimental and computational capabilities to evaluate various disposal concepts in such media. Significant progress has been made in FY18 in both experimental and modeling arenas in evaluation of used fuel disposal in crystalline rocks, especially in model demonstration using field data. The work covers a wide range of research topics identified in the R&D plan. The major accomplishments are summarized.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Solid Secondary Waste Form Testing Activities for the Integrated Disposal Facility Performance Assessment Support - 17567

Solid secondary waste (SSW) that will be generated at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) and from other activities at the Hanford site is destined for disposal at the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF). Construction of the IDF was undertaken based on a Performance Assessment (PA) performed in 2001. In 2016, a SSW data package was prepared to support the development of an updated PA (2017 IDF PA). There are many inputs required to support the IDF PA. Data needs were identified based on experience from the previous PAs and from the development of conceptual models and modeling approaches to be applied for the 2017 PA. Interactions with the IDF PA team and the inventory data package developer helped to focus detailed efforts on a few key waste streams, contaminants of concern, and disposal configurations that are expected to be the primary contributors to the dose resulting from SSW disposed at the IDF. The key waste streams include: High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters, ion exchange resins, granular activated carbon, and Ag-mordenite. The key parameters addressed in the 2016 data package include: saturated hydraulic conductivity, moisture characteristic curves, effective diffusion coefficient, distribution coefficient and porosity. The IDF PA team also identified a set of key contaminants that are expected to be the primary concern for the PA calculations (Tc-99, I-129, Cs-137, Sr-90, uranium isotopes (and total uranium), chromium, mercury and nitrate). These contaminants were the focus of the SSW data package. Specific formulations had not been identified for cementitious materials that will be used to encapsulate or stabilize SSW, and no IDF-specific experiments had been conducted to obtain the data for the PA. Thus, for the 2016 SSW data package, recommended property values were provided for a range of representative candidate materials based on a review of existing literature. However, starting in FY17, IDF-specific experiments will be performed for Hanford SSW expected to contribute most significantly to the dose for the IDF. This paper will summarize the information obtained for the 2016 data package and the plans for further testing to refine key inputs for the IDF PA. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radcalc: An Analytical Tool for Shippers of Radioactive Material and Waste

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) ships radioactive materials in support of its research and development, environmental restoration, and national defense activities. The Radcalc software program assists personnel working on behalf of DOE in packaging and transportation determinations (e.g., isotopic decay, decay heat, regulatory classification, and gas generation) for shipment of radioactive materials and waste. Radcalc performs: - The U.S. Department of Transportation determinations and classifications (i.e., activity concentration for exempt material Type A or B, effective A1/A2, limited quantity, low specific activity, highway route controlled quantity, fissile quantity, fissile excepted, reportable quantity, list of isotopes required on shipping papers) - DOE calculations (i.e., transuranic waste, Pu-239 equivalent curies, fissile-gram equivalents) - The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission packaging category (i.e., Category I, II, or III) - Dose-equivalent curie calculations - Radioactive decay calculations using a novel decay methodology and a decay data library of 1,867 isotopes typical of the range of materials encountered in DOE laboratory environments - Hydrogen and helium gas calculations - Pressure calculations. Radcalc is a validated and cost-effective tool to provide consistency, accuracy, reproducibility, timeliness, quality, compliance, and appropriate documentation to shippers of radioactive materials and waste at DOE facilities nationwide. Hundreds of shippers and engineers throughout the DOE Complex routinely use this software to automate various determinations and to validate compliance with the regulations. The effective use of software by DOE sites contributes toward minimizing risk involved in radioactive waste shipments and assuring the safety of workers and the public. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

The evaluation of an analytical protocol for the determination of substances in waste for hazard classification

Highlights: • Knowledge of wastes in substances will be necessary to assess HP1–HP15 hazard properties. • A new analytical protocol is proposed for this and tested by two service laboratories on 32 samples. • Sixty-three percentage of the samples have a satisfactory analytical balance between 90% and 110%. • Eighty-four percentage of the samples were classified identically (Seveso Directive) for their hazardousness by the two laboratories. • The method, in progress, is being normalized in France and is be proposed to CEN. - Abstract: The classification of waste as hazardous could soon be assessed in Europe using largely the hazard properties of its constituents, according to the the Classification, Labelling and Packaging (CLP) regulation. Comprehensive knowledge of the component constituents of a given waste will therefore be necessary. An analytical protocol for determining waste composition is proposed, which includes using inductively coupled plasma (ICP) screening methods to identify major elements and gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC–MS) screening techniques to measure organic compounds. The method includes a gross or indicator measure of ‘pools’ of higher molecular weight organic substances that are taken to be less bioactive and less hazardous, and of unresolved ‘mass’ during the chromatography of volatile and semi-volatile compounds. The concentration of some elements and specific compounds that are linked to specific hazard properties and are subject to specific regulation (examples include: heavy metals, chromium(VI), cyanides, organo-halogens, and PCBs) are determined by classical quantitative analysis. To check the consistency of the analysis, the sum of the concentrations (including unresolved ‘pools’) should give a mass balance between 90% and 110%. Thirty-two laboratory samples comprising different industrial wastes (liquids and solids) were tested by two routine service laboratories, to give circa 7000 parameter results. Despite discrepancies in some parameters, a satisfactory sum of estimated or measured concentrations (analytical balance) of 90% was reached for 20 samples (63% of the overall total) during this first test exercise, with identified reasons for most of the unsatisfactory results. Regular use of this protocol (which is now included in the French legislation) has enabled service laboratories to reach a 90% mass balance for nearly all the solid samples tested, and most of liquid samples (difficulties were caused in some samples from polymers in solution and vegetable oil). The protocol is submitted to French and European normalization bodies (AFNOR and CEN) and further improvements are awaited.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

RH-LLW Disposal Facility Project CD-2/3 to Design/Build Proposal Reconciliation Report

A reconciliation plan was developed and implemented to address potential gaps and responses to gaps between the design/build vendor proposals and the Critical Decision-2/3 approval request package for the Remote-Handled Low Level Waste Disposal Facility Project. The plan and results of the plan implementation included development of a reconciliation team comprised of subject matter experts from Battelle Energy Alliance and the Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office, identification of reconciliation questions, reconciliation by the team, identification of unresolved/remaining issues, and identification of follow-up actions and subsequent approvals of responses.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Evaluation of Nuclear Spent Fuel Disposal in Clay-Bearing Rock - Process Model Development and Experimental Studies

This report represents the milestone deliverable M2SF-23SN010301072 “Evaluation of Nuclear Spent Fuel Disposal in Clay-Bearing Rock - Process Model Development and Experimental Studies” The report provides a status update of FY23 activities for the work package Argillite Disposal work packages for the DOE-NE Spent Fuel Waste Form Science and Technology (SFWST) Program. Clay-rich geological media (often referred as shale or argillite) are among the most abundant type of sedimentary rock near the Earth’s surface. Argillaceous rock formations have the following advantageous attributes for deep geological nuclear waste disposal: widespread geologic occurrence, found in stable geologic settings, low permeability, self-sealing properties, low effective diffusion coefficient, high sorption capacity, and have the appropriate depth and thickness to host nuclear waste repository concepts. The DOE R&D program under the Spent Fuel Waste Science Technology (SFWST) campaign has made key progress (through experiment, modeling, and testing) in the study of chemical and physical phenomena that could impact the long-term safety assessment of heat-generating nuclear waste disposition in clay/shale/argillaceous rock. International collaboration activities comprising field-scale heater tests, field data monitoring, and laboratory-scale experiments provide key information on changes to the engineered barrier system (EBS) material exposed high thermal loads. Moreover, consideration of direct disposal of large capacity dual-purpose canisters (DPCs) as part of the back-end SNF waste disposition strategy has generated interest in improving our understanding of the effects of elevated temperatures on the engineered barrier system (EBS) design concepts. Chemical and structural analyses of sampled bentonite material from laboratory tests at elevated temperatures are key to the characterization of thermal effects affecting bentonite clay barrier performance. The knowledge provided by these experiments is crucial to constrain the extent of sacrificial zones in the EBS design during the thermal period. Thermal, hydrologic, mechanical, and chemical (THMC) data collected from heater tests and laboratory experiments have been used in the development, validation, and calibration of THMC simulators to model near-field coupled processes. This information leads to the development of simulation approaches to assess issues on coupled processes involving porous media flow, transport, geomechanical phenomena, chemical interactions with barrier/geologic materials, and the development of EBS concepts. These lines of knowledge are central to the design of deep geological backfilled repository concepts where temperature plays a key role in the EBS behavior, potential interactions with host rock, and long-term performance in the safety assessment.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Macromolecules & Manufacturing Science

Outline • SRNL Overview • Mission overview • Polymers enabling the mission • R&D Highlights • Polymers in radiation environments • Tooling in shielded cells • Packaging for nuclear material shipments • Polymers supporting tank waste remediation • Ref electrode • Epoxy and polymer grout • Polymers for fusion energy • Deuterium labelling • Polymers for additive manufacturing • Coalescence and blends: experimental and predictive • Process modelling and sorting through big data (peregrine and latticeJ)

Chatham, Camden [Savannah River National Laborator↗

Hanford Site Composite Analysis Data Package: Exposure Scenarios and Radionuclide Specific Dose Conversion Factors.

This data package summarizes the exposure assumptions, equations, and methods used to calculate radionuclide-specific unit dose factors and the radiological doses for both groundwater and atmospheric pathways as a part of the revised Hanford Site Composite Analysis. An All-Pathways Representative Person exposure scenario is considered to evaluate exposure via both groundwater and atmospheric transport pathways. The radiological dose assessments for both groundwater and atmospheric pathways are included in the performance assessments for various Waste Management Areas at the Hanford Site. This data package calculates exposure route-specific and total unit dose factors for composite-analysis-specific radionuclides of concern based on the exposure assumptions used in the composite analysis and performance assessments. This data package presents the results and comparison of the radionuclide-specific unit dose factors based on the exposure assumptions used in the revised composite analysis and various performance assessments.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Packaging Capacity Calculation: Pu Oxide Packaging Options with the 2 Quart SAVY Container

This calculation supports programmatic efforts to Dilute and Dispose Pu. Metal is to be oxidized at LANL, then transported to SRS for dilution at SRS. Ultimately, the diluted oxide will be disposed of at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Currently 3013 containers are used to package the oxide, which are placed in to 9975 Type B shipping containers. The Oxide Packaging Technology Maturation Plan determined that a transition to the used of 2-qt SAVY containers placed in 9977 would increase efficiency in shipping and handling and increase programmatic flexibility. The 2-quart SAVY container meets DOE M 441.1 and TA-55 Documented Safety Analysis requirements for handling and storage of Pu oxide at LANL.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Design, Fabrication and Start-up of Test Facilities for the LAWPS Full-Scale IX Column Test and Engineering Scale Test - 17418

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection's (ORP) primary mission is to retrieve and treat Hanford's tank waste and close the Tank Farms to protect the Columbia River. Mixed radioactive waste is stored in 177 underground tanks at the Hanford Site as reported in DOE/ORP 2003-02, Environmental Impact Statement for Retrieval, Treatment, and Disposal of Tank Waste and Closure of the Single Shell Tanks at the Hanford Site, Richland WA, Inventory and Source Term Data Package. The 177 underground tanks are estimated to contain about 56 million gallons of waste. The Low Activity Waste Pretreatment System (LAWPS) Project provides for the early production of immobilized low activity waste (ILAW) by feeding LAW directly from Tank Farms to the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant's (WTP's) LAW Facility, bypassing the Pretreatment Facility. Prior to the transfer of feed to the WTP LAW Vitrification Facility, tank supernatant waste will be pretreated in the LAWPS to meet the WTP LAW waste acceptance criteria. The LAWPS will also facilitate the return of secondary liquid wastes from the WTP LAW Vitrification Facility to the Tank Farms. In November of 2015 DOE's Tank Operations Contractor, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), awarded a contract to the AECOM Team to design, fabricate and operate two test platforms to generate performance data at two different scales and demonstrate technology maturation. The first platform models the ion exchange (IX) columns at full scale, and the second platform models the integrated flowsheet (cross flow filter (CFF) and IX) at 1/9. scale. Both test platforms underwent shakedown and start-up testing in August 2016 and moved into actual testing and NQA-1 data generation shortly thereafter. This paper covers the engineering design, procurement, construction, installation, and acceptance testing of the test platforms (which are now operational) under an aggressive fast track schedule, and initial test data as available. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Testing Results from the Low Activity Waste Pretreatment System (LAWPS) Full-Scale Ion Exchange Column Test and Engineering Scale Integrated System Test - 18634

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection's (ORP) primary mission is to retrieve and treat Hanford's tank waste and close the Tank Farms to protect the Columbia River. Mixed radioactive waste is stored in 177 underground tanks at the Hanford Site as reported in DOE/ORP 2003- 02, Environmental Impact Statement for Retrieval, Treatment, and Disposal of Tank Waste and Closure of the Single Shell Tanks at the Hanford Site, Richland WA, Inventory and Source Term Data Package. The 177 underground tanks are estimated to contain about 56 million gallons of waste. The Low Activity Waste Pretreatment System (LAWPS) Project provides for the early production of immobilized low activity waste (ILAW) by feeding LAW directly from Tank Farms to the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant's (WTP's) LAW Facility, bypassing the Pretreatment Facility. Prior to the transfer of feed to the WTP LAW Vitrification Facility, tank supernatant waste will be pretreated in the LAWPS to meet the WTP LAW waste acceptance criteria. The LAWPS will also facilitate the return of secondary liquid wastes from the WTP LAW Vitrification Facility to the Tank Farms. In November of 2015 DOE's Tank Operations Contractor, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), awarded a contract to the AECOM team to design, fabricate and operate two test platforms to generate performance data at two different scales and demonstrate technology maturation. The first platform models the ion exchange (IX) columns at full scale, and the second platform models the integrated flowsheet (cross flow filter (CFF) and IX) at 1/9. scale. Overarching technical objectives of performing the full-scale ion exchange test and the engineering-scale integrated test are to: 1. Test interactions between unit process operations; 2. Test removal of non-radioactive cesium from process stream; 3. Test removal of undissolved solids from process stream; 4. Confirm operational flow rate range and stability; 5. Confirm volumetric throughput of waste stream over flow operating range; 6. Confirm range of process temperatures over planned operating range; 7. Establish system hydraulics and process criteria; 8. Coordinate key control and monitoring components; 9. Establish treated product chemistry meets requirements (cesium, solids, and pH); and 10. Test the hazard control strategy for a no flow condition through the IX column. Data collected during testing will be used by WRPS to validate the preliminary design, inform the final design of the permanent plant equipment, and demonstrate that the critical technology elements have advanced to a technology readiness level of 6 (prototypical system validation in a relevant environment). Testing on both platforms started in fall of 2016 generating NQA-1 data. This paper covers test results from the first five phases of testing on the 1/9. scale integrated test platform. A further three phases of testing are currently being executed, these including a 5.6 M sodium simulant containing foulant, a high viscosity simulant and finally a run performed with a lower Cs concentration (all earlier tests were spiked to 4 x Cs to reduce volume and cost). Results from these tests were not available at the time of writing available. Results are also presented from the full scale IX testing. Eight test were performed covering column loading, elution and regeneration; column loading, elution and regeneration with upflow displacement; IX column loading and gas migration; resin removal; solids accumulation; and IX column emergency recirculation and vent. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Results of recent tests of GNS transport and storage casks for nuclear waste - 15285

State of the art dimensioning of casks for nuclear waste is changing rapidly in recent years. Therefore even established packages that serve the market for many years have to face new type testing programs that implements changes to its designs. The paper shows some of the recent testing programs for existing packages and provides an outlook to future casks solutions and its testing programs. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Readiness Process and Transition to Operation for a Remote-Handled Transuranic Packaging Facility at Hanford - 19298

CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company manages the Sludge Retrieval Project, which has the mission to develop and deploy technologies to safely retrieve and package remote-handled transuranic sludge that is currently stored in the 105K West Reactor Fuel Storage Basin located in the 100-K Area of the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Site near Richland, Washington. In 2017, CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company installed and commissioned a process for removal of the sludge. A contractor Operational Readiness Review was completed in March 2018, and a U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office Operational Readiness Review was completed in May. The first sludge transfer was successfully completed on June 12, 2018, proving that the Engineered Container Retrieval and Transfer System process equipment worked as intended. This paper will describe the issues and successes along the path of readiness and startup, as well as the challenges that remain and CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company's plan to overcome them. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Contamination Control: Challenges and Innovative Design Solutions utilized at Chalk River Laboratories - 19263

CNL has operated research reactors at the Chalk River Laboratories (CRL) site since 1947, generating a variety of spent nuclear fuel wastes produced by irradiating metallic uranium and other prototype fuels. This legacy waste has been stored in below-grade, vertical cylindrical steel and concrete structures known as Tile Holes. Ongoing monitoring of the legacy waste has identified moisture resulting from incomplete drying prior to emplacement, surface water and humidity. The undesirable storage conditions result in corrosion of both the legacy waste and the storage containers. Continued storage in these conditions may result in further degradation of the storage container and contamination of the surrounding environment. In 2004, the Fuel Packaging and Storage (FPS) Project was initiated, with the objective to develop a complete system to safely retrieve legacy waste from these Tile Holes as well as provide a stable storage environment until a final long-term management plan is established. Contamination control during retrieval, transfer and repackaging operations is critical for personnel and environmental safety. The significant challenges with retrieval of the legacy waste from the Tile Holes includes management of loose collateral liquid and solids that will be brought into the system, with the retrieved waste container. During the retrieval, transfer and repackaging operation, the challenge was to: 1) Prevent an environmental release by potentially transferring these contaminants onto the external surface of the Tile Hole Array; 2) Prevent an environmental release and ensure personnel safety while transporting the legacy waste; 3) Control release of contaminants into the new clean storage container while preventing contamination of the packaging equipment. To address the first source of contamination, a debris guide liner capable of interfacing with multiple Tile Hole configurations was integrated within the Retrieval Flask to limit contamination of the flask interior and to direct collateral liquids and solids back into the Tile Hole. The system uses a multi-function sealed Shield Gate and Drip Tray to retain and prevent the contaminants from escaping while transferring the legacy waste. This gate, along with a thin walled, Disposable Debris Guide Liner (DDGL) is an innovative solution developed to control the flow characteristics of the residual waste and to contain the waste to protect the internal components of the repackaging equipment. The development of the complete solution was further challenged as the DDGL must not tear or rip and must compact inside the new storage containers for a range of legacy waste storage containers. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Engineering scale demonstration of a prospective cast Stone process - 15584

A cementitious waste form is one of the alternatives being evaluated for Supplemental Immobilization of Hanford Low Activity Waste (LAW). Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) is collecting data on cementitious or pozzolanic waste forms such as Cast Stone. The goal of this project for WRPS is to obtain data on the performance of the Cast Stone waste form for immobilizing LAW. As part of the data package being assembled, an engineering-scale demonstration with non-radioactive simulants was performed at the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) using the Scaled Continuous Processing Facility (SCPF) to fill a container with simulated Cast Stone grout. Legacy salt solution from previous Hanford salt waste testing was trimmed to resemble the average composition generated from the Hanford Tank Waste Operation Simulator (HTWOS) used in the screening tests. The dry blend materials, ordinary portland cement (OPC), Class F fly ash, and ground granulated blast furnace slag (GGBFS or BFS) were obtained from Lafarge North America in Pasco, WA. Over three days, the SCPF was used to fill a 6,056 liter (1600 gallon) container with simulated Cast Stone grout. The tank was instrumented with x-, y-, and z-axis thermocouples to monitor curing temperature and two formed core sampling vials. The target production rate was 5.7 L/min (1.5 gpm). This required a salt solution flow rate of approximately 3.78 L/min (1 gpm) and a premix feed rate of approximately 263 kh/h (580 lb/h). The final surface slope at a fill height of 100 cm was 2.5-3.8 cm across the 260 cm (8.5 ft) diameter tank. During processing, grout was collected from both the mixer discharge and the discharge into the tank. These samples were stored in a humid environment either in a closed box proximal to the tank or inside the laboratory. (authors)

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