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On-Line Monitoring for Control and Safeguarding of Radiochemical Streams at Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plant

Advanced techniques enabling enhanced safeguarding of the spent fuel reprocessing plants are urgently needed. Our approach is based on prerequisite that real time monitoring of the solvent extraction flowsheets provides unique capability to quickly detect unwanted manipulations with fissile isotopes present in the radiochemical streams during reprocessing activities. The methods used to monitor these processes must be robust and must be able to withstand harsh radiation and chemical environments. A new on-line monitoring system satisfying these requirements and featuring Raman spectroscopy combined with a Coriolis and conductivity probes, has been recently developed by our research team. It provides immediate chemical data and flow parameters of high-level radioactive waste streams with high brine content generated during retrieval activities from Hanford nuclear waste storage tanks. The nature of the radiochemical streams at the spent fuel reprocessing plant calls for additional spectroscopic information, which can be gained by the utilization of UV-vis-NIR capabilities. Raman and UV-vis-NIR spectroscopies are analytical techniques that have extensively been extensively applied for measuring the various organic and inorganic compounds including actinides. The corresponding spectrometers used under the laboratory conditions are easily convertible to the process-friendly configurations allowing remote measurements under the flow conditions. A fiber optic Raman probe allows monitoring of the high concentration species encountered in both aqueous and organic phases within the UREX suite of flowsheets, including metal oxide ions, such as uranyl, components of the organic solvent, inorganic oxo-anions, and water. The actinides and lanthanides are monitored remotely by UV-vis-NIR spectroscopy in aqueous and organic phases. In this report, we will present our recent results on spectroscopic measurements of simulant flowsheet solutions and commercial fuels available at PNNL. Measurements are performed at wide range of conditions adjusted to mimic UREX/PUREX processes and to demonstrate the applicability of Raman and vis-NIR spectroscopic analysis for actual dissolver feed solutions.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

LIFE vs. LWR: End of the Fuel Cycle

The worldwide energy consumption in 2003 was 421 quadrillion Btu (Quads), and included 162 quads for oil, 99 quads for natural gas, 100 quads for coal, 27 quads for nuclear energy, and 33 quads for renewable sources. The projected worldwide energy consumption for 2030 is 722 quads, corresponding to an increase of 71% over the consumption in 2003. The projected consumption for 2030 includes 239 quads for oil, 190 quads for natural gas, 196 quads for coal, 35 quads for nuclear energy, and 62 quads for renewable sources [International Energy Outlook, DOE/EIA-0484, Table D1 (2006) p. 133]. The current fleet of light water reactors (LRWs) provides about 20% of current U.S. electricity, and about 16% of current world electricity. The demand for electricity is expected to grow steeply in this century, as the developing world increases its standard of living. With the increasing price for oil and gasoline within the United States, as well as fear that our CO2 production may be driving intolerable global warming, there is growing pressure to move away from oil, natural gas, and coal towards nuclear energy. Although there is a clear need for nuclear energy, issues facing waste disposal have not been adequately dealt with, either domestically or internationally. Better technological approaches, with better public acceptance, are needed. Nuclear power has been criticized on both safety and waste disposal bases. The safety issues are based on the potential for plant damage and environmental effects due to either nuclear criticality excursions or loss of cooling. Redundant safety systems are used to reduce the probability and consequences of these risks for LWRs. LIFE engines are inherently subcritical, reducing the need for systems to control the fission reactivity. LIFE engines also have a fuel type that tolerates much higher temperatures than LWR fuel, and has two safety systems to remove decay heat in the event of loss of coolant or loss of coolant flow. These features of LIFE are expected to result in a more straightforward licensing process and are also expected to improve the public perception of risk from nuclear power generation, transportation of nuclear materials, and nuclear waste disposal. Waste disposal is an ongoing issue for LWRs. The conventional (once-through) LWR fuel cycle treats unburned fuel as waste, and results in the current fleet of LWRs producing about twice as much waste in their 60 years of operation as is legally permitted to be disposed of in Yucca Mountain. Advanced LWR fuel cycles would recycle the unused fuel, such that each GWe-yr of electricity generation would produce only a small waste volume compared to the conventional fuel cycle. However, the advanced LWR fuel cycle requires chemical reprocessing plants for the fuel, multiple handling of radioactive materials, and an extensive transportation network for the fuel and waste. In contrast, the LIFE engine requires only one fueling for the plant lifetime, has no chemical reprocessing, and has a single shipment of a small amount of waste per GWe-yr of electricity generation. Public perception of the nuclear option will be improved by the reduction, for LIFE engines, of the number of shipments of radioactive material per GWe-yr and the need to build multiple repositories. In addition, LIFE fuel requires neither enrichment nor reprocessing, eliminating the two most significant pathways to proliferation from commercial nuclear fuel to weapons programs.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Liquid-Liquid Extraction Equipment

Solvent extraction processing has demonstrated the ability to achieve high decontamination factors for uranium and plutonium while operating at high throughputs. Historical application of solvent extraction contacting equipment implies that for the HA cycle (primary separation of uranium and plutonium from fission products) the equipment of choice is pulse columns. This is likely due to relatively short residence times (as compared to mixer-settlers) and the ability of the columns to tolerate solids in the feed. Savannah River successfully operated the F-Canyon with centrifugal contactors in the HA cycle (which have shorter residence times than columns). All three contactors have been successfully deployed in uranium and plutonium purification cycles. Over the past 20 years, there has been significant development of centrifugal contactor designs and they have become very common for research and development applications. New reprocessing plants are being planned in Russia and China and the United States has done preliminary design studies on future reprocessing plants. The choice of contactors for all of these facilities is yet to be determined.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Monitoring, Controlling and Safeguarding Radiochemical Streams at Spent Fuel Reprocessing Facilities, Part 1: Optical Spectroscopic Methods

Abstract: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-useable nuclear material are not diverted from these facilities. For large throughput nuclear facilities, it is difficult to satisfy the IAEA safeguards accountancy goal for detection of abrupt diversion. Currently, methods to verify material control and accountancy (MC&A) at these facilities require time-consuming and resource-intensive destructive assay (DA). Leveraging new on-line non-destructive assay (NDA) process monitoring techniques in conjunction with the traditional and highly precise DA methods may provide an additional measure to nuclear material accountancy which would potentially result in a more timely, cost-effective and resource efficient means for safeguards verification at such facilities. By monitoring process control measurements (e.g. flowrates, temperatures, or concentrations of reagents, products or wastes), abnormal plant operations can be detected. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing on-line NDA process monitoring technologies based upon gamma-ray and optical spectroscopic measurements to potentially reduce the time and resource burden associated with current techniques. The Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor uses gamma spectroscopy and multivariate analysis to identify off-normal conditions in process streams. The spectroscopic monitor continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major stable flowsheet reagents using UV-Vis, Near IR and Raman spectroscopy. Multi-variate analysis is also applied to the optical measurements in order to quantify concentrations of analytes of interest within a complex array of radiochemical streams. This paper will provide an overview of these methods and reports on-going efforts to develop and demonstrate the technologies. This paper is Part 1 of a two part series, and focuses on the optical spectroscopy based process monitoring methods.

material control and accountancy, process monitor,↗

Monitoring, Controlling and Safeguarding Radiochemical Streams at Spent Fuel Reprocessing Facilities, Part 2: Gamma-Ray Spectroscopic Methods

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-useable nuclear material are not diverted from these facilities. For large throughput nuclear facilities, it is difficult to satisfy the IAEA safeguards accountancy goal for detection of abrupt diversion. Currently, methods to verify material control and accountancy (MC&A) at these facilities require time-consuming and resource-intensive destructive assay (DA). Leveraging new on-line non-destructive assay (NDA) process monitoring techniques in conjunction with the traditional and highly precise DA methods may provide an additional measure to nuclear material accountancy which would potentially result in a more timely, cost-effective and resource efficient means for safeguards verification at such facilities. By monitoring process control measurements (e.g. flowrates, temperatures, or concentrations of reagents, products or wastes), abnormal plant operations can be detected. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing on-line NDA process monitoring technologies based upon gamma-ray and optical spectroscopic measurements to potentially reduce the time and resource burden associated with current techniques. The Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor uses gamma spectroscopy and multivariate analysis to identify off-normal conditions in process streams. The spectroscopic monitor continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major stable flowsheet reagents using UV-Vis, Near IR and Raman spectroscopy. Multi-variate analysis is also applied to the optical measurements in order to quantify concentrations of analytes of interest within a complex array of radiochemical streams. This paper will provide an overview of these methods and reports on-going efforts to develop and demonstrate the technologies. This paper is Part 2 of a two part series, and focuses on the gamma spectroscopy based, Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor method.

Schwantes, Jon M↗

Monitoring, Controlling and Safeguarding Radiochemical Streams at Spent Fuel Reprocessing Facilities with Optical and Gamma-Ray Spectroscopic Methods

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-useable nuclear material are not diverted from these facilities. For large throughput nuclear facilities, it is difficult to satisfy the IAEA safeguards accountancy goal for detection of abrupt diversion. Currently, methods to verify material control and accountancy (MC&A) at these facilities require time-consuming and resourceintensive destructive assay (DA). Leveraging new on-line non-destructive assay (NDA) process monitoring techniques in conjunction with the traditional and highly precise DA methods may provide an additional measure to nuclear material accountancy which would potentially result in a more timely, cost-effective and resource efficient means for safeguards verification at such facilities. By monitoring process control measurements (e.g. flowrates, temperatures, or concentrations of reagents, products or wastes), abnormal plant operations can be detected. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing on-line NDA process monitoring technologies based upon gamma-ray and optical spectroscopic measurements to potentially reduce the time and resource burden associated with current techniques. The Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor uses gamma spectroscopy and multivariate analysis to identify offnormal conditions in process streams. The spectroscopic monitor continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major stable flowsheet reagents using UV-Vis, Near IR and Raman spectroscopy. Multi-variate analysis is also applied to the optical measurements in order to quantify concentrations of analytes of interest within a complex array of radiochemical streams. This paper will provide an overview of these methods and reports on-going efforts to develop and demonstrate the technologies.

controlling↗

Impact of Nd ions on the chemical kinetic behavior of radiolytic transients in molten LiCl-KCl-NdCl3 salt mixtures

Pyrochemical reprocessing technologies can be used to recover valuable materials from used nuclear fuel (UNF), such as uranium. However, other critical materials, such as fission product neodymium, are challenging to recover from molten chloride eutectic mixtures (LiCl-KCl) due to the presence of multivalent states (Nd2+/Nd3+), disproportionation reactions, and re-dissolution in the molten chloride salt. Understanding, predicting, and controlling these processes is further complicated by the presence of ionizing radiation fields, for which little is known on the interaction of neodymium ions with the radiolytic transients (es– and Cl2.–) in molten LiCl-KCl salt mixtures. Here, chemical kinetics, from integrated electron pulse irradiation and transient absorption spectroscopy, are presented for the reaction of Nd3+ ions with es– and Cl2.– as a function of temperature (400–600 ?).

36 - MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Demonstrating the Safety of Long-Term Dry Storage - 13468

Commercial nuclear plants in the United States were originally designed with the expectation that used nuclear fuel would be moved directly from the reactor pools and transported off site for either reprocessing or direct geologic disposal. However, Federal programs intended to meet this expectation were never able to develop the capability to remove used fuel from reactor sites - and these programs remain stalled to this day. Therefore, in the 1980's, with reactor pools reaching capacity limits, industry began developing dry cask storage technology to provide for additional on-site storage. Use of this technology has expanded significantly since then, and has today become a standard part of plant operations at most US nuclear sites. As this expansion was underway, Federal programs remained stalled, and it became evident that dry cask systems would be in use longer than originally envisioned. In response to this challenge, a strong technical basis supporting the long term dry storage safety has been developed. However, this is not a static situation. The technical basis must be able to address future challenges. Industry is responding to one such challenge - the increasing prevalence of high burnup (HBU) used fuel and the need to provide long term storage assurance for these fuels equivalent to that which has existed for lower burnup fuels over the past 25 years. This response includes a confirmatory demonstration program designed to address the aging characteristics of HBU fuel and set a precedent for a learning approach to aging management that will have broad applicability across the used fuel storage landscape. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Burnup credit for BWR UOX used fuels: criticality-safety sensitivity studies for reprocessing - 14609

Actinides Only Burnup Credit (BUC) has been successfully used for years for PWR UOX fuels at AREVA La Hague reprocessing plant. For BWR UOX fuel assemblies, the application of the methodology developed for PWR fuel is not straightforward. Indeed, BWR UOX fuel assemblies have specific and various design characteristics and progress can be made on our understanding of the impact of such characteristics on the rotary dissolver k{sub eff} value, taking into account various irradiation conditions. Moreover, the void fraction introduces a new variable, compared to PWR fuels. The purpose of this paper is to present, for a reference BWR UOX fuel assembly, the impact of design characteristics and irradiation conditions on the rotary dissolver k-effective. The impacts of each parameter are studied in an uncorrelated way and are defined according to burnup and void fraction. The design characteristics and irradiation conditions of the Fukushima-Daini benchmark are taken into account as reference values for all these parameters. A range of values is defined for each of these parameters in order to consider a large variety of design characteristics and irradiation conditions Depletion, with APOLLO2-A code, and criticality, with CRISTAL V1.2 package, calculations are successively performed to define impact of each parameter on dissolver reactivity. Then a ranking of these parameters according to their impact on the dissolver's reactivity is done. This ranking could be useful in a general BWR UOX burnup credit approach to cover a collection of BWR UOX fuel assemblies by a penalizing fuel assembly defined with a particular set of parameters. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF MATERIAL ASSOCIATED WITH A MOX FUEL CYCLE FROM A SAFEGUARDS PERSPECTIVE

This paper is an extension to earlier studies [1,2] that examined the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) and alternate nuclear materials (ANM) associated with the PUREX, UREX, coextraction, THOREX, and PYROX reprocessing schemes. This study extends the figure of merit (FOM) for evaluating attractiveness to cover a broad range of proliferant State and sub-national group capabilities. This study also considers those materials that will be recycled and burned, possibly multiple times, in LWRs [e.g., plutonium in the form of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel]. The primary conclusion of this study is that all fissile material needs to be rigorously safeguarded to detect diversion by a State and provided the highest levels of physical protection to prevent theft by sub-national groups; no “silver bullet” has been found that will permit the relaxation of current international safeguards or national physical security protection levels. This series of studies has been performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and is based on the calculation of "attractiveness levels" that are expressed in terms consistent with, but normally reserved for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities [3]. The expanded methodology and updated findings are presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance and physical security are discussed.

Fuel Cycle↗

Nondestructive Spent Fuel Assay Using Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence

Quantifying the isotopic composition of spent fuel is an important challenge and essential for many nuclear safeguards applications, such as independent verification of the Pu content declared by a regulated facility, shipper/receiver measurements, and quantifying isotopic input masses at a reprocessing facility. As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, NA-241 has recently funded a multilab/university collaboration to investigate a variety of nondestructive methods for determining the elemental Pu mass in spent fuel assemblies. Nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) is one of the methods being investigated. First modeling studies have been performed to investigate the feasibility of assaying a single fuel pin using a bremsstrahlung photon source. MCNPX modeling results indicate that NRF signals are significantly more intense than the background due to scattered interrogation photons even for isotopes with concentrations below 1percent. However, the studies revealed that the dominant contribution to the background is elastic scattering, which is currently not simulated by MCNPX. Critical to this effort, we have added existing NRF data to the MCNPX photonuclear data files and are now able to incorporate NRF physics into MCNPX simulations. Addition of the non-resonant elastic scattering data to MCNPX is in progress. Assaying fuel assemblies with NRF poses additional challenges: photon penetration through the assembly is small and the spent fuel radioactive decay and neutron activity lead to significantly higher backgrounds. First modeling studies to evaluate the efficacy of NRF for assaying assemblies have been initiated using the spent fuel assembly library created at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Researching the Effects of Long-Term Dry Storage on Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel

When the fuel in a nuclear reactor no longer contributes efficiently to power production, it is discharged and stored onsite in a water-filled spent fuel pool. When nuclear power plants in the United States were originally designed, it was expected that onsite storage would be temporary. The used nuclear fuel, also known as spent nuclear fuel (SNF), was to be removed from the storage pools after only a few years of cooling and sent for reprocessing. However, commercial reprocessing was not implemented in the United States, and utility spent fuel pools began running out of room. In order to continue power production, nuclear utilities began expanding onsite fuel storage capacities, first by increasing the density of fuel in the fuel pool racks, and then by developing and implementing dry storage casks. The dry storage casks are stored onsite by each utility at a licensed and secured independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI). Dry storage casks are robust systems typically consisting of a sealed metal cylinder surrounded by a combination of steel and concrete to provide radiation shielding. The first dry storage casks were loaded with SNF in 1986. Currently there are over 3,000 loaded dry storage casks, and approximately 200 new casks are being placed into service annually at operating nuclear power plants nationwide. Multiple nuclear power plant sites in the United States have shut down and completed decommissioning activities except for the removal of fuel in dry storage. Eventually, the 75,000+ tons of discharged SNF at more than 70 secured locations will need to be safely and securely transported to a new location(s) for eventual disposition. The continued safety and security of this material must be assured.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The behaviour of transuranic mixed oxide fuel in a Candu-900 reactor

The production of transuranic actinide fuels for use in current thermal reactors provides a useful intermediary step in closing the nuclear fuel cycle. Extraction of actinides reduces the longevity, radiation and heat loads of spent material. The burning of transuranic fuels in current reactors for a limited amount of cycles reduces the infrastructure demand for fast reactors and provides an effective synergy that can result in a reduction of as much as 95% of spent fuel waste while reducing the fast reactor infrastructure needed by a factor of almost 13.5 [1]. This paper examines the features of actinide mixed oxide fuel, TRUMOX, in a CANDU{sup R}* nuclear reactor. The actinide concentrations used were based on extraction from 30 year cooled spent fuel and mixed with natural uranium in 3.1 wt% actinide MOX fuel. Full lattice cell modeling was performed using the WIMS-AECL code, super-cell calculations were analyzed in DRAGON and full core analysis was executed in the RFSP 2-group diffusion code. A time-average full core model was produced and analyzed for reactor coefficients, reactivity device worth and online fuelling impacts. The standard CANDU operational limits were maintained throughout operations. The TRUMOX fuel design achieved a burnup of 27.36 MWd/kg HE. A full TRUMOX fuelled CANDU was shown to operate within acceptable limits and provided a viable intermediary step for burning actinides. The recycling, reprocessing and reuse of spent fuels produces a much more sustainable and efficient nuclear fuel cycle. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Development of self-interrogation neutron resonance densitometry (SINRD) to measure U-235 and Pu-239 content in a PWR spent fuel assembly

The use of Self-Interrogation Neutron Resonance Densitometry (SINRD) to measure the {sup 235}U and {sup 239}Pu content in a PWR spent fuel assembly was investigated via Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended transport code (MCNPX) simulations. The sensitivity of SINRD is based on using the same fissile materials in the fission chambers as are present in the fuel because the effect of resonance absorption lines in the transmitted flux is amplified by the corresponding (n, f) reaction peaks in fission chamber. These simulations utilize the {sup 244}Cm spontaneous fission neutrons to self-interrogate the fuel pins. The amount of resonance absorption of these neutrons in the fuel can be measured using {sup 235}U and {sup 239}Pu fission chambers placed adjacent to the assembly. We used ratios of different fission chambers to reduce the sensitivity of the measurements to extraneous material present in fuel. The development of SINRD to measure the fissile content in spent fuel is of great importance to the improvement of nuclear safeguards and material accountability. Future work includes the use of this technique to measure the fissile content in FBR spent fuel and heavy metal product from reprocessing methods.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Benefits from developments in the field of Decommissioning for Fukushima Daiichi fuel debris retrieval: Remote-Controlled Laser Cutting Process - 17110

Among the numerous challenges towards the decommissioning of Fukushima Dai-ichi reactors, removing fuel debris is certainly one of the tougher ones, requiring several technical developments. One of them, related to laser cutting of fuel debris is being developed by a French consortium 'ONET Technologies, CEA and IRSN'. Remote controlled laser cutting was implemented for the first time in a real decommissioning workshop in 2015, in UP1 reprocessing plant. In addition to laser cutting development in air and underwater, key aspects of fuel debris cutting of representative of corium debris simulants was performed to test the quantities of aerosols, gas and dusts released during the debris laser cutting. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Decontamination Process of Internal Part Pipes - 13442

The Marcoule Site, created in 1955 is one of the first nuclear sites in France. It combines the activities of the Research Centre of the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) and AREVA industrial operations. Today, a large part of the operations on this site consists of the cleaning and the dismantling of nuclear Installations, once the end of their life cycle has been reached. An example can be the reprocessing plant UP1. This unit, started in 1958 has been stopped in 1997 and its dismantling started quickly thereafter. Technical challenges of the UP1 dismantling are mainly linked to a very high risk of exposure due to a large variety of contaminated equipments and residuals of fission products, potential sources of irradiation. The dismantling of Hall 71 is a typical example of such challenge. This paper will present a solution developed by AREVA Clean-Up business unit, in collaboration with COFIM Industry, to remove contamination incrusted inside the pipes before starting the cutting operations, thus reducing irradiation risk. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Estimating Potential Tritium and Plutonium Production in North Korea’s Experimental Light Water Reactor

Our work explores North Korea's 100 MW-th Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR) and its potential contributions to the country's nuclear weapons program. Built at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, the ELWR began operations in October 2023 and represents North Korea's first attempts at a light-water reactor using domestically-enriched, ceramic fuel. Our study examines possible configurations for energy, tritium, and tritium-plutonium co-production. Assuming a single-batch core, the ELWR can be used to annually produce 48-82 grams of tritium, which can supply 2-4 new boosted warheads each year, up to a maximum arsenal of 88-150 warheads total. Concurrent production of tritium and weapon-grade plutonium is also possible but requires reprocessing of spent ceramic fuel. Furthermore, these findings underscore how North Korea's nuclear capabilities may be advanced through the ELWR's dual-use potential.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Belgian regulatory framework for decontamination and decommissioning - lessons learned and new initiatives

Belgium can rely on significant experience in the field of decontamination and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. Several projects are ongoing and include research reactors (BR3, Thetis), uranium and MOX fuel fabrication plants (FBFC International, Belgonucleaire), fuel reprocessing facilities (Eurochemic) and radwaste processing facilities (Belgoprocess). Additional projects are expected in the coming years with the planned final shutdown of the oldest nuclear power reactor units. Two national authorities are involved in the decontamination and decommissioning process of nuclear facilities. The FANC (together with its subsidiary Bel V) is concerned for all matters related to nuclear safety and radiation protection, while NIRAS/ONDRAF is concerned for all matters related to radioactive waste and fuel management and financial provisions. These attributions ensure that all safety and material concerns are addressed and that both the licensees and the national authorities bear their own responsibilities. They rely on an existing regulatory framework covering both the procedural and the technical aspects of the decontamination and decommissioning activities. However, opportunities for regulatory improvement were raised after some recent events in Belgium, among which the bankruptcy of a nuclear company producing radioisotopes, involving numerous additional interested parties in a complex judiciary context. Amendments in the current regulations are considered to increase the prerogatives of the authorities regarding the management of radioactive waste by a licensee, the transfer of an operating license from an operator to another, and the general decommissioning strategy of a facility. Furthermore, a dedicated 'waste and decommissioning' working group within WENRA defined new reference levels applying to the decontamination and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. Belgium committed to include these requirements explicitly in its national legislation, even though most of them were already included in the existing decommissioning authorizations. Amendments will cover the safety provisions inherent to the decontamination and decommissioning phase, such as the decommissioning strategy, the qualification of techniques, the experience feedback valorization, the periodic safety reviews, the radioactive waste management, or the final characterization of the sites. Additionally, requirements regarding the authorization process will be detailed, such as the content of the licensee's application file or the structure of the safety report covering the decontamination and decommissioning phase. These changes will contribute to a more secure regulatory framework for all interested parties. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗