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At least 847 records · Page 47

FAST FY 2018 Data Call: A Preliminary Review [Slides]

This presentation provides an overview of fiscal year 2018 federal motor vehicle fleet data at the individual vehicle level during the fall of 2018, a preliminary summary of the data collected, and how the collecting project has reviewed that information for potential quality issues. This presentation will be given at the March 2019 INTERFUEL group meeting, hosted by DOE's Federal Energy Management Program (DOE FEMP). The information is collected through the Federal Automotive Statistical Tool (FAST) project. FAST is a Web-based information system managed by the US Department of Energy, the US General Services Administration, and the Energy Information Administration. FAST is used to collect information about the fleet of motor vehicles used and managed by the Federal government. FAST is developed and maintained by DOE's Idaho National Laboratory (INL).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A Risk-Informed Performance-Based Methodology to Manage Fire Protection Systems in Nuclear Facilities

Fire protection systems (FPSs) and features are installed in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facilities to protect property (maximum possible fire loss thresholds), life, and nuclear safety (i.e., structures, systems, and components). These FPSs and features are designed and maintained in accordance with the prescriptive guidance provided in applicable building codes and National Fire Protection Association codes and standards. Management, operations, and maintenance activities of FPSs involve significant effort. A DOE facility’s documented safety analysis or other safety basis document could also rely on FPSs to provide either a safety significant or safety class function to mitigate fire hazards and minimize radiological consequences. In some cases, the designation of safety significant or safety class may be determined to provide a layer of defense-in-depth to minimize nuclear safety risks independent of the fire risk. DOE standards allow the use of performance-based design alternatives developed by the fire industry but do not consider the defense-in-depth layers of protection provided in DOE facilities to prevent or mitigate the risks associated with unintended release of radioactive materials into the environment. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed a decision-making methodology tailored for DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities to manage FPSs and features by integrating nuclear safety risk insights into a performance-based analysis. This risk-informed, performance-based (RIPB) methodology can be used to provide the technical basis for classifying an FPS as safety class and safety significant, tailoring administrative controls (e.g., technical safety requirements), and ranking the importance of FPSs to prioritize maintenance, upgrades, and replacement activities. The RIPB methodology is a graded approach to inform DOE facility owners and Fire Protection Program managers of the most risk-significant FPSs and equipment, and those systems would be cost-beneficial to relax rigor if there is a need to re-design the FPS coverage or deviate from DOE and National Fire Protection Association standards for those systems that would be less significant. This paper describes the framework used to develop the RIPB methodology and the outcome of implementing this methodology in a use-case nuclear facility. This paper also discusses the impact to DOE policies and standards and the safety margins and defense-in-depth measures credited in nuclear safety assessments in a facility’s documented safety analysis and the benefits of implementing an RIPB methodology in lieu of a prescriptive method to comply with fire protection requirements.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Seminar on Aspects of Planning and Implementing a Nuclear Power Program: A Simulation-Based Exercise

Countries worldwide are considering developing or expanding existing nuclear power programs to meet growing energy demand, to reduce reliance on declining domestic and foreign-based oil supplies, , and to limit the effects of climate change. Safe, secure and sustainable operation of these new reactors will require extensive planning and preparation, possibly as much as ten to 15 years before the first nuclear plant an be brought online, particularly in countries with little nuclear infrastructure in place. The planning and preparation will focus on development of the technical, legal, regulatory and human resources needed to support a nuclear power program. Countries and institutions that can provide technical assistance are already coordinating activities and leveraging resources to ensure these nascent nuclear needs are met cost-effectively. To this end, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is hosting seminars aimed at helping countries make more informed decisions about key nuclear safety, security and nonproliferation issues. This paper discusses the challenges associated with infrastructure development, particularly in countries with limited infrastructure, and summarizes the outcomes of the seminars NNSA has held to date .

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION

Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Report of the Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and Storage

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) refers to a set of technologies that can greatly reduce carbon dioxide (CO{sub 2}) emissions from new and existing coal- and gas-fired power plants, industrial processes, and other stationary sources of CO{sub 2}. In its application to electricity generation, CCS could play an important role in achieving national and global greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction goals. However, widespread cost-effective deployment of CCS will occur only if the technology is commercially available and a supportive national policy framework is in place. In keeping with that objective, on February 3, 2010, President Obama established an Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and Storage composed of 14 Executive Departments and Federal Agencies. The Task Force, co-chaired by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), was charged with proposing a plan to overcome the barriers to the widespread, cost-effective deployment of CCS within ten years, with a goal of bringing five to ten commercial demonstration projects online by 2016. Composed of more than 100 Federal employees, the Task Force examined challenges facing early CCS projects as well as factors that could inhibit widespread commercial deployment of CCS. In developing the findings and recommendations outlined in this report, the Task Force relied on published literature and individual input from more than 100 experts and stakeholders, as well as public comments submitted to the Task Force. The Task Force also held a large public meeting and several targeted stakeholder briefings. While CCS can be applied to a variety of stationary sources of CO{sub 2}, its application to coal-fired power plant emissions offers the greatest potential for GHG reductions. Coal has served as an important domestic source of reliable, affordable energy for decades, and the coal industry has provided stable and quality high-paying jobs for American workers. At the same time, coal-fired power plants are the largest contributor to U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and coal combustion accounts for 40 percent of global carbon dioxide (CO{sub 2}) emissions from the consumption of energy. EPA and Energy Information Administration (EIA) assessments of recent climate and energy legislative proposals show that, if available on a cost-effective basis, CCS can over time play a large role in reducing the overall cost of meeting domestic emissions reduction targets. By playing a leadership role in efforts to develop and deploy CCS technologies to reduce GHG emissions, the United States can preserve the option of using an affordable, abundant, and domestic energy resource, help improve national security, help to maximize production from existing oil fields through enhanced oil recovery (EOR), and assist in the creation of new technologies for export. While there are no insurmountable technological, legal, institutional, regulatory or other barriers that prevent CCS from playing a role in reducing GHG emissions, early CCS projects face economic challenges related to climate policy uncertainty, first-of-a-kind technology risks, and the current high cost of CCS relative to other technologies. Administration analyses of proposed climate change legislation suggest that CCS technologies will not be widely deployed in the next two decades absent financial incentives that supplement projected carbon prices. In addition to the challenges associated with cost, these projects will need to meet regulatory requirements that are currently under development. Long-standing regulatory programs are being adapted to meet the circumstances of CCS, but limited experience and institutional capacity at the Federal and State level may hinder implementation of CCS-specific requirements. Key legal issues, such as long-term liability and property rights, also need resolution. A climate policy designed to reduce our Nation's GHG emissions is the most important step for commercial deployment of low-carbon technologies such as CCS, because it will create a stable, long-term framework for private investments. A concerted effort to properly address financial, economic, technological, legal, institutional, and social barriers will enable CCS to be a viable climate change mitigation option that can over time play an important role in reducing the overall cost of meeting domestic and global emissions reduction targets. Federal and State agencies can use existing authorities and programs to begin addressing these barriers while ensuring appropriate safeguards are in place to protect the environment and public health and safety.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Targeting colorectal cancer cells by a novel sphingosine kinase 1 inhibitor PF-543

In this study, we showed that PF-543, a novel sphingosine kinase 1 (SphK1) inhibitor, exerted potent anti-proliferative and cytotoxic effects against a panel of established (HCT-116, HT-29 and DLD-1) and primary human colorectal cancer (CRC) cells. Its sensitivity was negatively associated with SphK1 expression level in the CRC cells. Surprisingly, PF-543 mainly induced programmed necrosis, but not apoptosis, in the CRC cells. CRC cell necrotic death was detected by lactate dehydrogenase (LDH) release, mitochondrial membrane potential (MMP) collapse and mitochondrial P53-cyclophilin-D (Cyp-D) complexation. Correspondingly, the necrosis inhibitor necrostatin-1 largely attenuated PF-543-induced cytotoxicity against CRC cells. Meanwhile, the Cyp-D inhibitors (sanglifehrin A and cyclosporin A), or shRNA-mediated knockdown of Cyp-D, remarkably alleviated PF-543-induced CRC cell necrotic death. Reversely, over-expression of wild-type Cyp-D in HCT-116 cells significantly increased PF-543's sensitivity. In vivo, PF-543 intravenous injection significantly suppressed HCT-116 xenograft growth in severe combined immunodeficient (SCID) mice, whiling remarkably improving the mice survival. The in vivo activity by PF-543 was largely attenuated when combined with the Cyp-D inhibitor cyclosporin A. Collectively, our results demonstrate that PF-543 exerts potent anti-CRC activity in vitro and in vivo. Mitochondrial programmed necrosis pathway is likely the key mechanism responsible for PF-543's actions in CRC cells. - Highlights: • PF-543 is anti-proliferative and cytotoxic to established and primary CRC cells. • PF-543 induces programmed necrosis, but not apoptosis, in CRC cells. • Modulation of mitochondrial protein cyclophilin-D alters PF-543's sensitivity. • PF-543 inhibits HCT-116 xenograft growth in SCID mice, improving mice survival. • Co-administration of cyclophilin-D inhibitor CsA inhibits PF-543's activity in vivo.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

VADER: A Tool for Criticality Safety Validation

The purpose of criticality safety is to prevent any inadvertent criticality from occurring during the handling or storage of fissile material. Calculations are frequently used to demonstrate that a sufficient subcritical margin exists. Validation is a key aspect of the evaluation process, establishing the suitability, accuracy, and associated uncertainty of the computational method and data to be used for the intended application. The validation process is performed by comparing the results of critical experiments with the calculated results from models of the experiments using the computational method to be validated. Laboratory critical experiments are controlled systems that achieve a k eff of approximately 1 in order to investigate the parameters at which such a critical condition is achieved. The validation parameters that are traditionally applied to safety analysis calculations are the bias and the bias uncertainty . The bias is the deviation of the average k eff of the validation suite from unity. The bias uncertainty accounts for the statistical uncertainty in the bias based on the standard deviation, sample size, and distribution of k eff values of the validation suite. The values of bias and bias uncertainty ensure that the systems predicted to be subcritical by the computational method will indeed be subcritical. The bias and bias uncertainty are often combined to determine an upper subcritical limit (USL) or computational margin that can then be applied to safety analysis calculations. Many methods have been developed by different organizations to calculate the bias and bias uncertainty for various types of criticality analyses. Each of these methods typically requires that the validity of various underpinning statistical assumptions be confirmed to demonstrate that the method is appropriate for the analysis of a given validation suite. An example of the validation decision making flow is shown in Fig.1. As shown in Fig. 1, the analyst performing the validation fits a trend line to the data and performs a test to determine if the trend was a statistically better representation of the data than if it were treated as an uncorrelated sample. If the trend line is a better representation of the data, then the analyst uses any one of a number of trending techniques to determine the bias and bias uncertainty. If a trend is not an appropriate representation of the data, then the analyst proceeds to perform a normality assessment for the data. If the normal assumption can be shown to be acceptable, then the analyst calculates the bias and bias uncertainty with the parametric technique. If the assumption of normality cannot be justified, then the nonparametric technique is used. Once the decision flow has been followed and the appropriate technique has been selected, the bias and bias uncertainty is typically combined with an administrative margin to determine a USL below which calculated values of k eff for safety analysis models can be considered subcritical. The calculations used in each decision are often performed with spreadsheets or with small programs available at various sites performing criticality analyses. Expertise in understanding and interpreting the results must be maintained to perform these calculations. This can often be an error-prone process. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is currently developing the Validation and Data Evaluation Resource (VADER) to simplify and automate the criticality safety validation process and to provide a software quality assurance pedigree to the calculational methods used. This paper discusses the use of the Fulcrum user interface with VADER, the anticipated initial capabilities of VADER to perform validation analyses, and the output from the code.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Renewable Energy Certificate Program

This project was primarily to develop and implement a curriculum which will train undergraduate and graduate students at the University seeking a degree as well as training for enrollees in a special certification program to prepare individuals to be employed in a broad range of occupations in the field of renewable energy and energy conservation. Curriculum development was by teams of Saint Francis University Faculty in the Business Administration and Science Departments and industry experts. Students seeking undergraduate and graduate degrees are able to enroll in courses offered within these departments which will combine theory and hands-on training in the various elements of wind power development. For example, the business department curriculum areas include economic modeling, finance, contracting, etc. The science areas include meteorology, energy conversion and projection, species identification, habitat protection, field data collection and analysis, etc.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Annual Site Environmental Report Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Calendar Year 2007

Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) is a government-owned/contractor-operated facility. Sandia Corporation (Sandia), a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, manages and operates the laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The DOE/NNSA Sandia Site Office (SSO) administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at the site. This annual report summarizes data and the compliance status of Sandia Corporation’s environmental protection and monitoring programs through December 31, 2007. Major environmental programs include air quality, water quality, groundwater protection, terrestrial surveillance, waste management, pollution prevention (P2), environmental restoration (ER), oil and chemical spill prevention, and implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Environmental monitoring and surveillance programs are required by DOE Order 450.1, Environmental Protection Program (DOE 2007a) and DOE Manual 231.1-1A, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting (DOE 2007).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Calendar Year 2009 Annual Site Environmental Report for Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico

Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) is a government-owned/contractor operated facility. Sandia Corporation (Sandia), a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMC), manages and operates the laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The DOE/NNSA, Sandia Site Office (SSO) administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at the site. This annual report summarizes data and the compliance status of Sandia Corporation’s environmental protection and monitoring programs through December 31, 2009. Major environmental programs include air quality, water quality, groundwater protection, terrestrial surveillance, waste management, pollution prevention (P2), environmental restoration (ER), oil and chemical spill prevention, and implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Environmental monitoring and surveillance programs are required by DOE Order 450.1A, Environmental Protection Program (DOE 2008a) and DOE Manual 231.1-1A, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting (DOE 2007).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Calendar Year 2013 Annual Site Environmental Report for Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico

Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico is a government-owned/contractor-operated facility. Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, manages and operates the laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The DOE/NNSA, Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at the site. This annual report summarizes data and the compliance status of Sandia Corporation’s sustainability, environmental protection, and monitoring programs through December 31, 2013. Major environmental programs include air quality, water quality, groundwater protection, terrestrial surveillance, waste management, pollution prevention, environmental restoration, oil and chemical spill prevention, and implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act. Environmental monitoring and surveillance programs are required by DOE Order 231.1B, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting (DOE 2012).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Sampling and Analysis Plan for USDOE/NNSA Pantex Plant Groundwater Remedial Action Progress

This Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) was originally developed as part of the Remedial Design Submittal Package required by the Interagency Agreement (IAG) for the United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (USDOE/NNSA) Pantex Plant. The SAP describes specifications for data collection, methods of sample collection and analysis, and requirements for quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) activities implemented during the life cycle of the program to ensure that data are of sufficient quality for their intended purpose (i.e., to support decision making regarding remediation of the groundwater beneath Pantex). The SAP was prepared according to United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidance on preparation of Quality Assurance Project Plans (QAPPs) QA/R-5 (EPA, 2001) and is designed to be a stand-alone document that describes both field sampling activities as well as QA/QC activities. The SAP is incorporated by reference to the compliance plan provisions of Hazardous Waste Permit No. 50284, issued by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, and was submitted as part of the Remedial Design/Remedial Action Work Plan submitted to EPA in accordance with the Interagency Agreement.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Report series: Evaluation, Finding of Effect, and Mitigation Documentation for the 1960s Dormitories and 1950s Quonset Hut Foundations, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada [3 Reports Consolidated]

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to modernize the town of Mercury at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada, to meet current and future National Weapons Science, Global and Homeland Security Programs, and Environmental Management mission requirements. These plans—including anticipated demolitions, consolidations, and rebuilding at Mercury—are considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 U.S.C. § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 U.S.C. § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, 36 C.F.R. Part 800. Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of Mercury in 2017. This effort resulted in the identification, recording, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District, as well as the identification of its contributing components. This district was recommended eligible to the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP or National Register) under Criteria A and C, but was unevaluated under Criteria B and D at that time. The Mercury Historic District contains 153 individual landscapes, buildings, and structures. Of these resources, DRI recommends all except one as contributing elements of the historic district during its period of significance corresponding to nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. During most of the Cold War, the land now called the NNSS was referred to as the Nevada Test Site (NTS). This report evaluates resources dating to the 1950s and 1960s between Jangle and Knothole Streets and south of Ranger Avenue in Mercury prior to the proposed demolition of all resources in that area between Sandstone and Greenhouse Avenues as a phase of the larger modernization program mentioned above. Although the Mercury Historic District as a whole is eligible to the National Register, further evaluation of these properties, as detailed in this report, indicates that none are individually eligible under any of the Secretary of Interior’s Significance Criteria, either at the national or local level.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Quantitative Evaluation of Potassium Iodide Implementation Strategies for Emergency Preparedness and Response

This study evaluates the effectiveness of potassium iodide (KI) distribution strategies in mitigating exposure to radioiodine during severe nuclear power plant accidents. This analysis quantitatively compares various KI distribution methods (pre-distributed versus stockpiles), including scenarios with and without KI administration. The results indicate that differences in distribution strategies impact the projected thyroid dose by at least an order of magnitude. The results also indicate that the timing of KI administration is critical, as expected. For scenarios involving delayed releases of significant quantities of radionuclides, evacuation is the most effective protection strategy regardless of KI distribution method. For scenarios involving rapid releases, retrieving KI from stockpiles can have a detrimental effect. Pre-distributed KI is potentially the most effective approach when used as a supplement to evacuation and sheltering. However, these model results are based on idealized conditions for KI distribution and administration; the actual benefits of KI prophylaxis are likely to be less than estimated in this report due to many variables. The results highlight the importance of considering the cost and rigor of different distribution programs and public compliance with emergency instructions. This report includes suggested research to explore KI distribution plans for advanced reactors.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

SUSTAINING NUCLEAR SECURITY REGIMES THROUGH CONTINUOUS LEARNING EXPERIENCES

As Member States plan, implement, and ultimately sustain their nuclear security regimes, human resource development supporting these regimes are paramount. Human resource development broadly includes programs addressing education, training, and knowledge management. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Implementing Guide, Sustaining a Nuclear Security Regime, highlights the importance of national-level support for assigning resources that help ensure States are able to develop and retain sufficient human resources in the short, medium, and long term. Determining the resources needed to support education, training, and knowledge management is not an easy task, and knowledge management is a practice often overlooked when States plan for and allocate human resources for a nuclear security regime. The paper highlights the importance of implementing knowledge management practices as part of sustaining a nuclear security regime. Given the availability of secure web-based knowledge management tools, a nuclear security human resource development program should not depend solely on direct human interactions. To that end, the paper will offer an approach for planning and implementing a knowledge management system by using the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration’s Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Knowledge Management Website as a case study. This example offers useful lessons learned for States considering or actively developing their own nuclear security knowledge management efforts and human resource development.

Tremonte, Matthew M.↗

Los Alamos Neutron Science Center

For more than 30 years the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) has provided the scientific underpinnings in nuclear physics and material science needed to ensure the safety and surety of the nuclear stockpile into the future. In addition to national security research, the LANSCE User Facility has a vibrant research program in fundamental science, providing the scientific community with intense sources of neutrons and protons to perform experiments supporting civilian research and the production of medical and research isotopes. Five major experimental facilities operate simultaneously. These facilities contribute to the stockpile stewardship program, produce radionuclides for medical testing, and provide a venue for industrial users to irradiate and test electronics. In addition, they perform fundamental research in nuclear physics, nuclear astrophysics, materials science, and many other areas. The LANSCE User Program plays a key role in training the next generation of top scientists and in attracting the best graduate students, postdoctoral researchers, and early-career scientists. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) —the principal sponsor of LANSCE—works with the Office of Science and the Office of Nuclear Energy, which have synergistic long-term needs for the linear accelerator and the neutron science that is the heart of LANSCE.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

2016 Annual Site Environmental Report Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico.

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The DOE/NNSA Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at SNL, New Mexico. This Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) summarizes data and the compliance status of sustainability, environmental protection, and monitoring programs at SNL/NM during calendar year 2016. Major environmental programs include air quality, water quality, groundwater protection, terrestrial and ecological surveillance, waste management, pollution prevention, environmental restoration, oil and chemical spill prevention, and implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act. This ASER is prepared in accordance with and required by DOE O 231.1B, Admin Change 1, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Pits 101: The four types of nuclear weapons modernization activities

We learned why we don’t need plutonium to make new pits in an earlier edition of Pits 101, but why do we need new pits from a national security standpoint? A plutonium pit, or the core of a nuclear weapon, is like a weapon’s battery. The pits that Los Alamos will make in coming years will be like new batteries for nuclear weapons in the existing stockpile. Pit production is mandated in order to meet Department of Defense (DOD) requirements by our primary customer, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which is a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy. NNSA’s mission is to “deliver safe, secure, reliable warheads for an effective nuclear deterrent.” As Marv Adams, head of NNSA Defense Programs, describes, it’s a mission that is simple to state, but challenging to deliver.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗