Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “secure”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 847 records · Page 47

Direct Nonlinear Approximation for Security Region Boundary of Integrated Energy Systems: A Polynomial Chaos Expansion Solution

The strong interdependence of electricity, gas, and heating systems can facilitate fault propagation within integrated energy systems (IESs), posing significant challenges to secure operation. This paper proposes a polynomial chaos expansion (PCE)-based approximation method to accurately characterize the IES security region boundary (IES–SRB). By integrating the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions with PCE theory, the IES-SRB approximation problem is reformulated as a set of nonlinear equations concerning the approximation coefficients. Using the Galerkin projection method, these equations are further transformed into a system of projection equations that govern the polynomial approximation coefficients in the IES-SRB approximation. To reduce computational complexity while maintaining high approximation accuracy, a piecewise polynomial approximation method is proposed. Numerical studies on the E39-G20-H6 and E118-G96-H52 IES test systems demonstrate that the proposed method can accurately and effectively construct IES security regions.

Wu, Chenghao [Northeast Electric Power University]↗

Estimation of organ and effective dose due to Compton backscatter security scans

Purpose: To estimate organ and effective radiation doses due to backscatter security scanners using Monte Carlo simulations and a voxelized phantom set. Methods: Voxelized phantoms of male and female adults and children were used with the GEANT4 toolkit to simulate a backscatter security scan. The backscatter system was modeled based on specifications available in the literature. The simulations modeled a 50 kVp spectrum with 1.0 mm-aluminum-equivalent filtration and a previously measured exposure of approximately 4.6 {mu}R at 30 cm from the source. Photons and secondary interactions were tracked from the source until they reached zero kinetic energy or exited from the simulation's boundaries. The energy deposited in the phantoms' respective organs was tallied and used to calculate total organ dose and total effective dose for frontal, rear, and full scans with subjects located 30 and 75 cm from the source. Results: For a full screen, all phantoms' total effective doses were below the established 0.25 {mu}Sv standard, with an estimated maximum total effective dose of 0.07 {mu}Sv for full screen of a male child. The estimated maximum organ dose due to a full screen was 1.03 {mu}Gy, deposited in the adipose tissue of the male child phantom when located 30 cm from the source. All organ dose estimates had a coefficient of variation of less than 3% for a frontal scan and less than 11% for a rear scan. Conclusions: Backscatter security scanners deposit dose in organs beyond the skin. The effective dose is below recommended standards set by the Health Physics Society (HPS) and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) assuming the system provides a maximum exposure of approximately 4.6 {mu}R at 30 cm.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Measuring Equality in Machine Learning Security Defenses: A Case Study in Speech Recognition

Over the past decade, the machine learning security community has developed a myriad of defenses for evasion attacks. An understudied question in that community is: for whom do these defenses defend? This work considers common approaches to defending learned systems and how security defenses result in performance inequities across different sub-populations. We outline appropriate parity metrics for analysis and begin to answer this question through empirical results of the fairness implications of machine learning security methods. We find that many methods that have been proposed can cause direct harm, like false rejection and unequal benefits from robustness training. The framework we propose for measuring defense equality can be applied to robustly trained models, preprocessing-based defenses, and rejection methods. We identify a set of datasets with a user-centered application and a reasonable computational cost suitable for case studies in measuring the equality of defenses. In our case study of speech command recognition, we show how such adversarial training and augmentation have non-equal but complex protections for social subgroups across gender, accent, and age in relation to user coverage. We present a comparison of equality between two rejection-based defenses: randomized smoothing and neural rejection, finding randomized smoothing more equitable due to the sampling mechanism for minority groups. This represents the first work examining the disparity in the adversarial robustness in the speech domain and the fairness evaluation of rejection-based defenses.

• Artificial intelligence (AI) / machine learning ↗

Towards improving software security by using simulation to inform requirements and conceptual design

We illustrate the use of modeling and simulation early in the system life-cycle to improve security and reduce costs. The models that we develop for this illustration are inspired by problems in reliability analysis and supervisory control, for which similar models are used to quantify failure probabilities and rates. In the context of security, we propose that models of this general type can be used to understand trades between risk and cost while writing system requirements and during conceptual design, and thereby significantly reduce the need for expensive security corrections after a system enters operation

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Data for Climate vs Energy Security: Quantifying the Trade-offs of BECCS Deployment and Overcoming Opportunity Costs on Set-Aside Land

Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) sits at the nexus of the climate and energy security. We evaluated trade-offs between scenarios that support climate stabilization (negative emissions and net climate benefit) or energy security (ethanol production). Our spatially explicit model indicates that the foregone climate benefit from abandoned cropland (opportunity cost) increased carbon emissions per unit of energy produced by 14–36%, making geologic carbon capture and storage necessary to achieve negative emissions from any given energy crop. The toll of opportunity costs on the climate benefit of BECCS from set-aside land was offset through the spatial allocation of crops based on their individual biophysical constraints. Dedicated energy crops consistently outperformed mixed grasslands. We estimate that BECCS allocation to land enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) could capture up to 9 Tg C year–1 from the atmosphere, deliver up to 16 Tg CE year–1 in emissions savings, and meet up to 10% of the US energy statutory targets, but contributions varied substantially as the priority shifted from climate stabilization to energy provision. Our results indicate a significant potential to integrate energy security targets into sustainable pathways to climate stabilization but underpin the trade-offs of divergent policy-driven agendas.

Field Data↗

Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept low-level radioactive waste and mixed low-level waste for disposal. The NNSSWAC includes requirements for the generator waste certification program, characterization, traceability, waste form, packaging, and transfer. The criteria apply to radioactive waste received at the NNSS Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex for disposal. The NNSA/NSO and support contractors are available to assist you in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NSO Waste Management Project at (702) 295-7063 or fax to (702) 295-1153.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Modeling and Design of Integrated Safeguards and Security for an Electrochemical Reprocessing Facility

Electrochemical reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel may be an alternative to aqueous processing and is considered more attractive for fast reactor fuel cycles. Molten salt processing of the fuel may simplify the number of processing steps, but the nuclear industry worldwide has much less operational experience with this technology, including safeguards and security. As interest in electrochemical processing grows in the U.S. and other countries, it is important to understand how to address materials accountancy and security in this unique environment. For this work, a model of a commercial-scale electrochemical plant was developed in Matlab Simulink for design and analysis of integrated safeguards and security systems. The model tracks the mass flow rates of the fuel and salt through the various unit operations and simulates materials accountancy, process monitoring measurements, and physical protection. These measurements are then used to calculate inventory balances during normal operation and diversion scenarios. The model analysis enables one to identify various strategies and options for safeguarding nuclear material, contingent upon the feasibility of the measurement technology. This paper describes the model development, measurement options and strategies, and performance under diversion scenarios.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Special Analysis for the Disposal of the Consolidated Edison Uranium Solidification Project Waste Stream at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The purpose of this Special Analysis (SA) is to determine if the Oak Ridge (OR) Consolidated Edison Uranium Solidification Project (CEUSP) uranium-233( 233 U) waste stream (DRTK000000050, Revision 0) is acceptable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The CEUSP 233 U waste stream requires a special analysis because the concentrations of thorium- 229 ( 229 Th), 230 Th, 232 U, 233 U, and 234 U exceeded their NNSS Waste Acceptance Criteria action levels. The acceptability of the waste stream is evaluated by determining if performance assessment (PA) modeling provides a reasonable expectation that SLB disposal is protective of human health and the environment. The CEUSP 233 U waste stream is a long-lived waste with unique radiological hazards. The SA evaluates the long-term acceptability of the CEUSP 233 U waste stream for near-surface disposal as a two tier process. The first tier, which is the usual SA process, uses the approved probabilistic PA model to determine if there is a reasonable expectation that disposal of the CEUSP 233 U waste stream can meet the performance objectives of U.S. Department of Energy Manual DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management,” for a period of 1,000 years (y) after closure. The second tier addresses the acceptability of the OR CEUSP 233 U waste stream for near-surface disposal by evaluating long-term site stability and security, by performing extended (i.e., 10,000 and 60,000 y) modeling analyses, and by evaluating the effect of containers and the depth of burial on performance. Tier I results indicate that there is a reasonable expectation of compliance with all performance objectives if the OR CEUSP 233 U waste stream is disposed in the Area 5 RWMS SLB disposal units. The maximum mean and 95 th percentile PA results are all less than the performance objective for 1,000 y. Monte Carlo uncertainty analysis indicates that there is a high likelihood of compliance with all performance objectives. Tier II results indicate that the long-term performance of the OR CEUSP 233 U waste stream is protective of human health and the environment. The Area 5 RWMS is located in one of the least populated and most arid regions of the U.S. Site characterization data indicate that infiltration of precipitation below the plant root zone at 2.5 meters (8.2 feet) ceased 10,000 to 15,000 y ago. The site is not expected to have a groundwater pathway as long as the current arid climate persists. The national security mission of the NNSS and the location of the Area 5 RWMS within the Frenchman Flat Corrective Action Unit require that access controls and land use restrictions be maintained indefinitely. PA modeling results for 10,000 to 60,000 y also indicate that the OR CEUSP 233 U waste stream is acceptable for near-surface disposal. The mean resident air pathway annual total effective dose (TED), the resident all-pathways annual TED, and the acute drilling TED are less than their performance objectives for 10,000 y after closure. The mean radon-222 (222Rn) flux density exceeds the performance objective at 4,200 y, but this is due to waste already disposed at the Area 5 RWMS and is only slightly affected by disposal of the CEUSP 233 U. The peak resident all-pathways annual TED from CEUSP key radionuclides occurs at 48,000 y and is less than the 0.25 millisievert performance objective. Disposal of the OR CEUSP 233 U waste stream in a typical SLB trench slightly increases PA results. Increasing the depth was found to eliminate any impacts of the OR CEUSP 233 U waste stream. Containers could not be shown to have any significant impact on performance due to the long half-life of the waste stream and a lack of data for pitting corrosion rates of stainless steel in soil. The results of the SA indicate that all performance objectives can be met with disposal of the OR CEUSP 233 U waste stream in the SLB units at the Area 5 RWMS. The long-term performance of the OR CEUSP 233 U waste stream disposed in the near surface is protective of human health and the environment. The waste stream is recommended for disposal without conditions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2012, Attachment A: Site Description

This attachment expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2012 (National Security Technologies, LLC [NSTec], 2013). Included are subsections that summarize the site’s geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological setting and the cultural resources of the NNSS. The subsections are meant to aid the reader in understanding the complex physical and biological environment of the NNSS. An adequate knowledge of the site’s environment is necessary to assess the environmental impacts of new projects, design and implement environmental monitoring activities for current site operations, and assess the impacts of site operations on the public residing in the vicinity of the NNSS. The NNSS environment contributes to several key features of the site that afford protection to the inhabitants of adjacent areas from potential exposure to radioactivity or other contaminants resulting from NNSS operations. These key features include the general remote location of the NNSS, restricted access, extended wind transport times, the great depths to slow-moving groundwater, little or no surface water, and low population density. This attachment complements the annual summary of monitoring program activities and dose assessments presented in the main body of this report.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

The future of infrastructure security :

Sandia National Laboratories hosted a workshop on the future of infrastructure security on February 27-28, 2013, in Albuquerque, NM. The 17 participants came from backgrounds as diverse as federal policy, the insurance industry, infrastructure management, and technology development. The purpose of the workshop was to surface key issues, identify directions forward, and lay groundwork for cross-sectoral and cross-disciplinary collaborations. The workshop addressed issues such as the problem space (what is included in infrastructure problems?), the general types of threats to infrastructure (such as acute or chronic, system-inherent or exogenously imposed) and definitions of secure and resilient infrastructures. The workshop concluded with a consideration of stakeholders and players in the infrastructure world, and identification of specific activities that could be undertaken by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other players.

Garcia, Pablo↗

Cyber Security Audit and Attack Detection Toolkit

This goal of this project was to develop cyber security audit and attack detection tools for industrial control systems (ICS). Digital Bond developed and released a tool named Bandolier that audits ICS components commonly used in the energy sector against an optimal security configuration. The Portaledge Project developed a capability for the PI Historian, the most widely used Historian in the energy sector, to aggregate security events and detect cyber attacks.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Inherent secure communications using lattice based waveform design

The wireless communications channel is innately insecure due to the broadcast nature of the electromagnetic medium. Many techniques have been developed and implemented in order to combat insecurities and ensure the privacy of transmitted messages. Traditional methods include encrypting the data via cryptographic methods, hiding the data in the noise floor as in wideband communications, or nulling the signal in the spatial direction of the adversary using array processing techniques. This work analyzes the design of signaling constellations, i.e. modulation formats, to combat eavesdroppers from correctly decoding transmitted messages. It has been shown that in certain channel models the ability of an adversary to decode the transmitted messages can be degraded by a clever signaling constellation based on lattice theory. This work attempts to optimize certain lattice parameters in order to maximize the security of the data transmission. These techniques are of interest because they are orthogonal to, and can be used in conjunction with, traditional security techniques to create a more secure communication channel.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Integrating Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards (ISOSS) into the design of small modular reactors : a handbook.

The existing regulatory environment for nuclear reactors impacts both the facility design and the cost of operations once the facility is built. Delaying the consideration of regulatory requirements until late in the facility design - or worse, until after construction has begun - can result in costly retrofitting as well as increased operational costs to fulfill safety, security, safeguards, and emergency readiness requirements. Considering the scale and scope, as well as the latest design trends in the next generation of nuclear facilities, there is an opportunity to evaluate the regulatory requirements and optimize the design process for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), as compared to current Light Water Reactors (LWRs). To this end, Sandia has embarked on an initiative to evaluate the interactions of regulations and operations as an approach to optimizing the design of SMR facilities, supporting operational efficiencies, as well as regulatory requirements. The early stages of this initiative consider two focus areas. The first focus area, reported by LaChance, et al. (2007), identifies the regulatory requirements established for the current fleet of LWR facilities regarding Safety, Security, Operations, Safeguards, and Emergency Planning, and evaluates the technical bases for these requirements. The second focus area, developed in this report, documents the foundations for an innovative approach that supports a design framework for SMR facilities that incorporates the regulatory environment, as well as the continued operation of the facility, into the early design stages, eliminating the need for costly retrofitting and additional operating personnel to fulfill regulatory requirements. The work considers a technique known as Integrated Safety, Operations, Security and Safeguards (ISOSS) (Darby, et al., 2007). In coordination with the best practices of industrial operations, the goal of this effort is to develop a design framework that outlines how ISOSS requirements can be incorporated into the pre-conceptual through early facility design stages, seeking a cost-effective design that meets both operational efficiencies and the regulatory environment. The larger scope of the project, i.e., in future stages, includes the identification of potentially conflicting requirements identified by the ISOSS framework, including an analysis of how regulatory requirements may be changed to account for the intrinsic features of SMRs.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 567: Miscellaneous Soil Sites - Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC 1

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 567: Miscellaneous Soil Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 567 based on the implementation of the corrective actions. The corrective actions implemented at CAU 567 were developed based on an evaluation of analytical data from the CAI, the assumed presence of COCs at specific locations, and the detailed and comparative analysis of the CAAs. The CAAs were selected on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. The implemented corrective actions meet all requirements for the technical components evaluated. The CAAs meet all applicable federal and state regulations for closure of the site. Based on the implementation of these corrective actions, the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 567. • The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection issue a Notice of Completion to the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office for closure of CAU 567. • CAU 567 be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Secure Interoperable Open Smart Grid Demonstration Project

The Consolidated Edison, Inc., of New York (Con Edison) Secure Interoperable Open Smart Grid Demonstration Project (SGDP), sponsored by the United States (US) Department of Energy (DOE), demonstrated that the reliability, efficiency, and flexibility of the grid can be improved through a combination of enhanced monitoring and control capabilities using systems and resources that interoperate within a secure services framework. The project demonstrated the capability to shift, balance, and reduce load where and when needed in response to system contingencies or emergencies by leveraging controllable field assets. The range of field assets includes curtailable customer loads, distributed generation (DG), battery storage, electric vehicle (EV) charging stations, building management systems (BMS), home area networks (HANs), high-voltage monitoring, and advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). The SGDP enables the seamless integration and control of these field assets through a common, cyber-secure, interoperable control platform, which integrates a number of existing legacy control and data systems, as well as new smart grid (SG) systems and applications. By integrating advanced technologies for monitoring and control, the SGDP helps target and reduce peak load growth, improves the reliability and efficiency of Con Edison’s grid, and increases the ability to accommodate the growing use of distributed resources. Con Edison is dedicated to lowering costs, improving reliability and customer service, and reducing its impact on the environment for its customers. These objectives also align with the policy objectives of New York State as a whole. To help meet these objectives, Con Edison’s long-term vision for the distribution grid relies on the successful integration and control of a growing penetration of distributed resources, including demand response (DR) resources, battery storage units, and DG. For example, Con Edison is expecting significant long-term growth of DG. The SGDP enables the efficient, flexible integration of these disparate resources and lays the architectural foundations for future scalability. Con Edison assembled an SGDP team of more than 16 different project partners, including technology vendors, and participating organizations, and the Con Edison team provided overall guidance and project management. Project team members are listed in Table 1-1.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Secure Information Exchange Gateway for Electric Grid Operations

The major objectives of the SIEGate project were to improve the security posture and minimize the cyber-attack surface of electric utility control centers and to reduce the cost of maintaining control-room-to-control-room information exchange. Major project goals included the design, development, testing, and commercialization of a single security-hardened appliance that could meet industry needs for resisting cyber-attacks while protecting the confidentiality and integrity of a growing volume of real-time information needed to ensure the reliability of the bulk electric system and interoperating with existing data formats and networking technologies. The SIEGate project has achieved its goals and objectives. The SIEGate Design Document, issued in March 2012, presented SIEGate use cases, provided SIEGate requirements, established SIEGate design principles, and prescribed design functionality of SIEGate as well as the components that make up SIEGate. SIEGate Release Version 1.0 was posted in January 2014. Release Version 1.0.83, which was posted on March 28, 2014, fixed many issues discovered by early adopters and added several new features. Release Candidate 1.1, which added additional improvements and bug fixes, was posted in June 2014. SIEGate executables have been downloaded more than 300 times. SIEGate has been tested at PJM, Entergy, TVA, and Southern. Security testing and analysis of SIEGate has been conducted at PNNL and PJM. Alstom has provided a summary of recommended steps for commercialization of the SIEGate Appliance and identified two deployment models with immediate commercial application.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Select Generic Dry-Storage Pilot Plant Design for Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) per Used Fuel Campaign

As preparation to the year-end deliverable (Provide SSBD Best Practices for Generic Dry-Storage Pilot Scale Plant) for the Work Package (FT-15LA040501–Safeguards and Security by Design for Extended Dry Storage), the initial step was to select a generic dry-storage pilot plant design for SSBD. To be consistent with other DOE-NE Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCR&D) activities, the Used Fuel Campaign was engaged for the selection of a design for this deliverable. For the work Package FT-15LA040501–“Safeguards and Security by Design for Extended Dry Storage”, SSBD will be initiated for the Generic Dry-Storage Pilot Scale Plant described by the layout of Reference 2. SSBD will consider aspects of the design that are impacted by domestic material control and accounting (MC&A), domestic security, and international safeguards.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Continuous Security and Configuration Monitoring of HPC Clusters

Continuous security and configuration monitoring of information systems has been a time consuming and laborious task for system administrators at the High Performance Computing (HPC) center. Prior to this project, system administrators had to manually check the settings of thousands of nodes, which required a significant number of hours rendering the old process ineffective and inefficient. This paper explains the application of Splunk Enterprise, a software agent, and a reporting tool in the development of a user application interface to track and report on critical system updates and security compliance status of HPC Clusters. In conjunction with other configuration management systems, the reporting tool is to provide continuous situational awareness to system administrators of the compliance state of information systems. Our approach consisted of the development, testing, and deployment of an agent to collect any arbitrary information across a massively distributed computing center, and organize that information into a human-readable format. Using Splunk Enterprise, this raw data was then gathered into a central repository and indexed for search, analysis, and correlation. Following acquisition and accumulation, the reporting tool generated and presented actionable information by filtering the data according to command line parameters passed at run time. Preliminary data showed results for over six thousand nodes. Further research and expansion of this tool could lead to the development of a series of agents to gather and report critical system parameters. However, in order to make use of the flexibility and resourcefulness of the reporting tool the agent must conform to specifications set forth in this paper. This project has simplified the way system administrators gather, analyze, and report on the configuration and security state of HPC clusters, maintaining ongoing situational awareness. Rather than querying each cluster independently, compliance checking can be managed from one central location.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗