Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “DOCUMENTATION”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 865 records · Page 48

SU-G-PinS Room/Hall E-00: HAZMAT Training for the Medical Physicist - Part II

Medical Physicists are frequently involved in shipping radioactive materials or supervising those who do. Current U.S. Department of Transportation Hazardous Material Regulations, 49 CFR Parts 171 - 185, require hazmat employees to have documented training specified in 49 CFR 172 Subpart H. A hazmat employee is defined as an individual who: (1) loads, unloads or handles hazardous material; (2) manufactures, tests, reconditions, repairs, modifies, marks or otherwise represents containers, drums or packagings as qualified for use in the transportation of hazardous materials; (3) prepares hazardous materials for transportation; (4) is responsible for safety of transporting hazardous materials; or (5) operates a vehicle used to transport hazardous materials. Recurrent training is required at least once every three years. (The IATA two year training interval is not applicable and is generally misunderstood.) FAA has escalated inspection and enforcement. Facilities who ship radiopharmaceuticals to other laboratories, return radiopharmaceuticals or radioactive sources to suppliers, or otherwise ship radioactive materials have been cited for failure to provide and document the required training. The interrelationship of transportation regulations, 49 CFR, IATA, ICAO and other transportation regulations, which are frequently misunderstood, will be explained. The course will cover typical shipments by air and highway which are encountered in a medical institution. Items such as fissile materials, highway route controlled quantities, rail shipments, vessel shipments and such will be omitted; although specific questions may be addressed. A major objective of the course is to present the process of shipping radioactive material in a sequential and logical fashion. How radioactive materials for transportation purposes are defined by activity concentrations for exempt materials and activity limits for exempt consignments will be explained. Radioactive material shipments of excepted packages and Type A packages will be emphasized. The program is designed to meet the function specific DOT training requirements for shippers of medical radioactive materials. General awareness training and security awareness training can be obtained from two free DOT training CDs. Safety training and security awareness training is generally satisfied by the training required under the institution’s radioactive material license. For shippers of radioactive Yellow III labeled packages an in-depth written security plan and training are no longer required as of April 8, 2010. In general almost all shippers of medical radioactive material are now not required to have an in-depth security plan. Contents of general awareness training, security awareness training and in-depth security plans will be briefly outlined. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to ensure that each hazmat employee is properly trained. No third party can fulfill that requirement. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to determine the degree to which this course meets the employer’s requirements, including contents of the course and the examination. Participants will gain sufficient knowledge to prepare hazmat training programs for others in their institutions. A handout will be posted which should be printed out and brought to the course for reference during the presentation. The handout will also satisfy part of the training documentation required by DOT. A feature handout section is a composite table which provides A1, A2, RQ, Exempt Concentration, and Exempt Consignment values in a single table in both Becquerel and Curie units. Course attendance will be certified through the AAPM CEU documentation system. Learning Objectives: Understand the regulatory requirements for shipping radioactive materials. Understand the regulatory requirements for training of hazmat employees. Comprehend how to classify, package, mark, label, document, placard, and transport radioactive materials.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

SU-G-PinS Room/Hall E-01

Medical Physicists are frequently involved in shipping radioactive materials or supervising those who do. Current U.S. Department of Transportation Hazardous Material Regulations, 49 CFR Parts 171 - 185, require hazmat employees to have documented training specified in 49 CFR 172 Subpart H. A hazmat employee is defined as an individual who: (1) loads, unloads or handles hazardous material; (2) manufactures, tests, reconditions, repairs, modifies, marks or otherwise represents containers, drums or packagings as qualified for use in the transportation of hazardous materials; (3) prepares hazardous materials for transportation; (4) is responsible for safety of transporting hazardous materials; or (5) operates a vehicle used to transport hazardous materials. Recurrent training is required at least once every three years. (The IATA two year training interval is not applicable and is generally misunderstood.) FAA has escalated inspection and enforcement. Facilities who ship radiopharmaceuticals to other laboratories, return radiopharmaceuticals or radioactive sources to suppliers, or otherwise ship radioactive materials have been cited for failure to provide and document the required training. The interrelationship of transportation regulations, 49 CFR, IATA, ICAO and other transportation regulations, which are frequently misunderstood, will be explained. The course will cover typical shipments by air and highway which are encountered in a medical institution. Items such as fissile materials, highway route controlled quantities, rail shipments, vessel shipments and such will be omitted; although specific questions may be addressed. A major objective of the course is to present the process of shipping radioactive material in a sequential and logical fashion. How radioactive materials for transportation purposes are defined by activity concentrations for exempt materials and activity limits for exempt consignments will be explained. Radioactive material shipments of excepted packages and Type A packages will be emphasized. The program is designed to meet the function specific DOT training requirements for shippers of medical radioactive materials. General awareness training and security awareness training can be obtained from two free DOT training CDs. Safety training and security awareness training is generally satisfied by the training required under the institution’s radioactive material license. For shippers of radioactive Yellow III labeled packages an in-depth written security plan and training are no longer required as of April 8, 2010. In general almost all shippers of medical radioactive material are now not required to have an in-depth security plan. Contents of general awareness training, security awareness training and in-depth security plans will be briefly outlined. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to ensure that each hazmat employee is properly trained. No third party can fulfill that requirement. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to determine the degree to which this course meets the employer’s requirements, including contents of the course and the examination. Participants will gain sufficient knowledge to prepare hazmat training programs for others in their institutions. A handout will be posted which should be printed out and brought to the course for reference during the presentation. The handout will also satisfy part of the training documentation required by DOT. A feature handout section is a composite table which provides A1, A2, RQ, Exempt Concentration, and Exempt Consignment values in a single table in both Becquerel and Curie units. Course attendance will be certified through the AAPM CEU documentation system. Learning Objectives: Understand the regulatory requirements for shipping radioactive materials. Understand the regulatory requirements for training of hazmat employees. Comprehend how to classify, package, mark, label, document, placard, and transport radioactive materials.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Critical Design Reviews Project: SAPHIRE 8

The Critical Design Review (CDR) is intended to be performed at the phase of the design request immediately before proceeding to implementation of the design request. The design request is initiated with a Design Specification document which includes a problem statement, design details, a design checklist and supporting documentation and/or projected sample output. The document then records the process through the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and on to the finalized design specification. In addition to this, the design specification has a chapter devoted to the completion of the CDR. This document describes the process of documentation of the CDR in the Design Specification.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Evaluation of Pre- and Post- Redevelopment Groundwater Chemical Analyses from LM Monitoring Wells

This report documents the efforts and analyses conducted for the Applied Studies and Technology (AS&T) Ancillary Work Plan (AWP) project titled Evaluation of Pre- and Post- Redevelopment Groundwater Sample Laboratory Analyses from Selected LM Groundwater Monitoring Wells. This effort entailed compiling an inventory of nearly 500 previous well redevelopment events at 16 U.S. Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management (LM) sites, searching the literature for impacts of well redevelopment on groundwater sample quality, and—the focus of this report—evaluating the impacts of well redevelopment on field measurements and sample analytical results. Study Catalyst Monitoring well redevelopment, the surging or high-volume pumping of a well to loosen and remove accumulated sediment and biological build-up from a well, is considered an element of monitoring well maintenance that is implemented periodically during the lifetime of the well to mitigate its gradual deterioration. Well redevelopment has been conducted fairly routinely at a few LM sites in the western United States (e.g., the Grand Junction office site and the Gunnison processing site in Colorado), but at most other sites in this region it is not a routine practice. Also, until recently (2014–2015), there had been no specific criteria for implementing well redevelopment, and documentation of redevelopment events has been inconsistent. A catalyst for this evaluation was the self-identification of these inconsistencies by the Legacy Management Support contractor. As a result, in early 2015 Environmental Monitoring Operations (EMO) staff began collecting and documenting additional field measurements during well redevelopment events. In late 2015, AS&T staff undertook an independent internal evaluation of EMO's well redevelopment records and corresponding pre- and post-well-redevelopment groundwater analytical results. Study Findings Although literature discussions parallel the prevailing industry-wide assumption that well redevelopment is necessary to increase production or to extend the life of a well, no data in the literature indicate that redevelopment affects chemical signatures in monitoring wells. The comprehensive evaluation undertaken for this study also yielded no evidence that redevelopment has any quantifiable or predictable effect on groundwater sample quality. Both short-term and long-term changes in groundwater chemistry were assessed relative to preceding and subsequent well redevelopment events. Although short-term changes in specific conductance or contaminant concentrations likely attributable to well redevelopment were found at some sites, these cases were limited to a small subset of wells in which chemical stratification had been observed. Redevelopment causes mixing of the well water, resulting in short-term impacts, but not in a consistent direction. Long-term groundwater concentration trends of uranium, the primary contaminant of concern at most LM Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) sites, were evaluated for all 16 sites addressed in this study. Based on the data evaluated, there are no apparent impacts of well redevelopment on uranium trends. In most cases where deviations in trends were found, these could be attributed to water level fluctuations or other factors. A few exceptions were found where spikes or marked decreases in uranium concentrations could potentially be related to the preceding well redevelopment, but apparent impacts were neither predictable nor quantifiable. Summary and Recommendations A catalyst for this project was a concern that there was a need for strict criteria for a program-wide approach to well redevelopment at LM sites. There was also an implicit question as to whether well redevelopment was a necessary practice that was being overlooked at some sites. The primary objective of this study was to determine if there are significant differences in laboratory analytical results between pre- and post-redevelopment groundwater samples. Results of this evaluation indicate that this is not the case—groundwater concentrations of uranium, the primary contaminant of concern at most LM UMTRCA sites, generally remained unchanged pre- and post-well-redevelopment. The literature supports redevelopment of monitoring and municipal wells if signs of reduced productivity, biofouling, sediment buildup, or other conditions potentially affecting long-term well integrity are observed. In these cases, use of a downhole camera to examine the condition of the well screen and casing may be useful. However, based on the data sets examined for this study, there is no evidence that well redevelopment is needed in order to obtain samples that have the same chemical concentrations as those in the groundwater. To conclusively demonstrate that point—that is, to define chemical effects—the underlying mechanisms have to be understood. For example, if biofouling is observed in a well and is considered a potential cause of spurious or invalid chemical data, appropriate hypothesis-testing ethodology should be used to test the validity of this claim. Until late 2014, the onset of this project, there was no standard procedure for documenting well redevelopment events; some (perhaps many) had not been captured in the historical record. EMO has made notable progress in this regard since 2015, having established a format for documenting well redevelopment events and associated field measurements, as well as a data repository for capturing those records. This policy should be continued to ensure that all well redevelopment events and associated field observations are recorded and easily tracked.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Collaborative Management for Complex Closure Teams - 19246

The closure documentation for government waste management sites requires a multidisciplinary approach to achieve success. This approach is necessary and similar to approaches utilized across remediation projects in the private and public sectors [1]. Closure documentation for government projects can range from tens of pages to upwards of thousands of pages. They normally take more than six months to put together - although, in many cases, it takes years - with multiple revisions. These documents, while all unique, share common themes with regards to communication and conflict with the other waste management projects. This paper explores the challenges in management and leadership approaches for generating technical documents, such as those found in the closure missions at government hazardous waste management sites. These matrixed teams are composed of many different members with varying expertise and experience, each with different stakeholder backgrounds. These teams experience challenges not only from using a matrixed approach - where the majority of the members are only partially engaged in the project - but also from integrating each of their respective stakeholder group's cultural individualities [2]. The Project Leads, who head up these highly matrixed projects, operate in environments comprised of virtual project teams- or more specifically in this context, intensive virtual project teams. Most of the participants are within the same city, but all of the document project teams operate with some level of organizational dispersion. Moreover, the larger a project becomes the more dispersed the team becomes. The frequent addition of sub-contracting resources by Project Leads further disperses the group and dilutes communication. The difficulties in communication derive from complications in the goal setting stages of a project and can manifest across the project team in the form of motivational issues, disengagement, quality expectations, and a loss of understanding. This puts a considerable amount of importance on a Project Lead to establish goals through the appropriate tools and methodology. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Requalification and Declaration of High-alpha Cemented TRU-waste from the Late 70's and Early 80's - 20499

KTE and Siemens launched a project to qualify a series of 391 waste drums and 115 concrete containers produced from 1979 to 1984. The waste is characterized by a high content of long-lived alpha-nuclides (TRU-waste - Pu, U, Am in the range of 1 E+11-1 E+12 Bq/ drum. This high radionuclide inventory requires a special packaging according to the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) of the repository Konrad [1] despite the fact, that the waste was treated manually. The raw waste originally was delivered in nitric acid solution and was solidified using ordinary Portland cement. The existing documentation comprises analyses, transfer documentation for the nuclear fuel nuclides and waste treatment documentation yielding information, which waste was treated together in a batch. Additionally all drums were subjected to non-destructive gamma-spectrometry assay. A small number of 7 drums were opened and sampled to support the existing declaration. For the entire series the waste products were attributed to defined batches using the accountancy data supported by the analyses and the gamma-spectrometry. Each batch was produced from a homogeneous stock of waste solution and can therefore be declared and documented together. The declaration concept is based on the gamma spectrometry results performed on the entire drums, which were corrected and extended for the uncertainty of the analyses. The declaration concept is verified by the regulator and its independent expert. The state of the project is in the documentation of the solidification campaigns followed by the planning of the container configuration. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS AND CASE STUDIES: Addressing the Public Outreach Responsibilities of the National Historic Preservation Act: Argonne National Laboratory’s Box Digital Display Platform

Federal agencies are made responsible for managing the historic properties under their jurisdiction by the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended. A component of this responsibility is to mitigate the effect of a federal undertaking on historic properties through mitigation often through documentation. Providing public access to this documentation has always been a challenge. To address the issue of public access to mitigation information, personnel from Argonne National Laboratory created the Box Digital Display Platform, a system for communicating information about historic properties to the public. The platform, developed for the US Army Dugway Proving Ground, uses short introductory videos to present a topic but can also incorporate photos, drawings, GIS information, and documents. The system operates from a small, self-contained computer that can be attached to any digital monitor via an HDMI cable. The system relies on web-based software that allows the information to be republished as a touch-screen device application or as a website. The system does not connect to the Internet, and this increases security and eliminates the software maintenance fees associated with websites. The platform is designed to incorporate the products of past documentation to make this information more accessible to the public; specifically those documentations developed using the Historic American Building Survey/ Historic American Engineering Record (HABS/HAER) standards. Argonne National Laboratory’s Box Digital Display Platform can assist federal agencies in complying with the requirements of the National Historic Preservation Act. Environmental Practice 18: 209–213 (2016)

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

An AI-driven framework for evaluating local and state authorities’ permitting processes

The demand for new energy infrastructure is increasing across the United States, but heterogenous permitting processes and embedded requirements across different local jurisdictions can cause project delays, increase “soft costs,” and hinder developer expansion. This study analyzes the variability in local permitting requirements across the U.S. and develops a quantitative approach to describe their clarity and effectiveness in enabling infrastructure project development. By using an Energy Language Model (ELM), a large language model (LLM) for energy technologies, we systematically gathered permitting information from nearly 300 state-, county-, and city-level documents, creating a structured dataset of requirements and procedures on an unprecedented scale and speed. Our analysis revealed that local (city and county) permitting requirement documents are underrepresented compared to state-level guidance documents, which can impede timely and cost-effective installation of new electric infrastructure. Our validation process showed that the final database has an accuracy of approximately 95%. We, further, created a new quantitative method to score permitting requirements for clarity and efficiency, with electric vehicle supply equipment as an initial use case. The average local permitting document scored a 1.8 out of 5, which we interpret as meaning that half of the requirements developers face when installing electric infrastructure are ambiguous, increasing both cost and time. We also created a “Generalized Permit Process”, highlighting common procedural steps and identifying specific opportunities for municipalities to improve their documentation. This research establishes a systematic and scalable framework for evaluating the complexities of local infrastructure permitting processes by combining LLM-powered data collection and quantitative scoring. The framework enables policymakers and developers to identify and mitigate procedural bottlenecks, with the expectation that these improvements can accelerate application review and approval, reduce project costs, and expedite connection to utility distribution grids. As a foundational approach for streamlining local project development processes, this study’s methods are intended to be extended to a wide range of energy applications.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

How Analysts Cognitively “Connect the Dots”

As analysts attempt to make sense of a collection of documents, such as intelligence analysis reports, they may wish to “connect the dots” between pieces of information that may initially seem unrelated. This process of synthesizing information between information requires users to make connections between pairs of documents, creating a conceptual story. We conducted a user study to analyze the process by which users connect pairs of documents and how they spatially arrange information. Users created conceptual stories that connected the dots using organizational strategies that ranged in complexity. We propose taxonomies for cognitive connections and physical structures used when trying to “connect the dots” between two documents. We compared the user-created stories with a data-mining algorithm that constructs chains of documents using co-occurrence metrics. Using the insight gained into the storytelling process, we offer design considerations for the existing data mining algorithm and corresponding tools to combine the power of data mining and the complex cognitive processing of analysts.

data mining↗

SU-CD-PinS Room/Hall E-00: HAZMAT Training for the Medical Physicist - Part I

Medical Physicists are frequently involved in shipping radioactive materials or supervising those who do. Current U.S. Department of Transportation Hazardous Material Regulations, 49 CFR Parts 171 - 185, require hazmat employees to have documented training specified in 49 CFR 172 Subpart H. A hazmat employee is defined as an individual who: (1) loads, unloads or handles hazardous material; (2) manufactures, tests, reconditions, repairs, modifies, marks or otherwise represents containers, drums or packagings as qualified for use in the transportation of hazardous materials; (3) prepares hazardous materials for transportation; (4) is responsible for safety of transporting hazardous materials; or (5) operates a vehicle used to transport hazardous materials. Recurrent training is required at least once every three years. (The IATA two-year training interval is not applicable and is generally misunderstood.) FAA has escalated inspection and enforcement. Facilities who ship radiopharmaceuticals to other laboratories, return radiopharmaceuticals or radioactive sources to suppliers, or otherwise ship radioactive materials have been cited for failure to provide and document the required training. The interrelationship of transportation regulations, 49 CFR, IATA, ICAO and other transportation regulations, which are frequently misunderstood, will be explained. The course will cover typical shipments by air and highway which are encountered in a medical institution. Items such as fissile materials, highway route controlled quantities, rail shipments, vessel shipments and such will be omitted; although specific questions may be addressed. A major objective of the course is to present the process of shipping radioactive material in a sequential and logical fashion. How radioactive materials for transportation purposes are defined by activity concentrations for exempt materials and activity limits for exempt consignments will be explained. Radioactive material shipments of excepted packages and Type A packages will be emphasized. The program is designed to meet the function specific DOT training requirements for shippers of medical radioactive materials. General awareness training and security awareness training can be obtained from two free DOT training CDs. Safety training and security awareness training is generally satisfied by the training required under the institution’s radioactive material license. For shippers of radioactive Yellow III labeled packages an in-depth written security plan and training are no longer required as of April 8, 2010. In general almost all shippers of medical radioactive material are now not required to have an in-depth security plan. Contents of general awareness training, security awareness training and in-depth security plans will be briefly outlined. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to ensure that each hazmat employee is properly trained. No third party can fulfill that requirement. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to determine the degree to which this course meets the employer’s requirements, including contents of the course and the examination. Participants will gain sufficient knowledge to prepare hazmat training programs for others in their institutions. A handout will be posted which should be printed out and brought to the course for reference during the presentation. The handout will also satisfy part of the training documentation required by DOT. A feature handout section is a composite table which provides A1, A2, RQ, Exempt Concentration, and Exempt Consignment values in a single table in both Becquerel and Curie units. Course attendance will be certified through the AAPM CEU documentation system. Learning Objectives: Understand the regulatory requirements for shipping radioactive materials. Understand the regulatory requirements for training of hazmat employees. Comprehend how to classify, package, mark, label, document, placard, and transport radioactive materials.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

SU-CD-PinS Room/Hall E-01

Medical Physicists are frequently involved in shipping radioactive materials or supervising those who do. Current U.S. Department of Transportation Hazardous Material Regulations, 49 CFR Parts 171 - 185, require hazmat employees to have documented training specified in 49 CFR 172 Subpart H. A hazmat employee is defined as an individual who: (1) loads, unloads or handles hazardous material; (2) manufactures, tests, reconditions, repairs, modifies, marks or otherwise represents containers, drums or packagings as qualified for use in the transportation of hazardous materials; (3) prepares hazardous materials for transportation; (4) is responsible for safety of transporting hazardous materials; or (5) operates a vehicle used to transport hazardous materials. Recurrent training is required at least once every three years. (The IATA two-year training interval is not applicable and is generally misunderstood.) FAA has escalated inspection and enforcement. Facilities who ship radiopharmaceuticals to other laboratories, return radiopharmaceuticals or radioactive sources to suppliers, or otherwise ship radioactive materials have been cited for failure to provide and document the required training. The interrelationship of transportation regulations, 49 CFR, IATA, ICAO and other transportation regulations, which are frequently misunderstood, will be explained. The course will cover typical shipments by air and highway which are encountered in a medical institution. Items such as fissile materials, highway route controlled quantities, rail shipments, vessel shipments and such will be omitted; although specific questions may be addressed. A major objective of the course is to present the process of shipping radioactive material in a sequential and logical fashion. How radioactive materials for transportation purposes are defined by activity concentrations for exempt materials and activity limits for exempt consignments will be explained. Radioactive material shipments of excepted packages and Type A packages will be emphasized. The program is designed to meet the function specific DOT training requirements for shippers of medical radioactive materials. General awareness training and security awareness training can be obtained from two free DOT training CDs. Safety training and security awareness training is generally satisfied by the training required under the institution’s radioactive material license. For shippers of radioactive Yellow III labeled packages an in-depth written security plan and training are no longer required as of April 8, 2010. In general almost all shippers of medical radioactive material are now not required to have an in-depth security plan. Contents of general awareness training, security awareness training and in-depth security plans will be briefly outlined. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to ensure that each hazmat employee is properly trained. No third party can fulfill that requirement. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to determine the degree to which this course meets the employer’s requirements, including contents of the course and the examination. Participants will gain sufficient knowledge to prepare hazmat training programs for others in their institutions. A handout will be posted which should be printed out and brought to the course for reference during the presentation. The handout will also satisfy part of the training documentation required by DOT. A feature handout section is a composite table which provides A1, A2, RQ, Exempt Concentration, and Exempt Consignment values in a single table in both Becquerel and Curie units. Course attendance will be certified through the AAPM CEU documentation system. Learning Objectives: Understand the regulatory requirements for shipping radioactive materials. Understand the regulatory requirements for training of hazmat employees. Comprehend how to classify, package, mark, label, document, placard, and transport radioactive materials.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

ANNUAL RADIOACTIVE WASTE TANK INSPECTION PROGRAM 2010

Aqueous radioactive wastes from Savannah River Site (SRS) separations and vitrification processes are contained in large underground carbon steel tanks. Inspections made during 2010 to evaluate these vessels and other waste handling facilities along with evaluations based on data from previous inspections are the subject of this report. The 2010 inspection program revealed that the structural integrity and waste confinement capability of the Savannah River Site waste tanks were maintained. All inspections scheduled per SRR-LWE-2009-00138, HLW Tank Farm Inspection Plan for 2010, were completed. Ultrasonic measurements (UT) performed in 2010 met the requirements of C-ESG-00006, In-Service Inspection Program for High Level Waste Tanks, Rev. 3, and WSRC-TR-2002-00061, Rev.6. UT inspections were performed on Tanks 30, 31 and 32 and the findings are documented in SRNL-STI-2010-00533, Tank Inspection NDE Results for Fiscal Year 2010, Waste Tanks 30, 31 and 32. A total of 5824 photographs were made and 1087 visual and video inspections were performed during 2010. Ten new leaksites at Tank 5 were identified in 2010. The locations of these leaksites are documented in C-ESR-G-00003, SRS High Level Waste Tank Leaksite Information, Rev.5. Ten leaksites at Tank 5 were documented during tank wall/annulus cleaning activities. None of these new leaksites resulted in a release to the environment. The leaksites were documented during wall cleaning activities and the waste nodules associated with the leaksites were washed away. Previously documented leaksites were reactivated at Tank 12 during waste removal activities.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Large Bore Powder Gun Qualification (U)

A Large Bore Powder Gun (LBPG) is being designed to enable experimentalists to characterize material behavior outside the capabilities of the NNSS JASPER and LANL TA-55 PF-4 guns. The combination of these three guns will create a capability to conduct impact experiments over a wide range of pressures and shock profiles. The Large Bore Powder Gun will be fielded at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) U1a Complex. The Complex is nearly 1000 ft below ground with dedicated drifts for testing, instrumentation, and post-shot entombment. To ensure the reliability, safety, and performance of the LBPG, a qualification plan has been established and documented here. Requirements for the LBPG have been established and documented in WE-14-TR-0065 U A, Large Bore Powder Gun Customer Requirements. The document includes the requirements for the physics experiments, the gun and confinement systems, and operations at NNSS. A detailed description of the requirements is established in that document and is referred to and quoted throughout this document. Two Gun and Confinement Systems will be fielded. The Prototype Gun will be used primarily to characterize the gun and confinement performance and be the primary platform for qualification actions. This gun will also be used to investigate and qualify target and diagnostic modifications through the life of the program (U1a.104 Drift). An identical gun, the Physics Gun, will be fielded for confirmatory and Pu experiments (U1a.102D Drift). Both guns will be qualified for operation. The Gun and Confinement System design will be qualified through analysis, inspection, and testing using the Prototype Gun for the majority of process. The Physics Gun will be qualified through inspection and a limited number of qualification tests to ensure performance and behavior equivalent to the Prototype gun. Figure 1.1 shows the partial configuration of U1a and the locations of the Prototype and Physics Gun/Confinement Systems.

CONFIGURATION↗

Evolution of Chemical Conditions and Estimated Plutonium Solubility in the Residual Waste Layer During Post-Closure Aging of Tank 18

This document updates the Eh-pH transitions from grout aging simulations and the plutonium waste release model of Denham (2007, Rev. 1) based on new data. New thermodynamic data for cementitious minerals are used for the grout simulations. Newer thermodynamic data, recommended by plutonium experts (Plutonium Solubility Peer Review Report, LA-UR-12-00079), are used to estimate solubilities of plutonium at various pore water compositions expected during grout aging. In addition, a new grout formula is used in the grout aging simulations and apparent solubilities of coprecipitated plutonium are estimated using data from analysis of Tank 18 residual waste. The conceptual model of waste release and the grout aging simulations are done in a manner similar to that of Denham (2007, Rev. 1). It is assumed that the pore fluid composition passing from the tank grout into the residual waste layer controls the solubility, and hence the waste release concentration of plutonium. Pore volumes of infiltrating fluid of an assumed composition are reacted with a hypothetical grout block using The Geochemist's Workbench{reg_sign} and changes in pore fluid chemistry correspond to the number of pore fluid volumes reacted. As in the earlier document, this results in three states of grout pore fluid composition throughout the simulation period that are termed Reduced Region II, Oxidized Region II, and Oxidized Region III. The one major difference from the earlier document is that pyrite is used to account for reducing capacity of the tank grout rather than pyrrhotite. This poises Eh at -0.47 volts during Reduced Region II. The major transitions in pore fluid composition are shown. Plutonium solubilities are estimated for discrete PuO2(am,hyd) particles and for plutonium coprecipitated with iron phases in the residual waste. Thermodynamic data for plutonium from the Nuclear Energy Agency are used to estimate the solubilities of the discrete particles for the three stages of pore fluid evolution. In Denham (2007, Rev. 1), the solubilities in the oxidized regions were estimated at Eh values in equilibrium with dissolved oxygen. Here, these are considered to be maximum possible solubilities because Eh values are unlikely to be in equilibrium with dissolved oxygen. More realistic Eh values are estimated here and plutonium solubilities calculated at these are considered more realistic. Apparent solubilities of plutonium that coprecipitated with iron phases are estimated from Pu:Fe ratios in Tank 18 residual waste and the solubilities of the host iron phases. The estimated plutonium solubilities are shown. Uncertainties in the grout simulations and plutonium solubility estimates are discussed. The primary uncertainty in the grout simulations is that little is known about the physical state of the grout as it ages. The simulations done here are pertinent to a porous medium, which may or may not be applicable to fractured grout, depending on the degree and nature of the fractures. Other uncertainties that are considered are the assumptions about the reducing capacity imparted by blast furnace slag, the effects of varying dissolved carbon dioxide and oxygen concentrations, and the treatment of silica in the simulations. The primary uncertainty in the estimates of plutonium solubility is that little is known about the exact form of plutonium in the residual waste. Other uncertainties include those inherent in the thermodynamic data, pH variations from those estimated in the grout simulations, the effects of the treatment of silica in the grout simulations, and the effect of varying total dissolved carbonate concentrations. The objective of this document is to update the model for solubility controls on release of plutonium from residual waste in closed F-Area waste tanks. The update is based on new information including a new proposed grout formulation, chemical analysis of Tank 18 samples and more current thermodynamic data for plutonium and grout minerals. In addition, minor changes to the modeling of the grout chemical evolution have been made. It should be noted that the intent is to provide bounding solubilities for plutonium to be used in Performance Assessment modeling rather than trying to identify an exact concentration of plutonium in pore fluids released from a tank at any given time. This document also considers suggestions and opportunities for improvement regarding the plutonium modeling assumptions from the Plutonium Solubility Peer Review Report, LA-UR-12-00079.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Approaches to 30% Energy Savings at the Community Scale in the Hot-Humid Climate

BA-PIRC has worked with several community-scale builders within the hot humid climate zone to improve performance of production, or community scale, housing. Tommy Williams Homes (Gainesville, FL), Lifestyle Homes (Melbourne, FL), and Habitat for Humanity (various locations, FL) have all been continuous partners of the BA Program and are the subjects of this report to document achievement of the Building America goal of 30% whole house energy savings packages adopted at the community scale. The scope of this report is to demonstrate achievement of these goals though the documentation of production-scale homes built cost-effectively at the community scale, and modeled to reduce whole-house energy use by 30% in the Hot Humid climate region. Key aspects of this research include determining how to evolve existing energy efficiency packages to produce replicable target savings, identifying what builders' technical assistance needs are for implementation and working with them to create sustainable quality assurance mechanisms, and documenting the commercial viability through neutral cost analysis and market acceptance. This report documents certain barriers builders overcame and the approaches they implemented in order to accomplish Building America (BA) Program goals that have not already been documented in previous reports.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

LANL Response to SRS Requirement G-ESR-G-00035 Item 11 Bed Temperature Requirements, For the Addition of Direct Metal Oxidation Unit 3, Revision 0

Los Alamos National Laboratory has identified a number of plutonium-bearing materials that will be placed in storage in 3013 containers per requirements of DOE-STD-3013-2004, or DOE-STD-3013-2012 when it is implemented in the LANL contract. Before these items can be considered for storage at Savannah River Site, 20 points of agreement, described in Savannah River Site (SRS) document G-ESR-G-00035, Revision 1, must be documented and provided to SRS for review. These agreements include documentation that the requirements of the 3013 Standard are met and the storage facility’s safety envelope is not compromised. Point 11 of the 20 points is the requirement that material be stabilized at 950°C for a minimum of two hours prior to packaging. This report addresses the Point 11 requirement, describing the controls used during stabilization to ensure that the material is properly stabilized using a continuous process (Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System [ARIES] direct metal oxidation [DMO] and recycle oxide calcination). These controls include verification of the furnace controller thermocouple profile and verification of the profiles for the calciner tube hot zone. This report is specific to Direct Metal Oxidation Unit 3 (DMO-3). The point 11 requirements for DMO-2 and muffle furnace oxidation are covered in reference. This report does not replace reference. The process and methodology used in this report are similar to that used for Direct Metal Oxidation Unit 2, or DMO-2, as documented in reference. This report documents the performance for ARIES DMO-3. The temperature on the outside of the calciner tube must be at least 1,032°C. The auger rotation rate set point will be dependent on the pitch of the installed auger. For an auger pitch of 1.297 in/rev the auger set point will be 0.0777 rpm or less, which allows for at least 132 minutes calcination time based on worst case conditions (i.e., lowest possible powder density at the lowest initial powder temperature, and under the least favorable heat transfer conditions, and with the least favorable auger pitch of the currently installed auger.) A new auger design may be used in future modifications of DMO-3 that has an auger pitch of 1.400 ± 0.025 inches which would change the required auger set point to 0.0707 rpm or less.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

LANL Response to SRS Requirement G-ESR-G-00035 Item 11 Bed Temperature, Revision 4

Los Alamos National Laboratory has identified a number of plutonium-bearing materials that will be placed in interim storage in 3013 containers per requirements of DOE-STD-3013- 2004, or DOE-STD-3013-2012. Before these items can be considered for storage at Savannah River Site, 20 points of agreement, described in Savannah River Site (SRS) document G-ESR-G-00035, Revision 1, must be documented and provided to SRS for review. These agreements include documentation that the requirements of the 3013 Standard are met and the storage facility’s safety envelope is not compromised. Point 11 of the 20 points is the requirement that material be stabilized at 950°C for a minimum of two hours prior to packaging. This report addresses the Point 11 requirement, describing the controls used during stabilization to ensure that the material is properly stabilized using either a batch (calciner boat) or continuous process (Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System [ARIES] direct metal oxidation unit 2 [DMO-2] and recycle oxide calcination). These controls include verification of the furnace controller thermocouple profile and verification of the profiles for the two thermocouples located in the bed and/or calciner tube hot zone. Revision 4 to this document only modifies the ARIES DMO-2 process controls. Batch processing requirements are unchanged. Changes to the DMO-2 process include use of alternate augers with differing pitch values and reduction of the minimum powder bulk density value. The new DMO-3 unit requirements are covered in a separate document.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Scaling Theory for Pulsed Jet Mixed Vessels, Sparging, and Cyclic Feed Transport Systems for Slurries

This document is a previously unpublished work based on a draft report prepared by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) for the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) in 2012. Work on the report stopped when WTP’s approach to testing changed. PNNL is issuing a modified version of the document a year later to preserve and disseminate the valuable technical work that was completed. This document establishes technical bases for evaluating the mixing performance of Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) pretreatment process tanks based on data from less-than-full-scale testing, relative to specified mixing requirements. The technical bases include the fluid mechanics affecting mixing for specified vessel configurations, operating parameters, and simulant properties. They address scaling vessel physical performance, simulant physical performance, and “scaling down” the operating conditions at full scale to define test conditions at reduced scale and “scaling up” the test results at reduced scale to predict the performance at full scale. Essentially, this document addresses the following questions: • Why and how can the mixing behaviors in a smaller vessel represent those in a larger vessel? • What information is needed to address the first question? • How should the information be used to predict mixing performance in WTP? The design of Large Scale Integrated Testing (LSIT) is being addressed in other, complementary documents.

non-Newtonian↗