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At least 865 records · Page 48

Working Toward Robust Process Monitoring for Safeguards Applications

New safeguards technologies allow continuous monitoring of plant processes. Efforts to deploy these technologies, as described in a preponderance of literature, typically have consisted of case studies attempting to prove their efficacy in proof-of-principle installations. While the enhanced safeguards capabilities of continuous monitoring have been established, studies thus far have not addressed such challenges as manipulation of a system by a host nation. To prevent this and other such vulnerabilities, one technology, continuous load cell monitoring, was reviewed. This paper will present vulnerabilities as well as mitigation strategies that were identified.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Data Quality Objectives for Direct LAW Feed Acceptance and Qualification - 17122

The Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Facility has been designed to operate under two scenarios. In the primary operating scenario, the Pretreatment Facility configuration, waste is first processed through the WTP Pretreatment Facility. Then the low-activity liquid is transferred to the WTP LAW Facility for vitrification. Alternately, under a direct feed operating scenario, known as Direct Feed LAW (DFLAW), the supernatant portion of the tank waste, referred to as the LAW feed, is treated in a Low-Activity Waste Pretreatment System (LAWPS) prior to transfer of treated feed to LAW Facility. The DFLAW scenario is a strategy to begin treating Hanford tank wastes as soon as 2022. A program has been established as part of One System to integrate and align the waste feed acceptance and qualification requirements for processing in the LAWPS and the LAW facility. One key activity of the program is the development of integrated data quality objectives (DQO) using U.S. Environmental Protection Agency guidance for the DQO process. [1] The integrated approach focused on one sampling event that will provide sufficient and necessary data to meet both LAWPS and LAW Facility criteria. Existing data and historical information were taken into account to develop sampling and data collection requirements necessary to meet waste acceptance criteria and processing requirements for both LAWPS and LAW Facility. Using a conceptual model for the sampling and decision process, the seven steps of the DQO process were completed. This paper discusses the details of the integrated DQO process. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radioactive Water Treatment at a United States Environmental Protection Agency Superfund Site - 12322

A water treatment system at a United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) Superfund site impacted by radiological contaminants is used to treat water entering the site. The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is actively managing the remedial action for the USEPA using contracts to support the multiple activities on site. The site is where former gas mantle production facilities operated around the turn of the century. The manufacturing facilities used thorium ores to develop the mantles and disposed of off-specification mantles and ore residuals in the surrounding areas. During Site remedial actions, both groundwater and surface water comes into contact with contaminated soils and must be collected and treated at an on-site treatment facility. The radionuclides thorium and radium with associated progeny are the main concern for treatment. Suspended solids, volatile organic compounds, and select metals are also monitored during water treatment. The water treatment process begins were water is pumped to a collection tank where debris and grit settle out. Stored water is pumped to a coagulant tank containing poly-aluminum chloride to collect dissolved solids. The water passes into a reaction tube where aspirated air is added or reagent added to remove Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC'S) by mass transfer and convert dissolved iron to a solid. The water enters the flocculent polymer tank to drop solids out. The flocculated water overflows to a fluidized bed contact chamber to increase precipitation. Flocculation is where colloids of material drop out of suspension and settle. The settled solids are periodically removed and disposed of as radioactive waste. The water is passed through filters and an ion exchange process to extract the radionuclides. Several million liters of water are processed each year from two water treatment plants servicing different areas of the remediation site. Ion exchange resin and filter material are periodically replaced and disposed of as radioactive waste. A total of 0.85 m{sup 3} of waste sludge per year requires disposal on average, in addition to another 6.6 m{sup 3} of waste cartridge filters. All water discharges are regulated by a state of New Jersey Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit implemented by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act). Laboratory analyses are required to satisfy requirements of the state NPDES permit. Specific monitoring parameters and discharge rates will be provided. Use of the water treatment systems drastically reduces the amount of contaminated water requiring solidification and water disposal to near zero. Millions of liters of potentially contaminated water from excavation activities is treated and released within permit limits. A small volume of solid radioactive waste (21 cubic meters) is generated annually from water treatment process operations. Management of ground and surface water is effectively controlled in remediation areas by the use of sumps, erosion control measures and pumping of water to storage vessels. Continued excavations can be made as water impacting the site is effectively controlled. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Strengthening the Security of Operational Technology: Understanding Contemporary Bill of Materials

The evolution of cyber-physical infrastructure has made its security more challenging. The last few years have witnessed a convergence of hardware and software segments in various domains, including operational technology (OT) which is responsible for carrying out critical tasks such as monitoring and controlling power grids, nuclear plants, transportation, and emergency services. Both hardware and software encapsulate numerous open source and proprietary subcomponents, making it crucial for end-users to understand the composition of the products they are using. For example, wind turbines incorporate thousands of lines of code (software) used for the turbine's design, planning, operation, and analytics in addition to the numerous hardware subcomponents that construct it. Due to the highly complex nature of software and hardware, knowledge of the components and subcomponents is required to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities and defend against cyberattacks. There has also been a transformation from a traditional linear supply chain into a global, dynamic, diverse, and interconnected system. The digitization of the supply chain makes it easier to find and exploit vulnerabilities. Critical infrastructures (e.g., power grids, oil, natural gas, water, and wastewater) rely on OT to function, and if the OT is compromised, equipment damage and potential interruption of services could result. A significant security measure to protect OT systems from disruption is to develop a supply chain bill of materials (BoM) corresponding to the software and hardware used in OT, along with attestations amongst vendors and asset owners. A supply chain BoM is a proactive way to understand the inherent vulnerabilities in the system and mitigate them in advance of being exploited. BoMs bolster the trust placed in the digital infrastructure and enhance software supply chain security by sustaining the management of component obsolescence and compliance, along with the seclusion of unsafe segments of a specific product. Adopting BoM tools is becoming increasingly important across various government sectors, as evidenced by the recent U.S. executive order on cybersecurity (NIST 2021). This paper aims to classify BoMs based on structure, functionality, component type, and architecture. The work also discusses case studies to further highlight the benefits of BoMs. In addition, it identifies missing pieces in existing BoM implementations so that future research may identify bounds on where it could expect to make improvements and directly enable researchers to identify promising areas for exploration. Further, the authors provide valuable recommendations to tool developers, researchers, and standardizing organizations (policymakers), additionally benefitting critical infrastructure owners and government executives. This aids in paving a path for future work, thereby, providing suggestions to determine a tool for consumers that best suit their needs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Seismic Data Gathering and Validation

Three recent earthquakes in the last seven years have exceeded their design basis earthquake values (so it is implied that damage to SSC’s should have occurred). These seismic events were recorded at North Anna (August 2011, detailed information provided in [Virginia Electric and Power Company Memo]), Fukushima Daichii and Daini (March 2011 [TEPCO 1]), and Kaswazaki-Kariwa (2007, [TEPCO 2]). However, seismic walk downs at some of these plants indicate that very little damage occurred to safety class systems and components due to the seismic motion. This report presents seismic data gathered for two of the three events mentioned above and recommends a path for using that data for two purposes. One purpose is to determine what margins exist in current industry standard seismic soil-structure interaction (SSI) tools. The second purpose is the use the data to validated seismic site response tools and SSI tools. The gathered data represents free field soil and in-structure acceleration time histories data. Gathered data also includes elastic and dynamic soil properties and structural drawings. Gathering data and comparing with existing models has potential to identify areas of uncertainty that should be removed from current seismic analysis and SPRA approaches. Removing uncertainty (to the extent possible) from SPRA’s will allow NPP owners to make decisions on where to reduce risk. Once a realistic understanding of seismic response is established for a nuclear power plant (NPP) then decisions on needed protective measures, such as SI, can be made.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Multi-Phased, Post-Accident Support of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant - 12246

In the wake of the March 11 earthquake and tsunami and the subsequent flooding of several of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi reactors, Japan and the Japanese utility TEPCO faced a crisis situation with incredible challenges: substantial amounts of radioactive mixed seawater and freshwater accumulated in the basements of four reactor and other buildings on the site. This water held varying levels of contamination due to the fact that it had been in contact with damaged fuel elements in the cores and with other contaminated components. The overall water inventory was estimated at around 110,000 tons of water with contamination levels up to the order of 1 Ci/l. Time was of the essence to avoid overflow of this accumulated water into the ocean. AREVA proposed, designed and implemented a water treatment solution using a proven chemical coprecipitation process with ppFeNi reagent, which is currently in use for effluent treatment on several nuclear sites including AREVA sites. In addition to the extremely short schedule the other challenge was to adapt the chemical treatment process to the expected composition of the Fukushima water and, in particular, to evaluate the impact of salinity on process performance. It was also necessary to define operating conditions for the VEOLIA equipment that had been selected for implementation of the process in the future facility. The operation phase began on June 17, and by the end of July more than 30,000 tons of highly radioactive saltwater had been decontaminated - the Decontamination Factor (DF) for Cesium was ∼10{sup 4}. It allowed recycling the contaminated water to cool the reactors while protecting workers and the environment. This paper focuses on the Actiflo{sup TM}-Rad water treatment unit project that was part of the TEPCO general water treatment scheme. It presents a detailed look at the principles of the Actiflo{sup TM}-Rad, related on-the-fly R and D, an explanation of system implementation challenges, and a brief summary of operation results to date. AREVA's response to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi crisis was multi-phased: emergency aid and relief supply was sent within days after the accident; AREVA-Veolia engineering teams designed and implemented a water treatment solution in record time, only 3 months; and AREVA continues to support TEPCO and propose solutions for waste management, soil remediation and decontamination of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi site. Despite the huge challenges, the Actiflo{sup TM}-Rad project has been a success: the water treatment unit started on time and performed as expected. The performance is the result of many key elements: AREVA expertise in radioactive effluents decontamination, Veolia know-how in water treatment equipments in crisis environment, and of course AREVA and Veolia teams' creativity. The project success is also due to AREVA and Veolia teams' reactivity and high level of commitment with engineering teams working 24/7 in Japan, France and Germany. AREVA and Veolia deep knowledge of the Japanese industry ensured that the multi-cultural exchanges were not an issue. Finally the excellent overall project management and execution by TEPCO and other Japanese stakeholders was very efficient. The emergency water treatment was a key step of the roadmap towards restoration from the accident at Fukushima Dai-Ichi that TEPCO designed and keeps executing with success. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security Program: Cybersecurity Scenarios

The use of digital control systems and automation in advanced nuclear power systems introduces different types of vulnerabilities compared to legacy (i.e. analog) control systems that cyber adversaries can exploit. These vulnerabilities pose a challenge to reactor operators and cyber operations staff due to the dynamic nature of the event in which a human response or a lack of response can potentially evolve into a worsening plant condition. Using the Department of Homeland Security Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) critical infrastructure exercise framework, this document presents several cyber security scenarios typical of digital control systems that could be used in advanced reactor designs. These scenarios can be used in tabletop exercises to evaluate cyber security posture or conduct training on different aspects of cyber security, including detection, threat hunting using indicators of compromise, evaluating incident response, risk mitigation, incident reporting, information sharing and recovery.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Catalina Repower Feasibility Study: NREL Phases I & II Summary Report

Engineers at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) supported Southern California Edison (SCE) and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by conducting technical and economic analyses for energy systems at Santa Catalina (Catalina) Island, which is located 22 miles off the coast of Long Beach, California. This effort was part of a broader Repower Catalina Feasibility Study that was also supported by NV5, an engineering consulting firm and project partner to NREL for this analysis. This document describes NREL’s techno-economic modeling and optimization analysis for the first two phases of this project which focus on supply-side generation and energy storage options for Catalina. SCE’s goal for this analysis is to determine a strategy for electricity generation on Catalina Island that results in lower energy costs, improved energy resiliency, and reduced air emissions. EPA goals for this effort are to reduce emissions of air pollution and encourage renewable energy development on contaminated and formerly contaminated lands when such development is aligned with the community’s vision for the site. Currently, an on-island SCE power plant serves the Catalina Island electrical load with 6 reciprocating diesel generators totaling 9.4 MW; 23 propane-fueled microturbines totaling 1.5 MW; and a 1-MW, 7.2-MWh sodium sulfur battery energy storage system (BESS). In 2017, the electricity consumption on the island was 29.1 GWh, with an average load of 3.3 MW and peak load of approximately 5.5 MW. Considering new environmental standards on diesel generator emissions from California’s South Coast Air Quality Management District, a 60% renewable energy target for 2030 laid out in California’s Senate Bill 100, SCE’s Clean Power Electrification Pathway, and the characteristics of the island’s existing diesel generators, SCE is seeking to evaluate the technical and economic implications of different energy technology options to determine a path forward. Phases I and II of the Repower Catalina Feasibility Study, summarized in this document, evaluated the following: Interconnection with the mainland via an undersea cable; On-island fossil fuel generation, including diesel, propane, and/or liquified natural gas (LNG); On-island renewable energy (RE) technologies, including solar photovoltaics (PV), wind turbines, and wave energy devices; BESS to support the above generation technologies; Initial analysis of the potential impacts of implementing energy efficiency measures. Results indicate strong techno-economic potential for a mix of on-island diesel and/or propane generators, solar PV, BESS, and energy efficiency measures to help SCE and Catalina achieve their goals compliant with California’s emissions and clean energy standards while minimizing electricity life cycle costs (LCC) over the 30-year analysis period. This document summarizes the considerations and findings of Phases I and II, focusing on high-level takeaways from Phase I and more detailed results from Phase II, and discusses a potential path forward for Phase III.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Managing the interfaces for successful waste treatment operations at the river protection project - 15347

The Department of Energy (DOE) is constructing the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) at the Hanford site in Washington to treat and immobilize(vitrify) approximately 432 million liters (114 million gallons) of high level radioactive waste (after all single-shell retrievals are accomplished). The tank operating contractor (TOC) is charged with delivering feed, with preconditioning if required. Other Hanford contractors are charged with providing utilities and other services and waste disposal facilities. In all, four DOE contractors, two DOE offices along with DOE headquarters, and two Washington state regulators play essential roles in enabling successful treatment operations eliminate the radioactive and hazardous waste threats to the public and the environment. DOE has decided that the appropriate approach is to proceed with operations at the WTP's Low-Activity Waste (LAW) vitrification facility ahead of completing the WTP Pretreatment and High Level Waste (HLW) waste vitrification facilities, This paper outlines the approach that is being taken to ensure that all the functions, reviews, and approvals needed for radioactive operations are achieved to allow successful feed delivery, startup, and operations of the WTP in a direct feed to LAW mode. A massive effort is needed to be successful and a One System organization, jointly managed and staffed by WTP and TOC personnel is tasked with achieving the integration, coordination, tracking, and reporting necessary for the endeavor. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Design, Fabrication and Performance Characterization of Near-Surface Embedded Cooling Channels with an Oxide Dispersion Strengthened (ODS) Coating Layer

The primary goal of this research is to develop an innovative approach to provide an immensely improved level of thermal protection for hot-section components, such as turbine airfoils, in modern and future gas turbines. Current and future designs for advanced turbine systems, such as IGCC, advanced Natural Gas Combined Cycle (NGCC), and the emerging supercritical CO 2 (SCO 2 ) systems, are targeting turbine inlet temperatures well beyond the substrate melting temperature, typically ranging from ~ 1400°C-1800°C. Meanwhile, targeted cycle efficiency calls for a reduction of the amount of coolant air significantly below the current level. Hence the development of novel internal airfoil designs that provide a satisfactory level of component durability with affordable coolant management is critical to the further advances of today’s turbine technology. This proposal is a response to this grand challenge.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Validation of the integration of CFD and SAS4A/SASSYS-1: Analysis of EBR-II shutdown heat removal test 17

Recent analyses have demonstrated the need to model multidimensional phenomena, particularly thermal stratification in outlet plena, during safety analyses of loss-of-flow transients of certain liquid-metal cooled reactor designs. Therefore, Argonne's reactor systems safety code SAS4A/SASSYS-1 is being enhanced by integrating 3D computational fluid dynamics models of the plena. A validation exercise of the new tool is being performed by analyzing the protected loss-of-flow event demonstrated by the EBR-II Shutdown Heat Removal Test 17. In this analysis, the behavior of the coolant in the cold pool is modeled using the CFD code STAR-CCM+, while the remainder of the cooling system and the reactor core are modeled with SAS4A/SASSYS-1. This paper summarizes the code integration strategy and provides the predicted 3D temperature and velocity distributions inside the cold pool during SHRT-17. The results of the coupled analysis should be considered preliminary at this stage, as the exercise pointed to the need to improve the CFD model of the cold pool tank. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A complete dosimetry experimental program in support to the core characterization and to the power calibration of the CABRI reactor. A complete dosimetry experimental program in support of the core characterization and of the power calibration of the CABRI reactor

CABRI is an experimental pulse reactor operated by CEA at the Cadarache research center. Since 1978 the experimental programs have aimed at studying the fuel behavior under Reactivity Initiated Accident (RIA) conditions. Since 2003, it has been refurbished in order to be able to provide RIA and LOCA (Loss Of Coolant Accident) experiments in prototypical PWR conditions (155 bar, 300 deg. C). This project is part of a broader scope including an overall facility refurbishment and a safety review. The global modification is conducted by the CEA project team. It is funded by IRSN, which is conducting the CIP experimental program, in the framework of the OECD/NEA project CIP. It is financed in the framework of an international collaboration. During the reactor restart, commissioning tests are realized for all equipment, systems and circuits of the reactor. In particular neutronics and power commissioning tests will be performed respectively in 2015 and 2016. This paper focuses on the design of a complete and original dosimetry program that was built in support to the CABRI core characterization and to the power calibration. Each one of the above experimental goals will be fully described, as well as the target uncertainties and the forecasted experimental techniques and data treatment. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Modernization of Technical Requirements for Licensing of Advanced Non-Light Water Reactors: Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth Adequacy

This document supports the work contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 18-04 “Risk-Informed Performance-Based Technology Inclusive Guidance for Advanced Reactor Licensing Basis Development” Revision 0. NEI 18-04 presents a modern, technology-inclusive, risk-informed, and performance-based (TI-RIPB) process for selection of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs); safety classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and associated risk-informed special treatments; and determination of defense-in-depth (DID) adequacy for non-LWRs. The NEI guidance document provides one acceptable means for addressing the aforementioned topics as part of demonstrating a specific design provides reasonable assurance of adequate radiological protection. This report provides the framework and associated methodology guidelines and discussion for establishing, then evaluating, confirming, and documenting the adequacy of defense-in-depth (DID) for advanced non-light-water reactor technologies. It was developed as part of the Licensing Modernization Project led by Southern Company and cost-shared by the United States Department of Energy and has benefited from considerable NRC formal reviews and public workshops. The methodology converts the DID philosophy into a structured process that is implementable, embraces existing United States and international definitions and philosophies of DID that set the foundation for the process. It builds on the DID framework developed in the Department of Energy Next Generation Nuclear Plant Project and earlier works on this subject. The approach to establishing DID adequacy involves the incorporation of DID attributes into the plant capabilities and programmatic elements of DID. The integrated evaluation of DID adequacy includes both quantitative elements to incorporate risk-informed and performance-based (RIPB) considerations and qualitative elements that address uncertainties and limitations in the quantitative models and supporting data. Demonstration of DID adequacy ensures that there are multiple layers of defense for risk-significant challenges to the design and that the plant capabilities and programs that support each layer are provided in a manner that minimizes dependencies among these layers. The focus of this report is assurance of DID adequacy with respect to protection of the public from radiological exposures resulting from accidental releases of radioactive material. While other hazards are not specifically addressed, this methodology is expected to be beneficial for determining DID adequacy for them as well. Risk-informed evaluation of DID considers the integrated performance of all plant SSCs and associated programs to manage daily operational activities, transients, and accidents, including the evaluation of strategies for accident prevention and mitigation. The RIPB LBE scenario methodology used in this evaluation defines the challenges to the plant safety features included in the plant design basis and beyond, and the scope of all deterministic and probabilistic safety evaluations. By examining event sequences across the whole spectrum of LBEs, a systematic assessment of DID can be accomplished.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Review and Evaluation of Updated Research on the Health Effects Associated with Low-Dose Ionizing Radiation

Potential health effects of low levels of radiation have predominantly been based on those effects observed at high levels of radiation. The authors have reviewed more than 200 percent publications in radiobiology and epidermiology related to low dose radiation and concluded that recent radiobiological studies at low-doses; that doses <100 mSv in a single exposure appear to be too small to allow epidermiological detection of statistically significant excess cancers in the presence of naturally occurring cancers; that low dose radiation research should to holistic, systems-based approaches to develop models that define the shape of the dose-response relationships at low doses; and that these results should be combined with the latest epidermiology to produce a comprehensive understanding of radiation effects that addresses both damage, likely with a linear effect, and response, possibly with non-linear consequences.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Groundwater Protection Program Management Plan For The U.S. Department Of Energy Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

This document presents the Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP) management plan for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (hereafter referenced as Y-12). The Y-12 GWPP functions as the primary point-of-contact for groundwater-related issues at Y-12, provides stewardship of the extensive network of groundwater monitoring wells at Y-12, and serves as a resource for technical expertise, support, and historical data for groundwater-related activities at Y-12. These organizational functions each serve the primary programmatic purpose of the GWPP, which is to ensure that groundwater monitoring activities within areas under Y-12 administrative control provide representative data in compliance with the multiple purposes of applicable state and federal regulations, DOE orders, and the corporate policies of Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Y-12 LLC (hereafter referenced as B&W Y-12), the Y-12 management and operations (M&O) contractor for DOE. B&W Y-12 is a new corporate name, assumed in January 2007, for the company formerly known as BWXT Y-12, L.L.C., hereafter referenced as BWXT. This GWPP management plan addresses the requirements of DOE Order 450.1A Environmental Protection Program (hereafter referenced as DOE O 450.1A), which emphasize a site-wide approach for groundwater protection at each DOE facility through implementation of groundwater surveillance monitoring. Additionally, this plan addresses the relevant and applicable GWPP elements and goals described in the DOE O 450.1A technical guidance documents issued in June 2004 (DOE 2004) and May 2005 (DOE 2005). This GWPP management plan is a &#x27;living&#x27; document that is reviewed annually, revised and reissued every three years, and is formatted to provide for updating individual sections independent of the rest of the document. Section 2 includes a short description of the groundwater system at Y-12, the history of groundwater monitoring at Y-12 and the corresponding evolution of the GWPP, and an overview of ongoing Y-12 groundwater monitoring activities. Section 3 describes the key elements of the GWPP management strategy. Organizational roles and responsibilities of GWPP personnel are outlined in Section 4. Section 5 presents an overview of the GWPP project plans for applicable programmatic elements. Section 6 lists the reports, plans, and documents that are referenced for technical and administrative details.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

01-07 Reactor Supplemental Shielding For the NRIC DOME Test Bed 01-07 Reactor Supplemental Shielding For the NRIC DOME Test Bed 2

A radiation shielding system is needed to protect personnel and equipment from harsh neutron and photon fluxes during: Reactor operations Post shut down operations Disassembly Decommissioning Examples of RSS driving requirements Radiological Controls Operating dose rate: the dose rate during normal reactor operations shall be <0.5 mrem/hr at the exterior wall of DOME containment Outdoor radiation limit: shielding shall provide the dose to a facility worker outside of DOME to <0.05 mrem/hr at 50 ft from the exterior wall of the DOME Temperature Reactors may have operating temperatures up to 800C The RSS shall be capable of removing up to 100 KW of heat during normal operating conditions the concrete structure has an upper temperature limit of 100°C

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Spray‐induced gene silencing to identify powdery mildew gene targets and processes for powdery mildew control

Abstract Spray‐induced gene silencing (SIGS) is an emerging tool for crop pest protection. It utilizes exogenously applied double‐stranded RNA to specifically reduce pest target gene expression using endogenous RNA interference machinery. In this study, SIGS methods were developed and optimized for powdery mildew fungi, which are widespread obligate biotrophic fungi that infect agricultural crops, using the known azole‐fungicide target cytochrome P450 51 (CYP51) in the Golovinomyces orontii–Arabidopsis thaliana pathosystem. Additional screening resulted in the identification of conserved gene targets and processes important to powdery mildew proliferation: apoptosis‐antagonizing transcription factor in essential cellular metabolism and stress response; lipid catabolism genes lipase a , lipase 1 , and acetyl‐CoA oxidase in energy production ; and genes involved in manipulation of the plant host via abscisic acid metabolism ( 9‐cis‐epoxycarotenoid dioxygenase , xanthoxin dehydrogenase , and a putative abscisic acid G‐protein coupled receptor ) and secretion of the effector protein, effector candidate 2 . Powdery mildew is the dominant disease impacting grapes and extensive powdery mildew resistance to applied fungicides has been reported. We therefore developed SIGS for the Erysiphe necator–Vitis vinifera system and tested six successful targets identified using the G. orontii–A. thaliana system. For all targets tested, a similar reduction in powdery mildew disease was observed between systems. This indicates screening of broadly conserved targets in the G. orontii–A. thaliana pathosystem identifies targets and processes for the successful control of other powdery mildew fungi. The efficacy of SIGS on powdery mildew fungi makes SIGS an exciting prospect for commercial powdery mildew control.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗