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At least 865 records · Page 48

3D Imaging with Structured Illumination for Advanced Security Applications

Three-dimensional (3D) information in a physical security system is a highly useful discriminator. The two-dimensional data from an imaging systems fails to provide target distance and three-dimensional motion vector, which can be used to reduce nuisance alarm rates and increase system effectiveness. However, 3D imaging devices designed primarily for use in physical security systems are uncommon. This report discusses an architecture favorable to physical security systems; an inexpensive snapshot 3D imaging system utilizing a simple illumination system. The method of acquiring 3D data, tests to understand illumination design, and software modifications possible to maximize information gathering capability are discussed.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Los Alamos National Security, LLC Request for Information from industrial entities that desire to commercialize Laboratory-developed Extremely Low Resource Optical Identifier (ELROI) tech

Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS) is the manager and operator of the Los Alamos National Laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC52-06NA25396. LANS is a mission-centric Federally Funded Research and Development Center focused on solving the most critical national security challenges through science and engineering for both government and private customers.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Used fuel extended storage security and safeguards by design roadmap

In the United States, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is safely and securely stored in spent fuel pools and dry storage casks. The available capacity in spent fuel pools across the nuclear fleet has nearly reached a steady state value. The excess SNF continues to be loaded in dry storage casks. Fuel is expected to remain in dry storage for periods beyond the initial dry cask certification period of 20 years. Recent licensing renewals have approved an additional 40 years. This report identifies the current requirements and evaluation techniques associated with the safeguards and security of SNF dry cask storage. A set of knowledge gaps is identified in the current approaches. Finally, this roadmap identifies known knowledge gaps and provides a research path to deliver the tools and models needed to close the gaps and allow the optimization of the security and safeguards approaches for an interim spent fuel facility over the lifetime of the storage site.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Technology Empowerment: Security Challenges.

“Technology empowerment” means that innovation is increasingly accessible to ordinary people of limited means. As powerful technologies become more affordable and accessible, and as people are increasingly connected around the world, ordinary people are empowered to participate in the process of innovation and share the fruits of collaborative innovation. This annotated briefing describes technology empowerment and focuses on how empowerment may create challenges to U.S. national security. U.S. defense research as a share of global innovation has dwindled in recent years. With technology empowerment, the role of U.S. defense research is likely to shrink even further while technology empowerment will continue to increase the speed of innovation. To avoid falling too far behind potential technology threats to U.S. national security, U.S. national security institutions will need to adopt many of the tools of technology empowerment.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

TCIA Secure Cyber Critical Infrastructure Modernization.

The Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia Labs) tribal cyber infrastructure assurance initiative was developed in response to growing national cybersecurity concerns in the the sixteen Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defined critical infrastructure sectors1. Technical assistance is provided for the secure modernization of critical infrastructure and key resources from a cyber-ecosystem perspective with an emphasis on enhanced security, resilience, and protection. Our purpose is to address national critical infrastructure challenges as a shared responsibility.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Rapidly Deployable Security System Final Report CRADA No. TC-2030-01

The ultimate objective of the LEADER and LLNL strategic partnership was to develop and commercialize_a security-based system product and platform for the use in protecting the substantial physical and economic assets of the government and commerce of the United States. The primary goal of this project was to integrate video surveillance hardware developed by LLNL with a security software backbone developed by LEADER. Upon completion of the project, a prototype hardware/software security system that is highly scalable was to be demonstrated.

42 ENGINEERING↗

A 3S Risk Assessment Approach for Nuclear Power: Safety, Security, and Safeguards

Safety-focused risk analysis and assessment approaches struggle to adequately include malicious, deliberate acts against the nuclear power industry's fissile and waste material, infrastructure, and facilities. Further, existing methods do not adequately address non- proliferation issues. Treating safety, security, and safeguards concerns independently is inefficient because, at best, it may not take explicit advantage of measures that provide benefits against multiple risk domains, and, at worst, it may lead to implementations that increase overall risk due to incompatibilities. What is needed is an integrated safety, security and safeguards risk (or "3SR") framework for describing and assessing nuclear power risks that can enable direct trade-offs and interactions in order to inform risk management processes — a potential paradigm shift in risk analysis and management. These proceedings of the Sandia ePRA Workshop (held August 22-23, 2017) are an attempt to begin the discussions and deliberations to extend and augment safety focused risk assessment approaches to include security concerns and begin moving towards a 3S Risk approach. Safeguards concerns were not included in this initial workshop and are left to future efforts.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Workshop Summary for Maintaining Innovation and Security in Biotechnology: Lessons Learned from Nuclear, Chemical, and Informational Technologies

In the fast-paced field of biotechnology where innovation has such far-reaching impacts on human health and the environment, dealing with the implications of possible illicit activities, accidents or unintended research consequences with potential detrimental societal impacts tends to remain in the background. While controls may be inevitable for the biotech industry, workshop attendees agreed that the way in which controls are implemented will play a major role in the agility and innovation of the biotechnology industry. There is little desire to slow down the pace of the gains while dealing with the security issues that arise. As was seen from the brief examinations of the Nuclear, Chemical, and Information Technology sectors explored in this workshop, establishing a regulatory regime needs to be a partnership between the public, corporate interests, scientists, and the government. Regulation is often written to combat perceived risk rather than actual risk—the public’s perceptions (occasionally even fictional portrayals) can spur regulatory efforts. This leads to the need for a thorough and continuing assessment of the risks posed by modern biotechnology. Inadequate or minimal risk assessment might expedite development in the short term but has potential negative long-term security and economic consequences. Industry and the technical community also often have a large role in setting regulatory policy, especially when well-crafted incentives are incorporated into the regulations. Such incentives might actually lead to enhanced innovation while poorly designed incentives can actually reduce safety and security. Any regulations should be as agile and flexible as the technology they regulate and when applied to biotechnologies they will need a new framework for thinking and implementing. The new framework should consider biotechnology as a technology and not simply a science since it is an extremely complex and adaptive system. This suggests the need to invest in social and political systems, rather than exclusively in technology, as a part of maintaining not only robust, but agile regulation. Modeling and simulations to illustrate how the biotech ecosystem might respond to new policies may be a promising approach to crafting regulations.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security Program Office - HIGHLIGHTS 2017

The Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security (NNS) Program Office within the Global Security Directorate at Los Alamos supports the Laboratory’s mission of strategic deterrence through activities aimed at detecting and preventing nuclear proliferation and improving nuclear and radiological security. The program portfolio includes research and development, deployment activities, and policy support. In FY17, work for NNSA’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation office (DNN, or “NA-20”) made up 80% of the NNS portfolio; therefore, most of our work is aligned with DNN’s mission.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2017-Attachment A: Site Description

This attachment expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2017 . Included are subsections that This volume of the three-part report summarizes the site’s geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological settings and the cultural resources of the Nevada National Security Site. The subsections are meant to aid the reader in understanding the complex physical and biological environment of the NNSS. An adequate knowledge of the site’s environment is necessary to assess the environmental impacts of new projects, design and implement environmental monitoring activities for current site operations, and assess the impacts of site operations on the public residing in the vicinity of the NNSS. The NNSS environment contributes to several key features of the site that afford protection to the inhabitants of adjacent areas from potential exposure to radioactivity or other contaminants resulting from NNSS operations. These key features include the general remote location of the NNSS, restricted access, extended wind transport times, the great depths to slow-moving groundwater, little or no surface water, and low population density. This attachment complements the annual summary of monitoring program activities and dose assessments presented in the main body of this report.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report Summary 2017

The National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) prepares the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) each year to provide the public an understanding of the environmental monitoring and compliance activities that are conducted on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) to protect the public and the environment from radiation hazards and from potential nonradiological impacts. It is a comprehensive report of environmental activities performed at the NNSS and offsite facilities over the previous calendar year. This Summary provides an abbreviated and more readable version of the full NNSSER.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Fundamentals of Nuclear Security Culture [PowerPoint]

We examine the following topics: Nuclear and Radiological Security Culture; Threats and consequences ; The Human Factor; Legal and Regulatory Basis for Security Culture; Security Culture basic concepts; Systematic SC program; Enhancing SC; and, Situational Awareness. We will discuss these aspects and conduct exercises to apply them

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

An Architectural Survey of the Test Cell C Historic District, Area 25, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) has authorized an updated recording and evaluation of Test Cell C. This facility is part of the former Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) in Area 25 of Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada (formerly the Nevada Test Site [NTS]). Future alterations to the facility are anticipated to meet current and future National Weapons Science, Global and Homeland Security Programs, and Environmental Management mission requirements. Therefore, this survey was done to comply with requirements of Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act and its implementing regulations, 36 C.F.R. Part 800. An architectural survey of 35.75 acres was completed by Desert Research Institute (DRI). This area also represents the potential Test Cell C Historic District and is identified by NNSA/NFO as the Area of Potential Effect (APE) within which the undertaking may directly cause alterations to the character of historic properties. One resource, Building 25-3210 (SHPO Resource No. B2444), within this area was previously surveyed by DRI. It was found eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP or National Register) under Criteria A and C, and Consideration G. Mitigation of this building was completed prior to its demolition. The APE for reasonably foreseeable effects that may indirectly cause alterations later in time, be farther removed in distance, or be cumulative is the unrecorded NRDS historic district. The present survey updates the previous survey to present standards and expands it to include the entire Test Cell C complex. This includes updated recording and evaluation of the remains of 25-3210 and its 32 previously unrecorded and unevaluated Accessory Resources. The entire complex was recorded as the Test Cell C Historic District (SHPO Resource No. D346), which is eligible for the National Register at the National Level under Criteria A, C, and D. All nine architectural resources in the district are recommended as contributing elements of the Test Cell C Historic District (Figure 2). Of these, four (25-3210 Resource No. B2444, 25-3220 SHPO Resource No. B18110, 25-3226 SHPO Resource No. B18111, and 25-3230-32 SHPO Resource No. B18114) are recommended as individually eligible to the National Register under Criteria A and C, and one (KIWI-TNT [Transient Nuclear Test] SHPO Resource No. S2287) is recommended as individually eligible under Criteria A, C, and D. The remaining four resources (25-3214 SHPO Resource No. B18109, 25-3228 SHPO Resource No. B18112, 25-3229 SHPO Resource No. B18113, and 25-3233 SHPO Resource No. 18115) are not recommended as individually eligible. In addition, the Test Cell C Historic District is regarded as a contributor to the potential national significance of the NRDS Historic District. In 2010, the NTS became the NNSS. Because of the nature of the discussion in the Historic Context below, “NTS” is used throughout that section, otherwise “NNSS” is used to refer to the site. The survey area is located in unplatted sections of T13S R51E Mount Diablo Baseline and Meridian (projected) in Area 25 of the NNSS. It is within the NRDS in Jackass Flats, which has long been recognized as a potential historic district. An oblique aerial photo of the Test Cell C complex is shown on the cover of this report.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Tailoring of cyber security technology adoption practices for operational adoption in complex organizations

As concerns with cyber security and network protection increase, there is a greater need for organizations to deploy state-of-the-art technology to keep their cyber information safe. However, foolproof cyber security and network protection are a difficult feat since a security breach can be caused simply by a single employee who unknowingly succumbs to a cyber threat. It is critical for an organization’s workforce to holistically adopt cyber technologies that enable enhanced protection, help ward off cyber threats, and are efficient at encouraging human behavior towards safer cyber practices. It is also crucial for the workforce, once they have adopted cyber technologies, to remain consistent and thoughtful in their use of these technologies to keep resistance strong against cyber threats and vulnerabilities. Adoption of cyber technology can be difficult. Many organizations struggle with their workforce adopting newly-introduced cyber technologies, even when the technologies themselves have proven to be worthy solutions. Research, especially in the domain of cognitive science and the human dimension, has sought to understand how technology adoption works and can be leveraged. This paper reviews what empirical literature has found regarding cyber technology adoption, the current research gaps, and how non-research based efforts can influence adoption. Focusing on current efforts accomplished by a government-sponsored activity entitled “ACT” (Adoption of Cybersecurity Technologies), the aim of this paper is to empirically study cyber technology adoption to better understand how to influence operational adoption across the government-sector as well as how what can be done to develop a model that enables cyber technology adoption.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Secure Policy-Based Configuration Framework (PBCONF)

In 2013, EPRI and a project team comprised of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Ameren, and Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories began a multi-year effort under an award from the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability Cyber Security or Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) to develop a framework for secure remote configuration of modern and legacy devices. A goal of this Secure Policy-Based Configuration Framework (PBCONF) is to develop an extensible, open source, policy-based configuration framework.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Report series: Evaluation, Finding of Effect, and Mitigation Documentation for the 1960s Dormitories and 1950s Quonset Hut Foundations, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada [3 Reports Consolidated]

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to modernize the town of Mercury at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada, to meet current and future National Weapons Science, Global and Homeland Security Programs, and Environmental Management mission requirements. These plans—including anticipated demolitions, consolidations, and rebuilding at Mercury—are considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 U.S.C. § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 U.S.C. § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, 36 C.F.R. Part 800. Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of Mercury in 2017. This effort resulted in the identification, recording, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District, as well as the identification of its contributing components. This district was recommended eligible to the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP or National Register) under Criteria A and C, but was unevaluated under Criteria B and D at that time. The Mercury Historic District contains 153 individual landscapes, buildings, and structures. Of these resources, DRI recommends all except one as contributing elements of the historic district during its period of significance corresponding to nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. During most of the Cold War, the land now called the NNSS was referred to as the Nevada Test Site (NTS). This report evaluates resources dating to the 1950s and 1960s between Jangle and Knothole Streets and south of Ranger Avenue in Mercury prior to the proposed demolition of all resources in that area between Sandstone and Greenhouse Avenues as a phase of the larger modernization program mentioned above. Although the Mercury Historic District as a whole is eligible to the National Register, further evaluation of these properties, as detailed in this report, indicates that none are individually eligible under any of the Secretary of Interior’s Significance Criteria, either at the national or local level.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Additive Manufacturing and Nuclear Security: Calibrating Rewards and Risks

In a security environment marked by a high degree of technological dynamism, additive manufacturing (AM) stands out for its special significance. The AM field has emerged from infancy, with many new and potential applications in the commercial and military sectors. Its potential impact on nuclear security is a matter of rising debate, with some emphasizing the disruptive consequences of AM competition for international stability and others emphasizing the disruptive benefits for the United States. This essay addresses both aspects and draws on a technical analysis to inform the further development of U.S. policy. From a nuclear-security perspective, additive manufacturing offers both rewards and risks for the United States and its allies. The rewards are primarily (1) reduced scale of effort and cost in maintaining weapons-production infrastructure and (2) greatly increased responsiveness and agility in production infrastructure. Both these benefits are long-standing U.S. policy goals. The risks derive from the potential impact of AM on foreign nuclear weapons programs and are of three kinds. Those impacts will likely be a function of the degree of technical sophistication of the foreign actor. Non-state actors and entry-level proliferants pose modest AM risks relative to more advanced states, including both existing nuclear-weapon- states and those developed countries with a high degree of nuclear latency. A critical factor in predicting the impact of AM is current uncertainty as to the utility of AM techniques in the fabrication of special nuclear materials. To meet the emerging challenges of AM, U.S. policy makers face a number of decisions regarding which benefits to seek, how much risk to accept, and how to reduce that risk. The basic strategic approach of the United States to the AM problem is sound, but some fine-tuning is necessary and appropriate at this time. The good news is that we have time to act; the bad news is that the time to act decisively may be shorter than we would wish.

42 ENGINEERING↗

2020 LLNL Nuclear Science and Security Summer Internship Program

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Nuclear Science and Security Summer Internship Program (NS 3 IP) is designed to give graduate students an opportunity to come to LLNL for 8–10 weeks of hands-on research. Students conduct research under the supervision of a staff scientist, attend a weekly lecture series, interact with other students, and present their work in poster format at the end of the program. Students also have the opportunity to meet staff scientists one-on-one, participate in LLNL facility tours (e.g., the National Ignition Facility and Center for Accelerator Mass Spectrometry), and gain a better understanding of the various science programs at LLNL. Due to the travel and access restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 NS 3 IP was organized as an “all-virtual” internship program. With LLNL’s extensive institutional support, students accessed the laboratory’s cyberinfrastructure through a secure virtual desktop environment and all seminars, mentor interactions, summer presentations, and laboratory tours were performed remotely. While this virtual internship format did not allow for hands-on laboratory research projects, both the interns and their mentors constructed creative research projects that maximized student exposure to nuclear science research that is relevant to DTRA and LLNL interests in nuclear security.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗