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At least 883 records · Page 49
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2011

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 547: Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

The purpose of this CADD/CAP is to present the corrective action alternatives (CAAs) evaluated for CAU 547, provide justification for selection of the recommended alternative, and describe the plan for implementing the selected alternative. Corrective Action Unit 547 consists of the following three corrective action sites (CASs): (1) CAS 02-37-02, Gas Sampling Assembly; (2) CAS 03-99-19, Gas Sampling Assembly; and(3) CAS 09-99-06, Gas Sampling Assembly. The gas sampling assemblies consist of inactive process piping, equipment, and instrumentation that were left in place after completion of underground safety experiments. The purpose of these safety experiments was to confirm that a nuclear explosion would not occur in the case of an accidental detonation of the high-explosive component of the device. The gas sampling assemblies allowed for the direct sampling of the gases and particulates produced by the safety experiments. Corrective Action Site 02-37-02 is located in Area 2 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and is associated with the Mullet safety experiment conducted in emplacement borehole U2ag on October 17, 1963. Corrective Action Site 03-99-19 is located in Area 3 of the NNSS and is associated with the Tejon safety experiment conducted in emplacement borehole U3cg on May 17, 1963. Corrective Action Site 09-99-06 is located in Area 9 of the NNSS and is associated with the Player safety experiment conducted in emplacement borehole U9cc on August 27, 1964. The CAU 547 CASs were investigated in accordance with the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to determine and implement appropriate corrective actions for CAU 547. Existing radiological survey data and historical knowledge of the CASs were sufficient to meet the DQOs and evaluate CAAs without additional investigation. As a result, further investigation of the CAU 547 CASs was not required. The following CAAs were identified for the gas sampling assemblies: (1) clean closure, (2) closure in place, (3) modified closure in place, (4) no further action (with administrative controls), and (5) no further action. Based on the CAAs evaluation, the recommended corrective action for the three CASs in CAU 547 is closure in place. This corrective action will involve construction of a soil cover on top of the gas sampling assembly components and establishment of use restrictions at each site. The closure in place alternative was selected as the best and most appropriate corrective action for the CASs at CAU 547 based on the following factors: (1) Provides long-term protection of human health and the environment; (2) Minimizes short-term risk to site workers in implementing corrective action; (3) Is easily implemented using existing technology; (4) Complies with regulatory requirements; (5) Fulfills FFACO requirements for site closure; (6) Does not generate transuranic waste requiring offsite disposal; (7) Is consistent with anticipated future land use of the areas (i.e., testing and support activities); and (8) Is consistent with other NNSS site closures where contamination was left in place.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2012

What Then Do We Do About Computer Security?

This report presents the answers that an informal and unfunded group at SNL provided for questions concerning computer security posed by Jim Gosler, Sandia Fellow (00002). The primary purpose of this report is to record our current answers; hopefully those answers will turn out to be answers indeed. The group was formed in November 2010. In November 2010 Jim Gosler, Sandia Fellow, asked several of us several pointed questions about computer security metrics. Never mind that some of the best minds in the field have been trying to crack this nut without success for decades. Jim asked Campbell to lead an informal and unfunded group to answer the questions. With time Jim invited several more Sandians to join in. We met a number of times both with Jim and without him. At Jim's direction we contacted a number of people outside Sandia who Jim thought could help. For example, we interacted with IBM's T.J. Watson Research Center and held a one-day, videoconference workshop with them on the questions.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2012

Nevada National Security Site Radiological Control Manual (Rev. 2)

This manual contains the radiological control requirements to be used for all radiological activities conducted by programs under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). Compliance with these requirements will ensure compliance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835, “Occupational Radiation Protection.” Programs covered by this manual are located at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS); Nellis Air Force Base and North Las Vegas, Nevada; Santa Barbara and Livermore, California; and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. In addition, fieldwork by NNSA/NSO at other locations is covered by this manual.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 548: Areas 9, 10, 18, 19, and 20 Housekeeping Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Closure Report (CR) documents closure activities for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 548, Areas 9, 10, 18, 19, and 20 Housekeeping Sites, and complies with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; the U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996 as amended). CAU 548 consists of the following Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 9, 10, 12, 18, 19, and 20 of the Nevada National Security Site: · CAS 09-99-02, Material Piles (2) · CAS 09-99-04, Wax, Paraffin · CAS 09-99-05, Asbestos, Vermiculite · CAS 09-99-07, Tar Spill · CAS 10-22-02, Drums · CAS 10-22-05, Gas Block · CAS 10-22-07, Gas Block · CAS 10-22-34, Drum · CAS 10-22-38, Drum; Cable · CAS 12-99-04, Epoxy Tar Spill · CAS 12-99-08, Cement Spill · CAS 18-14-01, Transformers (3) · CAS 19-22-01, Drums · CAS 19-22-11, Gas Block (2) · CAS 19-44-01, Fuel Spill · CAS 20-22-07, Drums (2) · CAS 20-22-09, Drums (3) · CAS 20-22-14, Drums (2) · CAS 20-22-16, Drums (2) · CAS 20-24-09, Battery Closure activities began in July 2011 and were completed in December 2011 and included removal and disposal of material piles, spills, sanitary debris, a lead acid battery, lead and steel shot, and stained soil. Activities were conducted according to the Sectored Clean-up Work Plan for Housekeeping Category Waste Sites (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2003). Closure activities generated sanitary waste, hydrocarbon waste, low-level waste, hazardous waste, and mixed waste. Some wastes exceeded land disposal limits and required offsite treatment prior to disposal. Other wastes met land disposal restrictions and were disposed in appropriate onsite or offsite landfills. NNSA/NSO requests the following: · A Notice of Completion from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to NNSA/NSO for closure of CAU 548 · The transfer of CAU 548 from Appendix III to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, of the FFACO

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Nevada National Security Site Radiation Protection Program

Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835, “Occupational Radiation Protection,” establishes radiation protection standards, limits, and program requirements for protecting individuals from ionizing radiation resulting from the conduct of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) activities. 10 CFR 835.101(a) mandates that DOE activities be conducted in compliance with a documented Radiation Protection Program (RPP) as approved by DOE. This document promulgates the RPP for the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), related (on-site or off-site) U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operations, and environmental restoration off-site projects. This RPP section consists of general statements that are applicable to the NNSS as a whole. The RPP also includes a series of appendices which provide supporting detail for the associated NNSS Tennant Organizations (TOs). Appendix H, “Compliance Demonstration Table,” contains a cross-walk for the implementation of 10 CFR 835 requirements. This RPP does not contain any exemptions from the established 10 CFR 835 requirements. The RSPC and TOs are fully compliant with 10 CFR 835 and no additional funding is required in order to meet RPP commitments. No new programs or activities are needed to meet 10 CFR 835 requirements and there are no anticipated impacts to programs or activities that are not included in the RPP. There are no known constraints to implementing the RPP. No guides or technical standards are adopted in this RPP as a means to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 835.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2014

Post-Closure Strategy for Use-Restricted Sites on the Nevada National Security Site, Nevada Test and Training Range, and Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

The purpose of this Post-Closure Strategy is to provide a consistent methodology for continual evaluation of post-closure requirements for use-restricted areas on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), and Tonopah Test Range (TTR) to consolidate, modify, or streamline the program. In addition, this document stipulates the creation of a single consolidated Post-Closure Plan that will detail the current post-closure requirements for all active use restrictions (URs) and outlines its implementation and subsequent revision. This strategy will ensure effective management and control of the post-closure sites. There are currently over 200 URs located on the NNSS, NTTR, and TTR. Post-closure requirements were initially established in the Closure Report for each site. In some cases, changes to the post-closure requirements have been implemented through addenda, errata sheets, records of technical change, or letters. Post-closure requirements have been collected from these multiple sources and consolidated into several formats, such as summaries and databases. This structure increases the possibility of inconsistencies and uncertainty. As more URs are established and the post-closure program is expanded, the need for a comprehensive approach for managing the program will increase. Not only should the current requirements be obtainable from a single source that supersedes all previous requirements, but the strategy for modifying the requirements should be standardized. This will enable more effective management of the program into the future. This strategy document and the subsequent comprehensive plan are to be implemented under the assumption that the NNSS and outlying sites will be under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration for the foreseeable future. This strategy was also developed assuming that regulatory control of the sites remains static. The comprehensive plan is not intended to be a permanent long-term stewardship plan. However, it is intended to clarify requirements and identify components to effectively manage the sites until regulatory requirements are met or management of the site changes. The Environmental Management Program is required to manage these sites until the NNSS Environmental Restoration program is completed, currently planned for 2030. Prior to completion of the Environmental Restoration program, additional planning will be conducted to ensure that long-term stewardship of the sites is maintained. A comprehensive post-closure plan can be transitioned effectively into any future site-wide long-term stewardship program that may be developed. Therefore, the post-closure plan will include current aspects of the post-closure program that are also important aspects of long-term stewardship, including the following: • Management of physical and engineering controls such as fences, signs, and soil covers • Management of institutional and administrative controls such as use restrictions and real estate systems • Management of monitoring and maintenance programs • Management of information related to the sites such as geographic information system data and related documentation The strategy will also allow for periodic review and modification of any aspect of the program to ensure continued effectiveness.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

SPSP Phase III Recruiting, Selecting, and Developing Secure Power Systems Professionals: Behavioral Interview Guidelines by Job Roles

The Secure Power Systems Professional Phase III final report was released last year which an appendix of Behavioral Interview Guidelines by Job Roles. This new report is that appendix broken out as a standalone document to assist utilities in recruiting and developing Secure Power Systems Professionals at their site. The complete list of knowledge, skills, and abilities required in each of the studied job roles was assembled into the Behavioral Interview Guidelines. The guidelines were developed to apply the results of Phases I and II in a format that can be used in part or in whole to align workforce capabilities with the strategic goals and tactical focus of a power grid organization. These guidelines may 1) be applied to develop performance reviews or to produce individual professional development programs for existing staff; 2) assist in specifying learning objectives for a training or education program; and 3) be easily incorporated into most human capital software to facilitate development of job descriptions that comply with guidelines established by the Society of Human Resource Management. The guidelines can be immediately applied by human resources professionals, recruiters, and hiring managers to assist in recruiting and interviewing candidates for new SPSP position openings.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2014

The Intersection of National Security and Climate Change

On June 4, 2014, the Henry M. Jackson Foundation and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory hosted a groundbreaking symposium in Seattle, Washington, that brought together 36 leaders from federal agencies, state and local governments, NGOs, business, and academia. The participants examined approaches and tools to help decision makers make informed choices about the climate and security risks they face. The following executive summary is based on the day’s discussions and examines the problem of climate change and its impact on national security, the responses to date, and future considerations.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2015

Risk Based Security Management at Research Reactors

This presentation provides a background of what led to the international emphasis on nuclear security and describes how nuclear security is effectively implemented so as to preserve the societal benefits of nuclear and radioactive materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2015

3rd Quarter Transportation Report FY2015: Radioactive Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS)

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of radioactive waste shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at Area 5. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment and returned to the NNSS this quarter. This report summarizes the 3rd quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW) shipments.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Regulatory Guide on Conducting a Security Vulnerability Assessment

This document will provide guidelines on conducting a security vulnerability assessment at a facility regulated by the Radiation Protection Centre. The guidelines provide a performance approach assess security effectiveness. The guidelines provide guidance for a review following the objectives outlined in IAEA NSS#11 for Category 1, 2, & 3 sources.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2015

Information security management system planning for CBRN facilities

The focus of this document is to provide guidance for the development of information security management system planning documents at chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) facilities. It describes a risk-based approach for planning information security programs based on the sensitivity of the data developed, processed, communicated, and stored on facility information systems.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2016

Review Facility Design Drawings M3FT-16LA040105011 - Safeguards and Security by Design for Used Fuel Extended Storage: 1.02.04.01.05 FT – 16LA04010501

This work package focuses on developing Best Practices for the design of security for, and domestic safeguarding (e.g. MC&A) of, a pilot-scale independent spent/used fuel storage facility consistent with conceptual design efforts in Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation (NFST) and Used Fuel Disposal (UFD) campaigns. This is a review of the basic design of the facility to determine a candidate list of accounting and control requirements that could be considered for safeguards and security purposes.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Computer Security for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants - Literature Review for Korea Hydro Nuclear Power Central Research Institute

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is providing training and consultation activities on security planning and design for the Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Central Research Institute (KHNPCRI). As part of this effort, SNL performed a literature review on computer security requirements, guidance and best practices that are applicable to an advanced nuclear power plant. This report documents the review of reports generated by SNL and other organizations [U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Nuclear Energy Institute, and International Atomic Energy Agency] related to protection of information technology resources, primarily digital controls and computer resources and their data networks. Copies of the key documents have also been provided to KHNP-CRI.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Nevada National Security Site 2015 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These data include direct radiation exposure, as well as radiation from the air, groundwater, meteorology, and vadose zone. This report summarizes the 2015 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports developed by National Security Technologies, LLC. Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data show that tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS were all below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection system at the mixed low-level waste cell were below established contaminant regulatory limits. During 2015, precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS was 0.9% above average, and precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS was 25% above average. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation as measured from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. The 1.8 inches of precipitation in September reached the lowest sensors at 180 cm on the Cell 5S and 5N covers, however the sensors on the floor do not indicate any signs of the precipitation percolating thru the waste to the floor. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 150 centimeters (cm) (5 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS. A second remedial revegetation trial was done on the southern portion of the North Cover. In March 2015 it was determined that germination occurred on both the mulched and non-mulched treatments that were irrigated, but that no germination occurred on the non-irrigated treatments. By June the seedlings observed in March were gone, possibly grazed by rabbits which were observed inside the rabbit-proof fence. In August the entire area was sprayed with the herbicide glyphosate in an attempt to minimize weed seed production. During 2015, there was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil as indicated from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. Thirty-one percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter, which received 3 times the natural precipitation. All 2015 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facilities’ PAs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Y-12 National Security Complex, Model ES-3100 Package with Bulk HEU Contents

This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) presents the results of the safety analysis prepared in support of the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) request for licensing of the Model ES-3100 package with bulk highly enriched uranium (HEU) contents and issuance of a Type B(U) Fissile Material Certificate of Compliance. This SARP, published in the format specified in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 7.9 and using information provided in UCID-21218 and NRC Regulatory Guide 7.10, demonstrates that the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) ES-3100 package with bulk HEU contents meets the established NRC regulations for packaging, preparation for shipment, and transportation of radioactive materials given in Title 10, Part 71, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) [10 CFR 71] as well as U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for packaging and shipment of hazardous materials given in Title 49 CFR. To protect the health and safety of the public, shipments of radioactive materials are made in packaging that is designed, fabricated, assembled, tested, procured, used, maintained, and repaired in accordance with the provisions cited above. Safety requirements addressed by the regulations that must be met when transporting radioactive materials are containment of radioactive materials, radiation shielding, and assurance of nuclear subcriticality.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2017

Secure ICCP Final Report

Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol (ICCP), defined by the IEC 60870-6 TASE.2 standard, was developed to enable data exchange over wide area networks between electric system entities, including utility control centers, Independent System Operators (ISOs), Regional Transmission Operators (RTOs) and Independent Power Producers (IPP) also known as Non-Utility Generators (NUG). ICCP is an unprotected protocol, and as a result is vulnerable to such actions as integrity violation, interception or alteration, spoofing, and eavesdropping. Because of these vulnerabilities with unprotected ICCP communication, security enhancements, referred to as Secure ICCP, have been added and are included in the ICCP products that utilities have received since 2003 when the standard was defined. This has resulted in an ICCP product whose communication can be encrypted and authenticated to address these vulnerabilities.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Second Quarter Transportation Report Fiscal Year 2019 Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site, Radioactive Waste Management Complex

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) in Area 3 and Area 5. This report summarizes the second quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2019 and serves as a quarterly report for the following types of shipments: Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLW), Mixed Low-Level Radioactive Waste (MLLW), Classified Non-Radioactive (CNR) Waste, Classified Non-Radioactive Hazardous (CNRH) Waste.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗