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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 91 records · Page 5

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NASA NTRS1984

Handling qualities related to stall/spin accidents of supersonic fighter aircraft

This paper reviews the handling qualities which influence the high angle of attack (AOA) behavior of supersonic fighter aircraft in order to obtain a clearer understanding of the causes of stall/spin accidents. The results show that, because modern fighters suffer more serious consequences when control is lost, good handling qualities are essential for safe operation at high AOA. Relaxed static stability used on some fighter aircraft can result in control problems at high AOA owing to inertia coupling and the difficulty of a recovery from a deep stall. Indications are that the use of departure/spin resistance and an automatic spin prevention system will greatly improve the safety record for modern supersonic fighters.

Anderson, S. B.↗

NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's independent investigation into the tragic February 1, 2003, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted nearly seven months and involved 13 Board members, approximately 120 Board investigators, and thousands of NASA and support personnel. Because the events that initiated the accident were not apparent for some time, the investigation's depth and breadth were unprecedented in NASA history. Further, the Board determined early in the investigation that it intended to put this accident into context. We considered it unlikely that the accident was a random event; rather, it was likely related in some degree to NASA's budgets, history, and program culture, as well as to the politics, compromises, and changing priorities of the democratic process. We are convinced that the management practices overseeing the Space Shuttle Program were as much a cause of the accident as the foam that struck the left wing. The Board was also influenced by discussions with members of Congress, who suggested that this nation needed a broad examination of NASA's Human Space Flight Program, rather than just an investigation into what physical fault caused Columbia to break up during re-entry. Findings and recommendations are in the relevant chapters and all recommendations are compiled in Chapter 11. Volume I is organized into four parts: The Accident; Why the Accident Occurred; A Look Ahead; and various appendices. To put this accident in context, Parts One and Two begin with histories, after which the accident is described and then analyzed, leading to findings and recommendations. Part Three contains the Board's views on what is needed to improve the safety of our voyage into space. Part Four is reference material. In addition to this first volume, there will be subsequent volumes that contain technical reports generated by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and NASA, as well as volumes containing reference documentation and other related material.

Gehman, Harold W., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS1985

Investigation of technology needs for avoiding helicopter pilot error related accidents

Pilot error which is cited as a cause or related factor in most rotorcraft accidents was examined. Pilot error related accidents in helicopters to identify areas in which new technology could reduce or eliminate the underlying causes of these human errors were investigated. The aircraft accident data base at the U.S. Army Safety Center was studied as the source of data on helicopter accidents. A randomly selected sample of 110 aircraft records were analyzed on a case-by-case basis to assess the nature of problems which need to be resolved and applicable technology implications. Six technology areas in which there appears to be a need for new or increased emphasis are identified.

Chais, R. I.↗

NASA NTRS1999

National Transportation Safety Board Aircraft Accident Investigation Supported

The main purpose of this investigation was for NASA to help the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) gain better understanding of the events that led to the loss of Comair Flight 3272 over Monroe, Michigan, on January 9, 1997. In-flight icing was suspected as being the primary cause of this accident. Of particular interest to the Safety Board was what NASA could learn about the potential performance degradation of the wing of the Embraer EMB-120 twin-turboprop commuter aircraft with various levels of ice contamination. NASA agreed to undertake (1) ice-accretion prediction computations with NASA s LEWICE program to bound the kind of contaminations that the vehicle may have developed, (2) testing in the NASA Lewis Research Center's Icing Research Tunnel to verify and refine the ice shapes developed by LEWICE, (3) a two-dimensional Navier- Stokes analysis to determine the performance degradation that those ice shapes could have caused, and (4) an examination using three-dimensional Navier-Stokes codes to study the three-dimensional effects of ice contamination.

Reehorst, Andrew L.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Loss of Signal, Aeromedical Lessons Learned from the STS-107 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

Loss of Signal, a NASA publication to be available in May 2014 presents the aeromedical lessons learned from the Columbia accident that will enhance crew safety and survival on human space flight missions. These lessons were presented to limited audiences at three separate Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA) conferences: in 2004 in Anchorage, Alaska, on the causes of the accident; in 2005 in Kansas City, Missouri, on the response, recovery, and identification aspects of the investigation; and in 2011, again in Anchorage, Alaska, on future implications for human space flight. As we embark on the development of new spacefaring vehicles through both government and commercial efforts, the NASA Johnson Space Center Human Health and Performance Directorate is continuing to make this information available to a wider audience engaged in the design and development of future space vehicles. Loss of Signal summarizes and consolidates the aeromedical impacts of the Columbia mishap process-the response, recovery, identification, investigative studies, medical and legal forensic analysis, and future preparation that are needed to respond to spacecraft mishaps. The goal of this book is to provide an account of the aeromedical aspects of the Columbia accident and the investigation that followed, and to encourage aerospace medical specialists to continue to capture information, learn from it, and improve procedures and spacecraft designs for the safety of future crews. This poster presents an outline of Loss of Signal contents and highlights from each of five sections - the mission and mishap, the response, the investigation, the analysis and the future.

Stepaniak, Phillip C.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Loss of Signal, Aeromedical Lessons Learned for the STS-I07 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

Loss of Signal, a NASA publication to be available in May 2014, presents the aeromedical lessons learned from the Columbia accident that will enhance crew safety and survival on human space flight missions. These lessons were presented to limited audiences at three separate Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA) conferences: in 2004 in Anchorage, Alaska, on the causes of the accident; in 2005 in Kansas City, Missouri, on the response, recovery, and identification aspects of the investigation; and in 2011, again in Anchorage, Alaska, on future implications for human space flight. As we embark on the development of new spacefaring vehicles through both government and commercial efforts, the NASA Johnson Space Center Human Health and Performance Directorate is continuing to make this information available to a wider audience engaged in the design and development of future space vehicles. Loss of Signal summarizes and consolidates the aeromedical impacts of the Columbia mishap process-the response, recovery, identification, investigative studies, medical and legal forensic analysis, and future preparation that are needed to respond to spacecraft mishaps. The goals of this book are to provide an account of the aeromedical aspects of the Columbia accident and the investigation that followed, and to encourage aerospace medical specialists to continue to capture information, learn from it, and improve procedures and spacecraft designs for the safety of future crews.

Patlach, Robert↗

NASA NTRS2003

Methods Developed by the Tools for Engine Diagnostics Task to Monitor and Predict Rotor Damage in Real Time

Tools for Engine Diagnostics is a major task in the Propulsion System Health Management area of the Single Aircraft Accident Prevention project under NASA s Aviation Safety Program. The major goal of the Aviation Safety Program is to reduce fatal aircraft accidents by 80 percent within 10 years and by 90 percent within 25 years. The goal of the Propulsion System Health Management area is to eliminate propulsion system malfunctions as a primary or contributing factor to the cause of aircraft accidents. The purpose of Tools for Engine Diagnostics, a 2-yr-old task, is to establish and improve tools for engine diagnostics and prognostics that measure the deformation and damage of rotating engine components at the ground level and that perform intermittent or continuous monitoring on the engine wing. In this work, nondestructive-evaluation- (NDE-) based technology is combined with model-dependent disk spin experimental simulation systems, like finite element modeling (FEM) and modal norms, to monitor and predict rotor damage in real time. Fracture mechanics time-dependent fatigue crack growth and damage-mechanics-based life estimation are being developed, and their potential use investigated. In addition, wireless eddy current and advanced acoustics are being developed for on-wing and just-in-time NDE engine inspection to provide deeper access and higher sensitivity to extend on-wing capabilities and improve inspection readiness. In the long run, these methods could establish a base for prognostic sensing while an engine is running, without any overt actions, like inspections. This damage-detection strategy includes experimentally acquired vibration-, eddy-current- and capacitance-based displacement measurements and analytically computed FEM-, modal norms-, and conventional rotordynamics-based models of well-defined damages and critical mass imbalances in rotating disks and rotors.

Baaklini, George Y.↗

NASA NTRS1985

Pilots of the future - Human or computer?

In connection with the occurrence of aircraft accidents and the evolution of the air-travel system, questions arise regarding the computer's potential for making fundamental contributions to improving the safety and reliability of air travel. An important result of an analysis of the causes of aircraft accidents is the conclusion that humans - 'pilots and other personnel' - are implicated in well over half of the accidents which occur. Over 70 percent of the incident reports contain evidence of human error. In addition, almost 75 percent show evidence of an 'information-transfer' problem. Thus, the question arises whether improvements in air safety could be achieved by removing humans from control situations. In an attempt to answer this question, it is important to take into account also certain advantages which humans have in comparison to computers. Attention is given to human error and the effects of technology, the motivation to automate, aircraft automation at the crossroads, the evolution of cockpit automation, and pilot factors.

Chambers, A. B.↗

NASA NTRS1984

Report of the Panel on Human Factors

Human error in the operation of complex systems is the largest single cause of incidents, accidents, and the loss of lives and dollars. Therefore, it is understandable that the focus of human factors research and engineering is on increasing our understanding of the basic mechanisms of human error and on developing techniques for reducing or eliminating the various causes of human error.

Rouse, William B.↗

NASA NTRS1986

The use of flight test techniques in aircraft accident investigations

Wind shear is a serious safety hazard to commercial aviation. Low level wind shear (downburst) was the cause of the takeoff accident in New Orleans, July 9, 1982, and the landing accident in Dallas, Aug. 2, 1985. Shear layer instability is a common cause of clear air turbulence (CAT) at cruising altitudes. A number of encounters with severe CAT, in which passengers were injured, have recently occurred (Hannibal, MO, April 1981; Morton, WY, July 1982; etc.). Improved accident investigation techniques can lead to a better understanding of the nature of the wind environment associated with downbursts and CAT and to better detection and avoidance procedures. For the past several years, NASA-Ames has worked closely with the National Transportation Safety Board in the investigation of wind related accidents.

Parks, E. K.↗

NASA NTRS2005

The Role of Spatial Disorientation in Fatal General Aviation Accidents

In-flight Spatial Disorientation (SD) in pilots is a serious threat to aviation safety. Indeed, SD may play a much larger role in aviation accidents than the approximate 6-8% reported by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) each year, because some accidents coded by the NTSB as aircraft control-not maintained (ACNM) may actually result from SD. The purpose of this study is to determine whether SD is underestimated as a cause of fatal general aviation (GA) accidents in the NTSB database. Fatal GA airplane accidents occurring between January 1995 and December 1999 were reviewed from the NTSB aviation accident database. Cases coded as ACNM or SD as the probable cause were selected for review by a panel of aerospace medicine specialists. Using a rating scale, each rater was instructed to determine if SD was the probable cause of the accident. Agreement between the raters and agreement between the raters and the NTSB were evaluated by Kappa statistics. The raters agreed that 11 out of 20 (55%) accidents coded by the NTSB as ACNM were probably caused by SD (p less than 0.05). Agreement between the raters and the NTSB did not reach significance (p greater than 0.05). The 95% C.I. for the sampling population estimated that between 33-77% of cases that the NTSB identified as ACNM could be identified by aerospace medicine experts as SD. Aerospace medicine specialists agreed that some cases coded by the NTSB as ACNM were probably caused by SD. Consequently, a larger number of accidents may be caused by the pilot succumbing to SD than indicated in the NTSB database. This new information should encourage regulating agencies to insure that pilots receive SD recognition training, enabling them to take appropriate corrective actions during flight. This could lead to new training standards, ultimately saving lives among GA airplane pilots.

Scheuring, RIchard↗

NASA NTRS2011

NASA Medical Response to Human Spacecraft Accidents

This slide presentation reviews NASA's role in the response to spacecraft accidents that involve human fatalities or injuries. Particular attention is given to the work of the Mishap Investigation Team (MIT), the first response to the accidents and the interface to the accident investigation board. The MIT does not investigate the accident, but the objective of the MIT is to gather, guard, preserve and document the evidence. The primary medical objectives of the MIT is to receive, analyze, identify, and transport human remains, provide assistance in the recovery effort, and to provide family Casualty Coordinators with latest recovery information. The MIT while it does not determine the cause of the accident, it acts as the fact gathering arm of the Mishap Investigation Board (MIB), which when it is activated may chose to continue to use the MIT as its field investigation resource. The MIT membership and the specific responsibilities and tasks of the flight surgeon is reviewed. The current law establishing the process is also reviewed.

Patlach, Robert↗

NASA NTRS2005

Return to Flight Task Group

It has been 29 months since Columbia was lost over East Texas in February 2003. Seven months after the accident, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) released the first volume of its final report, citing a variety of technical, managerial, and cultural issues within NASA and the Space Shuttle Program. To their credit, NASA offered few excuses, embraced the report, and set about correcting the deficiencies noted by the accident board. Of the 29 recommendations issued by the CAIB, 15 were deemed critical enough that the accident board believed they should be implemented prior to returning the Space Shuttle to flight. Some of these recommendations were relatively easy, most were straightforward, a few bordered on the impossible, and others were largely overcome by events, particularly the decision by the President to retire the Space Shuttle by 2010. The Return to Flight Task Group (RTF TG, or simply, the Task Group) was chartered by the NASA Administrator in July 2003 to provide an independent assessment of the implementation of the 15 CAIB return-to-flight recommendations. An important observation must be stated up-front: neither the CAIB nor the RTF TG believes that all risk can be eliminated from Space Shuttle operations; nor do we believe that the Space Shuttle is inherently unsafe. What the CAIB and RTF TG do believe, however, is that NASA and the American public need to understand the risks associated with space travel, and that NASA must make every reasonable effort to minimize such risk. Since the release of the CAIB report, NASA and the Space Shuttle Program expended enormous effort and resources toward correcting the causes of the accident and preparing to fly again. Relative to the 15 specific recommendations that the CAIB indicated should be implemented prior to returning to flight, NASA has met or exceeded most of them the Task Group believes that NASA met the intent of the CAIB for 12 of these recommendations. The remaining three recommendations were so challenging that NASA could not comply completely with the intent of the CAIB.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2004

Space Shuttle Columbia Reconstruction Effort: An Analysis of the Thermal Protection System.

Upon the breakup of the Space Shuffle Columbia, which occurred during peak heating, at an altitude of 200,000 feet, and traveling at Mach 19, the daunting responsibility was placed upon National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to determine the root cause of the accident. One of the foremost tasks was to begin locating Columbia's debris, which was scattered acr ss a 2,000 square miles area of Texas and into western Louisiana. Each potential shuttle debris piece found was categorized and the longitude and latitude noted. This provided crucial data to the vehicle's breakup trajectory path and aided in locating key shuffle components. Since the airframe and tiles would be the primary focus during the reconstruction effort at the Kennedy Space center in Florida, packing and shipping was crucial to the preservation of the shape and condition of each recovered object. Over 83,000 pieces of Columbia, in a five-month timeframe, were located. The recovered tiles still bonded to structure indicated failures modes due to heating and aerodynamic loads. Also, different types of tile bond failure modes were observed, with adhesion failures at the Koropon layer or material failure at the tile's densification layer. Numerous tiles had the identification markings burned off, slumping of the Reaction-Cured Glass (RCG) coating, and of the Ll-900 silica base material. The conditions in which the tiles were found resulted in developing methods to aid in the identification of the tile. Correctly identifying each tile was critical to understanding the heating patterns of the tiles in relationship to the vehicle, since it was known that the lower left wing received the initial external tank foam impact. With the aid of multiple disciplines, the clues found in the TPS debris, lead to the root cause of the breakup of Columbia.

Micklos, Ann M.↗

NASA NTRS1977

Active microwave measurement from space of sea-surface winds

Radar backscatter measurements from the ocean were made at 13.9 GHz from Skylab. The radar signal increased rapidly with wind speed over the entire range of winds encountered, and for angles of incidence of 30 deg larger. Signals observed were normalized to a nominal incidence angle and to a nominal upwind observation direction, using a theoretical model that has been verified as approximately true with aircraft experiments. Observations during the summer and winter Skylab missions were treated separately because of possible differences caused by an accident to the antenna between the two sets of observations. The results are in general agreement with the theory in all cases. The objective analysis method used for determining surface-truth winds in the Skylab experiment was tested by comparing results obtained at weather ships with the observations made by the weather ships themselves. In most cases, the variance about the regression line between objective analysis and weather-ship data actually exceeded that about the regression line between objective analysis and backscatter data

Young, J. D.↗

NASA NTRS1991

Potential health risks from postulated accidents involving the Pu-238 RTG on the Ulysses solar exploration mission

Potential radiation impacts from launch of the Ulysses solar exploration experiment were evaluated using eight postulated accident scenarios. Lifetime individual dose estimates rarely exceeded 1 mrem. Most of the potential health effects would come from inhalation exposures immediately after an accident, rather than from ingestion of contaminated food or water, or from inhalation of resuspended plutonium from contaminated ground. For local Florida accidents (that is, during the first minute after launch), an average source term accident was estimated to cause a total added cancer risk of up to 0.2 deaths. For accidents at later time after launch, a worldwide cancer risk of up to three cases was calculated (with a four in a million probability). Upper bound estimates were calculated to be about 10 times higher.

Goldman, Marvin↗

NASA NTRS1922

Aviation and insurance

This article considers some of the causes which hinder the development of aircraft insurance. Different risks are discussed as well as the causes of aircraft accidents. Pilot error, poor airdromes, weather conditions, poorly adapted airplanes, and engine failures are all examined and some conclusions are made.

INSURANCE↗

NASA NTRS1923

Control of airplanes at low speeds

Loss of control over the orientation of an airplane as the incidence approaches and enters the region of stalled flight is a prolific cause of serious accidents. This report discusses methods of landing at slow speeds approaching stall.

CONTROL AT LOW SPEEDS↗