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October 2023 monthly newsletter provides highlights in the following areas: nuclear security; science, technology, and engineering; mission operations; and, community relations.
This report documents the results and findings of a one-year scoping study investigating multichannel readout application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) for interfacing to, and processing data from, silicon photomultiplier (SiPM) arrays. We document ASIC desired and required specifications for four applications supporting national security mission areas: neutron radiography, associated particle imaging, and two versions of kinematic neutron imaging cameras. While each application has a few unique requirements that stress capability, there is generally good agreement among most. Two recently developed ASIC devices were evaluated in a system-like configuration by interfacing these to scintillator crystals exposed to gamma and neutron sources. The 64-channel ORNL device delivered functional capability while meeting most mission requirements for neutron radiography. The Nalu Scientific device, a 32-channel full waveform digitizer, did not demonstrate reliable neutron / gamma separation but it is unclear if this was an ASIC issue or problems with test setup or firmware. A literature survey of other commercial and academic ASICs was undertaken to with the conclusion that existing devices do not meet all requirements.
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Overview The Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program represents a cornerstone of foundational scientific research and development (R&D) at SRNL. It is central to advancing SRNL’s mission areas—National Security, Environmental Stewardship, and Energy Resilience—while aligning with the laboratory’s Strategic Plan to deliver long-term benefits to the Department of Energy (DOE) and other key stakeholders
Building 06-CP-65 has been determined to be a contributing element to the Area 6 Control Point Historic District (O’Neill et al. 2021; Reed 2022). It contributes to the significance of the historic district under Criterion A as one of the principal buildings that supported timing and firing operations for nuclear testing on the NNSS from 1966 to 1992. As such, the building served as a major warehouse with office space within the district. It was used by both REECo, a long-time general contractor at the NNSS, as well as EG&G, which provided technical support to the national laboratories and the DOD. The building served as an important staging area and electrical power supply point for the NNSS diagnostic trailer fleet and its unique location immediately along Mercury Highway allowed easy accessibility to the forward areas of the NNSS. The building also contributes to the historic district under Criterion C as it is one of the large, unadorned, precast concrete buildings at the Control Point. These types of buildings were the prominent elements of the compound that convey the district’s overall utilitarian, military-industrial character. Building 06-CP-65 retains all aspects of integrity to a high degree and easily conveys its significance as a warehouse that supported Control Point operations. Building 06-CP-65 is not recommended eligible for listing in the NRHP as an individual resource. While it served an important support function as part of the Control Point Historic District, an archival and literature review did not reveal information linking it to any specific test, series of tests, programs, or for any specific role on the NNSS other than as a warehouse (Criterion A). It has no direct association with any important individual (Criterion B). It also is not architecturally significant in its own right beyond reflecting the overall aesthetic of the Control Point Historic District (Criterion C), and it does not have potential to yield information important to the history of nuclear testing beyond what can be learned from historic texts, drawings, and other documents (Criterion D).
The purpose of this letter report is to document the mitigation of adverse effects of a proposed undertaking in compliance with the stipulations in the Programmatic Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25554 Among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada, hereafter referred to as the NNSS PA. The proposed undertaking would demolish Buildings 12-32 (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B18291), 12-34 (SHPO Resource No. B18292), 12-35 (SHPO Resource No. B18293), and 12-37 (SHPO Resource No. B18294) in the Area 12 Camp Historic District (SHPO Resource No. D372) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The Area 12 Camp Historic District has been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A and C (Reed 2021; Reno et al. 2021).
Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This report summarizes the 2019 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports (Mission Support and Test Services, LLC 2019, 2020a, 2020b). Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs show that tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS are below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection systems at the Area 5 mixed low-level waste disposal unit are below established contaminant regulatory limits. During 2019, precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS was 77 percent above average, and precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS was 69 percent above average. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter at the Area 5 RWMS dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation as measured from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Vadose zone monitoring in the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS soil covers shows no evidence of precipitation percolating through the covers to the waste. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 120 centimeters (3.9 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS during 2019. There was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil as indicated from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. At the Area 3 RWMS, which received three times the natural precipitation, 57 percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter. All 2019 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facilities’ PAs.
Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This report summarizes the 2021 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities.
This Closure Report presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 366, Area 11 Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites, and provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that closure objectives for CAU 366 were met. CAU 366 consists of the following six Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Area 11 of the Nevada National Security Site: • CAS 11-08-01, Contaminated Waste Dump #1 • CAS 11-08-02, Contaminated Waste Dump #2 • CAS 11-23-01, Radioactively Contaminated Area A • CAS 11-23-02, Radioactively Contaminated Area B • CAS 11-23-03, Radioactively Contaminated Area C • CAS 11-23-04, Radioactively Contaminated Area D
The Mission Support and Test Services, LLC (MSTS) Geoscience Operations Group performed a hydrogeologic study of an area of interest in Area 25 at the request of the MSTS Enterprise Infrastructure Program to identify potential locations for a new water well to replace J-14 Water Well (J-14 WW). Based on limited subsurface hydrogeologic data for the area, geologists developed two options for construction of a new well. Option 1 is to construct the well within approximately 250 feet (ft) of J-14 WW, and Option 2 is to construct the well approximately 1,550 ft north of J-11 Water Well (J-11 WW). Option 1 may be preferred, as the hydrogeology is better understood adjacent to an existing well. A well drilled at the Option 2 location would not have to be as deep as that at the Option 1 location, but the hydrogeologic setting is more uncertain at this greater distance from a verified subsurface geologic data point.
This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) is for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” which is located in Area 5 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). CAU 577 includes five low-level waste cells at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS), was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. To resolve issues related to this alleged violation of hazardous waste regulations, a Settlement Agreement was executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office on April 25, 2019, which identified agreed-upon mitigation measures. The Settlement Agreement required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO).
This report presents the analytical data for the 2019 calendar year (CY) (January 1 through December 31, 2019). Appendix C presents data from samples collected in 2016, 2017, and 2018. These results were not reported in previous sampling reports because they were not available from the specialized laboratories at the time of the publication of the reports.
This CY 2020 annual sampling report presents the background of the FFACO and Sampling Plan implementation, sampling and analysis methods, sampling results, quality assurance and quality control, regulatory requirements, and analytical data for the CY 2020. Appendix A presents data from samples collected in CY 2020 from the YF/CM CAU and the RM/SM CAU. This sampling was conducted in support of the Sampling Plan at these CAUs prior to approval of the final CRs. Appendix B presents the well completion diagrams for the wells sampled in CY 2020. Appendix C presents data from samples collected in CY 2019. These results were not reported in the previous sampling report because they were not available from the specialized laboratories at the time of the report’s publication.
This addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 113: Area 25, Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility, Building 3110, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, DOE/NV--891-VOL I-Rev. 1, dated July 2003, provides details of demolition, waste disposal, and use restriction (UR) modification for Corrective Action Unit 113, Area 25 R-MAD Facility. Demolition was completed on July 15, 2010, when the last of the building debris was disposed. Final field activities were concluded on August 30, 2010, after all equipment was demobilized and UR signs were posted. This work was funded by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.
This report presents groundwater and leachate sample results from the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada National Security Site in Nye County, Nevada. Since 1993, groundwater samples have been collected and static water levels have been measured from the aquifer immediately below the Area 5 RWMS. The data are evaluated for evidence of effects on the aquifer related to the Area 5 RWMS. Leachate from the Cell 18 lined mixed waste cell has been sampled since 2011, and leachate from the Cell 25 lined mixed waste cell was first sampled in 2019 after it began receiving waste in August 2018. Leachate data are analyzed for hazardous contaminants to determine appropriate leachate handling and disposal. This report includes five years of data from 2015 through 2019.
This report presents groundwater and leachate sample results from the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada National Security Site in Nye County, Nevada. Since 1993, groundwater samples have been collected and static groundwater depths have been measured from the aquifer immediately below the Area 5 RWMS. The data are evaluated for evidence of effects on the aquifer related to the Area 5 RWMS. Leachate from the Cell 18 lined mixed waste cell has been sampled since 2011, and leachate from the Cell 25 lined mixed waste cell was first sampled in 2019 after it began receiving waste in August 2018. Leachate data are analyzed for hazardous contaminants to determine appropriate leachate handling and disposal. This report includes five years of data from 2016 through 2020.
This report is required by the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity QAP and identifies the UGTA QA activities for CY 2022. The QA activities included conducting assessments for UGTA Activity QAP compliance, identifying findings and completing corrective actions, evaluating laboratory performance, reviewing technical work, and publishing documents. DRI; LANL; and MSTS did not conduct QA activities for the UGTA Activity in 2022.