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International Space Station (ISS) Meteoroid/Orbital Debris Shielding

Design practices to provide protection for International Space Station (ISS) crew and critical equipment from meteoroid and orbital debris (M/OD) Impacts have been developed. Damage modes and failure criteria are defined for each spacecraft system. Hypervolocity Impact -1 - and analyses are used to develop ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for each exposed spacecraft system. BLEs define Impact particle sizes that result in threshold failure of a particular spacecraft system as a function of Impact velocity, angles and particle density. The BUMPER computer code Is used to determine the probability of no penetration (PNP) that falls the spacecraft shielding based on NASA standard meteoroid/debris models, a spacecraft geometry model, and the BLEs. BUMPER results are used to verify spacecraft shielding requirements Low-weight, high-performance shielding alternatives have been developed at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology Facility (HITF) to meet spacecraft protection requirements.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗

Characterization of the Protein Crystal Growth Apparatus for Microgravity Aboard the Space Station

We have conducted experiments to determine the equilibration rates of some major precipitants used in protein crystallography aboard the International Space Station (ISS). The solutions were placed in the Protein Crystallization Apparatus for Microgravity (PCAM) which mimic Cryschem sitting drop trays. The trays were placed in cylinders. These cylinders were placed inside a Single locker Thermal Enclosure System (STES), and were activated for different durations during the flight. Bumpers pressed against elastomers seal drops in a deactivated state during pre-flight and prior to transfer to the ISS. Activation occurs while in flight on the ISS by releasing the bumpers allowing the drops to be exposed to the reservoir. PCAM was flown to the ISS on STS 100, Flight 6A, on April 19, 2001. Six series of equilibration experiments were tested for each precipitant with a small amount of Green Fluorescent Protein (GFP). Cylinder 10 was never activated, 7 was activated for 40 days, 8 was activated for 20 days, 9 was activated for 10 days, 11 was activated for 4 days and 12 was activated for 2 days. Upon the return to Earth by STS 104 on July 24,2001 the samples were transferred to Marshall Space Flight Center. The samples were then brought to the lab and the volumes of each sample were measured.

Kundrot, Craig E.↗

Cooking Dinner at Home--From the Office

It is well past quitting time, but you are still stuck in the office. Your spouse left work over an hour ago, but is caught in bumper-to-bumper traffic. As a result, neither of you were available to pick up your daughter on time from her soccer game. If your son hadn't gotten detention at school today, which also made him late for work, he could have picked her up. The next thing you know, it is already 8:30 at night, and your family members are finally all together under the same roof. No one has had a bite to eat since lunch, and dinner certainly isn't going to cook itself, or is it? For those who are all too familiar with this situation, it might be time to welcome the oven of the future into your homes: the ConnectIo Intelligent Oven, brought to you by TMIO, LLC, of Cleveland. Applying the same remote command and control concepts that NASA uses to run experiments on the International Space Station (ISS), ConnectIo allows its owners to cook dinner from the road, via a cell phone, personal digital assistant, or Internet connection.

Source record↗

Assessing MMOD Impacts on Seal Performance

The elastomer seal needed to seal in cabin air when NASA s Crew Exploration Vehicle is docked is exposed to space prior to docking. While open to space, the seal might be hit by orbital debris or meteoroids. The likelihood of damage of this type depends on the size of the particle. Our campaign is designed to find the smallest particle that will cause seal failure resulting in loss of mission. We will then be able to estimate environmental risks to the seal. Preliminary tests indicate seals can withstand a surprising amount of damage and still function. Collaborations with internal and external partners are in place and include seal leak testing, modeling of the space environment using a computer code known as BUMPER, and hypervelocity impact (HVI) studies at Caltech. Preliminary work at White Sands Test Facility showed a 0.5 mm diameter HVI damaged areas about 7 times that diameter, boring deep (5 mm) into elastomer specimens. BUMPER simulations indicate there is a 1 in 1440 chance of getting hit by a particle of diameter 0.08 cm for current Lunar missions; and 0.27 cm for a 10 year ISS LIDS seal area exposure.

deGroh, Henry C., III↗

Honeycomb vs. Foam: Evaluating Potential Upgrades to ISS Module Shielding

The presence of honeycomb cells in a dual-wall structure is advantageous for mechanical performance and low weight in spacecraft primary structures but detrimental for shielding against impact of micrometeoroid and orbital debris particles (MMOD). The presence of honeycomb cell walls acts to restrict the expansion of projectile and bumper fragments, resulting in the impact of a more concentrated (and thus lethal) fragment cloud upon the shield rear wall. The Multipurpose Laboratory Module (MLM) is a Russian research module scheduled for launch and ISS assembly in 2011 (currently under review). Baseline shielding of the MLM is expected to be predominantly similar to that of the existing Functional Energy Block (FGB), utilizing a baseline triple wall configuration with honeycomb sandwich panels for the dual bumpers and a thick monolithic aluminum pressure wall. The MLM module is to be docked to the nadir port of the Zvezda service module and, as such, is subject to higher debris flux than the FGB module (which is aligned along the ISS flight vector). Without upgrades to inherited shielding, the MLM penetration risk is expected to be significantly higher than that of the FGB module. Open-cell foam represents a promising alternative to honeycomb as a sandwich panel core material in spacecraft primary structures as it provides comparable mechanical performance with a minimal increase in weight while avoiding structural features (i.e. channeling cells) detrimental to MMOD shielding performance. In this study, the effect of replacing honeycomb sandwich panel structures with metallic open-cell foam structures on MMOD shielding performance is assessed for an MLM-representative configuration. A number of hypervelocity impact tests have been performed on both the baseline honeycomb configuration and upgraded foam configuration, and differences in target damage, failure limits, and derived ballistic limit equations are discussed.

Ryan, Shannon J.↗

Hypervelocity Impact Performance of Open Cell Foam Core Sandwich Panel Structures

Metallic foams are a relatively new class of materials with low density and novel physical, mechanical, thermal, electrical and acoustic properties. Although incompletely characterized, they offer comparable mechanical performance to traditional spacecraft structural materials (i.e. honeycomb sandwich panels) without detrimental through-thickness channeling cells. There are two competing types of metallic foams: open cell and closed cell. Open cell foams are considered the more promising technology due to their lower weight and higher degree of homogeneity. Leading micrometeoroid and orbital debris shields (MMOD) incorporate thin plates separated by a void space (i.e. Whipple shield). Inclusion of intermediate fabric layers, or multiple bumper plates have led to significant performance enhancements, yet these shields require additional non-ballistic mass for installation (fasteners, supports, etc.) that can consume up to 35% of the total shield weight [1]. Structural panels, such as open cell foam core sandwich panels, that are also capable of providing sufficient MMOD protection, represent a significant potential for increased efficiency in hypervelocity impact shielding from a systems perspective through a reduction in required non-ballistic mass. In this paper, the results of an extensive impact test program on aluminum foam core sandwich panels are reported. The effect of pore density, and core thickness on shielding performance have been evaluated over impact velocities ranging from 2.2 - 9.3 km/s at various angles. A number of additional tests on alternate sandwich panel configurations of comparable-weight have also been performed, including aluminum honeycomb sandwich panels (see Figure 1), Nomex honeycomb core sandwich panels, and 3D aluminum honeycomb sandwich panels. A total of 70 hypervelocity impact tests are reported, from which an empirical ballistic limit equation (BLE) has been derived. The BLE is in the standard form suitable for implementation in risk analysis software, and includes the effect of panel thickness, core density, and facesheet material properties. A comparison between the shielding performance of foam core sandwich panel structures and common MMOD shielding configurations is made for both conservative (additional 35% non-ballistic mass) and optimistic (additional mass equal to 30% of bumper mass) considerations. Suggestions to improve the shielding performance of foam core sandwich panels are made, including the use of outer mesh layers, intermediate fabric/composite layers, and varying pore density.

Ryan, Shannon↗

Capacitors Would Help Protect Against Hypervelocity Impacts

A proposal investigates alternatives to the present bumper method of protecting spacecraft against impacts of meteoroids and orbital debris. The proposed method is based on a British high-voltage-capacitance technique for protecting armored vehicles against shaped-charge warheads. A shield, according to the proposal, would include a bare metal outer layer separated by a gap from an inner metal layer covered with an electrically insulating material. The metal layers would constitute electrodes of a capacitor. A bias potential would be applied between the metal layers. A particle impinging at hypervelocity on the outer metal layer would break apart into a debris cloud that would penetrate the electrical insulation on the inner metal layer. The cloud would form a path along which electric current could flow between the metal layers, thereby causing the capacitor to discharge. With proper design, the discharge current would be large enough to vaporize the particles in the debris cloud to prevent penetration of the spacecraft. The shield design can be mass optimized to be competitive with existing bumper designs. Parametric studies were proposed to determine optimum correction between bias voltage, impacting particle velocity, gap space, and insulating material required to prevent spacecraft penetration.

Edwards, David↗

Retaining Device for the Interior Structure of a Spacecraft Payload

A device denoted as a bumper assembly for a spacecraft payload container comprises an interior structure surrounded by skin or some other protective enclosure (see figure). When arranged with three or more like assemblies, this bumper assembly is designed to secure the interior structure within a payload s protective enclosure during the stresses endured in flight and, if required, recovery of the payload. Furthermore, proper use of this innovation facilitates the ability of designers and engineers to maximize the total placement area for components, thus increasing utilization of very valuable and limited space.

Fleming. Orville N., Jr.↗

As-Flown Shuttle Micro-Meteoroid Orbital Debris (MMOD) Assessment History

The final flight of the Space Shuttle program was completed on July 21st of 2011. The reusable nature of the Orbiter vehicles has provided NASA with a unique opportunity to inspect and sample spacecraft surfaces exposed to the MMOD environment in low Earth orbit. This paper will provide details of MMOD damages found on Orbiter surfaces after recent flights, as well as putting these damages in context by providing historical comparisons of recent damage to previous flights. The Bumper threat assessment computer code is used by NASA to determine spacecraft MMOD penetration risk. The tool was used before each mission to estimate pre-flight MMOD risk for the Shuttle Program Office using planned vehicles attitudes and exposure times. This paper summarizes the efforts of the authors to assess the expected number MMOD impacts of selected particles sizes of 52 shuttle missions ranging from STS-50 (1992) through STS-133 (2011) using as-flown attitude data. The missions encompass the Shuttle/Mir precursors to the International Space Station (ISS) as well as the ISS assembly flights. The paper includes a comparison of observed MMOD impact damage to the predicted number of impacts from Bumper code assessments. This data can be used to validate engineering models of the orbital debris and micrometeoroid environment, such NASA s ORDEM debris model and MEM meteoroid model.

Hyde, James L.↗

Flexible Shields for Protecting Spacecraft Against Debris

A report presents the concept of Flexshield a class of versatile, lightweight, flexible shields for protecting spacecraft against impacts by small meteors and orbiting debris. The Flexshield concept incorporates elements of, but goes beyond, prior spacecraft-shielding concepts, including those of Whipple shields and, more recently, multi-shock shields and multi-shock blankets. A shield of the Flexshield type includes multiple outer layers (called bumpers in the art) made, variously, of advanced ceramic and/or polymeric fibers spaced apart from each other by a lightweight foam. As in prior such shields, the bumpers serve to shock an impinging hypervelocity particle, causing it to disintegrate vaporize, and spread out over a larger area so that it can be stopped by an innermost layer (back sheet). The flexibility of the fabric layers and compressibility of the foam make it possible to compress and fold the shield for transport, then deploy the shield for use. The shield can be attached to a spacecraft by use of snaps, hook-and-pile patches, or other devices. The shield can also contain multilayer insulation material, so that it provides some thermal protection in addition to mechanical protection.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗

HVI Ballistic Performance Characterization of Non-Parallel Walls

The Double-Wall, "Whipple" Shield [1] has been the subject of many hypervelocity impact studies and has proven to be an effective shield system for Micro-Meteoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) impacts for spacecraft. The US modules of the International Space Station (ISS), with their "bumper shields" offset from their pressure holding rear walls provide good examples of effective on-orbit use of the double wall shield. The concentric cylinder shield configuration with its large radius of curvature relative to separation distance is easily and effectively represented for testing and analysis as a system of two parallel plates. The parallel plate double wall configuration has been heavily tested and characterized for shield performance for normal and oblique impacts for the ISS and other programs. The double wall shield and principally similar Stuffed Whipple Shield are very common shield types for MMOD protection. However, in some locations with many spacecraft designs, the rear wall cannot be modeled as being parallel or concentric with the outer bumper wall. As represented in Figure 1, there is an included angle between the two walls. And, with a cylindrical outer wall, the effective included angle constantly changes. This complicates assessment of critical spacecraft components located within outer spacecraft walls when using software tools such as NASA's BumperII. In addition, the validity of the risk assessment comes into question when using the standard double wall shield equations, especially since verification testing of every set of double wall included angles is impossible.

Bohl, William↗

Hypervelocity Impact of Explosive Transfer Lines

Hypervelocity impact tests of 2.5 grains per foot flexible confined detonating chord (FCDC) shielded by a 1 mm thick 2024-T3 aluminum alloy bumper standing off 51 mm from the FCDC were performed. Testing showed that a 6 mm diameter 2017-T4 aluminum alloy ball impacting the bumper at 6.97 km/s and 45 degrees impact angle initiated the FCDC. However, impact by the same diameter and speed ball at 0 degrees angle of impact did not initiate the FCDC. Furthermore, impact at 45 degrees and the same speed by a slightly smaller diameter ball (5.8 mm diameter) also did not initiate the FCDC.

Bjorkman, Michael D.↗

Alternative MMOD Shielding Concepts

The main types of meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) shields are single-layer “monolithic” shields, dual-wall “Whipple” shields, and multi-wall shields (“Stuffed Whipple” and “multi-shock” are common types). Aluminum alloys are typically used for the outer bumper layer and for the rear wall of the dual- and multi-wall shields, although carbon-composites are increasingly employed in MMOD shields given their low-mass and high-strength. Ceramic (NextelTM) and KevlarTM fabrics are commonly used for the intermediate layers of Stuffed Whipple shields. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group is continuously working to improve NASA spacecraft MMOD shielding by evaluating new materials and shielding concepts by test and analysis. HVIT has performed many hypervelocity impact tests over several years to evaluate alternative MMOD shield materials and concepts. This paper will provide results of this work in the following areas: (1) Material substitutions to improve radiation and MMOD protection within Stuffed Whipple shields, (2) Metallic and ceramic foam bumper and intermediate layer materials, (3) Self-sealing materials. In the first two areas listed above, the candidate shield materials were tested under similar test conditions and with fixed shield standoff and mass. Damage to the rear wall was quantified and compared to determine the best performing shield materials. In the self-sealing material evaluations, the test objective was to gauge the ability of different materials and techniques to stop leaks in a rear wall with a 1-atmosphere (air) delta-pressure across the wall. This paper provides results of the investigations and describes forward work to continue the development of the most promising MMOD shield alternatives. KevlarTM is a trademark of DuPont de Nemours, Inc. NextelTM is a trademark of 3M Corporation Note, Trade names and trademarks are used in this report for identification only. Their usage does not constitute an official endorsement, either expressed or implied, by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Hypervelocity↗

Updated Numerical Analysis Benchmarks for Meteoroid Relevant Materials

Proposal for update of numerical analysis benchmark for meteoroid relevant materials. - Two recently performed shots are proposed to be numerical analysis benchmarks for numerical simulations of impacts of high-density meteoroids (Al 2 O 3 surrogate) and low-density meteoroids (Nylon surrogate). - A pair of general Whipple shields have been studied: - Bumper and rear walls are the same material and thickness between shields - Separation is 4.5 cm for Al 2 O 3 and 1.5 cm for Nylon - Information gathered includes high speed (1 MHz) shadowgraphs of debris cloud, bumper hole size and rear wall hole area.

Orbital Debris↗

Orion Artemis I as Flown MMOD Analysis

The Orion spacecraft conducted the Artemis I flight around the Moon from November 16 through December 11, 2022. After the flight, the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group performed a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) analysis using the Bumper 3 risk assessment tool to predict the number of small impacts that would likely have occurred during the mission. Separately, the same group inspected the Orion capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. The results of the inspection were compared to those of the analysis to aid in improving the analysis, including the environment models. The comparison showed that Bumper analysis predictions were generally within one integer value of the damage found, which is considered high accuracy. As this was the first large, non-ablative returned surface from a lunar mission, this effort extends the MMOD community’s insight beyond low Earth orbit into cis-lunar space.

Kevin D Deighton↗

Orion Artemis I as Flown MMOD Analysis

The Orion spacecraft conducted the Artemis I flight around the Moon from November 16 through December 11, 2022. After the flight, the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group performed a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) analysis using the Bumper 3 risk assessment tool to predict the number of small impacts that would likely have occurred during the mission. Separately, the same group inspected the Orion capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. The results of the inspection were compared to those of the analysis to aid in improving the analysis, including the environment models. The comparison showed that Bumper analysis predictions were generally within one integer value of the damage found, which is considered high accuracy. As this was the first large, non-ablative returned surface from a lunar mission, this effort extends the MMOD community’s insight beyond low Earth orbit into cis-lunar space.

MMOD↗

Overview of Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Analysis Process for Mars Sample Return Earth Entry System

Introduction: Micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) risk analyses for the Mars Sample Return (MSR) Earth Entry System (EES) have been significantly more rigorous than previously flown missions because of its categorization as a Class V restricted return mission. This means the returned samples present significant concern for biogenic contamination. These analyses seek to determine if a micrometeoroid or orbital debris strike would result in loss of containment assurance and are summarized in the flowchart in Fig. 1. Methodology: The mission is considered in two MMOD phases: a pre-release phase where the EES is protected by a Micrometeoroid Protection System (MMPS) and a post-release phase called “free-flight” where the EES is exposed directly to the MMOD environment. These phases correspond to interplanetary cruise and imminent re-entry, respectively. To inform the MMPS design, a 30-shot high velocity impact testing (HVIT) series on candidate configurations at NASA White Sands Test Facility was completed in the summer of 2022. Sample post-shot images are shown in Fig 2 [1]. These data are used to baseline the MMPS design and to tune the hydrocode simulations. ALE3D, CTH, and SPHC are the hydrocodes that simulate physics of high-speed impacts [2]. Results generated with these populate a penetration depth versus energy space beyond the testable velocity regime of HVIT (~7 km/s). The penetration depth versus energy space data are used to define a critical projectile diameter function called a Ballistic Limit Equation (BLE), where the projectile “criticality” is determined by zone dependent failure criteria defined a-priori [3]. For example, the nose of the heatshield has a failure criterion of 50% TPS penetration, assigned because the landing loads are concentrated on that region and no substructure damage is permitted. The BLEs for each vehicle material zone are input into the BUMPER 3 code, along with the vehicle surface mesh and the corresponding space environment model, to calculate a probability of penetration or number of penetrations. The environment models, MEM3 for MM and ORDEM 3.2 for OD, simulate the meteoroid environment from 0.2 to 2 au based on the Grün flux equation, and the debris environment up to 40,000 km altitude from Earth surface, respectively [4,5]. Presentation Focus: The presentation or poster will present the results to-date focusing on the full risk analysis process flow seen in Fig. 1. Details on the derivation of the failure criteria will be discussed, along with HVIT results and how these influenced the MMPS configuration baseline decision. Further, results of hydrocode simulations will be presented and the tuning to HVIT outputs will be described. Finally, the strategies that direct the BLE formulation will be reviewed, specifically, for the EES elements that are most exposed to the MMOD environment.

mmod↗