Transmitting G-Code with Geometry Commands for Extrusion Additive Manufacturing
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This document provides general guidelines for airport managers, local officials, and other stakeholders for developing a response and recovery plan for a major airport following the release of a biological warfare agent, with specific guidance for remediation. San Francisco International Airport was selected as the example airport during development of the guidance to illustrate specific details. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis was selected as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the agents most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The focus of the guidance is on cleanup and disposal activities associated with the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance Phases that are defined herein. Activities associated with the Notification and First-Response Phases are brieÀy discussed in Appendixes A and B, respectively. In addition to the main text of this Remediation Guidance document and associated appendixes, a data supplement was developed specifically for San Francisco International Airport. Requests for the data supplement must be made directly to the Emergency Planning Operations Division of San Francisco International Airport. This document does not describe public health responses to release of a biological warfare agent. If laboratory analytical results confirm the presence of a biological agent, the responsible public health agency involved in the response will commence appropriate public health actions, such as treatment (CDC 2004) and decontamination of potentially contaminated individuals, distribution of prophylaxis, and medical examinations. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site for more information on emergency public health responses (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). Effective communication with the media and the public is an essential component of airport remediation and recovery. Whereas such communication is beyond the scope of this document, many helpful resources are available. (See Section 1.1 for more information.) The concept of operations described in this document for cleanup of a Bacillus anthracis release at a major airport conforms to the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2008) and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). In most cases, a Unified Command would be formed to direct the cleanup process jointly and to take ultimate responsibility for all cleanup decisions. The Unified Command would likely include the Airport Manager or Airport Emergency Operations Manager, representatives from state and local public health and emergency management agencies, and Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Unified Command and Incident Command Staff would ideally be co-located in an Incident Command Post in an uncontaminated area of the airport. If a release is large or complex, co-location of all key players may not be possible. If a major incident is declared, a Principal Federal Official may be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal support to the Unified Command. In some facilities and jurisdictions, additional response plans or procedures (such as BioWatch or other emergency response plans, procedures, or protocols) may govern notification and first response. Facility personnel, responders, and emergency management coordinators should be aware of all applicable plans and procedures and how to implement them. Cleanups following the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the U.S. pre-dated the NRF and NIMS and did not make use of a NIMS Incident Command System as we know it today. Most Incident Commanders for the larger of those cleanups chose to convene a Technical Working Group (TWG) of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, outside experts to advise in developing sampling and decontamination plans. Most of the Incident Commanders also convened a separate Environmental Clearance Committee (ECC) to independently review pre- and post decontamination sampling data as well as data on decontamination parameters, to evaluate whether the decontamination was effective, and to add credibility regarding a decision that decontaminated areas may be reoccupied. Use of such specialized technical expertise is strongly recommended, although it would now operate within the construct of the NIMS Incident Command System. The TWG, if convened, would act in an advisory capacity to the Environmental Unit within the Planning Section. Likewise, the ECC, if convened, would provide independent peer review of products and recommendations by the Environmental Unit. For maximum impartiality, the ECC could also provide recommendations directly to the Unified Command. Cleanup activities commence with site characterization. The principal goal of characterization is to define the extent of contamination and to gather information needed to design the decontamination approach. Initial sampling data collected by first responders are assessed to approximate the location(s) of contamination. Confirmation of the agent type and viability is obtained from a Laboratory Response Network laboratory. Additional characterization data are collected to determine the extent of contamination and where decontamination actions are needed. Areas suspected of being contaminated are contained and isolated to the degree possible to prevent further movement of an agent to uncontaminated areas or the environment, and to reduce the potential for future exposure from the agent or fumigant, if fumigation is needed. Agent air monitoring in areas adjacent to the contained contamination zones is done to ensure the protection of remediation personnel and to monitor any release from the contained zones. Various sampling approaches are considered. For example, wipe samples can be used to sample hard, nonporous surfaces. Swab samples can be used to sample nooks, crannies, joints, and seams. Appendix I is a template for preparing an incident-specific, operational characterization plan. Upon completion of the characterization plan, an internal review is initiated. Upon approval of the plan by the Unified Command, characterization commences. The Site Safety Officer develops a Health and Safety Plan to ensure that coordinated health and safety measures are in place for all responding personnel. This plan describes physical, chemical, and biological hazards at the site, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination procedures, and emergency procedures to be used by sampling and remediation personnel. An incident-specific Remediation Action Plan is developed, which describes the decontamination methods to be used and other details, including waste disposal. Under NIMS, this overall plan, as well as other plans described below, are implemented through a series of standardized, shorter-term Incident Action Plans, which describe specific activities that will take place during a shift or a day. The template in Appendix J is designed to facilitate preparation of the Remediation Action Plan. If fumigation will be done, a Sampling and Analysis Plan will be needed, as well as an Ambient Air Monitoring Plan, which can be a component of the Remediation Action Plan. These three plans are needed to obtain a crisis exemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for authorized use of an unregistered sterilant or pesticide during cleanup. If pesticide products become registered for inactivation of B. anthracis in the future, the three plans will likely be required by the product’s labeling, but the plans would no longer be submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval; rather, the Incident Commander would approve them. If fumigation is used, an Emergency Response Plan is also recommended, although such a plan is not required for a crisis exemption. For some nonpersistent biological warfare agents, natural attenuation may be an adequate decontamination option. In cases where contamination is not extensive or an agent is not persistent, application of surface decontaminants or other methods of medical infection control may be effective. For extensive contamination by persistent agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, fumigation may be necessary. In those cases, the Decontamination Phase commences with source reduction, such as pre-cleaning surfaces to reduce the contaminant load. To expedite cleanup and prevent costs from escalating unnecessarily, a cost–benefit analysis should be incorporated in the decision process related to retention versus disposal of facility items and materials. Certain materials and structural components can be decontaminated for reuse, but it may not be feasible or cost-effective to decontaminate other items. Those items must be pre-treated, packaged (with the package decontaminated externally), and removed for disposal as waste. Site preparation includes sealing openings to prevent leaks and setting up equipment. Decontamination reagents and delivery systems are selected, and pre-testing all systems is done before carrying out chemical treatment(s). The important choice of decontamination technologies depends on characteristics of the agent, the nature and extent of contamination, and other site parameters identified during characterization. Decontamination-related decisions can have a major impact on waste-disposal costs, and it is necessary to develop a disposal plan that identifies a means of disposal, necessary approvals, transportation, and other details. A clearance strategy is developed to ensure that after decontamination, the risk of exposure to residual contamination is negligible. A clearance sampling plan is developed, which sets clearance criteria, specifies how to determine whether the criteria have been met, and describes how and where to collect clearance samples after decontamination. In most cases, clearance sampling includes both surface and aggressive air samples. Appendix K is a clearance plan template that identifies the types of required information. To determine whether the decontaminated area may be reoccupied, the Environmental Unit (and the ECC separately, if one is convened) evaluates the results of clearance samples. For the anthrax incidents to date, and given methods that have been used, cleanup was considered successful only when there was no growth of B. anthracis cultured from any environmental samples taken after decontamination. Other factors that will be considered include the decontamination process parameters (e.g., temperature, relative humidity, decontaminant concentration, and contact time) and the results from post-decontamination culture of biological indicators that may have been used during fumigation or sterilization processes. From such an evaluation the Environmental Unit or ECC, or both, recommend whether the area may be reoccupied, or whether further decontamination is necessary. The UC makes the final decision that a facility is appropriately decontaminated for reoccupancy. The facility owner or responsible public health agency makes the final decision to reopen a decontaminated facility. A theme that is emphasized throughout this document is that many activities can greatly reduce the time required to restore airport operations if those activities are conducted prior to an actual release of biological warfare agent. A summary of specific resources (such as Federal, state, and local agency contacts; contractors; prospective team members; subject-matter experts; laboratory facilities; and other entities) that should be identified in advance by airport officials is provided in each pertinent section of this document, and summary contact lists of such resources are provided in Appendix L. A summary of overall pre-planning actions that should be completed by airport officials is presented at the end of this document.
An electronic control system is disclosed for controlling individually controllable elements of an external component. In one embodiment the system may include a state translator subsystem for receiving a state command from an external subsystem. The state translator subsystem may have at least one module for processing the state command and generating operational commands for controlling the elements to achieve a desired state or condition. A programmable calibration command translation layer (PCCTL) subsystem may be included which receives and uses the operational commands to generate granular level commands for controlling the elements. A feedback control layer subsystem may be included which applies the granular level commands to the elements, and further modifies the granular level commands as needed to control the elements in closed loop fashion.
Techniques for executing an atomic command in a distributed computing network are provided. A core cluster, including a plurality of processing cores that do not natively issue atomic commands to the distributed computing network, is coupled to a translation unit. To issue an atomic command, a core requests a location in the translation unit to write an opcode and operands for the atomic command. The translation unit identifies a location (a “window”) that is not in use by another atomic command and indicates the location to the processing core. The processing core writes the opcode and operands into the window and indicates to the translation unit that the atomic command is ready. The translation generates an atomic command and issues the command to the distributed computing network for execution. After execution, the distributed computing network provides a response to the translation unit, which provides that response to the core.
The invention includes a motor controller and technique for controlling a permanent magnet motor. In accordance with one aspect of the present technique, a permanent magnet motor is controlled by receiving a torque command, determining a physical torque limit based on a stator frequency, determining a theoretical torque limit based on a maximum available voltage and motor inductance ratio, and limiting the torque command to the smaller of the physical torque limit and the theoretical torque limit. Receiving the torque command may include normalizing the torque command to obtain a normalized torque command, determining the physical torque limit may include determining a normalized physical torque limit, determining a theoretical torque limit may include determining a normalized theoretical torque limit, and limiting the torque command may include limiting the normalized torque command to the smaller of the normalized physical torque limit and the normalized theoretical torque limit.
OpenPET is an open source, flexible, high-performance, and modular data acquisition system for a variety of applications. The OpenPET electronics are capable of reading analog voltage or current signals from a wide variety of sensors. The electronics boards make extensive use of field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) to provide flexibility and scalability. Firmware and software for the FPGAs and computer are used to control and acquire data from the system. The command and control flow is similar to the data flow, however, the commands are initiated from the computer similar to a tree topology (i.e., from top-to-bottom). Each node in the tree discovers its parent and children, and all addresses are configured accordingly. A user (or a script) initiates a command from the computer. This command will be translated and encoded to the corresponding child (e.g., SB, MB, DB, etc.). Consecutively, each node will pass the command to its corresponding child(ren) by looking at the destination address. Finally, once the command reaches its desired destination(s) the corresponding node(s) execute(s) the command and send(s) a reply, if required. All the firmware, software, and the electronics board design files are distributed through the OpenPET website (http://openpet.lbl.gov).
A memory device receives a plurality of read commands and/or write commands in parallel. The memory device transmits data corresponding to respective read commands on respective portions of a data bus and receives data corresponding to respective write commands on respective portions of the data bus. The memory device includes I/O logic to receive the plurality of read commands in parallel, to transmit the data corresponding to the respective read commands on respective portions of the data bus, and to receive the data corresponding to the respective write commands on respective portions of the data bus.
BACKGROUND:Ontologies are invaluable in the life sciences, but building and maintaining ontologies often requires a challenging number of distinct tasks such as running automated reasoners and quality control checks, extracting dependencies and application-specific subsets, generating standard reports, and generating release files in multiple formats. Similar to more general software development, automation is the key to executing and managing these tasks effectively and to releasing more robust products in standard forms. For ontologies using the Web Ontology Language (OWL), the OWL API Java library is the foundation for a range of software tools, including the Protégé ontology editor. In the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) community, we recognized the need to package a wide range of low-level OWL API functionality into a library of common higher-level operations and to make those operations available as a command-line tool. RESULTS:ROBOT (a recursive acronym for "ROBOT is an OBO Tool") is an open source library and command-line tool for automating ontology development tasks. The library can be called from any programming language that runs on the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). Most usage is through the command-line tool, which runs on macOS, Linux, and Windows. ROBOT provides ontology processing commands for a variety of tasks, including commands for converting formats, running a reasoner, creating import modules, running reports, and various other tasks. These commands can be combined into larger workflows using a separate task execution system such as GNU Make, and workflows can be automatically executed within continuous integration systems. CONCLUSIONS:ROBOT supports automation of a wide range of ontology development tasks, focusing on OBO conventions. It packages common high-level ontology development functionality into a convenient library, and makes it easy to configure, combine, and execute individual tasks in comprehensive, automated workflows. This helps ontology developers to efficiently create, maintain, and release high-quality ontologies, so that they can spend more time focusing on development tasks. It also helps guarantee that released ontologies are free of certain types of logical errors and conform to standard quality control checks, increasing the overall robustness and efficiency of the ontology development lifecycle.
A method of controlling a pump supplying a fluid to a transmission includes sensing a requested power and an excess power for a powertrain. The requested power substantially meets the needs of the powertrain, while the excess power is not part of the requested power. The method includes sensing a triggering condition in response to the ability to convert the excess power into heat in the transmission, and determining that an operating temperature of the transmission is below a maximum. The method also includes determining a calibrated baseline and a dissipation command for the pump. The calibrated baseline command is configured to supply the fluid based upon the requested power, and the dissipation command is configured to supply additional fluid and consume the excess power with the pump. The method operates the pump at a combined command, which is equal to the calibrated baseline command plus the dissipation command.
A method for operating a thermoelectric generator supplying a variable-load component includes commanding the variable-load component to operate at a first output and determining a first load current and a first load voltage to the variable-load component while operating at the commanded first output. The method also includes commanding the variable-load component to operate at a second output and determining a second load current and a second load voltage to the variable-load component while operating at the commanded second output. The method includes calculating a maximum power output of the thermoelectric generator from the determined first load current and voltage and the determined second load current and voltage, and commanding the variable-load component to operate at a third output. The commanded third output is configured to draw the calculated maximum power output from the thermoelectric generator.
A system for communicating information on an energy distribution network is disclosed. In one embodiment, the system includes a local supervisor on a communication network, wherein the local supervisor can collect data from one or more energy generation/monitoring devices. The system also includes a command center on the communication network, wherein the command center can generate one or more commands for controlling the one or more energy generation devices. The local supervisor can periodically transmit a data signal indicative of the data to the command center via a first channel of the communication network at a first interval. The local supervisor can also periodically transmit a request for a command to the command center via a second channel of the communication network at a second interval shorter than the first interval. This channel configuration provides effective data communication without a significant increase in the use of network resources.
Physical device safety is typically implemented locally using embedded controllers, while operations safety is primarily performed in control centers. Safe operations can be enhanced by correct design of device-level control algorithms, and protocols, procedures and operator training at the control-room level, but all can fail. Moreover, these elements exchange data and issue commands via vulnerable communication layers. In order to secure these gaps and enhance operational safety, we believe monitoring of command sequences must be combined with an awareness of physical device limitations and automata models that capture safety mechanisms. One way of doing this is by leveraging specification-based intrusion detection to monitor for physical constraint violations. The method can also verify that physical infrastructure state is consistent with monitoring information and control commands exchanged between field devices and control centers. This additional security layer enhances protection from both outsider attacks and insider mistakes. We implemented specification-based SCADA command analyzers using physical constraint algorithms directly in the Bro framework and Broccoli APIs for three separate scenarios: a water heater, an automated distribution system, and an over-current protection scheme. To accomplish this, we added low-level analyzers capable of examining control system-specific protocol packets for both Modbus TCP and DNP3, and also higher-level analyzers able to interpret device command and data streams within the context of each device's physical capabilities and present operational state. Thus the software that we are making available includes the Bro/Broccoli scripts for these three scenarios, as well as simulators, written in C, of those scenarios that generate sample traffic that is monitored by the Bro/Broccoli scripts. In addition, we have also implemented systems to directly pull cyber-physical information from the OSIsoft PI historian system. We have included the Python scripts used to perform that monitoring.
The Omics Tools package provides several small trivial tools for work in genomics. This single portable package, the omics.jar file, is a toolbox that works in any Java-based environment, including PCs, Macs, and supercomputers. The number of tools is expected to grow. One tool (called cmsearch.hadoop or cmsearch.local), calls the external cmsearch program to predict non-coding RNA in a genome. The cmsearch program is part of the third-party Infernal package. Omics Tools does not contain Infernal. Infernal may be installed separately. The cmsearch.hadoop subtool requires Apache Hadoop and runs on a supercomputer, though cmsearch.local does not and runs on a server. Omics Tools does not contain Hadoop. Hadoop mat be installed separartely The other tools (cmgbk, cmgff, fastats, pal, randgrp, randgrpr, randsub) do not interface with third-party tools. Omics Tools is written in Java and Scala programming languages. Invoking the help command shows currently available tools, as shown below: schaumbe@gpint06:~/proj/omics$ java -jar omics.jar help Known commands are: cmgbk : compare cmsearch and GenBank Infernal hits cmgff : compare hits among two GFF (version 3) files cmsearch.hadoop : find Infernal hits in a genome, on your supercomputer cmsearch.local : find Infernal hits in a genome, on your workstation fastats : FASTA stats, e.g. # bases, GC content pal : stem-loop motif detection by palindromic sequence search (code stub) randgrp : random subsample without replacement, of groups randgrpr : random subsample with replacement, of groups (fast) randsub : random subsample without replacement, of file lines For more help regarding a particular command, use: java -jar omics.jar command help Usage: java -jar omics.jar command args
Physical device safety is typically implemented locally using embedded controllers, while operations safety is primarily performed in control centers. Safe operations can be enhanced by correct design of device-level control algorithms, and protocols, procedures and operator training at the control-room level, but all can fail. Moreover, these elements exchange data and issue commands via vulnerable communication layers. In order to secure these gaps and enhance operational safety, we believe monitoring of command sequences must be combined with an awareness of physical device limitations and automata models that capture safety mechanisms. One way of doing this is by leveraging specification-based intrusion detection to monitor for physical constraint violations. The method can also verify that physical infrastructure state is consistent with monitoring information and control commands exchanged between field devices and control centers. This additional security layer enhances protection from both outsider attacks and insider mistakes. We implemented specification-based SCADA command analyzers using physical constraint algorithms directly in the Bro framework and Broccoli APIs for three separate scenarios: a water heater, an automated distribution system, and an over-current protection scheme. To accomplish this, we added low-level analyzers capable of examining control system-specific protocol packets for both Modbus TCP and DNP3, and also higher-level analyzers able to interpret device command and data streams within the context of each device's physical capabilities and present operational state. Thus the software that we are making available includes the Bro/Broccoli scripts for these three scenarios, as well as simulators, written in C, of those scenarios that generate sample traffic that is monitored by the Bro/Broccoli scripts. In addition, we have also implemented systems to directly pull cyber-physical information from the OSIsoft PI historian system. We have included the Python scripts used to perform that monitoring.
Technologies for providing secure emergency power control of a high voltage direct current transmission (HVDC) system include a controller. The controller includes circuitry configured to receive status data indicative of a present physical status of a power system. The circuitry is also configured to obtain an emergency power control command triggered by a remote source. The emergency power control command is to be executed by an HVDC transmission system of the power system. Further, the circuitry is configured to determine, as a function of the status data, whether the emergency power control command is consistent with the present physical status of the power system and block, in response to a determination that the emergency power control command is not consistent with the present physical status of the power system, execution of the emergency power control command by the HVDC transmission system.
Advanced nuclear reactors are essential to meet the changing energy requirements throughout both the United States and the rest of world. In addition to other features, they are designed to enable deployment in remote locations and operate in a fully (or near-fully) autonomous manner, which will require a new control paradigm. To realize autonomously operating reactors, the U.S. Department of Energy’s Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies Advanced Sensors and Instrumentation (NEET ASI) program conducts research and development into the enabling technologies and methods needed, including digital twins, machine learning, and risk modeling, in addition to various types of control methods. These technologies and methods are the key foundations needed to achieve fully autonomous systems. To develop and evaluate the technologies and methods necessary for achieving autonomous operations, it is critical to identify a software tool capable of integrating all the required elements. In surveying the available solutions, no software platforms were identified that could accomplish what was needed without introducing drawbacks. This challenge was the motivation for the current effort: to develop a software platform that can seamlessly integrate autonomouscontrol-enabling technologies and methods, allowing for accelerated research and development and transfer of ideas. The resulting platform, known as the Control and Optimization Modular Modeling Application for Nuclear Deployment (COMMAND), is Python-based, and leverages open-source tools to provide flexibility and facilitate building upon prior research. It is designed to enable advanced reactor developers to deploy and test advanced control technologies and methods coupled with their own models, solutions, and hardware. Given the substantial undertaking of developing such a platform, the current effort focused on laying down scalable, flexible software foundations and infrastructure, then demonstrating the platform via a use case. These foundations included developing generic modules, which contain the base variable and system blocks (the information and functional building blocks, respectively, that can be used to design a simulation) and the data handling and storage blocks needed to exchange information between the various blocks; as well as enablingtechnology-specific modules. This platform was evaluated via a use case, which was to simulate and control a process for the Microreactor Automated Control System (MACS) test bed. While MACS is not currently directly coupled to any specific microreactor physics, it was initially developed in concert with the Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation (MARVEL) microreactor, and so the MARVEL physics are used here. As part of this use case, several enabling-technology-specific blocks within COMMAND were integrated, including a proportional integral derivative (PID) control block, a Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program (RELAP5-3D) block, and an anomaly detection block. The COMMAND software platform was successfully demonstrated to achieve the scalability and flexibility objectives of this effort and will be leveraged by the program’s research efforts to advance state of the art control methodologies towards autonomous operations of advanced reactors. As new use cases are created and implemented, it is anticipated that COMMAND will continue to grow and evolve to meet new requirements.