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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 91 records · Page 5

An Efficient Method to Design Premature End-of-Life Trajectories: A Hypothetical Alternate Fate for Cassini

What would happen if, hypothetically, the highly successful Cassini mission were to end prematurely due to lack of propellant or sudden subsystem failure? A solid plan to quickly produce a solution for any given scenario, regardless of where the spacecraft is along its reference path, must be in place to safely dispose of the spacecraft and meet all planetary protection requirements. As a contingency plan for this hypothetical situation, a method to design viable high-fidelity terminating trajectories based on a hybrid approach that exploits two-body and three-body flyby transfers combined with a numerical optimization scheme is detailed in this paper.

end-of-mission↗

Agile Science Operations: A New Approach for Primitive Exploration Bodies

Primitive body exploration missions such as potential Comet Surface Sample Return or Trojan Tour and Rendezvous would challenge traditional operations practices. Earth-based observations would provide only basic understanding before arrival and many science goals would be defined during the initial rendezvous. It could be necessary to revise trajectories and observation plans to quickly characterize the target for safe, effective observations. Detection of outgassing activity and monitoring of comet surface activity are even more time constrained, with events occurring faster than round-trip light time. "Agile science operations" address these challenges with contingency plans that recognize the intrinsic uncertainty in the operating environment and science objectives. Planning for multiple alternatives can significantly improve the time required to repair and validate spacecraft command sequences. When appropriate, time-critical decisions can be automated and shifted to the spacecraft for immediate access to instrument data. Mirrored planning systems on both sides of the light-time gap permit transfer of authority back and forth as needed. We survey relevant science objectives, identifying time bottlenecks and the techniques that could be used to speed missions' reaction to new science data. Finally, we discuss the results of a trade study simulating agile observations during flyby and comet rendezvous scenarios. These experiments quantify instrument coverage of key surface features as a function of planning turnaround time. Careful application of agile operations techniques can play a significant role in realizing the Decadal Survey plan for primitive body exploration

Agile science↗

A Comparison of Probabilistic and Deterministic Campaign Analysis for Human Space Exploration

Human space exploration is by its very nature an uncertain endeavor. Vehicle reliability, technology development risk, budgetary uncertainty, and launch uncertainty all contribute to stochasticity in an exploration scenario. However, traditional strategic analysis has been done in a deterministic manner, analyzing and optimizing the performance of a series of planned missions. History has shown that exploration scenarios rarely follow such a planned schedule. This paper describes a methodology to integrate deterministic and probabilistic analysis of scenarios in support of human space exploration. Probabilistic strategic analysis is used to simulate "possible" scenario outcomes, based upon the likelihood of occurrence of certain events and a set of pre-determined contingency rules. The results of the probabilistic analysis are compared to the nominal results from the deterministic analysis to evaluate the robustness of the scenario to adverse events and to test and optimize contingency planning.

Merrill, R. Gabe↗

Voyager at Uranus

The engineering changes that had to be made in the Voyager 2 spacecraft in order to enable it to fly beyond the originally planned encounters with Jupiter and Saturn and the underlying engineering strategy leading to the encounter with Uranus are discussed. Fixes of the azimuth actuator failure, receiver failure, and memory failure, and capability upgrades of Image Data Compression, aperture augmentation protective coding, smear reduction, Image Motion Compensation, power management, and contingency planning are summarized. The use of the Computer Command Subsystem in the extension of the voyage is described. The ways in which the strategic priorities, including spacecraft preservation, protection of the near-encounter load, development of new ground and spacecraft capabilities, and repair or circumvention of existing spacecraft faults, were accomplished are reviewed, and the accomplishment of additional tasks is also discussed.

Mclaughlin, W. I.↗

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for calendar year 1998-a year of sharp contrasts and significant successes at NASA. The year opened with the announcement of large workforce cutbacks. The slip in the schedule for launching the International Space Station (ISS) created a 5-month hiatus in Space Shuttle launches. This slack period ended with the successful and highly publicized launch of the STS-95 mission. As the year closed, ISS assembly began with the successful orbiting and joining of the Functional Cargo Block (FGB), Zarya, from Russia and the Unity Node from the United States. Throughout the year, the Panel maintained its scrutiny of NASAs safety processes. Of particular interest were the potential effects on safety of workforce reductions and the continued transition of functions to the Space Flight Operations Contractor. Attention was also given to the risk management plans of the Aero-Space Technology programs, including the X-33, X-34, and X-38. Overall, the Panel concluded that safety is well served for the present. The picture is not as clear for the future. Cutbacks have limited the depth of talent available. In many cases, technical specialties are "one deep." The extended hiring freeze has resulted in an older workforce that will inevitably suffer significant departures from retirements in the near future. The resulting "brain drain" could represent a future safety risk unless appropriate succession planning is started expeditiously. This and other topics are covered in the section addressing workforce. In the case of the Space Shuttle, beneficial and mandatory safety and operational upgrades are being delayed because of a lack of sufficient present funding. Likewise, the ISS has little flexibility to begin long lead-time items for upgrades or contingency planning.

Source record↗

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for Corrective Action Unit 116: Area 25 Test Cell C Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 1

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan identifies the activities required for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 116, Area 25 Test Cell C Facility. The Test Cell C (TCC) Facility is located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) approximately 25 miles northwest of Mercury, Nevada (Figure 1). CAU 116 is currently listed in Appendix III of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996 (as amended February 2008) and consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs): (1) CAS 25-23-20, Nuclear Furnace Piping; and (2) CAS 25-41-05, Test Cell C Facility. CAS 25-41-05 is described in the FFACO as the TCC Facility but actually includes Building 3210 and attached concrete shield wall only. CAU 116 will be closed by demolishing Building 3210, the attached concrete shield wall, and the nuclear furnace piping. In addition, as a best management practice (BMP), Building 3211 (moveable shed) will be demolished due to its close proximity to Building 3210. This will aid in demolition and disposal operations. Radiological surveys will be performed on the demolition debris to determine the proper disposal pathway. As much of the demolition debris as space allows will be placed into the Building 3210 basement structure. After filling to capacity with demolition debris, the basement structure will be mounded or capped and closed with administrative controls. Prior to beginning demolition activities and according to an approved Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP), representative sampling of surface areas that are known, suspected, or have the potential to contain hazardous constituents such as lead or polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) will be performed throughout all buildings and structures. Sections 2.3.2, 4.2.2.2, 4.2.2.3, 4.3, and 6.2.6.1 address the methodologies employed that assure the solid debris placed in the basement structure will not contain contaminants of concern (COCs) above hazardous waste levels. The anticipated post-closure-posting requirements for the mounded/capped basement structure, as well as for the entire CAU, are addressed in Section 4.2.10. The site contains radiologically impacted surfaces and hazardous materials. Based on review of the historical information for CAU 116 and recent site inspections, there is sufficient process knowledge to close CAU 116 using the SAFER process. CAUs that may be closed using the SAFER process have conceptual corrective actions that are clearly identified. Consequently, corrective action alternatives can be chosen prior to completing a corrective action investigation, given anticipated investigation results. The SAFER process combines elements of the data quality objective (DQO) process and the observational approach to plan and conduct closure activities. The DQOs are used to identify the problem and define the type and quality of data needed to complete the investigation phase of the SAFER process. The purpose of the investigation phase is to verify the adequacy of existing information used to determine the chosen corrective action. The observational approach provides a framework for managing uncertainty during the planning and decision-making phases of the project. The SAFER process allows for technical decisions to be made based on information gathered during site visits, interviews, meetings, research, and a consensus of opinion by the decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) team members. Any uncertainties are addressed by documented assumptions that are verified by sampling and analysis, data evaluation, onsite observations, and contingency plans, as necessary. Closure activities may proceed simultaneously with site characterization as sufficient data are gathered to confirm or disprove the assumptions made during selection of the corrective action. If, at any time during the closure process, new information is discovered that indicates that closure activities should be revised, closure activities will be reevaluated as appropriate. Based on a detailed review of historical documentation, there is sufficient process knowledge to close CAU 116 using the SAFER process. The COC have been determined and are discussed in Section 4.1.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Application of quantitative risk assessment to address stakeholder questions in geologic carbon storage

Ambitious international greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets demand a rapid transformation to a low-carbon economy. This transformation includes the accelerated adoption of carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and storage (CCS) technology. However, as with any large-scale engineering enterprise, the widespread commercial-scale deployment of geologic carbon storage (GCS) raises important questions about technology and cost-effectiveness, safety, environmental risk, and long-term liability. Effectively assessing and managing risks and liability associated with GCS projects is a key technical need throughout the project life cycle-from site selection and permitting to monitoring design, operational risk management, and post-operational site closure. This presentation highlights recent advancements in tools for quantitative risk assessment, being developed by the National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP). NRAP is a multi-year, multinational laboratory research collaboration sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management. Our focus will be on these tools' applications in addressing critical stakeholder questions related to supporting permitting to ensure secure and environmentally protective storage; designing effective and efficient monitoring plans; evaluating the effectiveness of remedial actions and risk management alternatives; and informing liability assessment and investment decisions. This paper will detail the key functionality of NRAP’s Open-Source Integrated Assessment Model (NRAP-Open-IAM), a computational framework for assessing leakage risk and containment assurance. This model features streamlined workflows for calculating leakage risk profiles, delineating risk-based area of review, and assessing contingency plans and post-injection site care requirements. ORION is an open-source, observation-based ensemble forecasting toolkit to help operators assess the seismic hazard at a carbon storage site. The State of Stress Analysis Tool (SOSAT), designed to assess subsurface stress conditions and evaluate geomechanical risk resulting from CO2 injection in an area of interest will also be presented. We will also introduce a prototype model to evaluate storage project costs and liability associated with risk management. The Technoeconomic and Liability Evaluation for Storage (TALES) model uses results from forecasts of leakage and induced seismicity risk to estimate the lifecycle cost of managing risk. Finally, a preliminary example of how the NRAP Risk-based Adaptive Monitoring Plan (RAMP) tool can be used to design efficient and effective site monitoring plans and estimate the detectability of fluid leakage will be provided. The relevance of these tools for addressing key stakeholder questions amidst uncertainty will be emphasized.

decision support↗

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for calendar year 1998-a year of sharp contrasts and significant successes at NASA. The year opened with the announcement of large workforce cutbacks. The slip in the schedule for launching the International Space Station (ISS) created a five-month hiatus in Space Shuttle launches. This slack period ended with the successful and highly publicized launch of the STS-95 mission. As the year closed, ISS assembly began with the successful orbiting and joining of the Functional Cargo Block (FGB), Zarya, from Russia and the Unity Node from the United States. Throughout the year, the Panel maintained its scrutiny of NASA's safety processes. Of particular interest were the potential effects on safety of workforce reductions and the continued transition of functions to the Space Flight Operations Contractor. Attention was also given to the risk management plans of the Aero-Space Technology programs, including the X-33, X-34, and X-38. Overall, the Panel concluded that safety is well served for the present. The picture is not as clear for the future. Cutbacks have limited the depth of talent available. In many cases, technical specialties are 'one deep.' The extended hiring freeze has resulted in an older workforce that will inevitably suffer significant departures from retirements in the near future. The resulting 'brain drain' could represent a future safety risk unless appropriate succession planning is started expeditiously. This and other topics are covered in the section addressing workforce. The major NASA programs are also limited in their ability to plan property for the future. This is of particular concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS because these programs are scheduled to operate well into the next century. In the case of the Space Shuttle, beneficial and mandatory safety and operational upgrades are being delayed because of a lack of sufficient present funding. Likewise, the ISS has little flexibility to begin long lead-time items for upgrades or contingency planning. For example, the section on computer hardware and software contains specific findings related to required longer range safety-related actions. NASA can be proud of its accomplishments this past year, but must remain ever vigilant, particularly as ISS assembly begins to accelerate. The Panel will continue to focus on both the short- and long-term aspects of risk management and safety planning. This task continues to be made manageable and productive by the excellent cooperation the Panel receives from both NASA and its contractors. Particular emphasis will continue to be directed to longer term workforce and program planning issues as well as the immediate risks associated with ISS assembly and the initial flights of the X-33 and X-34. Section 2 of this report presents specific findings and recommendations generated by ASAP activities during 1998. Section 3 contains more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. Appendix A is a current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1997 ASAP Annual Report. Appendix C details the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1998. During the year, Mr. Richard D. Blomberg was elected chair of the Panel and Vice Admiral (VADM) Robert F Dunn was elected deputy chair. VADM Bernard M. Kauderer moved from consultant to member. Mr. Charles J. Donlan retired from the Panel after many years of meritorious service. Ms. Shirley C. McCarty and Mr. Robert L. ('Hoot') Gibson joined the Panel as consultants.

Source record↗

An interactive tool for design and support of lunar, gravity assist, and libration point trajectories

The 'Swingby' interactive tool for design, analysis, and support of maneuver planning for missions that involve transfers to the moon, the lunar orbits, multiple-gravity assists, and the libration-point orbits, runs on a PC and uses pull-down and pop-up menus to allow users to change physical constants and select perturbations for inclusion. Swingby can also target by ascertain parameters, or allow the computer to generate goals on the basis of mission requirements. Rapid mission analyses, operational maneuvers, and contingency plans are thereby obtainable.

Carrico, J.↗

Flight Dynamics Planning and Operations Support for the JWST Mission

The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) was launched from Kourou Spaceport on December 25, 2021, at 12:20 UTC on an Ariane 5 launch vehicle. The launch vehicle inserted JWST into a 30-day transfer trajectory to the Sun-Earth-Moon (SEM) Lagrange point L2 region. JWST executed three mid-course correction maneuvers (MCCs) to insert the spacecraft into a quasi-halo orbit about SEM L2; JWST will maintain its trajectory about L2 for at least 5.5 years, with a goal of at least 10.5 years. This paper summarizes the flight dynamics support for JWST, including the prelaunch nominal trajectory design, the launch window analysis, contingency planning for trajectory-related anomalies, mission operations support for the first 6 months, and a comparison of the planned and achieved actual JWST trajectory results. The orbit determination strategy, both planned and executed, will be summarized, and the method of addressing the anomalies as they occurred will be included.

Space Operations↗

Flight Dynamics Planning and Operations Support for the JWST Mission

The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) was launched from Kourou Spaceport on December 25, 2021, at 12:20 UTC on an Ariane 5 launch vehicle. The launch vehicle inserted JWST into a 30-day transfer trajectory to the Sun-Earth-Moon (SEM) Lagrange point L2 region. JWST executed three mid-course correction maneuvers (MCCs) to insert the spacecraft into a quasi-halo orbit about SEM L2; JWST will maintain its trajectory about L2 for at least 5.5 years, with a goal of at least 10.5 years. This paper summarizes the flight dynamics support for JWST, including the prelaunch nominal trajectory design, the launch window analysis, contingency planning for trajectory-related anomalies, mission operations support for the first 6 months, and a comparison of the planned and achieved actual JWST trajectory results. The orbit determination strategy, both planned and executed, will be summarized, and the method of addressing the anomalies as they occurred will be included.

Karen Richon↗

Assessing Cumulative Impacts from Source Units within Hanford's Inner Area - 16546

The Central Plateau area at the Hanford Site has a complex mix of waste sites in several operable units, with many co-mingled source contamination and groundwater plumes. A key component of the evaluation process involves a planned assessment of the potential cumulative impacts resulting from co-mingled plumes and potential contribution from waste sites sources throughout the Inner Area, about 26 million square meters (10 square miles) area located in the middle of the Central Plateau. This assessment will evaluate the fate and transport of contamination at each waste site and remedial actions at those waste sites, providing an integrated vadose zone and groundwater fate and transport assessment. Although DOE's goal is to remediate the entire Inner Area to meet standard requirements in the National Contingency Plan (NCP), the complexity of the contamination including continuing contaminant sources in the Inner Area may not allow restoration of groundwater in a reasonable timeframe. DOE and regulatory agencies may need to evaluate the technical practicability of remedial actions and the potential for establishment of one or more waste management areas where drinking water standards can be obtained and maintained. The cumulative impacts evaluation is the tool to evaluate remedial action effects across source and groundwater operable units, contribute to technical impracticability evaluations, support remedial design and remedial process optimization efforts, identify additional monitoring requirements, and evaluate standard and conditional points of compliance for use considering all contaminant sources and groundwater plumes. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

U.S. Department of Energy Consequence Management Under the National Response Framework

Under the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex of the National Response Framework, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has specific responsibilities as a coordinating agency and for leading interagency response elements in the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). Emergency response planning focuses on rapidly providing response elements in stages after being notified of a nuclear/radiological incident. The use of Home Teams during the field team deployment period and recent advances in collecting and transmitting data from the field directly to assessment assets has greatly improved incident assessment times for public protection decisions. The DOE’s Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) based in Las Vegas, Nevada, has successfully deployed technical and logistical support for this mission at national exercises such as Top Officials Exercise IV (TOPOFF IV). In a unique response situation, DOE will provide advance contingency support to NASA during the scheduled launch in the fall of 2009 of the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL). The MSL rover will carry a radioisotope power system that generates electricity from the heat of plutonium’s radioactive decay. DOE assets and contingency planning will provide a pre-incident response posture for rapid early plume phase assessment in the highly unlikely launch anomaly.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The Hubble Space Telescope servicing missions: Past, present, and future operational challenges

The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) is a complex spacecraft designed to conduct leading edge scientific observations over a planned fifteen year mission lifetime. It was designed for servicing by the Space Shuttle to upgrade systems, replace failed components, and boost into a higher orbit. There are many operational challenges that must be addressed in preparing for and executing a Servicing Mission (SM) which range from both technical to managerial issues. This paper will be exploring the operational challenges faced by the HST Operations and Ground System Project in supporting the First Servicing Mission (FSM) and future Servicing Missions. We give special emphasis to those areas that helped ensure mission success. These areas include training, testing, and contingency planning.

William R Ochs↗

Flight Support System (FSS) docking and umbilical services systems

The Satellite Servicing Project at GSFC in the early 80's developed a facility for servicing observatories in orbit when docked on the shuttle. The facility includes a three point docking ring and one or two umbilicals to provide power, data and command capability to docked payloads. This facility was used in the 1984 repair of the Solar Maximum satellite. It will be used for the Hubble repair mission in 1993, and it is planned to be used on the Explorer Platform retrieval mission in 1995 and for servicing AXAF in the late 90's. The basic three point docking mechanisms and umbilical interfaces were adopted by the OMU Project for that vehicle's remote rendezvous and docking mission capability. This would have assured a common interface for a serviceable payload for either shuttle based or remote servicing, i.e., HST. For OMU remote servicing, quick reaction docking latches were under development when that Project was cancelled. Although there is no remote servicing capability being funded at present, the EOS spacecraft configuration does include three pins compatible with the FSS latches as a contingency planning measure.

Falkenhayn, Edward↗

BioSentinel: Mission Summary and Lessons Learned From the First Deep Space Biology CubeSat Mission

Launched on Artemis-1, BioSentinel carries a biology experiment into deep space for the first time in 50 years. A 6U CubeSat form factor was utilized for the spacecraft which included technologies newly developed or adapted for operations beyond Earth orbit. The spacecraft carries onboard budding yeast, Saccharomyces cerevisiae, as an analog to human cells to test the biological response to deep space radiation. This was the maiden deep-space voyage for many of the subsystems, and the first time to evaluate their performance in flight operation. Flying a CubeSat beyond LEO comes with unique challenges with respect to trajectory uncertainty and mission operations planning. The nominal plan was a lunar fly-by, followed by an insertion into Heliocentric orbit. However, some possible scenarios included lunar eclipses that could have severely impacted the power budget during that phase of the mission, while others could have resulted in a “Retrograde” hyperbola at swing-by resulting in the spacecraft traveling inward toward Earth or even towards a collision with the lunar surface. The commissioning phase of the mission was successful and completed a week ahead of schedule. It did not come without its exciting moments and challenges. First contact with the spacecraft uncovered that the vehicle was unexpectedly tumbling after deployment, a situation that needed to be corrected urgently. The mission operations team executed a contingency plan to stabilize the spacecraft, with just moments to spare before the battery ran out of power. The BioSensor payload onboard the spacecraft is a complex instrument that includes microfluidics, fluid systems, sensor control electronics, as well at the living yeast cells. BioSentinel also included a TimePix radiation sensor implemented by JSC’s RadWorks group. Dose and Linear Energy Transfer (LET) data is compared directly to the rate of DSB-and repair events measured by the S. cerevisiae cells. BioSentinel mature nanosatellite technologies included: deep space communications and navigation, autonomous attitude control and momentum management, and micro-propulsion systems, to provide an adaptable nanosatellite platform for deep space uses. This paper discusses the performance of the BioSentinel spacecraft through the mission phase, and includes lessons learned from challenges and anomalies. BioSentinel had many successes and will be a pathfinder for future deep space CubeSats and biology missions.

BioSentinel↗

Biosentinel: Mission Summary and Lessons Learned From the First Deep Space Biology CubeSat Mission

Launched on Artemis-1, BioSentinel carries a biology experiment into deep space for the first time in 50 years. A 6U CubeSat form factor was utilized for the spacecraft which included technologies newly developed or adapted for operations beyond Earth orbit. The spacecraft carries onboard budding yeast, Saccharomyces cerevisiae, as an analog to human cells to test the biological response to deep space radiation. This was the maiden deep-space voyage for many of the subsystems, and the first time to evaluate their performance in flight operation. Flying a CubeSat beyond LEO comes with unique challenges with respect to trajectory uncertainty and mission operations planning. The nominal plan was a lunar fly-by, followed by an insertion into Heliocentric orbit. However, some possible scenarios included lunar eclipses that could have severely impacted the power budget during that phase of the mission, while others could have resulted in a “Retrograde” hyperbola at swing-by resulting in the spacecraft traveling inward toward Earth or even towards a collision with the lunar surface. The commissioning phase of the mission was successful and completed a week ahead of schedule. It did not come without its exciting moments and challenges. First contact with the spacecraft uncovered that the vehicle was unexpectedly tumbling after deployment, a situation that needed to be corrected urgently. The mission operations team executed a contingency plan to stabilize the spacecraft, with just moments to spare before the battery ran out of power. The BioSensor payload onboard the spacecraft is a complex instrument that includes microfluidics, fluid systems, sensor control electronics, as well at the living yeast cells. BioSentinel also included a TimePix radiation sensor implemented by JSC’s RadWorks group. Dose and Linear Energy Transfer (LET) data is compared directly to the rate of DSB-and repair events measured by the S. cerevisiae cells. BioSentinel mature nanosatellite technologies included: deep space communications and navigation, autonomous attitude control and momentum management, and micro-propulsion systems, to provide an adaptable nanosatellite platform for deep space uses. This paper discusses the performance of the BioSentinel spacecraft through the mission phase, and includes lessons learned from challenges and anomalies. BioSentinel had many successes and will be a pathfinder for future deep space CubeSats and biology missions.

BioSentinel↗

Biosentinel: The First Deep Space Biology CubeSat Mission- Mission Summary and Lessons Learned

Launched on Artemis-1, BioSentinel carries a biology experiment into deep space for the first time in 50 years. A 6U CubeSat form factor was utilized for the spacecraft which included technologies newly developed or adapted for operations beyond Earth orbit. The spacecraft carries onboard budding yeast, Saccharomyces cerevisiae, as an analog to human cells to test the biological response to deep space radiation. This was the maiden deep-space voyage for many of the subsystems, and the first time to evaluate their performance in flight operation. Flying a CubeSat beyond LEO comes with unique challenges with respect to trajectory uncertainty and mission operations planning. The nominal plan was a lunar fly-by, followed by an insertion into Heliocentric orbit. However, some possible scenarios included lunar eclipses that could have severely impacted the power budget during that phase of the mission, while others could have resulted in a “Retrograde” hyperbola at swing-by resulting in the spacecraft traveling inward toward Earth or even towards a collision with the lunar surface. The commissioning phase of the mission was successful and completed a week ahead of schedule. It did not come without its exciting moments and challenges. First contact with the spacecraft uncovered that the vehicle was unexpectedly tumbling after deployment, a situation that needed to be corrected urgently. The mission operations team executed a contingency plan to stabilize the spacecraft, with just moments to spare before the battery ran out of power. The BioSensor payload onboard the spacecraft is a complex instrument that includes microfluidics, fluid systems, sensor control electronics, as well at the living yeast cells. BioSentinel also included a TimePix radiation sensor implemented by JSC’s RadWorks group. Dose and Linear Energy Transfer (LET) data is compared directly to the rate of DSB-and repair events measured by the S. cerevisiae cells. BioSentinel mature nanosatellite technologies included: deep space communications and navigation, autonomous attitude control and momentum management, and micro-propulsion systems, to provide an adaptable nanosatellite platform for deep space uses. This paper discusses the performance of the BioSentinel spacecraft through the mission phase, and includes lessons learned from challenges and anomalies. BioSentinel had many successes and will be a pathfinder for future deep space CubeSats and biology missions.

BioSentinel↗