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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 91 records · Page 5

SECURED: Simulator-Enhanced Control and Understanding of Reactor systems for cyber-Event Defense

The study discusses a learning approach for analyzing cyber-events in reactor systems using integrated hardware and personal computer simulator models. Key points include the rise in cyber-attacks and their sophistication in industrial control systems (ICS), the necessity for awareness, understanding, resource allocation, and preparation to combat these threats, and the digital transformation of old and new nuclear plants, increasing their exposure to cyber threats. It highlights the cyber vulnerabilities of advanced reactor systems, which rely on digital instrumentation and control for operations and safety functions, making them susceptible to cyber-attacks. The approach involves demonstrating reactor system plant ICS cyber-attacks under various operational conditions utilizing tools like simulator models and hardware-based kits. A strategic solution approach tailored to critical infrastructure is emphasized, along with community engagement for public and government support, adopting effective learning approaches, and the preparation for anticipated future challenges. The presentation concludes with a call to action to address challenges, leverage opportunities, and advance through lesson learning in cybersecurity for nuclear energy systems.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Cyber-Resilient Automatic Generation Control for Systems of AC Microgrids

In this paper we propose a co-design of the secondary frequency regulation in systems of AC microgrids and its cyber security solutions. We term the secondary frequency regulator a Micro-Automatic Generation Control (μ AGC) for highlighting its same functionality as the AGC in bulk power systems. We identify sensory challenges and cyber threats facing the μ AGC. To address the sensory challenges, we introduce a new microgrid model by exploiting the rank-one deficiency property of microgrid dynamics. This model is used to pose an optimal μ AGC control problem that is easily implemented, because it does not require fast frequency measurements. An end-to-end cyber security solution to the False Data Injection (FDI) attack detection and mitigation is developed for the proposed μ AGC. The front-end barrier of applying off-the-shelf algorithms for cyber attack detection is removed by introducing a data-driven modeling approach. Finally, we propose an observer-based corrective control for an islanded microgrid and a collaborative mitigation scheme in systems of AC microgrids. We demonstrate a collaborative role of systems of microgrids during cyber attacks. Furthermore, the performance of the proposed cyber-resilient μ AGC is tested in a system of two networked microgrids.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Anomaly Detection for Resilient Control Systems Using Fuzzy-Neural Data Fusion Engine

Resilient control systems in critical infrastructures require increased cyber-security and state-awareness. One of the necessary conditions for achieving the desired high level of resiliency is timely reporting and understanding of the status and behavioral trends of the control system. This paper describes the design and development of a neural-network based data-fusion system for increased state-awareness of resilient control systems. The proposed system consists of a dedicated data-fusion engine for each component of the control system. Each data-fusion engine implements three-layered alarm system consisting of: (1) conventional threshold-based alarms, (2) anomalous behavior detector using self-organizing maps, and (3) prediction error based alarms using neural network based signal forecasting. The proposed system was integrated with a model of the Idaho National Laboratory Hytest facility, which is a testing facility for hybrid energy systems. Experimental results demonstrate that the implemented data fusion system provides timely plant performance monitoring and cyber-state reporting.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

The Spaceport Command and Control System Security Assessor Project

This Summer, I worked as a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Internships and Fellowships (NIF) intern under my mentor, Jill Giles within the Software Engineering Branch. Within this project, I worked alongside the Cyber Security branch to identify a list of Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) software to analyze, research, and gain insight about potential vulnerabilities within the software that could become a threat of attack. After identifying the list of COTS software, my team and I used Microsoft Excel to create a worksheet to easily organize and design a questionnaire about the software. Security reports weregiven to us to identify the software used on the machines in the firing rooms. With these reports, we created a script that would populate the database with the software information to identify potential security weaknesses of COTS software.The goal of the project was to produce a final report, summarizing the most vulnerable launch control system servers and configurations and document vulnerabilities, residual risk, likelihood, and consequence. This project is important for the Cyber Security and Information Technology branches because it will identify security weaknesses and help to mitigate risk. From the Spaceport Command and Control System Security Assessor Project, I learned how to properly identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities within software and how to mitigate the risks within the software. This project also taught me how to create databases using scripts and input files.

Destani Satora Van Arsdalen↗

Attack Scenarios Relating to Army Facility-Related Control Systems: Quantifying the Cost to Secure and Cost Savings of the Army’s FRCS Program

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) analyzed the cyber-threat environment to U.S. Army facilities. This report describes three key factors in securing Army-owned facility-related control systems (FRCS). First, Section 1.0 provides background information about the project. Section 2.0 describes the various types of cyber-attacks. Section 3.0 provides a series of attack scenarios from real-world use cases are described in Section 3. These examples are relevant to the Army because the targeted systems or operating environments are like those used at Army installations. An estimated range for the cost to secure these systems is described in Section 4.0. Finally, the cost savings of preventing these kinds of attacks are described in Section 5.0.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Information flow for security in control systems

This paper considers the development of information flow analyses to support resilient design and active detection of adversaries in cyber physical systems (CPS). CPS security, though well studied, suffers from fragmentation. In this paper, we consider control systems as an abstraction of CPS. Here, we use information flow analysis, a well established set of methods developed in software security, to obtain a unified framework that captures and extends results in control system security. Specifically, we propose the Kullback Liebler (KL) divergence as a causal measure of information flow, which quantifies the effect of adversarial inputs on sensor outputs. We show that the proposed measure characterizes the resilience of control systems to specific attack strategies by relating the KL divergence to optimal detection. We then relate information flows to stealthy attack scenarios where an adversary can bypass detection. Finally, this article examines active detection mechanisms where a defender intelligently manipulates control inputs or the system itself to elicit information flows from an attacker's malicious behavior. In all previous cases, we demonstrate an ability to investigate and extend existing results through the proposed information flow analyses.

Weerakkody, Sean↗

Cyber Security for Lighting Systems

Fact sheet discusses cyber threats unique to lighting control systems in buildings and helps facility managers identify the types of lighting control systems that could introduce cybersecurity risks. Download the fact sheet.

Cyber security↗

Scalable, Physical Effects Measurable Microgrid for Cyber Resilience Analysis (SPEMMCRA)

The ability to advance state of the art automated protections for industrial control systems (ICS) has as a precursor in the ability to understand the tradeoff space. That is, to enable a cyber feedback loop in a control system environment you must first consider both the security mitigation available, the benefits and the impacts to the control system functionality when the mitigation is used. More damaging impacts could be precipitated that the mitigation was intended to rectify. This paper details networked ICS that controls a simulation of the frequency response represented with the swing equation. The microgrid loads and base generation can be balanced through the control of an emulated battery and power inverter. The simulated plant, which is implemented in Raspberry Pi computers, provides an inexpensive platform to realize the physical effects of cyber attacks to show the tradeoffs of available mitigatoins. This network design can include a commercial ICS controller to introduce real world implementation of feedback controls, and provides a scalable, physical effects measurable Microgrid for cyber resilience analysis (SPEMMCRA).

42 ENGINEERING↗

Design and Evaluation of a Secure Virtual Power Plant.

For three years, Sandia National Laboratories, Georgia Institute of Technology, and University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign investigated a smart grid vision in which renewable-centric Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) provided ancillary services with interoperable distributed energy resources (DER). This team researched, designed, built, and evaluated real-time VPP designs incorporating DER forecasting, stochastic optimization, controls, and cyber security to construct a system capable of delivering reliable ancillary services, which have been traditionally provided by large power plants or other dedicated equipment. VPPs have become possible through an evolving landscape of state and national interconnection standards, which now require DER to include grid-support functionality and communications capabilities. This makes it possible for third party aggregators to provide a range of critical grid services such as voltage regulation, frequency regulation, and contingency reserves to grid operators. This paradigm (a) enables renewable energy, demand response, and energy storage to participate in grid operations and provide grid services, (b) improves grid reliability by providing additional operating reserves for utilities, independent system operators (ISOs), and regional transmission organization (RTOs), and (c) removes renewable energy high-penetration barriers by providing services with photovoltaics and wind resources that traditionally were the jobs of thermal generators. Therefore, it is believed VPP deployment will have far-reaching positive consequences for grid operations and may provide a robust pathway to high penetrations of renewables on US power systems. In this report, we design VPPs to provide a range of grid-support services and demonstrate one VPP which simultaneously provides bulk-system energy and ancillary reserves.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

The NREL Sensor Laboratory Detection of Hydrogen Emissions

The development of a functional hydrogen detection system is a multifaceted process that integrates hardware, deployments strategies, and analytics which can be supported by the NREL Sensor Laboratory: 1. Support of the design, validation and optimization of sensing prototypes; 2. Guide optimized sensing element development, including control electronics; 3. Laboratory testing to validate/optimize metrological performance (measurement range, detection limit, etc.); 4. Provide test sites for field deployments representative of real-world scenarios with controlled hydrogen releases; 5. Develop sensor placement and operation guidance; 6. Provide guidance on electronics to accommodate facility integration; 7. Electrical safety designs to allow for operation within restricted zones; 8. Integration into facility monitoring and control systems; 9. Guide incorporation of cyber security elements to protect facilities from malicious attacks; 10. Modeling and application of advanced analytics to detect and quantify emissions; 11. Higher Order dispersion models to guide sensor placement for reliable detection; 12. Advanced analytics for improved metrological performances, and to inform inverse modeling; 13. Market support and commercialization (national and international markets); 14. Commercial deployments in H2@SCALE markets (e.g., HUBs and other large-scale hydrogen markets); and 15. Leverage off international collaborations/partnerships (e.g., NREL is on the advisory board for the European initiative "pre-Normative Research on Hydrogen Releases Assessment"-NHyRA).

08 HYDROGEN↗

Network visualization, intrusion detection, and network healing

The present disclosure is related to a cyber-security system that includes a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) network monitor configured to receive a data set from a power system network, an event manager, and a mitigation system, where the SCADA network monitor includes an anomaly detector.

Rivera, Joshua Eli↗

'Known Secure Sensor Measurements' for Critical Infrastructure Systems: Detecting Falsification of System State

This paper describes a first investigation on a low cost and low false alarm, reliable mechanism for detecting manipulation of critical physical processes and falsification of system state. We call this novel mechanism Known Secure Sensor Measurements (KSSM). The method moves beyond analysis of network traffic and host based state information, in fact it uses physical measurements of the process being controlled to detect falsification of state. KSSM is intended to be incorporated into the design of new, resilient, cost effective critical infrastructure control systems. It can also be included in incremental upgrades of already in- stalled systems for enhanced resilience. KSSM is based on known secure physical measurements for assessing the likelihood of an attack and will demonstrate a practical approach to creating, transmitting, and using the known secure measurements for detection.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Deny-by-Default Network Port Security: SPaRC Technical Bulletin #002

Operational Technology (OT) networks [e.g., industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems] have unique cyber security challenges due to their decades long service life, high availability requirements, and limited visibility. OT networks often take credit for being “air gapped” (i.e. disconnected from the Internet) and all devices within the OT network can “talk” to each other—even if they should not. This SPaRC Technical Bulletin describes how the unique limitations of OT networks can become strengths when it comes to cybersecurity.

Cybersecurity↗

Interdisciplinary Education through “Edutainment”: Electric Grid Resilient Control Systems Course

As energy companies and governments attempt to get more from the existing power grid and other critical infrastructures, more automatic control systems are being applied 1-2. With this greater reliance on network-based, digital automation and the stresses of pressing existing infrastructure for greater performance, the power grid and underlying systems have become more susceptible to both malicious attacks and unexpected, natural threats. Governments and other stakeholders have chosen to address infrastructure issues by the implementation of a smarter grid. In the smart grid, operators and control systems supervise power generation, distribution, transmission, and loads to utilize these assets most efficiently3. Such extensive monitoring and control over a distributed system cause complexity that challenge systems designers and human operators in new ways. In addition, cyber vulnerability of these systems has been illustrated in many recent articles on malicious attacks to electric power systems and other similar infrastructure for natural gas, water and communications4. It is therefore critical in the next generation of control systems that resilience plays a large and critical role in the grid design and development. Resilient control systems is a field of research that seeks solutions to the complexity through a holistic approach that combines cognitive science, computer security, communications, and control systems. To enable future researchers and practitioners to assist with designing more resilient systems, science, technology, engineering and mathematics education needs to incorporate interdisciplinary topics. While electrical engineering and computer science programs in the nation include a cyber-security perspective, few if any have focused on the unique control system aspects. Human cognitive aspects are most definitely not addressed in technology education discourse. To this end, a class and education tools in resilient control systems have been created.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Quantifying Availability in SCADA Environments Using the Cyber Security Metric MFC

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are distributed networks dispersed over large geographic areas that aim to monitor and control industrial processes from remote areas and/or a centralized location. They are used in the management of critical infrastructures such as electric power generation, transmission and distribution, water and sewage, manufacturing/industrial manufacturing as well as oil and gas production. The availability of SCADA systems is tantamount to assuring safety, security and profitability. SCADA systems are the backbone of the national cyber-physical critical infrastructure. Herein, we explore the definition and quantification of an econometric measure of availability, as it applies to SCADA systems; our metric is a specialization of the generic measure of mean failure cost.

Availability↗

Modeling and simulation for cyber-physical system security research, development and applications.

This paper describes a new hybrid modeling and simulation architecture developed at Sandia for understanding and developing protections against and mitigations for cyber threats upon control systems. It first outlines the challenges to PCS security that can be addressed using these technologies. The paper then describes Virtual Control System Environments (VCSE) that use this approach and briefly discusses security research that Sandia has performed using VCSE. It closes with recommendations to the control systems security community for applying this valuable technology.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Supervisory Control System Architecture for Advanced Small Modular Reactors

This technical report was generated as a product of the Supervisory Control for Multi-Modular SMR Plants project within the Instrumentation, Control and Human-Machine Interface technology area under the Advanced Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Research and Development Program of the U.S. Department of Energy. The report documents the definition of strategies, functional elements, and the structural architecture of a supervisory control system for multi-modular advanced SMR (AdvSMR) plants. This research activity advances the state-of-the art by incorporating decision making into the supervisory control system architectural layers through the introduction of a tiered-plant system approach. The report provides a brief history of hierarchical functional architectures and the current state-of-the-art, describes a reference AdvSMR to show the dependencies between systems, presents a hierarchical structure for supervisory control, indicates the importance of understanding trip setpoints, applies a new theoretic approach for comparing architectures, identifies cyber security controls that should be addressed early in system design, and describes ongoing work to develop system requirements and hardware/software configurations.

Cetiner, Sacit M.↗

Using Discrete Event Simulation to Model Attacker Interactions with Cyber and Physical Security Systems

The number of connections between physical and cyber security systems is rapidly increasing due to centralized control from automated and remotely connected means. As the number of interfaces between systems continues to grow, the interactions and interdependencies between them cannot be ignored. Historically, physical and cyber vulnerability assessments have been performed independently. This independent evaluation omits important aspects of the integrated system, where the impacts resulting from malicious or opportunistic attacks are not easily known or understood. Here, we describe a discrete event simulation model that uses information about integrated physical and cyber security systems, attacker characteristics and simple response rules to identify key safeguards that limit an attacker's likelihood of success. Key features of the proposed model include comprehensive data generation to support a variety of sophisticated analyses, and full parameterization of safeguard performance characteristics and attacker behaviours to evaluate a range of scenarios. Lastly, we also describe the core data requirements and the network of networks that serves as the underlying simulation structure.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗