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At least 91 records · Page 5

Anomaly Detection for Resilient Control Systems Using Fuzzy-Neural Data Fusion Engine

Resilient control systems in critical infrastructures require increased cyber-security and state-awareness. One of the necessary conditions for achieving the desired high level of resiliency is timely reporting and understanding of the status and behavioral trends of the control system. This paper describes the design and development of a neural-network based data-fusion system for increased state-awareness of resilient control systems. The proposed system consists of a dedicated data-fusion engine for each component of the control system. Each data-fusion engine implements three-layered alarm system consisting of: (1) conventional threshold-based alarms, (2) anomalous behavior detector using self-organizing maps, and (3) prediction error based alarms using neural network based signal forecasting. The proposed system was integrated with a model of the Idaho National Laboratory Hytest facility, which is a testing facility for hybrid energy systems. Experimental results demonstrate that the implemented data fusion system provides timely plant performance monitoring and cyber-state reporting.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Attack Scenarios Relating to Army Facility-Related Control Systems: Quantifying the Cost to Secure and Cost Savings of the Army’s FRCS Program

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) analyzed the cyber-threat environment to U.S. Army facilities. This report describes three key factors in securing Army-owned facility-related control systems (FRCS). First, Section 1.0 provides background information about the project. Section 2.0 describes the various types of cyber-attacks. Section 3.0 provides a series of attack scenarios from real-world use cases are described in Section 3. These examples are relevant to the Army because the targeted systems or operating environments are like those used at Army installations. An estimated range for the cost to secure these systems is described in Section 4.0. Finally, the cost savings of preventing these kinds of attacks are described in Section 5.0.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Information flow for security in control systems

This paper considers the development of information flow analyses to support resilient design and active detection of adversaries in cyber physical systems (CPS). CPS security, though well studied, suffers from fragmentation. In this paper, we consider control systems as an abstraction of CPS. Here, we use information flow analysis, a well established set of methods developed in software security, to obtain a unified framework that captures and extends results in control system security. Specifically, we propose the Kullback Liebler (KL) divergence as a causal measure of information flow, which quantifies the effect of adversarial inputs on sensor outputs. We show that the proposed measure characterizes the resilience of control systems to specific attack strategies by relating the KL divergence to optimal detection. We then relate information flows to stealthy attack scenarios where an adversary can bypass detection. Finally, this article examines active detection mechanisms where a defender intelligently manipulates control inputs or the system itself to elicit information flows from an attacker's malicious behavior. In all previous cases, we demonstrate an ability to investigate and extend existing results through the proposed information flow analyses.

Weerakkody, Sean↗

Cyber Security for Lighting Systems

Fact sheet discusses cyber threats unique to lighting control systems in buildings and helps facility managers identify the types of lighting control systems that could introduce cybersecurity risks. Download the fact sheet.

Cyber security↗

Scalable, Physical Effects Measurable Microgrid for Cyber Resilience Analysis (SPEMMCRA)

The ability to advance state of the art automated protections for industrial control systems (ICS) has as a precursor in the ability to understand the tradeoff space. That is, to enable a cyber feedback loop in a control system environment you must first consider both the security mitigation available, the benefits and the impacts to the control system functionality when the mitigation is used. More damaging impacts could be precipitated that the mitigation was intended to rectify. This paper details networked ICS that controls a simulation of the frequency response represented with the swing equation. The microgrid loads and base generation can be balanced through the control of an emulated battery and power inverter. The simulated plant, which is implemented in Raspberry Pi computers, provides an inexpensive platform to realize the physical effects of cyber attacks to show the tradeoffs of available mitigatoins. This network design can include a commercial ICS controller to introduce real world implementation of feedback controls, and provides a scalable, physical effects measurable Microgrid for cyber resilience analysis (SPEMMCRA).

42 ENGINEERING↗

Design and Evaluation of a Secure Virtual Power Plant.

For three years, Sandia National Laboratories, Georgia Institute of Technology, and University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign investigated a smart grid vision in which renewable-centric Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) provided ancillary services with interoperable distributed energy resources (DER). This team researched, designed, built, and evaluated real-time VPP designs incorporating DER forecasting, stochastic optimization, controls, and cyber security to construct a system capable of delivering reliable ancillary services, which have been traditionally provided by large power plants or other dedicated equipment. VPPs have become possible through an evolving landscape of state and national interconnection standards, which now require DER to include grid-support functionality and communications capabilities. This makes it possible for third party aggregators to provide a range of critical grid services such as voltage regulation, frequency regulation, and contingency reserves to grid operators. This paradigm (a) enables renewable energy, demand response, and energy storage to participate in grid operations and provide grid services, (b) improves grid reliability by providing additional operating reserves for utilities, independent system operators (ISOs), and regional transmission organization (RTOs), and (c) removes renewable energy high-penetration barriers by providing services with photovoltaics and wind resources that traditionally were the jobs of thermal generators. Therefore, it is believed VPP deployment will have far-reaching positive consequences for grid operations and may provide a robust pathway to high penetrations of renewables on US power systems. In this report, we design VPPs to provide a range of grid-support services and demonstrate one VPP which simultaneously provides bulk-system energy and ancillary reserves.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

The NREL Sensor Laboratory Detection of Hydrogen Emissions

The development of a functional hydrogen detection system is a multifaceted process that integrates hardware, deployments strategies, and analytics which can be supported by the NREL Sensor Laboratory: 1. Support of the design, validation and optimization of sensing prototypes; 2. Guide optimized sensing element development, including control electronics; 3. Laboratory testing to validate/optimize metrological performance (measurement range, detection limit, etc.); 4. Provide test sites for field deployments representative of real-world scenarios with controlled hydrogen releases; 5. Develop sensor placement and operation guidance; 6. Provide guidance on electronics to accommodate facility integration; 7. Electrical safety designs to allow for operation within restricted zones; 8. Integration into facility monitoring and control systems; 9. Guide incorporation of cyber security elements to protect facilities from malicious attacks; 10. Modeling and application of advanced analytics to detect and quantify emissions; 11. Higher Order dispersion models to guide sensor placement for reliable detection; 12. Advanced analytics for improved metrological performances, and to inform inverse modeling; 13. Market support and commercialization (national and international markets); 14. Commercial deployments in H2@SCALE markets (e.g., HUBs and other large-scale hydrogen markets); and 15. Leverage off international collaborations/partnerships (e.g., NREL is on the advisory board for the European initiative "pre-Normative Research on Hydrogen Releases Assessment"-NHyRA).

08 HYDROGEN↗

Network visualization, intrusion detection, and network healing

The present disclosure is related to a cyber-security system that includes a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) network monitor configured to receive a data set from a power system network, an event manager, and a mitigation system, where the SCADA network monitor includes an anomaly detector.

Rivera, Joshua Eli↗

'Known Secure Sensor Measurements' for Critical Infrastructure Systems: Detecting Falsification of System State

This paper describes a first investigation on a low cost and low false alarm, reliable mechanism for detecting manipulation of critical physical processes and falsification of system state. We call this novel mechanism Known Secure Sensor Measurements (KSSM). The method moves beyond analysis of network traffic and host based state information, in fact it uses physical measurements of the process being controlled to detect falsification of state. KSSM is intended to be incorporated into the design of new, resilient, cost effective critical infrastructure control systems. It can also be included in incremental upgrades of already in- stalled systems for enhanced resilience. KSSM is based on known secure physical measurements for assessing the likelihood of an attack and will demonstrate a practical approach to creating, transmitting, and using the known secure measurements for detection.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Deny-by-Default Network Port Security: SPaRC Technical Bulletin #002

Operational Technology (OT) networks [e.g., industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems] have unique cyber security challenges due to their decades long service life, high availability requirements, and limited visibility. OT networks often take credit for being “air gapped” (i.e. disconnected from the Internet) and all devices within the OT network can “talk” to each other—even if they should not. This SPaRC Technical Bulletin describes how the unique limitations of OT networks can become strengths when it comes to cybersecurity.

Cybersecurity↗

Interdisciplinary Education through “Edutainment”: Electric Grid Resilient Control Systems Course

As energy companies and governments attempt to get more from the existing power grid and other critical infrastructures, more automatic control systems are being applied 1-2. With this greater reliance on network-based, digital automation and the stresses of pressing existing infrastructure for greater performance, the power grid and underlying systems have become more susceptible to both malicious attacks and unexpected, natural threats. Governments and other stakeholders have chosen to address infrastructure issues by the implementation of a smarter grid. In the smart grid, operators and control systems supervise power generation, distribution, transmission, and loads to utilize these assets most efficiently3. Such extensive monitoring and control over a distributed system cause complexity that challenge systems designers and human operators in new ways. In addition, cyber vulnerability of these systems has been illustrated in many recent articles on malicious attacks to electric power systems and other similar infrastructure for natural gas, water and communications4. It is therefore critical in the next generation of control systems that resilience plays a large and critical role in the grid design and development. Resilient control systems is a field of research that seeks solutions to the complexity through a holistic approach that combines cognitive science, computer security, communications, and control systems. To enable future researchers and practitioners to assist with designing more resilient systems, science, technology, engineering and mathematics education needs to incorporate interdisciplinary topics. While electrical engineering and computer science programs in the nation include a cyber-security perspective, few if any have focused on the unique control system aspects. Human cognitive aspects are most definitely not addressed in technology education discourse. To this end, a class and education tools in resilient control systems have been created.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Quantifying Availability in SCADA Environments Using the Cyber Security Metric MFC

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are distributed networks dispersed over large geographic areas that aim to monitor and control industrial processes from remote areas and/or a centralized location. They are used in the management of critical infrastructures such as electric power generation, transmission and distribution, water and sewage, manufacturing/industrial manufacturing as well as oil and gas production. The availability of SCADA systems is tantamount to assuring safety, security and profitability. SCADA systems are the backbone of the national cyber-physical critical infrastructure. Herein, we explore the definition and quantification of an econometric measure of availability, as it applies to SCADA systems; our metric is a specialization of the generic measure of mean failure cost.

Availability↗

Modeling and simulation for cyber-physical system security research, development and applications.

This paper describes a new hybrid modeling and simulation architecture developed at Sandia for understanding and developing protections against and mitigations for cyber threats upon control systems. It first outlines the challenges to PCS security that can be addressed using these technologies. The paper then describes Virtual Control System Environments (VCSE) that use this approach and briefly discusses security research that Sandia has performed using VCSE. It closes with recommendations to the control systems security community for applying this valuable technology.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Supervisory Control System Architecture for Advanced Small Modular Reactors

This technical report was generated as a product of the Supervisory Control for Multi-Modular SMR Plants project within the Instrumentation, Control and Human-Machine Interface technology area under the Advanced Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Research and Development Program of the U.S. Department of Energy. The report documents the definition of strategies, functional elements, and the structural architecture of a supervisory control system for multi-modular advanced SMR (AdvSMR) plants. This research activity advances the state-of-the art by incorporating decision making into the supervisory control system architectural layers through the introduction of a tiered-plant system approach. The report provides a brief history of hierarchical functional architectures and the current state-of-the-art, describes a reference AdvSMR to show the dependencies between systems, presents a hierarchical structure for supervisory control, indicates the importance of understanding trip setpoints, applies a new theoretic approach for comparing architectures, identifies cyber security controls that should be addressed early in system design, and describes ongoing work to develop system requirements and hardware/software configurations.

Cetiner, Sacit M.↗

Using Discrete Event Simulation to Model Attacker Interactions with Cyber and Physical Security Systems

The number of connections between physical and cyber security systems is rapidly increasing due to centralized control from automated and remotely connected means. As the number of interfaces between systems continues to grow, the interactions and interdependencies between them cannot be ignored. Historically, physical and cyber vulnerability assessments have been performed independently. This independent evaluation omits important aspects of the integrated system, where the impacts resulting from malicious or opportunistic attacks are not easily known or understood. Here, we describe a discrete event simulation model that uses information about integrated physical and cyber security systems, attacker characteristics and simple response rules to identify key safeguards that limit an attacker's likelihood of success. Key features of the proposed model include comprehensive data generation to support a variety of sophisticated analyses, and full parameterization of safeguard performance characteristics and attacker behaviours to evaluate a range of scenarios. Lastly, we also describe the core data requirements and the network of networks that serves as the underlying simulation structure.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Deep Cyber-Physical Situational Awareness for Energy Systems: A Secure Foundation for Next-Generation Energy Management

This document provides the final report for the CYPRES project. The purpose is (1) to highlight and summarize its major accomplishments and (2) to provide guidance on how its outcomes have informed and can inform important additional research and technology transfer. The goal of CYPRES was the research, development, and demonstration of a security-oriented next generation cyber-physical EMS for electric power systems that detects malicious and abnormal events through the fusion of cyber and physical data. To achieve this, the CYPRES project team researched, developed, and built a prototype of the solution, referred to as the CYPRES EMS. The CYPRES EMS is a proof-of-concept cyber-physical platform that demonstrates the management of the energy system, communications, security, and cyber-physical grid modeling and analytics. As part of the capabilities of the CYPRES EMS, the team designed and developed a suite of power system applications for monitoring, risk analyses, detection, and control that are inherently cyberaware. At its core, the project aimed to research, develop, and demonstrate a security-oriented next-generation cyber-physical Energy Management System (EMS) capable of detecting malicious and abnormal events through the innovative fusion of cyber and physical data. This approach represents a fundamental shift from traditional EMS, reimagining how critical infrastructure can be protected through unified cyber-aware and physics-aware secure data flow pipelines. The project’s cornerstone deliverable, the CYPRES EMS, serves as a proof-of-concept cyber-physical platform that revolutionizes the management of energy systems, communications, security, and cyber-physical grid modeling and analytics. This prototype implements a comprehensive suite of power system applications for monitoring, risk analyses, detection, and control, all designed with inherent cyber awareness. The system’s architecture extends from end-devices in the field through to control center applications, establishing a secure and resilient control framework that addresses the challenges posed by diverse devices of unknown trustworthiness connecting to modern power systems. Through this innovative approach to deep cyber-physical situational awareness, the CYPRES project not only advances the state-of-the-art in energy infrastructure protection but also establishes a new paradigm for how EMS can be designed, deployed, and operated in an increasingly complex threat landscape. The findings and developments from this project provide crucial insights for stakeholders across the energy sector, offering a blueprint for enhancing the reliability and resilience of our nation’s critical energy infrastructure in the face of evolving cyber threats.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Control System Applicable Use Assessment of the Secure Computing Corporation - Secure Firewall (Sidewinder)

Battelle’s National Security & Defense objective is, “applying unmatched expertise and unique facilities to deliver homeland security solutions. From detection and protection against weapons of mass destruction to emergency preparedness/response and protection of critical infrastructure, we are working with industry and government to integrate policy, operational, technological, and logistical parameters that will secure a safe future”. In an ongoing effort to meet this mission, engagements with industry that are intended to improve operational and technical attributes of commercial solutions that are related to national security initiatives are necessary. This necessity will ensure that capabilities for protecting critical infrastructure assets are considered by commercial entities in their development, design, and deployment lifecycles thus addressing the alignment of identified deficiencies and improvements needed to support national cyber security initiatives. The Secure Firewall (Sidewinder) appliance by Secure Computing was assessed for applicable use in critical infrastructure control system environments, such as electric power, nuclear and other facilities containing critical systems that require augmented protection from cyber threat. The testing was performed in the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) Electric Infrastructure Operations Center (EIOC). The Secure Firewall was tested in a network configuration that emulates a typical control center network and then evaluated. A number of observations and recommendations are included in this report relating to features currently included in the Secure Firewall that support critical infrastructure security needs.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Intrusion Monitoring in Process Control Systems

To protect process control networks from cyber intrusions, preventive security measures such as perimeter defenses (for example, network firewalls and demilitarized zones) and secure versions of process control network protocols have been increasingly adopted or proposed. Although system hardening and fixing known vulnerabilities of existing systems are crucial to secure process control systems, intrusion monitoring is essential to ensure that the preventive measures are not compromised or bypassed. Our approach involves a multilayer security architecture for monitoring process control systems to achieve accurate and effective situational awareness. Also, we leverage some of the characteristics of process control systems such as the regularity of network traffic patterns to perform intrusion detection, with the potential to detect unknown attacks. To facilitate human analysts to gain a better understanding of anomalous network traffic patterns, we present a visualization tool that supports multiple usercustomizable views and animation for analyzing network packet traces.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗