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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Humans to Mars, but How Many? Using Imprint Human Performance Models to Inform Crew Size

HUMANS TO MARS, BUT HOW MANY? USING IMPRINT HUMAN PERFORMANCE MODELS TO INFORM CREW SIZE Missions to Mars will differ from previous human spaceflight missions in that the onboard crew of astronauts will be required to operate in an Earth-independent manner due to long communication delays. Without a systematic, repeatable process to determine the number and composition of crew necessary to successfully accomplish these missions, NASA increases the risk that crew sizes may be too small to meet primary mission objectives under nominal conditions and, more consequentially, that crewmembers may not have the expertise needed to successfully respond to unforeseen failures without the real-time expertise of the Mission Control Central (MCC) team NASA currently relies upon. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) is developing a methodology for assessing the trade space of factors that affect the number of crew for future missions. This methodology includes the consideration of results from three human performance models developed using the Improved Performance Research and Integration Tool (IMPRINT) modeling platform as well as a custom-built model on expertise trained within the crew. The custom-built crew expertise model results will be presented in the training sub-tag. Here we present results of the three IMPRINT models. Two of these models were built using IMPRINT’s Operations Model capability, with detailed task networks for specific systems and scenarios allowing for a comprehensive mental workload analysis on certain crew positions. The third model was built using IMPRINT’s Force Model capability, allowing for a higher-level manpower analysis based on crew engagement in activities performed over a longer Mars transit scenario, and how those activities may be impacted by unplanned events and new tasking unique to the Mars mission. Differences between the models will be presented, as well as examples of model results and a discussion of how those results may inform future Mars mission manpower requirements, system design, and operating procedures.

Donna L Dempsey↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Role of Trust and Usability in Enabling Spaceflight Crew Autonomy

Future long duration exploration missions will require an increased use of onboard automated systems as spaceflight crews venture further than before and have longer communications delays with ground support. The design of these systems must support appropriate crew trust and have sufficient usability to enable spaceflight crew autonomy or risk being misused while crews wait to communicate with ground support. We evaluated trust & usability in our self-scheduling tool, Playbook, for crew mission timelines. Data was collected in a controlled lab experiment with 31 participants. Participants in the study conducted two tasks: scheduling, where participants were responsible for scheduling a majority of a day's operational tasks, and rescheduling, where participants were provided a schedule and asked to reschedule higher priority activities. We found a significant correlation between system trust and usability, irrespective of self-scheduling tasks. We conclude that system usability may play a bigger role in how trust is learned while conducting novel crew autonomy tasks such as self-scheduling. Future research should investigate the role of usability to encourage appropriate trust in onboard automated crew systems and enable crew autonomy.

crew autonomy↗
NASA NTRS1988

Design of a fast crew transfer vehicle to Mars

A final report is made on the trajectory and vehicle requirements for a fast crew transfer vehicle to Mars which will complete an Earth to Mars (and Mars to Earth) transfer in 150 days and will have a stay time at Mars of 40 days. This vehicle will maximize the crew's effectiveness on Mars by minimizing detrimental physiological effects such as bone demineralization and loss of muscle tone caused by long period exposure to zero gravity and radiation from cosmic rays and solar flares. The crew transfer vehicle discussed will complete the second half of a Split Mission to Mars. In the Split Mission, a slow, unmanned cargo vehicle, nicknamed the Barge, is sent to Mars ahead of the crew vehicle. Once the Barge is in orbit around Mars, the fast crew vehicle will be launched to rendezvous with the Barge in Mars orbit. The vehicle presented is designed to carry six astronauts for a mission duration of one year. The vehicle uses a chemical propulsion system and a nuclear power system. Four crew modules, similar to the proposed Space Station Common Modules, are used to house the crew and support equipment during the mission. The final design also includes a command module that is shielded to protect the crew during radiation events.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1993

Data link air traffic control and flight deck environments: Experiment in flight crew performance

This report describes an experiment undertaken in a full mission simulation environment to investigate the performance impact of, and human/system response to, data-linked Air Traffic Control (ATC) and automated flight deck operations. Subjects were twenty pilots (ten crews) from a major United States air carrier. Crews flew the Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator (ACFS), a generic 'glass cockpit' simulator at NASA Ames. The method of data link used was similar to the data link implementation plans for a next-generation aircraft, and included the capability to review ATC messages and directly enter ATC clearance information into the aircraft systems. Each crew flew experimental scenarios, in which data reflecting communication timing, errors and clarifications, and procedures were collected. Results for errors and clarifications revealed an interaction between communication modality (voice v. data link) and communication type (air/ground v. intracrew). Results also revealed that voice crews initiated ATC contact significantly more than data link crews. It was also found that data link crews performed significantly more extraneous activities during the communication task than voice crews. Descriptive data from the use of the review menu indicate the pilot-not-flying accessing the review menu most often, and also suggest diffulty in accessing the target message within the review menu structure. The overall impact of communication modality upon air/ground communication and crew procedures is discussed.

Lozito, Sandy↗
NASA NTRS2000

A Human Factors Evaluation of a Methodology for Pressurized Crew Module Acceptability for Zero-Gravity Ingress of Spacecraft

This project aimed to develop a methodology for evaluating performance and acceptability characteristics of the pressurized crew module volume suitability for zero-gravity (g) ingress of a spacecraft and to evaluate the operational acceptability of the NASA crew return vehicle (CRV) for zero-g ingress of astronaut crew, volume for crew tasks, and general crew module and seat layout. No standard or methodology has been established for evaluating volume acceptability in human spaceflight vehicles. Volume affects astronauts'ability to ingress and egress the vehicle, and to maneuver in and perform critical operational tasks inside the vehicle. Much research has been conducted on aircraft ingress, egress, and rescue in order to establish military and civil aircraft standards. However, due to the extremely limited number of human-rated spacecraft, this topic has been un-addressed. The NASA CRV was used for this study. The prototype vehicle can return a 7-member crew from the International Space Station in an emergency. The vehicle's internal arrangement must be designed to facilitate rapid zero-g ingress, zero-g maneuverability, ease of one-g egress and rescue, and ease of operational tasks in multiple acceleration environments. A full-scale crew module mockup was built and outfitted with representative adjustable seats, crew equipment, and a volumetrically equivalent hatch. Human factors testing was conducted in three acceleration environments using ground-based facilities and the KC-135 aircraft. Performance and acceptability measurements were collected. Data analysis was conducted using analysis of variance and nonparametric techniques.

Sanchez, Merri J.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Matching Crew Diet and Crop Food Production in BIO-Plex

This paper matches the BIO-Plex crop food production to the crew diet requirements. The expected average calorie requirement for BIO-Plex is 2,975 Calories per crewmember per day, for a randomly selected crew with a typical level of physical activity. The range of 2,550 to 3,400 Calories will cover about two-thirds of all crews. The exact calorie requirement will depend on the gender composition, individual weights, exercise, and work effort of the selected crew. The expected average crewmember calorie requirement can be met by 430 grams of carbohydrate, 100 grams of fat, and 90 grams of protein per crewmember per day, for a total of 620 grams. Some fat can replaced by carbohydrate. Each crewmember requires only 2 grams of vitamins and minerals per day. Only unusually restricted diets may lack essential nutrients. The Advanced Life Support (ALS) consensus is that BIO-Plex should grow wheat, potato, and soybean, and maybe sweet potato or peanut, and maybe lettuce and tomato. The BIO-Plex Biomass Production System food production and the external food supply must be matched to the crew diet requirement for calories and nutritional balance. The crop production and external supply specifications can each be varied as long as their sum matches the required diet specification. We have wide flexibility in choosing the crops and resupply. We can easily grow one-half the crew calories in one BIO-Plex Biomass Production Chamber (BPC) if we grow only the most productive crops (wheat, potato, and sweet potato) and it we achieve nominal crop productivity. If we assume higher productivity we can grow a wider variety of crops. If we grow one-half of the crew calories, externally supplied foods can easily provide the other half of the calories and balance the diet. We can not grow 95 percent of the crew calories in two BPCs at nominal productivity while growing a balanced diet. We produce maximum calories by growing wheat, potato, and peanut.

Jones, Harry↗
NASA NTRS2008

Cooling Properties of the Shuttle Advanced Crew Escape Spacesuit: Results of an Environmental Chamber Experiment

The shuttle crew wears the Advanced Crew Escape Spacesuit (ACES) to protect themselves from cabin decompression and to support bail out during landing. ACES is cooled by a liquid-cooled garment (LCG) that interfaces to a heat exchanger that dumps heat into the cabin. The ACES outer layer is made of Gore-Tex(Registered TradeMark), permitting water vapor to escape while containing oxygen. The crew can only lose heat via insensible water losses and the LCG. Under nominal landing operations, the average cabin temperature rarely exceeds 75 F, which is adequate for the ACES to function. Problem A rescue shuttle will need to return 11 crew members if the previous mission suffers a thermal protection system failure, preventing it from returning safely to Earth. Initial analysis revealed that 11 crew members in the shuttle will increase cabin temperature at wheel stop above 80 F, which decreases the ACES ability to keep crew members cool. Air flow in the middeck of the shuttle is inhomogeneous and some ACES may experience much higher temperatures that could cause excessive thermal stress to crew members. Methods A ground study was conducted to measure the cooling efficiency of the ACES at 75 F, 85 F, and 95 F at 50% relative humidity. Test subjects representing 5, 50, and 95 percentile body habitus of the astronaut corps performed hand ergometry keeping their metabolic rate at 400, 600, and 800 BTU/hr for one hour. Core temperature was measured by rectal probe and skin, while inside and outside the suit. Environmental chamber wall and cooling unit inlet and outlet temperatures were measured using high-resolution thermistors ( 0.2 C). Conclusions Under these test conditions, the ACES was able to protect the core temperature of all test subjects, however thermal stress due to high insensible losses and skin temperature and skin heat flow may impact crew performance. Further research should be performed to understand the impact on cognitive performance.

Hamilton, Douglas↗
NASA NTRS2009

Hubble Space Telescope Crew Rescue Analysis

In the aftermath of the 2003 Columbia accident NASA removed the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Servicing Mission 4 (SM4) from the Space Shuttle manifest. Reasons cited included concerns that the risk of flying the mission would be too high. There was at the time no viable technique to repair the orbiter s thermal protection system if it were to be damaged by debris during ascent. Furthermore in the event of damage, since the mission was not to the International Space Station, there was no safe haven for the crew to wait for an extended period of time for a rescue. The HST servicing mission was reconsidered because of improvements in the ascent debris environment, the development of techniques for the astronauts to perform on orbit repairs to damage thermal protection, and the development of a strategy to provide a crew rescue capability. However, leading up to the launch of servicing mission, the HST crew rescue capability was a recurring topic. For HST there was a limited amount of time available to perform a crew rescue because of the limited consumables available on the Orbiter. The success of crew rescue depends upon several factors including when a problem is identified, when and to what extent power down procedures are begun, and where the rescue vehicle is in its ground processing cycle. Severe power downs maximize crew rescue success but would eliminate the option for the orbiter servicing the HST to attempt a landing. Therefore, crew rescue success needed to be weighed against preserving the ability of the orbiter to have landing option in case there was a problem with the rescue vehicle. This paper focuses on quantification of the HST mission loss of crew rescue capability using Shuttle historical data and various power down capabilities. That work supported NASA s decision to proceed with the HST service mission, which was successfully completed on May 24th 2009.

Hamlin, Teri L.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Introduction of the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident, Investigation Details, Findings and Crew Survival Investigation Report

As the Space Shuttle Program comes to an end, it is important that the lessons learned from the Columbia accident be captured and understood by those who will be developing future aerospace programs and supporting current programs. Aeromedical lessons learned from the Accident were presented at AsMA in 2005. This Panel will update that information, closeout the lessons learned, provide additional information on the accident and provide suggestions for the future. To set the stage, an overview of the accident is required. The Space Shuttle Columbia was returning to Earth with a crew of seven astronauts on 1Feb, 2003. It disintegrated along a track extending from California to Louisiana and observers along part of the track filmed the breakup of Columbia. Debris was recovered from Littlefield, Texas to Fort Polk, Louisiana, along a 567 statute mile track; the largest ever recorded debris field. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded its investigation in August 2003, and released their findings in a report published in February 2004. NASA recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew and the Space Shuttle Program managers commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT) to accomplish this. Their task was to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training and procedures intended to protect the crew. NASA released the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report in December 2008. Key personnel have been assembled to give you an overview of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the medical response, the medico-legal issues, the SCSIIT findings and recommendations and future NASA flight surgeon spacecraft accident response training. Educational Objectives: Set the stage for the Panel to address the investigation, medico-legal issues, the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team report and training for accident response.

Chandler, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2011

Crew Health and Performance Improvements with Reduced Carbon Dioxide Levels and the Resource Impact to Accomplish Those Reductions

Carbon dioxide (CO2) removal is one of the primary functions of the International Space Station (ISS) atmosphere revitalization systems. Primary CO2 removal is via the ISS s two Carbon Dioxide Removal Assemblies (CDRAs) and the Russian carbon dioxide removal assembly (Vozdukh); both of these systems are regenerable, meaning that their CO2 removal capacity theoretically remains constant as long as the system is operating. Contingency CO2 removal capability is provided by lithium hydroxide (LiOH) canisters, which are consumable, meaning that their CO2 removal capability disappears once the resource is used. With the advent of 6 crew ISS operations, experience showing that CDRA failures are not uncommon, and anecdotal association of crew symptoms with CO2 values just above 4 mmHg, the question arises: How much lower do we keep CO2 levels to minimize the risk to crew health and performance, and what will the operational cost to the CDRAs be to do it? The primary crew health concerns center on the interaction of increased intracranial pressure from fluid shifts and the increased intracranial blood flow induced by CO2. Typical acute symptoms include headache, minor visual disturbances, and subtle behavioral changes. The historical database of CO2 exposures since the beginning of ISS operations has been compared to the incidence of crew symptoms reported in private medical conferences. We have used this database in an attempt to establish an association between the CO2 levels and the risk of crew symptoms. This comparison will answer the question of the level needed to protect the crew from acute effects. As for the second part of the question, operation of the ISS s regenerable CO2 removal capability reduces the limited life of constituent parts. It also consumes limited electrical power and thermal control resources. Operation of consumable CO2 removal capability (LiOH) uses finite consumable materials, which must be replenished in the long term. Therefore, increased CO2 removal means increased resource use, with increased logistical capability to maintain necessary resources on board ISS. We must strike a balance between sufficiently low CO2 levels to maintain crew health and CO2 levels which are operationally feasible for the ISS program

James, John T.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Crew Survivability After a Rapid Cabin Depressurization Event

Anecdotal evidence acquired through historic failure investigations involving rapid cabin decompression (e.g. Challenger, Columbia and Soyuz 11) show that full evacuation of the cabin atmosphere may occur within seconds. During such an event, the delta-pressure between the sealed suit ventilation system and the cabin will rise at the rate of the cabin depressurization; potentially at a rate exceeding the capability of the suit relief valve. It is possible that permanent damage to the suit pressure enclosure and ventilation loop components may occur as the integrated system may be subjected to delta pressures in excess of the design to pressures. Additionally, as the total pressure of the suit ventilation system decreases, so does the oxygen available to the crew. The crew may be subjected to a temporary incapacitating, but non-lethal, hypoxic environment. It is expected that the suit will maintain a survivable atmosphere on the crew until the vehicle pressure control system recovers or the cabin has otherwise attained a habitable environment. A common finding from the aforementioned reports indicates that the crew would have had a better chance at surviving the event had they been in a protective configuration, that is, in a survival suit. Making use of these lessons learned, the Constellation Program implemented a suit loop in the spacecraft design and required that the crew be in a protective configuration, that is suited with gloves on and visors down, during dynamic phases of flight that pose the greatest risk for a rapid and uncontrolled cabin depressurization event: ascent, entry, and docking. This paper details the evaluation performed to derive suit pressure garment and ventilation system performance parameters that would lead to the highest probability of crew survivability after an uncontrolled crew cabin depressurization event while remaining in the realm of practicality for suit design. This evaluation involved: (1) assessment of stakeholder expectations to validate the functionality being imposed; (2) review/refinement of concept of operations to establish the potential triggers for such an event and define the response of the spacecraft and suit ventilation loop pressure control systems; and (3) assessment of system capabilities with respect to structural capability and pressure control. 1 Crew and Thermal Systems Division, NASA Johnson Space Center, Mail Code: AES29, 2101 NASA Parkway, Houston,

Sargusingh, Miriam J.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Flight Crew Health Stabilization Program

This document establishes the policy and procedures for the HSP and is authorized through the Director, Johnson Space Center (JSC). This document delineates the medical operations requirements for the HSP. The HSP goals are accomplished through an awareness campaign and procedures such as limiting access to flight crewmembers, medical screening, and controlling flight crewmember activities. NASA's Human Space Flight Program uses strategic risk mitigation to achieve mission success while protecting crew health and safety. Infectious diseases can compromise crew health and mission success, especially in the immediate preflight period. The primary purpose of the Flight Crew Health Stabilization Program (HSP) is to mitigate the risk of occurrence of infectious disease among astronaut flight crews in the immediate preflight period. Infectious diseases are contracted through direct person-to-person contact, and through contact with infectious material in the environment. The HSP establishes several controls to minimize crew exposure to infectious agents. The HSP provides a quarantine environment for the crew that minimizes contact with potentially infectious material. The HSP also limits the number of individuals who come in close contact with the crew. The infection-carrying potential of these primary contacts (PCs) is minimized by educating them in ways to avoid infections and avoiding contact with the crew if they are or may be sick. The transmission of some infectious diseases can be greatly curtailed by vaccinations. PCs are strongly encouraged to maintain updated vaccinations.

Johnston, Smith L.↗
NASA NTRS2015

The Evolution of On-Board Emergency Training for the International Space Station Crew

The crew of the International Space Station (ISS) receives extensive ground‐training in order to safely and effectively respond to any potential emergency event while on‐orbit, but few people realize that their training is not concluded when they launch into space. The evolution of the emergency On‐ Board Training events (OBTs) has recently moved from paper "scripts" to an intranet‐based software simulation that allows for the crew, as well as the flight control teams in Mission Control Centers across the world, to share in an improved and more realistic training event. This emergency OBT simulator ensures that the participants experience the training event as it unfolds, completely unaware of the type, location, or severity of the simulated emergency until the scenario begins. The crew interfaces with the simulation software via iPads that they keep with them as they translate through the ISS modules, receiving prompts and information as they proceed through the response. Personnel in the control centers bring up the simulation via an intranet browser at their console workstations, and can view additional telemetry signatures in simulated ground displays in order to assist the crew and communicate vital information to them as applicable. The Chief Training Officers and emergency instructors set the simulation in motion, choosing the type of emergency (rapid depressurization, fire, or toxic atmosphere) and specific initial conditions to emphasize the desired training objectives. Project development, testing, and implementation was a collaborative effort between ISS emergency instructors, Chief Training Officers, Flight Directors, and the Crew Office using commercial off the shelf (COTS) hardware along with simulation software created in‐house. Due to the success of the Emergency OBT simulator, the already‐developed software has been leveraged and repurposed to develop a new emulator used during fire response ground‐training to deliver data that the crew receives from the handheld Compound Specific Analyzer for Combustion Products (CSA‐CP). This CSA‐CP emulator makes use of a portion of codebase from the Emergency OBT simulator dealing with atmospheric contamination during fire scenarios, and feeds various data signatures to crew via an iPod Touch with a flight‐like CSA‐CP display. These innovative simulations, which make use of COTS hardware with custom in‐house software, have yielded drastic improvements to emergency training effectiveness and risk reduction for ISS crew and flight control teams during on‐orbit and ground training events.

LaBuff, Skyler↗
NASA NTRS2015

Mars Conjunction Crewed Missions With a Reusable Hybrid Architecture

A new crew Mars architecture has been developed that provides many potential benefits for NASA-led human Mars moons and surface missions beginning in the 2030s or 2040s. By using both chemical and electric propulsion systems where they are most beneficial and maintaining as much orbital energy as possible, the Hybrid spaceship that carries crew round trip to Mars is pre-integrated before launch and can be delivered to orbit by a single launch. After check-out on the way to cis-lunar space, it is refueled and can travel round trip to Mars in less than 1100 days, with a minimum of 300 days in Mars vicinity (opportunity dependent). The entire spaceship is recaptured into cis-lunar space and can be reused. The spaceship consists of a habitat for 4 crew attached to the Hybrid propulsion stage which uses long duration electric and chemical in-space propulsion technologies that are in use today. The hybrid architecture's con-ops has no in-space assembly of the crew transfer vehicle and requires only rendezvous of crew in a highly elliptical Earth orbit for arrival at and departure from the spaceship. The crew transfer vehicle does not travel to Mars so it only needs be able to last in space for weeks and re-enter at lunar velocities. The spaceship can be refueled and resupplied for multiple trips to Mars (every other opportunity). The hybrid propulsion stage for crewed transits can also be utilized for cargo delivery to Mars every other opportunity in a reusable manner to pre-deploy infrastructure required for Mars vicinity operations. Finally, the Hybrid architecture provides evolution options for mitigating key long-duration space exploration risks, including crew microgravity and radiation exposure.

Merrill, Raymond G.↗
NASA NTRS2015

AMO EXPRESS: A Command and Control Experiment for Crew Autonomy Onboard the International Space Station

NASA is investigating a range of future human spaceflight missions, including both Mars-distance and Near Earth Object (NEO) targets. Of significant importance for these missions is the balance between crew autonomy and vehicle automation. As distance from Earth results in increasing communication delays, future crews need both the capability and authority to independently make decisions. However, small crews cannot take on all functions performed by ground today, and so vehicles must be more automated to reduce the crew workload for such missions. NASA's Advanced Exploration Systems Program funded Autonomous Mission Operations (AMO) project conducted an autonomous command and control experiment on-board the International Space Station that demonstrated single action intelligent procedures for crew command and control. The target problem was to enable crew initialization of a facility class rack with power and thermal interfaces, and involving core and payload command and telemetry processing, without support from ground controllers. This autonomous operations capability is enabling in scenarios such as initialization of a medical facility to respond to a crew medical emergency, and representative of other spacecraft autonomy challenges. The experiment was conducted using the Expedite the Processing of Experiments for Space Station (EXPRESS) rack 7, which was located in the Port 2 location within the U.S Laboratory onboard the International Space Station (ISS). Activation and deactivation of this facility is time consuming and operationally intensive, requiring coordination of three flight control positions, 47 nominal steps, 57 commands, 276 telemetry checks, and coordination of multiple ISS systems (both core and payload). Utilization of Draper Laboratory's Timeliner software, deployed on-board the ISS within the Command and Control (C&C) computers and the Payload computers, allowed development of the automated procedures specific to ISS without having to certify and employ novel software for procedure development and execution. The procedures contained the ground procedure logic and actions as possible to include fault detection and recovery capabilities. The autonomous operations concept includes a reduction of the amount of data a crew operator is required to verify during activation or de-activation, as well as integration of procedure execution status and relevant data in a single integrated display. During execution, the auto-procedures (via Timerliner) provide a step-by-step messaging paradigm and a high-level status upon termination. This messaging and high-level status is the only data generated for operator display. To enhance situational awareness of the operator, the Web-based Procedure Display (WebPD) provides a novel approach to the issues of procedure display and execution tracking. WebPD is a web based application that serves as the user interface for electronic procedure execution. It incorporates several aspects of the HTML5 standard. Procedures are written in a dialect of XML called Procedure Representation Language (PRL). WebPD tracks execution status in the procedure or procedures being displayed. WebPD aggregates and simplifies the auto-sequence execution status information, and formatted to be easily followed and understood by an operator who is not dedicated to actively monitoring the task. WebPD also provides an integrated data and control interface to pause or halt the execution in order to provide a check point of operation and to examine progress before starting the next sequence of activities. For this demonstration, the procedure was initiated and monitored from the ground. As the Timeliner sequences executed, their high-level execution status was written to PLMDM memory. This memory is read and downlinked via Ku-Band at a 1 Hz rate. The data containing the high-level execution status is de-commutated on the ground, and rebroadcast for WebPD consumption. A future demonstration will be performed onboard, with ISS astronauts initiating the operations instead of ground controllers. The AMO EXPRESS experiment demonstrated activation and de-activation of EXPRESS rack 7, providing the capability of future single button activations and deactivations of facility class racks. The experiment achieved numerous technical and operations 'firsts' for the ISS

Stetson, Howard K.↗
NASA NTRS2017

An Alternative Approach to Human Servicing of Crewed Earth Orbiting Spacecraft

As crewed spacecraft have grown larger and more complex, they have come to rely on spacewalks, or Extravehicular Activities (EVA), for mission success and crew safety. Typically, these spacecraft maintain all of the hardware and trained personnel needed to perform an EVA on-board at all times. Maintaining this capability requires volume and up-mass for storage of EVA hardware, crew time for ground and on-orbit training, and on-orbit maintenance of EVA hardware. This paper proposes an alternative methodology, utilizing launch on-need hardware and crew to provide EVA capability for space stations in Earth orbit after assembly complete, in the same way that one would call a repairman to fix something at their home. This approach would reduce ground training requirements, save Intravehicular Activity (IVA) crew time in the form of EVA hardware maintenance and on-orbit training, and lead to more efficient EVAs because they would be performed by specialists with detailed knowledge and training stemming from their direct involvement in the development of the EVA. The on-orbit crew would then be available to focus on the immediate response to the failure as well as the day-to-day operations of the spacecraft and payloads. This paper will look at how current unplanned EVAs are conducted, including the time required for preparation, and offer alternatives for future spacecraft. As this methodology relies on the on-time and on-need launch of spacecraft, any space station that utilized this approach would need a robust transportation system including more than one launch vehicle capable of carrying crew. In addition, the fault tolerance of the space station would be an important consideration in how much time was available for EVA preparation after the failure. Each future program would have to weigh the risk of on-time launch against the increase in available crew time for the main objective of the spacecraft.

Mularski, John R.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Progress of Crew Autonomous Scheduling Test (CAST) On the ISS

The United States space policy is evolving toward missions beyond low Earth orbit. In an effort to meet that policy, NASA has recognized Autonomous Mission Operations (AMO) as a valuable capability. Identified within AMO capabilities is the potential for autonomous planning and replanning during human spaceflight operations. That is allowing crew members to collectively or individually participate in the development of their own schedules. Currently, dedicated mission operations planners collaborate with international partners to create daily plans for astronauts aboard the International Space Station (ISS), taking into account mission requirements, ground rules, and various vehicle and payload constraints. In future deep space operations the crew will require more independence from ground support due to communication transmission delays. Furthermore, crew members who are provided with the capability to schedule their own activities are able to leverage direct experience operating in the space environment, and possibly maximize their efficiency. CAST (Crew Autonomous Scheduling Test) is an ISS investigation designed to analyze three important hypotheses about crew autonomous scheduling. First, given appropriate inputs, the crew is able to create and execute a plan in a reasonable period of time without impacts to mission success. Second, the proximity of the planner, in this case the crew, to the planned operations increases their operational efficiency. Third, crew members are more satisfied when given a role in plan development. This presentation shows the progress done in this study with a single astronaut test subject participating in five CAST sessions. CAST is a technology demonstration payload sponsored by the ISS Research Science and Technology Office, and performed by experts in Mission Operations Planning from the Flight Operations Directorate at NASA Johnson Space Center, and researchers across multiple NASA centers.

Healy, Matthew↗
NASA NTRS2020

Characterization of How CO2 Level May Impact Crew Performance Related to the HSIA Risk

Safety and mission critical anomalies are inevitable on NASA exploration missions. Delays and interruptions in communication with Earth-experts drives the requirement that crew resolve these anomalies on their own. The Human Factors and Behavioral Performance (HFBP) element of the NASA Human Research Program (HRP) recently stood-up the Human-System Integration Architecture (HSIA) risk. The specific risk statement is: “Given decreasing real-time ground support for execution of complex operations during future exploration missions, there is a possibility of adverse performance outcomes including that crew are unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety critical procedural errors.” Reliable, on-board capabilities will need to support the crew - not only to resolve anomalies, but also to promote situation awareness (SA) and to reduce workload. Unfortunately, the present level of technological advancement limits the range of achievable intelligent support (Wu & Vera, 2019). The Human Capabilities Assessment for Autonomous Missions (HCAAM) projects were devised to identify how technology may benefit crew situation awareness and enhance crew trust in the intelligent systems. A suite of time-critical and complex exploration tasks have been identified (Holden et al., 2019) that may advance human-integration Concept of Operations (ConOps) development. This ConOps (a future HFBP directed task) along with standards and guidelines (Holden et al., 2019) may be used as the foundation for human-system requirements for a self-reliant crew. Spaceflight CO2 levels are elevated relative to terrestrial levels. Above 2.5 mmHg there is an increase in the incidence of crew headaches (Law et al., 2014) and Mission Control reports of mood and performance changes in the crew. The concern is that elevated CO2 effects may exacerbate the HSIA risk. Unfortunately, effects of higher concentrations of CO2 on performance decrements are not well established. The main goal of the current report is to identify how elevated CO2 impacts the HSIA risk. The approach taken is to trace the relationship between cognitive and motor abilities required for anomaly response with critical mission tasks and the level of technological advancement to support anomaly resolution to identify how elevated CO2 may impact the HSIA risk. The conclusion is that elevated CO2 could exacerbate the HSIA risk. Several research gaps are identified.

cognition↗