Results for “Engineering Risk Assessment” — Page 5

NASA NTRS2007

Software Safety Risk in Legacy Safety-Critical Computer Systems

Safety-critical computer systems must be engineered to meet system and software safety requirements. For legacy safety-critical computer systems, software safety requirements may not have been formally specified during development. When process-oriented software safety requirements are levied on a legacy system after the fact, where software development artifacts don't exist or are incomplete, the question becomes 'how can this be done?' The risks associated with only meeting certain software safety requirements in a legacy safety-critical computer system must be addressed should such systems be selected as candidates for reuse. This paper proposes a method for ascertaining formally, a software safety risk assessment, that provides measurements for software safety for legacy systems which may or may not have a suite of software engineering documentation that is now normally required. It relies upon the NASA Software Safety Standard, risk assessment methods based upon the Taxonomy-Based Questionnaire, and the application of reverse engineering CASE tools to produce original design documents for legacy systems.

Hill, Janice↗

NASA NTRS1978

Hazards of lithium thionyl chloride batteries

Two different topics which only relate in that they are pertinent to lithium thionyl chloride battery safety are discussed. The first topic is a hazards analysis of a system (risk assessment), a formal approach that is used in nuclear engineering, predicting oil spills, etc. It is a formalized approach for obtaining assessment of the degree of risk associated with the use of any particular system. The second topic is a small piece of chemistry related to the explosions that can occur with lithium thionyl chloride systems. After the two topics are presented, a discussion is generated among the Workshop participants.

Parry, J. M.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Assessment

The Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) Project requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) conduct an independent evaluation of the Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) models used in the latest JPSS MMOD risk assessment. The principal focus of the assessment was to compare Orbital Debris Engineering Model version 3 (ORDEM 3.0) with the Meteoroid and Space Debris Terrestrial Environment Reference version 2009 (MASTER-2009) and Aerospace Debris Environment Projection Tool (ADEPT) and provide recommendations to the JPSS Project regarding MMOD protection. The outcome of the NESC assessment is contained in this report.

Squire, Michael D.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Computational Analyses in Support of Sub-scale Diffuser Testing for the A-3 Facility: Steady Predictions - Part 1

Simulation technology can play an important role in rocket engine test facility design and development by assessing risks, providing analysis of dynamic pressure and thermal loads, identifying failure modes and predicting anomalous behavior of critical systems. Advanced numerical tools assume greater significance in supporting testing and design of high altitude testing facilities and plume induced testing environments of high thrust engines because of the greater inter-dependence and synergy in the functioning of the different sub-systems. This is especially true for facilities such as the proposed A-3 facility at NASA SSC because of a challenging operating envelope linked to variable throttle conditions at relatively low chamber pressures. Facility designs in this case will require a complex network of diffuser ducts, steam ejector trains, fast operating valves, cooling water systems and flow diverters that need to be characterized for steady state performance. In this paper, we will demonstrate with the use of CFD analyses s advanced capability to evaluate supersonic diffuser and steam ejector performance in a sub-scale A-3 facility at NASA Stennis Space Center (SSC) where extensive testing was performed. Furthermore, the focus in this paper relates to modeling of critical sub-systems and components used in facilities such as the A-3 facility. The work here will address deficiencies in empirical models and current CFD analyses that are used for design of supersonic diffusers/turning vanes/ejectors as well as analyses for confined plumes and venting processes. The primary areas that will be addressed are: (1) supersonic diffuser performance including analyses of thermal loads (2) accurate shock capturing in the diffuser duct; (3) effect of turning duct on the performance of the facility (4) prediction of mass flow rates and performance classification for steam ejectors (5) comparisons with test data from sub-scale diffuser testing and assessment of confidence levels in CFD based flowpath modeling of the facility. The analyses tools used here expand on the multi-element unstructured CFD which has been tailored and validated for impingement dynamics of dry plumes, complex valve/feed systems, and high pressure propellant delivery systems used in engine and component test stands at NASA SSC. The analyses performed in the evaluation of the sub-scale diffuser facility explored several important factors that influence modeling and understanding of facility operation such as (a) importance of modeling the facility with Real Gas approximation, (b) approximating the cluster of steam ejector nozzles as a single annular nozzle, (c) existence of mixed subsonic/supersonic flow downstream of the turning duct, and (d) inadequacy of two-equation turbulence models in predicting the correct pressurization in the turning duct and expansion of the second stage steam ejectors. The procedure used for modeling the facility was as follows: (i) The engine, test cell and first stage ejectors were simulated with an axisymmetric approximation (ii) the turning duct, second stage ejectors and the piping downstream of the second stage ejectors were analyzed with a three-dimensional simulation utilizing a half-plane symmetry approximation. The solution i.e. primitive variables such as pressure, velocity components, temperature and turbulence quantities were passed from the first computational domain and specified as a supersonic boundary condition for the second simulation. (iii) The third domain comprised of the exit diffuser and the region in the vicinity of the facility (primary included to get the correct shock structure at the exit of the facility and entrainment characteristics). The first set of simulations comprising the engine, test cell and first stage ejectors was carried out both as a turbulent real gas calculation as well as a turbulent perfect gas calculation. A comparison for the two cases (Real Turbulent and Perfect gas turbulent) of the Ma Number distribution and temperature distributions are shown in Figures 1 and 2 respectively. The Mach Number distribution shows small yet distinct differences between the two cases such as locations of shocks/shock reflections and a slightly different impingement point on the wall of the diffuser from the expansion at the exit of the nozzle. Similarly the temperature distribution indicates different flow recirculation patterns in the test cell. Both cases capture all the essential flow phenomena such as the shock-boundary layer interaction, plume expansion, expansion of the first stage ejectors, mixing between the engine plume and the first stage ejector flow and pressurization due to the first stage ejectors. The final paper will discuss thermal loads on the walls of the diffuser and cooling mechanisms investigated.

Allgood, Daniel C.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Computational Analyses in Support of Sub-scale Diffuser Testing for the A-3 Facility: Steady Predictions - Part 1

Simulation technology can play an important role in rocket engine test facility design and development by assessing risks, providing analysis of dynamic pressure and thermal loads, identifying failure modes and predicting anomalous behavior of critical systems. Advanced numerical tools assume greater significance in supporting testing and design of high altitude testing facilities and plume induced testing environments of high thrust engines because of the greater inter-dependence and synergy in the functioning of the different sub-systems. This is especially true for facilities such as the proposed A-3 facility at NASA SSC because of a challenging operating envelope linked to variable throttle conditions at relatively low chamber pressures. Facility designs in this case will require a complex network of diffuser ducts, steam ejector trains, fast operating valves, cooling water systems and flow diverters that need to be characterized for steady state performance. In this paper, we will demonstrate with the use of CFD analyses s advanced capability to evaluate supersonic diffuser and steam ejector performance in a sub-scale A-3 facility at NASA Stennis Space Center (SSC) where extensive testing was performed. Furthermore, the focus in this paper relates to modeling of critical sub-systems and components used in facilities such as the A-3 facility. The work here will address deficiencies in empirical models and current CFD analyses that are used for design of supersonic diffusers/turning vanes/ejectors as well as analyses for confined plumes and venting processes. The primary areas that will be addressed are: (1) supersonic diffuser performance including analyses of thermal loads (2) accurate shock capturing in the diffuser duct; (3) effect of turning duct on the performance of the facility (4) prediction of mass flow rates and performance classification for steam ejectors (5) comparisons with test data from sub-scale diffuser testing and assessment of confidence levels in CFD based flowpath modeling of the facility. The analyses tools used here expand on the multi-element unstructured CFD which has been tailored and validated for impingement dynamics of dry plumes, complex valve/feed systems, and high pressure propellant delivery systems used in engine and component test stands at NASA SSC. The analyses performed in the evaluation of the sub-scale diffuser facility explored several important factors that influence modeling and understanding of facility operation such as (a) importance of modeling the facility with Real Gas approximation, (b) approximating the cluster of steam ejector nozzles as a single annular nozzle, (c) existence of mixed subsonic/supersonic flow downstream of the turning duct, and (d) inadequacy of two-equation turbulence models in predicting the correct pressurization in the turning duct and expansion of the second stage steam ejectors. The procedure used for modeling the facility was as follows: (i) The engine, test cell and first stage ejectors were simulated with an axisymmetric approximation (ii) the turning duct, second stage ejectors and the piping downstream of the second stage ejectors were analyzed with a three-dimensional simulation utilizing a half-plane symmetry approximation. The solution i.e. primitive variables such as pressure, velocity components, temperature and turbulence quantities were passed from the first computational domain and specified as a supersonic boundary condition for the second simulation. (iii) The third domain comprised of the exit diffuser and the region in the vicinity of the facility (primary included to get the correct shock structure at the exit of the facility and entrainment characteristics). The first set of simulations comprising the engine, test cell and first stage ejectors was carried out both as a turbulent real gas calculation as well as a turbulent perfect gas calculation. A comparison for the two cases (Real Turbulent and Perfect gas turbulent) of the Ma Number distribution and temperature distributions are shown in Figures 1 and 2 respectively.

Allgood, Daniel C.↗

NASA NTRS2011

NASA Applications and Lessons Learned in Reliability Engineering

Since the Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986, communities across NASA have been developing and extensively using quantitative reliability and risk assessment methods in their decision making process. This paper discusses several reliability engineering applications that NASA has used over the year to support the design, development, and operation of critical space flight hardware. Specifically, the paper discusses several reliability engineering applications used by NASA in areas such as risk management, inspection policies, components upgrades, reliability growth, integrated failure analysis, and physics based probabilistic engineering analysis. In each of these areas, the paper provides a brief discussion of a case study to demonstrate the value added and the criticality of reliability engineering in supporting NASA project and program decisions to fly safely. Examples of these case studies discussed are reliability based life limit extension of Shuttle Space Main Engine (SSME) hardware, Reliability based inspection policies for Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) turbine disc, probabilistic structural engineering analysis for reliability prediction of the SSME alternate turbo-pump development, impact of ET foam reliability on the Space Shuttle System risk, and reliability based Space Shuttle upgrade for safety. Special attention is given in this paper to the physics based probabilistic engineering analysis applications and their critical role in evaluating the reliability of NASA development hardware including their potential use in a research and technology development environment.

Safie, Fayssal M.↗

NASA NTRS2022

Numerical Characterization of Astronaut CaOx Renal Stone Incidence Rates to Quantify In-flight and Post-flight Relative Risk

Changes in urine chemistry potentially alter the risk of renal stone formation in astronauts. Quantifying spaceflight renal stone incidence risk compared to pre-flight levels remains a significant challenge for assessing the appropriate vehicle, mission, and countermeasure design. A computational biochemistry model representing CaOx crystal precipitation, growth, and agglomeration is combined with a probabilistic analysis to predict the in- and post-flight CaOx renal stone incidence risk ratio (IRR) relative to pre-flight values using 1517 astronaut 24-hour urine chemistries. Our simulations predict that in-flight fluid intake alone would need to increase from current prescriptions of 2.0 - 2.5 L/day to approximately 3.2 L/day to approach CaOx IRR of the pre-flight population. Bone protective interventions would reduce CaOx risk to pre-flight levels if Ca excretion alone is reduced to < 150 mg/day or if current levels are diminished to 190mg/day in combination with increasing fluid intake to 2.5 - 2.7 L/day. This analysis provides a quantitative risk assessment that can influence the critical balance between engineering and astronaut health requirements.

renal stones↗

NASA NTRS2018

Risk Management at NASA and Its Applicability to the Oil and Gas Industry

NASA has a world-class capability for quantitatively assessing the risk of highly-complex, isolated engineering structures operated in extremely hostile environments. In particular, the International Space Station (ISS) represents a reasonable risk analog for High Pressure, High Temperature drilling and production operations on deepwater rigs. Through a long-term U.S. Government Interagency Agreement, BSEE has partnered with NASA to modify NASA's Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) capabilities for application to deepwater drilling and production operations. The immediate focus of the activity will be to modify NASA PRA Procedure Guides and Methodology Documents to make them applicable to the Oil &Gas Industry. The next step will be for NASA to produce a PRA for a critical drilling system component, such as a Blowout Preventer (BOP). Subsequent activities will be for NASA and industry partners to jointly develop increasingly complex PRA's that analyze other critical drilling and production system components, including both hardware and human reliability. In the presentation, NASA will provide the objectives, schedule, and current status of its PRA activities for BSEE. Additionally, NASA has a Space Act Agreement with Anadarko Petroleum Corporation to develop a PRA for a generic 20K BOP. NASA will summarize some of the preliminary insights gained to date from that 20K BOP PRA as an example of the distinction between quantitative versus qualitative risk assessment.

PRA↗

NASA NTRS2013

Practical Application of PRA as an Integrated Design Tool for Space Systems

This paper presents the application of the first comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) during the design phase of a joint NASA/NOAA weather satellite program, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite Series R (GOES-R). GOES-R is the next generation weather satellite primarily to help understand the weather and help save human lives. PRA has been used at NASA for Human Space Flight for many years. PRA was initially adopted and implemented in the operational phase of manned space flight programs and more recently for the next generation human space systems. Since its first use at NASA, PRA has become recognized throughout the Agency as a method of assessing complex mission risks as part of an overall approach to assuring safety and mission success throughout project lifecycles. PRA is now included as a requirement during the design phase of both NASA next generation manned space vehicles as well as for high priority robotic missions. The influence of PRA on GOES-R design and operation concepts are discussed in detail. The GOES-R PRA is unique at NASA for its early implementation. It also represents a pioneering effort to integrate risks from both Spacecraft (SC) and Ground Segment (GS) to fully assess the probability of achieving mission objectives. PRA analysts were actively involved in system engineering and design engineering to ensure that a comprehensive set of technical risks were correctly identified and properly understood from a design and operations perspective. The analysis included an assessment of SC hardware and software, SC fault management system, GS hardware and software, common cause failures, human error, natural hazards, solar weather and infrastructure (such as network and telecommunications failures, fire). PRA findings directly resulted in design changes to reduce SC risk from micro-meteoroids. PRA results also led to design changes in several SC subsystems, e.g. propulsion, guidance, navigation and control (GNC), communications, mechanisms, and command and data handling (C&DH). The fault tree approach assisted in the development of the fault management system design. Human error analysis, which examined human response to failure, indicated areas where automation could reduce the overall probability of gaps in operation by half. In addition, the PRA brought to light many potential root causes of system disruptions, including earthquakes, inclement weather, solar storms, blackouts and other extreme conditions not considered in the typical reliability and availability analyses. Ultimately the PRA served to identify potential failures that, when mitigated, resulted in a more robust design, as well as to influence the program's concept of operations. The early and active integration of PRA with system and design engineering provided a well-managed approach for risk assessment that increased reliability and availability, optimized lifecyc1e costs, and unified the SC and GS developments.

Kalia, Prince↗

NASA NTRS2003

Space Shuttle Main Engine Implications for the Abort-to-Orbit Off-the-Pad Study

In 2001, the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) project office was contacted by the Space Shuttle Ascent Guidance, Navigation, and Control group to provide the engine perspective for an Abort-to-Orbit (ATO) study. The purpose of the AT0 Off-the-Pad study was to determine the feasibility of eliminating the Return to Launch Site and Transatlantic abort modes by using a five-segment solid rocket booster and throttling the remaining SSMEs to a higher power level. This would enable all abort modes to be Abort-to-Orbit. The SSME project office at Marshall Space Flight Center collaborated with MSFC's Space Transportation Directorate and Rocketdyne Propulsion and Power to provide the AT0 Off-the-Pad study with the analysis required. Power levels at 109%, 1 11% and 1 13% of rated power level were studied as well as mixture ratio decreases down to 5.85. SSME was to evaluate and define the technical and programmatic impacts to certify the SSME to these abort power levels. The SSME systems analysis group performed a steady state analysis using the SSME power balance model to determine if there were any technical issues associated with higher power level, low mixture ratio operation. Based on each power level/mixture ratio combination, an engine certification plan was created and a preliminary probabilistic risk assessment was performed. The results showed favorable results for higher power 1evel/lower mixture ratio SSME operation. In nearly all performance and redline parameters, the traded engine operation was encompassed by nominal engine performance of a prior engine configuration.

Schoffstoll, Dayna L.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Johnson Space Center's Risk and Reliability Analysis Group 2008 Annual Report

The Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate s Risk and Reliability Analysis Group provides both mathematical and engineering analysis expertise in the areas of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) analysis, and data collection and analysis. The fundamental goal of this group is to provide National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) decisionmakers with the necessary information to make informed decisions when evaluating personnel, flight hardware, and public safety concerns associated with current operating systems as well as with any future systems. The Analysis Group includes a staff of statistical and reliability experts with valuable backgrounds in the statistical, reliability, and engineering fields. This group includes JSC S&MA Analysis Branch personnel as well as S&MA support services contractors, such as Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and SoHaR. The Analysis Group s experience base includes nuclear power (both commercial and navy), manufacturing, Department of Defense, chemical, and shipping industries, as well as significant aerospace experience specifically in the Shuttle, International Space Station (ISS), and Constellation Programs. The Analysis Group partners with project and program offices, other NASA centers, NASA contractors, and universities to provide additional resources or information to the group when performing various analysis tasks. The JSC S&MA Analysis Group is recognized as a leader in risk and reliability analysis within the NASA community. Therefore, the Analysis Group is in high demand to help the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) continue to fly safely, assist in designing the next generation spacecraft for the Constellation Program (CxP), and promote advanced analytical techniques. The Analysis Section s tasks include teaching classes and instituting personnel qualification processes to enhance the professional abilities of our analysts as well as performing major probabilistic assessments used to support flight rationale and help establish program requirements. During 2008, the Analysis Group performed more than 70 assessments. Although all these assessments were important, some were instrumental in the decisionmaking processes for the Shuttle and Constellation Programs. Two of the more significant tasks were the Space Transportation System (STS)-122 Low Level Cutoff PRA for the SSP and the Orion Pad Abort One (PA-1) PRA for the CxP. These two activities, along with the numerous other tasks the Analysis Group performed in 2008, are summarized in this report. This report also highlights several ongoing and upcoming efforts to provide crucial statistical and probabilistic assessments, such as the Extravehicular Activity (EVA) PRA for the Hubble Space Telescope service mission and the first fully integrated PRAs for the CxP's Lunar Sortie and ISS missions.

Valentine, Mark↗

NASA NTRS1997

NASA/JSC orbital debris models

The orbital debris models developed within the framework of the NASA Johnson Space Center's (JSC's) orbital debris program, are categorized as environment definition and risk assessment models. The EVOLVE, CHAIN and the orbital debris engineering model 1996 (ORDEM96) computer programs determine the past, present and future orbital particulate environment, while the BUMPER and debris assessment software (DAS) computer programs provide a means for evaluating the risks of specific space missions. These models are presented. To support these models and to conduct specialized analyses, NASA/JSC employs a range of auxiliary models, including explosion and collision satellite breakup models, hypervelocity impact ballistic limit models, orbit propagation and decay models, space traffic models and solid rocket motor effluent models.

Johnson, Nicholas↗

NASA NTRS2019

Meteoroid Engineering Model (MEM) 3: NASA’s Newest Meteoroid Model

Meteoroid impacts threaten spacecraft and astronauts at all locations within the Solar System. At certain altitudes in low-Earth orbit, orbital debris dominates the risk, but meteoroids are more significant within 250 km of the Earth’s surface and above 4000 km [1]. In interplanetary space, orbital debris is nonexistent and meteoroids constitute the entire population of potentially dangerous impactors. The NASA Meteoroid Environment Office (MEO) produces the Meteoroid Engineering Model (MEM) to support meteoroid impact risk assessments [2]; MEM is a stand-alone piece of software that describes the flux, speed, directionality, and bulk density of meteoroids striking a spacecraft on a user-supplied trajectory. The MEO released version 3 of MEM in 2019 [3]. This proceeding describes the orbital populations that form the core of MEM, highlights key differences between MEM 3 and its predecessors, discusses the implications of these changes for spacecraft, summarizes our validation against meteor and in-situ data, and delineates the model’s limitations.

Moorhead, Althea V.↗

NASA NTRS1993

Report of the SSME assessment team

In response to a request from the House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology in its Report No. 102-500 of April 22, 1992, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) created an ad hoc task force to conduct a thorough assessment of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). The membership was drawn mostly from organizations other than ASAP, and this report represents the views of that task force. Its task was to assess the risk that the SSME poses to the safe operation of the Space Shuttle, to identify and evaluate improvements to the engine that would reduce the risk, and to recommend a set of priorities for the implementation of these improvements. The SSME Assessment Team, as it opted to call itself, convened in mid-1992 and, subsequently, met with and gathered information from all the principal organizations involved in the SSME program. These included the Rocketdyne Division of Rockwell International, the Marshall Space Flight Center of NASA, and the Pratt & Whitney Division of United Technologies Corporation. The information in this report reflects the program status as of October 1992. From the information received, the Team formed its conclusions and recommendations. Changes in the program status have, of course, occurred since that time; however, they did not affect the Team's conclusions and recommendations.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2000

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA): A Bibliography

Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is a bottom-up analytical process that identifies process hazards, which helps managers understand vulnerabilities of systems, as well as assess and mitigate risk. It is one of several engineering tools and techniques available to program and project managers aimed at increasing the likelihood of safe and successful NASA programs and missions. This bibliography references 465 documents in the NASA STI Database that contain the major concepts, failure modes or failure analysis, in either the basic index of the major subject terms.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1999

Aerospace Systems Design in NASA's Collaborative Engineering Environment

Past designs of complex aerospace systems involved an environment consisting of collocated design teams with project managers, technical discipline experts, and other experts (e.g. manufacturing and systems operations). These experts were generally qualified only on the basis of past design experience and typically had access to a limited set of integrated analysis tools. These environments provided less than desirable design fidelity, often lead to the inability of assessing critical programmatic and technical issues (e.g., cost risk, technical impacts), and generally derived a design that was not necessarily optimized across the entire system. The continually changing, modern aerospace industry demands systems design processes that involve the best talent available (no matter where it resides) and access to the best design and analysis tools. A solution to these demands involves a design environment referred to as collaborative engineering. The collaborative engineering environment evolving within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is a capability that enables the Agency's engineering infrastructure to interact and use the best state-of-the-art tools and data across organizational boundaries. Using collaborative engineering, the collocated team is replaced with an interactive team structure where the team members are geographically distributed and the best engineering talent can be applied to the design effort regardless of physical location. In addition, a more efficient, higher quality design product is delivered by bringing together the best engineering talent with more up-to-date design and analysis tools. These tools are focused on interactive, multidisciplinary design and analysis with emphasis on the complete life cycle of the system, and they include nontraditional, integrated tools for life cycle cost estimation and risk assessment. NASA has made substantial progress during the last two years in developing a collaborative engineering environment. NASA is planning to use this collaborative engineering infrastructure to provide better aerospace systems life cycle design and analysis, which includes analytical assessment of the technical and programmatic aspects of a system from "cradle to grave." This paper describes the recent NASA developments in the area of collaborative engineering, the benefits (realized and anticipated) of using the developed capability, and the long-term plans for implementing this capability across the Agency.

Monell, Donald W.↗

NASA NTRS2000

Aerospace Systems Design in NASA's Collaborative Engineering Environment

Past designs of complex aerospace systems involved an environment consisting of collocated design teams with project managers, technical discipline experts, and other experts (e.g., manufacturing and systems operation). These experts were generally qualified only on the basis of past design experience and typically had access to a limited set of integrated analysis tools. These environments provided less than desirable design fidelity, often lead to the inability of assessing critical programmatic and technical issues (e.g., cost, risk, technical impacts), and generally derived a design that was not necessarily optimized across the entire system. The continually changing, modern aerospace industry demands systems design processes that involve the best talent available (no matter where it resides) and access to the the best design and analysis tools. A solution to these demands involves a design environment referred to as collaborative engineering. The collaborative engineering environment evolving within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is a capability that enables the Agency's engineering infrastructure to interact and use the best state-of-the-art tools and data across organizational boundaries. Using collaborative engineering, the collocated team is replaced with an interactive team structure where the team members are geographical distributed and the best engineering talent can be applied to the design effort regardless of physical location. In addition, a more efficient, higher quality design product is delivered by bringing together the best engineering talent with more up-to-date design and analysis tools. These tools are focused on interactive, multidisciplinary design and analysis with emphasis on the complete life cycle of the system, and they include nontraditional, integrated tools for life cycle cost estimation and risk assessment. NASA has made substantial progress during the last two years in developing a collaborative engineering environment. NASA is planning to use this collaborative engineering engineering infrastructure to provide better aerospace systems life cycle design and analysis, which includes analytical assessment of the technical and programmatic aspects of a system from "cradle to grave." This paper describes the recent NASA developments in the area of collaborative engineering, the benefits (realized and anticipated) of using the developed capability, and the long-term plans for implementing this capability across Agency.

Monell, Donald W.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Evaluating Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk Assessments Using Anomaly Data

The accuracy of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) risk assessments can be difficult to evaluate. A team from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) has completed a study that compared MMOD-related failures on operational satellites to predictions of how many of those failures should occur using NASA's TM"s MMOD risk assessment methodology and tools. The study team used the Poisson probability to quantify the degree of inconsistency between the predicted and reported numbers of failures. Many elements go into a risk assessment, and each of those elements represent a possible source of uncertainty or bias that will influence the end result. There are also challenges in obtaining accurate and useful data on MMOD-related failures.

Squire, Michael↗