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The susceptibility of a stereo amplifier to damage from a spectrum of lengths of graphite fibers was calculated. A simple analysis was developed by which such calculations can be based on test results with fibers of uniform lengths. A statistical analysis was applied for the conversation of data for various logical failure criteria.
The increasing complexity of many safety critical systems poses new problems for mishap analysis. Techniques developed in the sixties and seventies cannot easily scale-up to analyze incidents involving tightly integrated software and hardware components. Similarly, the realization that many failures have systemic causes has widened the scope of many mishap investigations. Organizations, including NASA and the NTSB, have responded by starting research and training initiatives to ensure that their personnel are well equipped to meet these challenges. One strand of research has identified a range of mathematically based techniques that can be used to reason about the causes of complex, adverse events. The proponents of these techniques have argued that they can be used to formally prove that certain events created the necessary and sufficient causes for a mishap to occur. Mathematical proofs can reduce the bias that is often perceived to effect the interpretation of adverse events. Others have opposed the introduction of these techniques by identifying social and political aspects to incident investigation that cannot easily be reconciled with a logic-based approach. Traditional theorem proving mechanisms cannot accurately capture the wealth of inductive, deductive and statistical forms of inference that investigators routinely use in their analysis of adverse events. This paper summarizes some of the benefits that logics provide, describes their weaknesses, and proposes a number of directions for future research.
This paper describes the prelaunch and post-launch reliability functions which contributed to the success of the Mariner 9 spacecraft. Examples are included to illustrate how each reliability activity was a vital part of each phase of the project. Prelaunch reliability functions included: (1) establishing, negotiating, and monitoring system and subsystem requirements, (2) participating in spacecraft system and subsystem design/hardware reviews, (3) monitoring preparation of failure mode effects and criticality analyses (FMECA), (4) establishing and managing a problem failure reporting (PFR) system for the spacecraft and its support equipment, (5) monitoring electronic parts activities, and (6) participating in spacecraft reviews. Particular emphasis is placed on mission operations reliability assurance activities, which included: (1) spacecraft problem/failure reporting, (2) managing an integrating failure reporting system which covered all mission operations activities, (3) real-time analysis of spacecraft anomalies, and (4) risk assessment.
Mobile launcher deck and tower are exposed to severe acoustic environments during launch. These environments, if not properly managed, can weaken ground support equipment and result in structure failure. The objectives of this study were: (1) Characterize the acoustic ground environment with and without water suppression systems. (2) Validate the ground acoustic prediction based on scaling of Saturn V data. and (3) Validate a semi-empirical acoustic analysis.
Fatigue failure analysis in small metallurgically- bonded joints in very small electronic components, using statistical analysis of random forces and dynamic response of member
Fast analysis of switching waveforms allows detection of impending failures. Switching power conditioner converts dc power from source such as battery or solar cell array to well regulated dc at convenient voltages and currents. Concept originally developed for space stations and spacecraft also suitable for power conditioning equipment in aircraft and in terrestrial photovoltaic power systems.
Time exposure photography, sometimes coupled with strobe illumination, is an accepted method for motion analysis that bypasses frame by frame analysis and resynthesis of data. Garden variety video cameras can now exploit this technique using a unique frame buffer that is a non-integrating memory that compares incoming data with that already stored. The device continuously outputs an analog video signal of the stored contents which can then be redigitized and analyzed using conventional equipment. Historically, photographic time exposures have been used to record the displacement envelope of harmonically oscillating structures to show mode shape. Mode shape analysis is crucial, for example, in aeroelastic testing of wind tunnel models. Aerodynamic, inertial, and elastic forces can couple together leading to catastrophic failure of a poorly designed aircraft. This paper will explore the usefulness of the peak store device as a videometric tool and in particular discuss methods for analyzing a targeted vibrating plate using the 'peak store' in conjunction with calibration methods familiar to the close-range videometry community. Results for the first three normal modes will be presented.
The Piaggio P-180 Avanti, a twin pusher-prop engine nine-passenger business aircraft was certified in 1990, to the requirements of FAR Part 23 and Associated Special Conditions for Composite Structure. Certification included the application of a damage tolerant methodology to the design of the composite forward wing and empennage (vertical fin, horizontal stabilizer, tailcone, and rudder) structure. This methodology included an extensive analytical evaluation coupled with sub-component and full-scale testing of the structure. The work from the Damage Tolerance Analysis Assessment was incorporated into the full-scale testing. Damage representing hazards such as dropped tools, ground equipment, handling, and runway debris, was applied to the test articles. Additional substantiation included allowing manufacturing discrepancies to exist unrepaired on the full-scale articles and simulated bondline failures in critical elements. The importance of full-scale testing in the critical environmental conditions and the application of critical damage are addressed. The implication of damage tolerance on static and fatigue testing is discussed. Good correlation between finite element solutions and experimental test data was observed.
This viewgraph presentation reviews possible ways to eliminate electrical stress during Electromagneticic Compatibility (EMC) testing. The presentation reviews tests that have had problems due to electrical stress. On December 5, 1995 Cassini Radar instrument failed a functional test in preparation for EMC conducted susceptibility (CSO 1 ) testing. The instrument power supply did not turn on as required, and failure occurred prior to injection of CS test stimulus. A investigation of the failure was conducted. A PSPICE simulation of Cassini Radar 30V line using the EMC test setup was performed; the result of the simulation was an oscillation on the 30V input of the power supply. In another case: on December 28, 1999 an oscillation occurred on the input power line of the SlRTF Infrared Array Camera (IRAC) while preparing to perform CSOI testing, Resulted in damage to flight hardware. Subsequent to failure, JPL provided GSFC history and corrective action from Cassini Radar CSOI test failure GSFC implemented the same corrective action as JPL, except that the value of the resistor connected across the isolation transformer primary winding is 2.5 ohms instead of 50 ohms. Three recommendations are made: (1) Make EMC test community aware of the problem and potential solutions by presenting papers at major environmental test conferences (2) Include warnings and safeguards in EMC test requirements and procedures (3) Try to convince EMC test equipment suppliers to design a CSOl test fixture similar to fixture shown in the diagram
Signal conditioners embodying advanced concepts in analog and digital electronic circuitry and software have been developed for use in data-acquisition systems that are required to be compact and lightweight, to utilize electric energy efficiently, and to operate with high reliability, high accuracy, and high power efficiency, without intervention by human technicians. These signal conditioners were originally intended for use aboard spacecraft. There are also numerous potential terrestrial uses - especially in the fields of aeronautics and medicine, wherein it is necessary to monitor critical functions. Going beyond the usual analog and digital signal-processing functions of prior signal conditioners, the new signal conditioner performs the following additional functions: It continuously diagnoses its own electronic circuitry, so that it can detect failures and repair itself (as described below) within seconds. It continuously calibrates itself on the basis of a highly accurate and stable voltage reference, so that it can continue to generate accurate measurement data, even under extreme environmental conditions. It repairs itself in the sense that it contains a micro-controller that reroutes signals among redundant components as needed to maintain the ability to perform accurate and stable measurements. It detects deterioration of components, predicts future failures, and/or detects imminent failures by means of a real-time analysis in which, among other things, data on its present state are continuously compared with locally stored historical data. It minimizes unnecessary consumption of electric energy. The design architecture divides the signal conditioner into three main sections: an analog signal section, a digital module, and a power-management section. The design of the analog signal section does not follow the traditional approach of ensuring reliability through total redundancy of hardware: Instead, following an approach called spare parts tool box, the reliability of each component is assessed in terms of such considerations as risks of damage, mean times between failures, and the effects of certain failures on the performance of the signal conditioner as a whole system. Then, fewer or more spares are assigned for each affected component, pursuant to the results of this analysis, in order to obtain the required degree of reliability of the signal conditioner as a whole system. The digital module comprises one or more processors and field-programmable gate arrays, the number of each depending on the results of the aforementioned analysis. The digital module provides redundant control, monitoring, and processing of several analog signals. It is designed to minimize unnecessary consumption of electric energy, including, when possible, going into a low-power "sleep" mode that is implemented in firmware. The digital module communicates with external equipment via a personal-computer serial port. The digital module monitors the "health" of the rest of the signal conditioner by processing defined measurements and/or trends. It automatically makes adjustments to respond to channel failures, compensate for effects of temperature, and maintain calibration.
A view of the facility and operational requirements involved in performing a manned thermal vacuum test is presented. The requirements fall into two major categories. The first category deals with placing the suited crewmen in a hazardous environment and assuring their safety. The second category deals with the constraints and special requirements involved with a suited crewman operating flight hardware in a 1-G environment. Design areas that deal with man rating a chamber, including fire suppression, emergency repress, emergency power, backups, reliable instrumentation and data systems, communications, television monitoring, biomedical monitoring, material compatibilities, and equipment supporting the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) are discussed. The operational issues that are peculiar to manned testing such as test rules, test procedures, test protocol, emergency drills, availability of hyperbaric facilities, test team training and certification engineering concerns for a safe mechanical and instrumentation buildup, hazard analysis, and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis are discussed. The constraints and special requirements involved with a suited crewman operating flight hardware in a 1-G environment are addressed.
The difference between the AS-510 observed and predicted separation distance is attributed to a greater F-1 engine "tail off" impulse than that used in the separation distance prediction. . The F-1 thrust decay was normal and not appreciably different from previous (AS-505 through 509) flights. . Analysis indicates that with an S-IC stage having only four retro motors, failure of one retro motor to ignite would result in marginal separation distances and, in the 3-sigma case, re-contact of the two stages. . S-IC-11 and subsequent flight stages were equipped with eight retro motors rather than the planned four.
The NASA Materials Science Laboratory (MSL) provides science and engineering services to NASA and Contractor customers at KSC, including those working for the Space Shuttle. International Space Station. and Launch Services Programs. These services include: (1) Independent/unbiased failure analysis (2) Support to Accident/Mishap Investigation Boards (3) Materials testing and evaluation (4) Materials and Processes (M&P) engineering consultation (5) Metrology (6) Chemical analysis (including ID of unknown materials) (7) Mechanical design and fabrication We provide unique solutions to unusual and urgent problems associated with aerospace flight hardware, ground support equipment and related facilities.
On-orbit anomaly records for satellites launched from 1990 through 2001 are reviewed to determine recent trends of un-manned space mission critical failures. Anomalies categorized by subsystems show that Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) subsystems have a high number of anomalies that result in a mission critical failure when compared to other subsystems. A mission critical failure is defined as a premature loss of a satellite or loss of its ability to perform its primary mission during its design life. The majority of anomalies are shown to occur early in the mission, usually within one year from launch. GN&C anomalies are categorized by cause and equipment type involved. A statistical analysis of the data is presented for all anomalies compared with the GN&C anomalies for various mission types, orbits and time periods. Conclusions and recommendations are presented for improving mission success and reliability.
The findings of the Hubble Space Telescope Optical Systems Board of Investigation are reported. The Board was formed to determine the cause of the flaw in the telescope, how it occurred, and why it was not detected before launch. The Board conducted its investigation to include interviews with personnel involved in the fabrication and test of the telescope, review of documentation, and analysis and test of the equipment used in the fabrication of the telescope's mirrors. The investigation proved that the primary mirror was made in the wrong shape (a 0.4-wave rms wavefront error at 632.8 nm). The primary mirror was manufactured by the Perkin-Elmer Corporation (Hughes Danbury Optical Systems, Inc.). The critical optics used as a template in shaping the mirror, the reflective null corrector (RNC), consisted of two small mirrors and a lens. This unit had been preserved by the manufacturer exactly as it was during the manufacture of the mirror. When the Board measured the RNC, the lens was incorrectly spaced from the mirrors. Calculations of the effect of such displacement on the primary mirror show that the measured amount, 1.3 mm, accounts in detail for the amount and character of the observed image blurring. No verification of the reflective null corrector's dimensions was carried out by Perkin-Elmer after the original assembly. There were, however, clear indications of the problem from auxiliary optical tests made at the time. A special optical unit called an inverse null corrector, designed to mimic the reflection from a perfect primary mirror, was built and used to align the apparatus; when so used, it clearly showed the error in the reflective null corrector. A second null corrector was used to measure the vertex radius of the finished primary mirror. It, too, clearly showed the error in the primary mirror. Both indicators of error were discounted at the time as being themselves flawed. The Perkin-Elmer plan for fabricating the primary mirror placed complete reliance on the reflective null corrector as the only test to be used in both manufacturing and verifying the mirror's surface with the required precision. This methodology should have alerted NASA management to the fragility of the process and the possibility of gross error. Such errors had been seen in other telescope programs, yet no independent tests were planned, although some simple tests to protect against major error were considered and rejected. During the critical time period, there was great concern about cost and schedule, which further inhibited consideration of independent tests.
With the Artemis program, we are planning longer stays on the surface, with more activities that have the potential to put the astronauts and equipment in contact with greater quantities of lunar dust. The success of these missions will depend on our understanding of material interactions with lunar dust and the development of ways to mitigate dust effects in cases where exposure to dust will lead to failure of components, unacceptable loss of power or thermal control, unacceptable loss of visibility, or health issues. Passive dust mitigation by coating or surface alteration is one method that is being developed and demonstrated under the Space Technology Mission Directorate’s Game Changing Technology, Dust Mitigation Program as part of the Patch Plate Materials Compatibility Assessment Task. The goal of the task is to alter the surfaces of materials in order to passively reduce the adhesion of dust, demonstrate their performance in relevant ground-based tests using lunar simulants, and prepare them for demonstration through experiment on the lunar surface. Optically transparent, sputter deposited, work function matching coatings are being developed to reduce adhesion of dust to windows, lenses and display panels by matching the minimum energy to remove an electron from the surface to that of lunar dust in order to reduce adhesion due to charge transfer. Low surface energy coatings and surfaces for thermal control are also being developed to reduce the bonding of dust with the surface enabling it to be removed more easily. Conductive coatings with the ability to shed dust more easily are being developed for use with the active Electrodynamic Dust Shield technology to help reduce the power needed to remove dust from the surface. Passive dust mitigation surfaces for metals such as aluminum, stainless steel, and titanium are being developed that reduce the area of dust contact with the surfaces through topographical modification using laser ablation patterning to impart hierarchical topographies with nanometer to micrometer length scales in a single step. Topographically modified polymeric materials, both those with extensive space heritage and those with lower technology readiness levels, are also being evaluated. Space suit fabric surfaces that can reduce dust penetration into and through the fabric are also being investigated as well as pristine and topographically modified ceramic materials that exhibit high wear resilience. An overview of the passive dust mitigation surfaces and coatings being developed under this task, ground testing being conducted using lunar simulants, characterization techniques, and materials preparation for flight sample delivery for integration into the Alpha Space Regolith Adherence Characterization experiment going to the lunar surface on a Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) lander in 2023 will be discussed.
Management emphasis on system safety in the rapid transit industry includes the granting and use of funds by the Federal Government according to systematic analysis of safety hazards in advance. Likelihood predictions that those hazards will be activated by exposure of the system to a system failure, a human error, external conditions, or combinations of these aspects determine alternatives to the assumption of risk and recommend corrections before the system is operational. Rigorous safety analyses are projected to assure operational safety for prolonged periods under varied maintenance conditions; these analysis encompass station accident possibilities as well as train-person collisions, car equipment and design, traffic control systems, and tunnel design problems.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) directorate at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) has applied its knowledge and experience with Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to projects in industries ranging from spacecraft to nuclear power plants. PRA is a comprehensive and structured process for analyzing risk in complex engineered systems and/or processes. The PRA process enables the user to identify potential risk contributors such as, hardware and software failure, human error, and external events. Recent developments in the oil and gas industry have presented opportunities for NASA to lend their PRA expertise to both ongoing and developmental projects within the industry. This paper provides an overview of the PRA process and demonstrates how this process was applied in estimating the probability that a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) operating in the Gulf of Mexico and equipped with a generically configured Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) loses location and needs to initiate an emergency disconnect. The PRA described in this paper is intended to be generic such that the vessel meets the general requirements of an International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)/Circ. 645 Class 3 dynamically positioned vessel. The results of this analysis are not intended to be applied to any specific drilling vessel, although provisions were made to allow the analysis to be configured to a specific vessel if required.