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High Reliability at Minimum Cost

This paper investigates the minimum cost of improving the reliability of complex technical systems. The two major methods to improve reliability are redesigning the system for higher reliability or providing redundant components to replace failed elements. The costs of redesign for reliability or adding redundancy are estimated. The most cost-effective combination for high reliability can be identified. The cost of increasing the intrinsic reliability of a system can be modeled as cost proportional to 1/(system failure rate) a , where the exponent “a” measures the difficulty of increasing reliability. The “a” exponent can vary from 0.25 to about 2.5. Operational reliability can also be increased by using redundant systems. The failure rate for N parallel redundant units is (system failure rate) N . The cost of redundancy is N times the system cost. The total redundant system cost is proportional to N/(system failure rate) a . The cost of redundancy increases as N gets larger, but larger N allows a higher system failure rate, which reduces the system design cost. There is a certain N, a certain level of redundancy, that has the minimum cost to achieve the required overall redundant system failure rate. The minimum cost for the redundant system is achieved at the optimum level of redundancy. The N for minimum cost is equal to -a ln (redundant system failure rate). The minimum cost of the N redundant systems is proportional to N * (original system failure rate) a . The optimum redesigned individual system failure rate is proportional to exp (-1/a), so the greater the difficulty, the higher the optimum individual system failure rate. Increasing the intrinsic reliability of a system encounters diminishing returns and at some point it becomes more cost-effective to add redundancy. The difficulty of increasing intrinsic system reliability determines the optimum design for high reliability at minimum cost.

reliability↗

High Reliability at Minimum Cost

This paper investigates the minimum cost of improving the reliability of complex technical systems. The two major methods to improve reliability are redesigning the system for higher reliability or providing redundant components to replace failed elements. The costs of redesign for reliability or adding redundancy are estimated. The most cost-effective combination for high reliability can be identified. The cost of increasing the intrinsic reliability of a system can be modeled as cost proportional to 1/(system failure rate) a , where the exponent “a” measures the difficulty of increasing reliability. The “a” exponent can vary from 0.25 to about 2.5. Operational reliability can also be increased by using redundant systems. The failure rate for N parallel redundant units is (system failure rate) N . The cost of redundancy is N times the system cost. The total redundant system cost is proportional to N/(system failure rate) a . The cost of redundancy increases as N gets larger, but larger N allows a higher system failure rate, which reduces the system design cost. There is a certain N, a certain level of redundancy, that has the minimum cost to achieve the required overall redundant system failure rate. The minimum cost for the redundant system is achieved at the optimum level of redundancy. The N for minimum cost is equal to -a ln (redundant system failure rate). The minimum cost of the N redundant systems is proportional to N * (original system failure rate) a . The optimum redesigned individual system failure rate is proportional to exp (-1/a), so the greater the difficulty, the higher the optimum individual system failure rate. Increasing the intrinsic reliability of a system encounters diminishing returns and at some point it becomes more cost-effective to add redundancy. The difficulty of increasing intrinsic system reliability determines the optimum design for high reliability at minimum cost.

reliability↗

Service Life Extension of the Propulsion System of Long-Term Manned Orbital Stations

One of the critical non-replaceable systems of a long-term manned orbital station is the propulsion system. Since the propulsion system operates beginning with the launch of station elements into orbit, its service life determines the service life of the station overall. Weighing almost a million pounds, the International Space Station (ISS) is about four times as large as the Russian space station Mir and about five times as large as the U.S. Skylab. Constructed over a span of more than a decade with the help of over 100 space flights, elements and modules of the ISS provide more research space than any spacecraft ever built. Originally envisaged for a service life of fifteen years, this Earth orbiting laboratory has been in orbit since 1998. Some elements that have been launched later in the assembly sequence were not yet built when the first elements were placed in orbit. Hence, some of the early modules that were launched at the inception of the program were already nearing the end of their design life when the ISS was finally ready and operational. To maximize the return on global investments on ISS, it is essential for the valuable research on ISS to continue as long as the station can be sustained safely in orbit. This paper describes the work performed to extend the service life of the ISS propulsion system. A system comprises of many components with varying failure rates. Reliability of a system is the probability that it will perform its intended function under encountered operating conditions, for a specified period of time. As we are interested in finding out how reliable a system would be in the future, reliability expressed as a function of time provides valuable insight. In a hypothetical bathtub shaped failure rate curve, the failure rate, defined as the number of failures per unit time that a currently healthy component will suffer in a given future time interval, decreases during infant-mortality period, stays nearly constant during the service life and increases at the end when the design service life ends and wear-out phase begins. However, the component failure rates do not remain constant over the entire cycle life. The failure rate depends on various factors such as design complexity, current age of the component, operating conditions, severity of environmental stress factors, etc. Development, qualification and acceptance test processes provide rigorous screening of components to weed out imperfections that might otherwise cause infant mortality failures. If sufficient samples are tested to failure, the failure time versus failure quantity can be analyzed statistically to develop a failure probability distribution function (PDF), a statistical model of the probability of failure versus time. Driven by cost and schedule constraints however, spacecraft components are generally not tested in large numbers. Uncertainties in failure rate and remaining life estimates increase when fewer units are tested. To account for this, spacecraft operators prefer to limit useful operations to a period shorter than the maximum demonstrated service life of the weakest component. Running each component to its failure to determine the maximum possible service life of a system can become overly expensive and impractical. Spacecraft operators therefore, specify the required service life and an acceptable factor of safety (FOS). The designers use these requirements to limit the life test duration. Midway through the design life, when benefits justify additional investments, supplementary life test may be performed to demonstrate the capability to safely extend the service life of the system. An innovative approach is required to evaluate the entire system, without having to go through an elaborate test program of propulsion system elements. Evaluating every component through a brute force test program would be a cost prohibitive and time consuming endeavor. ISS propulsion system components were designed and built decades ago. There are no representative ground test articles for some of the components. A 'test everything' approach would require manufacturing new test articles. The paper outlines some of the techniques used for selective testing, by way of cherry picking candidate components based on failure mode effects analysis, system level impacts, hazard analysis, etc. The type of testing required for extending the service life depends on the design and criticality of the component, failure modes and failure mechanisms, life cycle margin provided by the original certification, operational and environmental stresses encountered, etc. When specific failure mechanism being considered and the underlying relationship of that mode to the stresses provided in the test can be correlated by supporting analysis, time and effort required for conducting life extension testing can be significantly reduced. Exposure to corrosive propellants over long periods of time, for instance, lead to specific failure mechanisms in several components used in the propulsion system. Using Arrhenius model, which is tied to chemically dependent failure mechanisms such as corrosion or chemical reactions, it is possible to subject carefully selected test articles to accelerated life test. Arrhenius model reflects the proportional relationship between time to failure of a component and the exponential of the inverse of absolute temperature acting on the component. The acceleration factor is used to perform tests at higher stresses that allow direct correlation between the times to failure at a high test temperature to the temperatures to be expected in actual use. As long as the temperatures are such that new failure mechanisms are not introduced, this becomes a very useful method for testing to failure a relatively small sample of items for a much shorter amount of time. In this article, based on the example of the propulsion system of the first ISS module Zarya, theoretical approaches and practical activities of extending the service life of the propulsion system are reviewed with the goal of determining the maximum duration of its safe operation.

Kamath, Ulhas↗

Local Control Following Permanent Prostate Brachytherapy: Effect of High Biologically Effective Dose on Biopsy Results and Oncologic Outcomes

Purpose: To determine factors that influence local control and systemic relapse in patients undergoing permanent prostate brachytherapy (PPB). Methods and Materials: A total of 584 patients receiving PPB alone or PPB with external beam radiation therapy (19.5%) agreed to undergo prostate biopsy (PB) at 2 years postimplantion and yearly if results were positive or if the prostate-specific antigen (PSA) level increased. Short-term hormone therapy was used with 280 (47.9%) patients. Radiation doses were converted to biologically effective doses (BED) (using alpha/beta = 2). Comparisons were made by chi-square analysis and linear regression. Survival was determined by the Kaplan-Meier method. Results: The median PSA concentration was 7.1 ng/ml, and the median follow-up period was 7.1 years. PB results were positive for 48/584 (8.2%) patients. Positive biopsy results by BED group were as follows: 22/121 (18.2%) patients received a BED of <=150 Gy; 15/244 (6.1%) patients received >150 to 200 Gy; and 6/193 (3.1%; p < 0.001) patients received >200 Gy. Significant associations of positive PB results by risk group were low-risk group BED (p = 0.019), intermediate-risk group hormone therapy (p = 0.011) and BED (p = 0.040), and high-risk group BED (p = 0.004). Biochemical freedom from failure rate at 7 years was 82.7%. Biochemical freedom from failure rate by PB result was 84.7% for negative results vs. 59.2% for positive results (p < 0.001). Cox regression analysis revealed significant associations with BED (p = 0.038) and PB results (p = 0.002) in low-risk patients, with BED (p = 0.003) in intermediate-risk patients, and with Gleason score (p = 0.006), PSA level (p < 0.001), and PB result (p = 0.038) in high-risk patients. Fifty-three (9.1%) patients died, of which eight deaths were due to prostate cancer. Cause-specific survival was 99.2% for negative PB results vs. 87.6% for positive PB results (p < 0.001). Conclusions: Higher radiation doses are required to achieve local control following PPB. A BED of >200 Gy with an alpha/beta ratio of 2 yields 96.9% local control rate. Failure to establish local control impacts survival.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Redundancy: How Many Unreliable Spares are Needed for High Reliability and Confidence on a Time Limited Mission?

This paper investigates the number of redundant units needed to achieve high reliability with high confidence. The approach applies to the case where the unit failure rate is too high for a single unit to provide the required reliability over the mission duration. To achieve high reliability, the design then uses N redundant units, one operating unit and N – 1 spares. If the unit failure rate is f, the mission length is L, and f * L is small (not the case assumed here), the unit failure probability over the mission duration is F1 = f * L << 1. In this case, the probability that all N units will fail is FN = F1N, and the needed N = LN(FN)/LN(F1). For the case of large f * L assumed here, F1 = f * L > 1, and F1 is the expected number of failures during the mission. The needed redundancy, N, to achieve the specified N unit reliability, FN, can be computed using the cumulative Poisson distribution with mean equal to F1. The number of spares, N - 1, is increased until the probability - that the total number of failures will be less than N -1 - achieves the required reliability. The confidence that this reliability can be achieved can be computed using the cumulative Poisson distribution or the chi-square distribution. Since the measured unit failure rate, f, has some uncertainty, the confidence that the rate is not lower than the actual failure rate and the required reliability is not overestimated is about 50%. Adding more redundant units increases the confidence that the required reliability, FN, will be achieved. For a fixed number of redundant units, the expected reliability and confidence can be traded off, since lower reliability goals have higher confidence in being achieved. Both the required reliability and confidence can be specified initially and the needed number of redundant units computed using the measured failure rate. The unit failure rate is determined by initial reliability growth testing to remove design errors and to better estimate the final constant failure rate. Reducing the failure rate and reducing its variance both reduce the number of redundant units needed for the required reliability and confidence. Since the total cost is the sum of the costs of the units and of the testing, there is an optimum test time that produces minimum cost.

Harry W. Jones↗

The abcd Reliability Growth Model

This paper presents a modification of the well-known Duane-Crow reliability growth model. In the abcd reliability growth model, the initial period of exponential decline of the failure rate in the Duane-Crow model may be followed by a period of constant failure rate. Data often show that an exponential decline in failures is followed by a constant failure rate. If a growth model including only the initial period of exponential decline is applied to increasingly longer failure rate data sets, the data will include longer periods of constant failure rate, and the estimated reliability growth rate will decline from an initially high value down toward zero. Using the Duane-Crow model without extending it to include a possible period of constant failure rate may create the mistaken impression that the initial reliability growth continues forever, but at an ever decreasing rate.

Reliability growth↗

The abcd Reliability Growth Model

This paper presents a modification of the well-known Duane-Crow reliability growth model. In the abcd reliability growth model, the initial period of exponential decline of the failure rate in the Duane-Crow model may be followed by a period of constant failure rate. Data often show that an exponential decline in failures is followed by a constant failure rate. If a growth model including only the initial period of exponential decline is applied to increasingly longer failure rate data sets, the data will include longer periods of constant failure rate, and the estimated reliability growth rate will decline from an initially high value down toward zero. Using the Duane-Crow model without extending it to include a possible period of constant failure rate may create the mistaken impression that the initial reliability growth continues forever, but at an ever decreasing rate.

Reliability growth↗

Waste Generator Instructions: Key to Successful Implementation of the US DOE's 435.1 for Transuranic Waste Packaging Instructions (LA-UR-12-24155) - 13218

In times of continuing fiscal constraints, a management and operation tool that is straightforward to implement, works as advertised, and virtually ensures compliant waste packaging should be carefully considered and employed wherever practicable. In the near future, the Department of Energy (DOE) will issue the first major update to DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. This update will contain a requirement for sites that do not have a Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) waste certification program to use two newly developed technical standards: Contact-Handled Defense Transuranic Waste Packaging Instructions and Remote-Handled Defense Transuranic Waste Packaging Instructions. The technical standards are being developed from the DOE O 435.1 Notice, Contact-Handled and Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste Packaging, approved August 2011. The packaging instructions will provide detailed information and instruction for packaging almost every conceivable type of transuranic (TRU) waste for disposal at WIPP. While providing specificity, the packaging instructions leave to each site's own discretion the actual mechanics of how those Instructions will be functionally implemented at the floor level. While the Technical Standards are designed to provide precise information for compliant packaging, the density of the information in the packaging instructions necessitates a type of Rosetta Stone that translates the requirements into concise, clear, easy to use and operationally practical recipes that are waste stream and facility specific for use by both first line management and hands-on operations personnel. The Waste Generator Instructions provide the operator with step-by-step instructions that will integrate the sites' various operational requirements (e.g., health and safety limits, radiological limits or dose limits) and result in a WIPP certifiable waste and package that can be transported to and emplaced at WIPP. These little known but widely productive Waste Generator Instructions (WGIs) have been used occasionally in the past at large sites for treatment and packaging of TRU waste. The WGIs have resulted in highly efficient waste treatment, packaging and certification for disposal of TRU waste at WIPP. For example, a single WGI at LANL, combined with an increase in gram loading, resulted in a mind boggling 6,400% increase in waste loading for {sup 238}Pu heat source waste. In fact, the WGI combined with a new Contact Handled (CH) TRU Waste Content (TRUCON) Code provided a massive increase in shippable wattage per Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-II) over the previously used and more restrictive TRUCON Code that have been used previously for the heat source waste. In fact, the use of the WGI process at LANL's TA-55 facility reduced non-compliant drums for WIPP certification and disposal from a 13% failure rate down to a 0.5% failure rate and is expected to further reduce the failure rate to zero drums per year. The inherent value of the WGI is that it can be implemented in a site's current procedure issuance process and it provides documented proof of what actions were taken for each waste stream packaged. The WGI protocol provides a key floor-level operational component to achieve goal alignment between actual site operations, the WIPP TRU waste packaging instructions, and DOE O 435.1. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

International Space Station Operational Experience and Its Impacts on Future Mission Supportability

Operational experience gained on the International Space Station (ISS) has enabled significant improvements in failure rate estimates for various Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs). These improved estimates, in turn, allow more efficient and accurate spare parts allocations for future missions, enabling significant reductions in both logistics mass and risk. This paper examines the value of ISS experience to date in terms of its impact on supportability for future missions. A supportability model is presented that assesses the spares required as a function of mission endurance and risk, taking into account uncertainty in failure rate estimates. Changes in ISS Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLSS) ORU failure rate estimates are described and discussed, both in terms of the overall population of ORUs and the evolution of failure rate estimates over time for a particular item. The value of those updated failure rate estimates is assessed by calculating the estimated spares mass requirements for two cases, using the initial, pre-ISS estimates and using the estimates informed by on-orbit experience. Hidden risk resulting from underestimated failure rates is also assessed. These results indicate that, for a 1,200-day Mars mission, ISS experience has enabled a 3.9 t to 6.0 t reduction in ECLSS spares mass required and uncovered failure rate underestimates that would have resulted in an order of magnitude increase in risk had they not been discovered and corrected. The implications of these results for system development and mission planning are discussed, including approaches to accelerate the rate of failure rate refinement and the risks associated with making changes or introducing new systems. Overall, test time is a critical factor that must be carefully considered in system development, and new systems must budget appropriate time for testing in a relevant environment or accept higher risk and logistics requirements on future missions.

Owens, Andrew C.↗

Developing Reliable Life Support for Mars

A human mission to Mars will require highly reliable life support systems. Mars life support systems may recycle water and oxygen using systems similar to those on the International Space Station (ISS). However, achieving sufficient reliability is less difficult for ISS than it will be for Mars. If an ISS system has a serious failure, it is possible to provide spare parts, or directly supply water or oxygen, or if necessary bring the crew back to Earth. Life support for Mars must be designed, tested, and improved as needed to achieve high demonstrated reliability. A quantitative reliability goal should be established and used to guide development t. The designers should select reliable components and minimize interface and integration problems. In theory a system can achieve the component-limited reliability, but testing often reveal unexpected failures due to design mistakes or flawed components. Testing should extend long enough to detect any unexpected failure modes and to verify the expected reliability. Iterated redesign and retest may be required to achieve the reliability goal. If the reliability is less than required, it may be improved by providing spare components or redundant systems. The number of spares required to achieve a given reliability goal depends on the component failure rate. If the failure rate is under estimated, the number of spares will be insufficient and the system may fail. If the design is likely to have undiscovered design or component problems, it is advisable to use dissimilar redundancy, even though this multiplies the design and development cost. In the ideal case, a human tended closed system operational test should be conducted to gain confidence in operations, maintenance, and repair. The difficulty in achieving high reliability in unproven complex systems may require the use of simpler, more mature, intrinsically higher reliability systems. The limitations of budget, schedule, and technology may suggest accepting lower and less certain expected reliability. A plan to develop reliable life support is needed to achieve the best possible reliability.

life support↗

Helical Tomotherapy for Simultaneous Multitarget Radiotherapy for Pulmonary Metastasis

Purpose: To retrospectively evaluate our experience with tomotherapy for simultaneous multitarget radiotherapy in patients with pulmonary metastases. Methods and Materials: Thirty-one patients were treated with tomotherapy for pulmonary metastases. We defined gross tumor volume (GTV) in computed tomography scans, and the margin of the planning target volume was 1 to 1.5 cm from the GTV. The median doses prescribed were 50 Gy and 40 Gy delivered in 10 fractions over 2 weeks to the 95% isodose volume of the GTV and planning target volume, respectively. Prior to each treatment, online corrections were made in the three axes, and rotation was done after registration of the megavoltage and simulation computed tomography scans. Survival was calculated from the completion of tomotherapy, using the Kaplan-Meier method and log rank test. Results: The overall survival rate at 12 months was 60.5%, and the median survival time was 16.0 months. A rating of 1 or below on the Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group scale, a breast or colon cancer as the primary cancer, primary lesions that were completely controlled, and a response maintained at 3 months after tomotherapy were shown by univariate analysis to be statistically significant favorable prognostic factors. Progression-free survival rates at 1 and 2 years were 39.6% and 27.7%, respectively. The posttreatment failure rate was 64.5%, the local failure rate was 9.7%, the regional failure rate was 51.6%, and the synchronous local and regional failure rate was 3.2%. Grades I and II radiation-related toxicity levels were observed in 41.9% and 16.0% of patients, respectively. There were no treatment-related deaths. Conclusions: Tomotherapy could be offered to patients as a safe and effective treatment in select patients with lung metastases. However, large-scale, prospective clinical trials should be done to confirm our results.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Data Collection for Current U.S. Wind Energy Projects: Component Costs, Financing, Operations, and Maintenance (January 2011 - September 2011)

DNV Renewables (USA) Inc. (DNV) used an Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Cost Model to evaluate ten distinct cost scenarios encountered under variations in wind turbine component failure rates. The analysis considers 1) a Reference Scenario using the default part failure rates within the O&M Cost Model, 2) High Failure Rate Scenarios that increase the failure rates of three major components(blades, gearboxes, and generators) individually, 3) 100% Replacement Scenarios that model full replacement of these components over a 20 year operating life, and 4) Serial Failure Scenarios that model full replacement of blades, gearboxes, and generators in years 4 to 6 of the wind project. DNV selected these scenarios to represent a broad range of possible operational experiences. Also in thisreport, DNV summarizes the predominant financing arrangements used to develop wind energy projects over the past several years and provides summary data on various financial metrics describing those arrangements.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

A Misperception in Reliability Growth Modelling

The Duane reliability growth model is n(t)/t = k t^-alpha (1) The reliability growth rate is alpha, the downward slope of n(t)/t versus t. It usually varies from 0.2 to 0.6. k is a constant. Crow used a 56-failure data set to illustrate reliability growth.1 A graphical Duane model fit to this data gives n(t)/t = 0.640 t^-0.283 (2) A problem in using the Duane-Crow reliability growth model is that it assumes that reliability growth continues and the failure rate decreases throughout the test period. It is more usual that reliability growth stops when the failure rated is low enough. Growth testing is often followed by testing with a low constant failure rate due to rare or uncorrectable failure modes. As more and more low constant rate acceptable failures accumulate after the period of reliability growth, the reliability growth time exponent alpha decreases toward zero. This occurs if constant rate failures are treated as occurring during the reliability growth period. It is more accurate to model a period of initial reliability growth followed by testing without repair to more accurately determine the final constant failure rate. This is done in the abcd model. n(t)/t = a t^-b + c from t = 0 to td (3) = c + d after td, where d = a td^-b (4) The term a t^-b describes the continuous reliability growth that continues out to time td and c is the constant uncorrected failure rate. The parameter d represents an additional constant failure rate due to correctable but uncorrected failure modes. After the reliability growth process is terminated, the failure rate n(t)/t = c + d.

Harry W Jones↗

Accounting for Epistemic Uncertainty in Mission Supportability Assessment: A Necessary Step in Understanding Risk and Logistics Requirements

Future crewed missions to Mars present a maintenance logistics challenge that is unprecedented in human spaceflight. Mission endurance – defined as the time between resupply opportunities – will be significantly longer than previous missions, and therefore logistics planning horizons are longer and the impact of uncertainty is magnified. Maintenance logistics forecasting typically assumes that component failure rates are deterministically known and uses them to represent aleatory uncertainty, or uncertainty that is inherent to the process being examined. However, failure rates cannot be directly measured; rather, they are estimated based on similarity to other components or statistical analysis of observed failures. As a result, epistemic uncertainty – that is, uncertainty in knowledge of the process – exists in failure rate estimates that must be accounted for. Analyses that neglect epistemic uncertainty tend to significantly underestimate risk. Epistemic uncertainty can be reduced via operational experience; for example, the International Space Station (ISS) failure rate estimates are refined using a Bayesian update process. However, design changes may re-introduce epistemic uncertainty. Thus, there is a tradeoff between changing a design to reduce failure rates and operating a fixed design to reduce uncertainty. This paper examines the impact of epistemic uncertainty on maintenance logistics requirements for future Mars missions, using data from the ISS Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLS) as a baseline for a case study. Sensitivity analyses are performed to investigate the impact of variations in failure rate estimates and epistemic uncertainty on spares mass. The results of these analyses and their implications for future system design and mission planning are discussed.

Owens, Andrew↗

GPU age-aware scheduling to improve the reliability of leadership jobs on Titan

In 2015, OLCF's Titan supercomputer experienced a significant increase in GPU related job failures. The impact on jobs was serious and OLCF decided to replace ~50% of the GPUs. Unfortunately, jobs using more than 20% of the machine (i.e., leadership jobs) continued to encounter higher levels of application failures. These jobs contained significant amounts of both the low-failure rate and high-failure rate GPUs. The impacts of these failures are more adversely felt by leadership jobs due to longer wait times, runtimes, and higher charge rates. In this work, we have designed techniques to increase the use of low-failure GPUs in leadership jobs through targeted resource allocation. We have employed two complementary techniques, updating both the system ordering and the allocation mechanisms. Using simulation, the application of these techniques resulted in a 33% increase in low-failure GPU hours being assigned to leadership jobs. Our GPU Age-Aware Scheduling has been used in production on Titan since July of 2017.

Zimmer, Christopher↗

Facilitating Data Collection of Maintenance Events to Populate the Hydrogen Component Reliability Database (HyCReD)

The Hydrogen Component Reliability Database (HyCReD) is a collaborative project between the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, the University of Maryland, and hydrogen stakeholders to improve safety and reliability for hydrogen facilities by implementing component reliability data taxonomies that support hydrogen infrastructure failure rate analysis. The project aims to quantify failure rates of hydrogen components through high-quality data collection and analysis on root causes and maintenance needed. HyCReD provides a common database for cataloging hydrogen component failures which exists for reliability research in many other mature industries [2]. The database fills a gap for the hydrogen community by providing a scientifically rigorous approach to quantitative risk assessment (QRA), prognostic health management (PHM), and reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) analysis. High level results will be aggregated and anonymized to protect company sensitive information; detailed results will be used to help address issues of hydrogen components. These advanced analytics will support accelerated deployment of hydrogen infrastructure by enabling better: design and safety of projects (safety codes and standards development), infrastructure reliability and cost (component failure rates, maintenance protocols), and component R&D needs (robust supply chain). A key to a successful HyCReD implementation is facilitating the ease of reporting and data quality in the database that can be used for analysis. Maintenance data was a previously identified gap in initial efforts to populate and validate the database taxonomies [3]. Collection of maintenance data will be instrumental in identifying failure modes and rates, identifying incipient component failures or reduced performance, cataloging best practices for maintenance routines and methods for prognostic health management, and quantifying the risk and effect of different failure modes. Several key priorities are identified for streamlined data collection to achieve quality and detailed failure data: Applicability, Ease of Use, Accessibility, and Information Security. The HyCReD team has now begun deployment of the database to several companies and groups that have signed non-disclosure agreements to facilitate the data collection of failures in industry hydrogen refueling station infrastructure. This paper will provide an update into the process of HyCReD deployment including the development of a coding guide for facility personnel to reference and ensure data quality and consistency from one station to another as well as implementation of contextually dependent data fields of system taxonomy and formatted entries to provide ease of use. The goal is to communicate the lessons learned from the roll-out to technicians and engineers in the field, and the addition of need for high level of security to protect all stakeholders.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Correlation Between Weather Alerts and Grid Component Failures for Grid Alert

Weather events cause most grid failures. Often, we even get notifications on our phones to take cover or be prepared for an imminent event. If electric grid utilities had a similar warning that also included probable scenarios and the equipment involved, they could prepare and minimize the effects. Recent research at Idaho National Laboratory into electric grid risk analysis methods resulted in a tool that allows for the development of the most likely scenarios given failure probabilities of grid components. INL has a project with the U.S. Department of Energy’s Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) program to develop a Grid Alert application that receives messages from the existing emergency alert system, filters and determines components possibly affected by the emergency event, calculates probable scenarios uses MASTERRI and then notifies the utility if there is significant risk. Historical failure data of elements that comprise the U.S. electric grid have been compiled by utilities and organizations such as the international regulatory body North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). Nominal failure rates are obtained from this data. To make this tool possible, estimated failure rates are needed for different component types given the alert type, severity, and location. Historic weather-related grid element failures are correlated with historic weather events from Integrated Public Alert & Warning System (IPAWS). These correlated events and failures are used along with Bayesian updates from the historical norms to provide a modified failure rate for grid elements in the alert areas and calculate probable scenarios. This discusses the Grid Alert project plan but focuses on the data gathered and process used in determining failure rates for possible grid failure scenarios.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Review and categorization of existing studies on the estimation of probabilistic failure metrics for Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary piping and steam generator tubes in Nuclear Power Plants

This article presents the first output of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Coordinated Research Project (CRP), titled Methodology for Assessing Pipe Failure Rates in Advanced Water-Cooled Reactors (AWCRs), launched in 2018. This IAEA CRP is aimed at developing a good-practices document for estimating the probabilistic failure metrics of piping in AWCRs. The reliability of piping that comprise the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) is important for maintaining safe and stable operations of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) because failure of those piping components could lead to undesirable consequences, such as plant shutdown, costly repair, the occurrence of Loss-of-Coolant Accidents (LOCAs) and, possibly, subsequent core damage or large release events. Probabilistic failure metrics (e.g., failure rate, failure frequency, or failure probability) of RCPB components are the key inputs to the Probabilistic Safety/Risk Assessment (PSA/PRA) and risk management of NPPs. The estimation of probabilistic failure metrics, however, is challenging, especially for AWCRs, due to the lack of operating experience. Therefore, as the first step of the IAEA CRP activities, this paper is developed to provide a literature review of the existing studies (from 2000 to April 2019) on the estimation of probabilistic failure metrics for RCPB piping and Steam Generator (SG) tubes of NPPs and to categorize them based on four criteria: (1) explicitness of incorporation of physical failure mechanisms; (2) types of failure characterization; (3) types of physical models for degradation; and (4) explicitness of consideration of maintenance. The existing studies are also analyzed from the viewpoint of the following key aspects: (i) uncertainty analysis, (ii) sensitivity analysis, (iii) validation strategies, and (iv) the areas of applications.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗