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Enrichment Assay Methods for a UF6 Cylinder Verification Station

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors currently perform periodic inspections at uranium enrichment plants to verify UF6 cylinder enrichment declarations. Measurements are typically performed with handheld high-resolution sensors on a sampling of cylinders taken to be representative of the facility’s entire cylinder inventory. These enrichment assay methods interrogate only a small fraction of the total cylinder volume, and are time-consuming and expensive to execute for inspectors. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing an unattended measurement system capable of automated enrichment measurements over the full volume of Type 30B and Type 48 cylinders. This Integrated Cylinder Verification System (ICVS) could be located at key measurement points to positively identify each cylinder, measure its mass and enrichment, store the collected data in a secure database, and maintain continuity of knowledge on measured cylinders until IAEA inspector arrival. The focus of this paper is the development of nondestructive assay (NDA) methods that combine “traditional” enrichment signatures (e.g. 185-keV emission from U-235) and more-penetrating “non-traditional” signatures (e.g. high-energy neutron-induced gamma rays spawned primarily from U-234 alpha emission) collected by medium-resolution gamma-ray spectrometers (i.e. sodium iodide or lanthanum bromide). The potential of these NDA methods for the automated assay of feed, tail and product cylinders is explored through MCNP modeling and with field measurements on a cylinder population ranging from 0.2% to 5% in U-235 enrichment.

safeguards↗

Combining Inspection and Unattended Monitoring: Statistical Analysis of Timely Detection

Process monitoring traditionally relies on facility operator measurements. New concepts for future inspection regimes include inspectorate-owned systems that enable unattended monitoring (UM) of all declared material flow \cite{smith_potential}. If such systems can be established as viable alternatives, they may provide an important new capability: a true inspector's estimate of MUF that can achieve the efficiency and effectiveness goals outlined by the IAEA. A rigorous statistical framework for comparing traditional and new methodologies is needed to evaluate this potential and enable inspectorates to optimally balance UM and sampling in the context of timely detection and cost constraints. Recognizing that these are only two among a wide range of safeguards activities that support mass balance evaluation to detect missing material, this paper compares UM to traditional safeguards sampling in terms of detection probabilities as a function of time based on simplistic material loss scenarios, and shows how the detection probabilities can be rather easily combined. Using this approach can help enable tradeoff analysis and optimal resource allocation.

international safeguards↗

Integration of the Kromek D3S Detector and Spot Robot For Secondary Inspections

Inspecting vehicles and containers for the presence of nuclear material is a challenging task for border control and security. When performed manually by inspectors, this task also has an associated risk of exposing the inspectors to unknown radiation. With the advent of agile, easy-to-program, quadruped robots like the Boston Dynamics Spot, automation of secondary inspection can improve the efficiency of the inspection process and alleviates the radiation risks to inspectors. In this project, Brookhaven National Laboratory and the University of Massachussetts at Lowell explored how to automate a simple secondary inspection mission. The Spot robot comes with its own software development kit (SDK) that allows clients/users to write custom code in the Python programming language to control the robot. Spot also has a payload computer called Spot-CORE, which runs the Ubuntu Linux operating system and allows users to integrate external sensors, such as a radiation detector, with Spot. In this study, the Kromek D3S detector has been integrated with Spot via the Spot-CORE, allowing Spot to capture gamma spectra and neutron counts for a specified acquisition period. Two custom routines, search and confirmation, have been developed and executed in this specified order. The search routine directs Spot to go around the nearest obstacle, e.g., vehicle and container, in a preset distance and step to collect gamma and neutron gross counts with the D3S detector. The radiation data and the robot location corresponding to each step are stored and fed to the confirmation routine at the end of the search. The confirmation routine then navigates Spot to the locations of the highest gamma or neutron counts to perform a long, e.g., one minute, measurement, and gives the operators the signature gamma spectra and neutron counts at the hotspots. This paper presents a detailed description of this automated system along with results of the preliminary tests in identifying the location and signature of a 137Cs radiation source in a vehicle.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Integrating UF6 Cylinder RF Tracking With Continuous Load Cell Monitoring for Verifying Declared UF6 Feed and Withdrawal Operations Verifying Declared UF6 Feed and Withdrawal Operations

Oak Ridge National Laboratory is demonstrating the integration of UF6 cylinder tracking, using RF technology, with continuous load cell monitoring (CLCM) at mock UF6 feed and withdrawal (F&W) stations. CLCM and cylinder tracking are two of several continuous-monitoring technologies that show promise in providing integrated safeguards of F&W operations at enrichment plants. Integrating different monitoring technologies allows advanced, automated event processing to screen innocuous events thereby minimizing false alerts to independent inspectors. Traditionally, international inspectors rely on batch verification of material inputs and outputs derived from operator declarations and periodic on-site inspections at uranium enrichment plants or other nuclear processing facilities. Continuously monitoring F&W activities between inspections while providing filtered alerts of significant operational events will substantially increase the amount of valuable information available to inspectors thereby promising to enhance the effectiveness of safeguards and to improve efficiency in conducting on-site inspections especially at large plants for ensuring that all operations are declared.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Information-Driven Inspections

New uranium enrichment capacity is being built worldwide in response to perceived shortfalls in future supply. To meet increasing safeguards responsibilities with limited resources, the nonproliferation community is exploring next-generation concepts to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards, such as advanced technologies to enable unattended monitoring of nuclear material. These include attribute measurement technologies, data authentication tools, and transmission and security methods. However, there are several conceptual issues with how such data would be used to improve the ability of a safeguards inspectorate such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to reach better safeguards conclusions regarding the activities of a State. The IAEA is pursuing the implementation of information-driven safeguards, whereby all available sources of information are used to make the application of safeguards more effective and efficient. Data from continuous, unattended monitoring systems can be used to optimize on-site inspection scheduling and activities at declared facilities, resulting in fewer, better inspections. Such information-driven inspections are the logical evolution of inspection planning - making use of all available information to enhance scheduled and randomized inspections. Data collection and analysis approaches for unattended monitoring systems can be designed to protect sensitive information while enabling information-driven inspections. A number of such inspections within a predetermined range could reduce inspection frequency while providing an equal or greater level of deterrence against illicit activity, all while meeting operator and technology holder requirements and reducing inspector and operator burden. Three options for using unattended monitoring data to determine an information-driven inspection schedule are to (1) send all unattended monitoring data off-site, which will require advances in data analysis techniques to determine optimal thresholds; (2) have all separate unattended systems send individual go/no-go signals, allowing the inspectorate to know exactly which systems are exceeding their thresholds; and (3) develop a data aggregation system with attribute monitoring algorithms that would send a single go/no-go or other status signal off-site. Since the data in all of these options are used to inform on-site inspections (which will revert to randomized inspections if no thresholds are reached), the thresholds for the unattended systems can be set much closer to declared operating parameters than in current unattended monitoring systems.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Development of a portal monitor for UF6 cylinder verification

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors currently perform periodic inspections at uranium enrichment plants to verify UF6 cylinder enrichment declarations. Measurements are performed with handheld high-resolution sensors on a sampling of cylinders taken to be representative of the facility’s operations. As additional enrichment plans come online to support the expansion of nuclear power, reducing person-days of inspection will take on greater importance. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing a concept to automate the verification of enrichment plant cylinders to enable 100% product-cylinder verification and potentially, mass-balance calculations on the facility as a whole (by also measuring feed and tails cylinders). The Automated Cylinder Enrichment Verification System (ACEVS) would be located at key measurement points and will positively identify each cylinder, measure its mass and enrichment, store the data along with operator inputs in a secure database, and maintain continuity of knowledge on measured cylinders until IAEA inspector arrival. Given the potential for reduced inspector presence, the operational and manpower-reduction benefits of the portal concept are clear. However, it is necessary to assess whether the cylinder portal concept can meet, or potentially improve upon, today’s U-235 enrichment assay performance. PNNL’s ACEVS concept utilizes sensors that could be operated in an unattended mode: moderated He-3 neutron detectors and large NaI(Tl) scintillators for gamma-ray spectroscopy. The medium-resolution NaI(Tl) scintillators are a sacrifice in energy resolution but do provide high collection efficiency for signatures above 1 MeV. The He-3/NaI sensor combination allows the exploitation of additional, more-penetrating signatures than those currently utilized: Neutrons produced from F-19(μ,n) reactions (spawned primarily from U-234 alpha emission) and high-energy gamma rays (extending up to 10 MeV) induced by neutrons interacting in the steel cylinder. These signatures are indirect measures of U-235 that require a relatively stable U-234/U-235 ratio in the product material in order to be useful. The hypothesis of this work is that the U-234/U-235 ratio is sufficiently constant, for the specific facility where the automated system is installed, to rely on neutron and high-energy gamma-ray signatures for indirect measurement of U-235. Further, these highly penetrating signatures can be combined with a modified form of NaI-based 185-keV enrichment measurements to meet target uncertainties for the verification of product cylinders, with the additional benefits of full-volume assay of the cylinder and 100% product-cylinder verification (as opposed to today’s sampling-based approach). This paper focuses on the enrichment measurement aspects of the ACEVS concept: neutron and high-energy gamma-ray signatures, the radiation sensors designed to collect those signatures, and proof-of-principle cylinder measurements and analysis. Preliminary analysis indicates that an automated cylinder verification approach has the potential to meet target uncertainty values for 30B products cylinders (5%), assuming ore-based enrichment feed and a facility-specific calibration. Also described is the additional work needed to more definitively assess the concept’s viability, particularly through a better understanding of the U-234/U-235 ratio variability in modern enrichment plants.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Training program to prepare the U.S. DOE laboratories for the entry into force of the protocol additional to the agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in the United

In 2008, a joint team from Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) consisting of specialists in training IAEA inspectors in the use of complementary access activities formulated a training program to prepare the U.S DOE laboratories for the entry into force of the U.S. Additional Protocol. Since the U.S. Additional Protocol would allow for IAEA access to the DOE laboratories under the aegis of complementary access activities, the DOE laboratories would need to prepare for such visits. The goal of the training was to ensure that the DOE laboratories would successfully host an IAEA complementary access. In doing so, the labs must be able to provide the IAEA with the information that the IAEA would need to resolve its questions about the U.S. Declaration and declared activities at the lab, and also protect certain equities, as provided under the U.S. Additional Protocol Article 1.b and c. which set forth a 'National Security Exclusion.' This 'NSE' states that the AP provisions apply within the United States 'excluding only instances where its application would result in access by the Agency to activities with direct national security significance to the United States or to location or information associated with such activities.' These activities are referred to collectively as DNSS-direct national security significance. Furthermore, the U.S. has a specific right to employ managed access, without prejudice to the right under Article 1.b, in connection with activities of DNSS. The provisions in Articles 1.b and 1.c are unique to the U.S. AP, and are additional to the more general right, under Article 7, to use managed access to protect from disclosure proprietary and/or proliferation-sensitive information, and to meet safety and security requirements, that is incorporated directly from the Model Additional Protocol. The BNL-LANL team performed training at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory to cover the situations that these labs, which respectively represent nuclear weapons labs, nuclear energy labs, and science labs and environmental management sites, would encounter during a complementary access. Each of the three labs hosted a mock complementary access activity, which included mock inspectors from the BNL-LANL team. In addition to reviewing the draft declarations from each of the host labs, the BNL-LANL team conducted open source research in a manner similar to what IAEA inspectors would do to research the activities at a location and prepare questions for the location to answer and that would be the focus of a complementary access. The host labs and other labs attending the training found the training to be extremely useful and helpful in making sure that each lab's Additional Protocol team had made correct declarations of nuclear activities, had properly trained staff ready to host and answer IAEA inquiries, and would implement managed access during a complementary access that would provide access by the IAEA team to resolve questions or inconsistencies about a particular declaration and still protect the information addressed by Articles 1 and 7 of the U.S. AP.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Lessons Learned from the Development of an Example Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is interested in increasing capabilities of IAEA safeguards inspectors to access information that would improve their situational awareness on the job. A mobile information platform could potentially provide access to information, analytics, and technical and logistical support to inspectors in the field, as well as providing regular updates to analysts at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna or at satellite offices. To demonstrate the potential capability of such a system, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) implemented a number of example capabilities within a PNNL-developed precision information environment (PIE), and using a tablet as a mobile information platform. PNNL’s safeguards proof-of-concept PIE intends to; demonstrate novel applications of mobile information platforms to international safeguards use cases; demonstrate proof-of-principle capability implementation; and provide “vision” for capabilities that could be implemented. This report documents the lessons learned from this two-year development activity for the Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards (PIE-IS), describing the developed capabilities, technical challenges, and considerations for future development, so that developers working to develop a similar system for the IAEA or other safeguards agencies might benefit from our work.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Improved uncertainty quantification in nondestructive assay for nonproliferation

This paper illustrates methods to improve uncertainty quantification (UQ) for non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements used in nuclear nonproliferation. First, it is shown that current bottom-up UQ applied to calibration data is not always adequate, for three main reasons: (1) Because there are errors in both the predictors and the response, calibration involves a ratio of random quantities, and calibration data sets in NDA usually consist of only a modest number of samples (3–10); therefore, asymptotic approximations involving quantities needed for UQ such as means and variances are often not sufficiently accurate; (2) Common practice overlooks that calibration implies a partitioning of total error into random and systematic error, and (3) In many NDA applications, test items exhibit non-negligible departures in physical properties from calibration items, so model-based adjustments are used, but item-specific bias remains in some data. Therefore, improved bottom-up UQ using calibration data should predict the typical magnitude of item-specific bias, and the suggestion is to do so by including sources of item-specific bias in synthetic calibration data that is generated using a combination of modeling and real calibration data. Second, for measurements of the same nuclear material item by both the facility operator and international inspectors, current empirical (top-down) UQ is described for estimating operator and inspector systematic and random error variance components. A Bayesian alternative is introduced that easily accommodates constraints on variance components, and is more robust than current top-down methods to the underlying measurement error distributions.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Advancing the Fork detector for quantitative spent nuclear fuel verification

The Fork detector is widely used by the safeguards inspectorate of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify spent nuclear fuel. Fork measurements are routinely performed for safeguards prior to dry storage cask loading. Additionally, spent fuel verification will be required at the facilities where encapsulation is performed for acceptance in the final repositories planned in Sweden and Finland. The use of the Fork detector as a quantitative instrument has not been prevalent due to the complexity of correlating the measured neutron and gamma ray signals with fuel inventories and operator declarations. A spent fuel data analysis module based on the ORIGEN burnup code was recently implemented to provide automated real-time analysis of Fork detector data. This module allows quantitative predictions of expected neutron count rates and gamma units as measured by the Fork detectors using safeguards declarations and available reactor operating data. This study describes field testing of the Fork data analysis module using data acquired from 339 assemblies measured during routine dry cask loading inspection campaigns in Europe. Assemblies include both uranium oxide and mixed-oxide fuel assemblies. More recent measurements of 50 spent fuel assemblies at the Swedish Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel are also analyzed. An evaluation of uncertainties in the Fork measurement data is performed to quantify the ability of the data analysis module to verify operator declarations and to develop quantitative go/no-go criteria for safeguards verification measurements during cask loading or encapsulation operations. The goal of this approach is to provide safeguards inspectors with reliable real-time data analysis tools to rapidly identify discrepancies in operator declarations and to detect potential partial defects in spent fuel assemblies with improved reliability and minimal false positive alarms. Finally, the results are summarized, and sources and magnitudes of uncertainties are identified, and the impact of analysis uncertainties on the ability to confirm operator declarations is quantified.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Modernizing the active neutron collar poison rod correction using simulations to enhance PWR fresh fuel verification

The declared inventory of 235 U in fresh, low enriched uranium, nuclear fuel assemblies is routinely verified by nuclear safeguards inspectorates using the UNCL (Uranium Neutron Collar – Light Water Reactor Fuel) nondestructive assay instrument. The trend in modern fuels is towards higher initial enrichment, which in turn requires a larger number of burnable poison pins with higher Gadolinia concentration to hold down the initial reactivity. UNCL assay error for modern fuel assemblies typically exceeds 10%. The traditional algorithm used to correct the response for burnable poison content needs revision to achieve accuracy comparable to the $\sigma_\text{R}$ of 4.5% expected for poison-free assemblies. Here we review the problem and use a large set of 287 Monte Carlo simulations based on an experimentally benchmarked model corresponding to the 16×16 PWR array used in Brazilian Angra type II and III fuel. Simulated relative responses are used to evaluate the functional form of the poison correction and determine parameters optimal for 16×16 PWR assemblies. This update is conducted using between 4–24 Gadolinia pins ranging 2–11 wt% Gd 2 O 3 with assemblies having mean enrichments ranging 2.5%–5%. Experimental validation of the updated coefficients using seven measurements shows bias is reduced by an order of magnitude and $\sigma_\text{R}$R reduced from 10% to less than 2%. Two updated sets of coefficients are provided, the most accurate of which is directly useable in the existing analysis code (INCC) in use by inspectorate at fuel fabrication facilities.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Detection of Diversion in a Realistic Heat Pipe Microreactor Using Supervised Machine Learning

Microreactors (MRs) pose new challenges for international safeguards. Here, their small size and mass reproducibility make them ideal for deployment in greater numbers and in remote locations, making the job of safeguards inspectors more challenging. Machine learning (ML) is currently being applied to many fields to augment human performance and increase automation; in particular, ML could be used to provide insight for international inspectors to help detect the diversion of nuclear fuel from MR cores. Four ML model types (k-nearest neighbors, decision tree, random forest, and histogram-based gradient boosted ensemble) were trained on integrated flux and critical control drum angle data generated with Serpent 2 for a realistic heat pipe MR design, achieving nearly 100% binary classification accuracy of nominal and diversion core configurations by the end of 1 full power year for three of the four model types. Regression model variants were also trained, using the same input data, for predicting the number of fuel pins diverted. Root-mean-square errors below 5% of the total number of fuel pins were achieved by the 1 full power year mark for all models.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Hybrid Enrichment Assay Methods for a UF6 Cylinder Verification Station: FY10 Progress Report

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing the concept of an automated UF6 cylinder verification station that would be located at key measurement points to positively identify each cylinder, measure its mass and enrichment, store the collected data in a secure database, and maintain continuity of knowledge on measured cylinders until the arrival of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. At the center of this unattended system is a hybrid enrichment assay technique that combines the traditional enrichment-meter method (based on the 186 keV peak from 235U) with non-traditional neutron-induced high-energy gamma-ray signatures (spawned primarily by 234U alpha emissions and 19F(alpha, neutron) reactions). Previous work by PNNL provided proof-of-principle for the non-traditional signatures to support accurate, full-volume interrogation of the cylinder enrichment, thereby reducing the systematic uncertainties in enrichment assay due to UF6 heterogeneity and providing greater sensitivity to material substitution scenarios. The work described here builds on that preliminary evaluation of the non-traditional signatures, but focuses on a prototype field system utilizing NaI(Tl) and LaBr3(Ce) spectrometers, and enrichment analysis algorithms that integrate the traditional and non-traditional signatures. Results for the assay of Type-30B cylinders ranging from 0.2 to 4.95 wt% 235U, at an AREVA fuel fabrication plant in Richland, WA, are described for the following enrichment analysis methods: 1) traditional enrichment meter signature (186 keV peak) as calculated using a square-wave convolute (SWC) algorithm; 2) non-traditional high-energy gamma-ray signature that provides neutron detection without neutron detectors and 3) hybrid algorithm that merges the traditional and non-traditional signatures. Uncertainties for each method, relative to the declared enrichment for each cylinder, are calculated and compared to the uncertainties from an attended HPGe verification station at AREVA, and the IAEA’s uncertainty target values for feed, tail and product cylinders. A summary of the major findings from the field measurements and subsequent analysis follows: • Traditional enrichment-meter assay using specially collimated NaI spectrometers and a Square-Wave-Convolute algorithm can achieve uncertainties comparable to HPGe and LaBr for product, natural and depleted cylinders. • Non-traditional signatures measured using NaI spectrometers enable interrogation of the entire cylinder volume and accurate measurement of absolute 235U mass in product, natural and depleted cylinders. • A hybrid enrichment assay method can achieve lower uncertainties than either the traditional or non-traditional methods acting independently because there is a low degree of correlation in the systematic errors of the two individual methods (wall thickness variation and 234U/235U variation, respectively). This work has indicated that the hybrid NDA method has the potential to serve as the foundation for an unattended cylinder verification station. When compared to today’s handheld cylinder-verification approach, such a station would have the following advantages: 1) improved enrichment assay accuracy for product, tail and feed cylinders; 2) full-volume assay of absolute 235U mass; 3) assay of minor isotopes (234U and 232U) important to verification of feedstock origin; single instrumentation design for both Type 30B and Type 48 cylinders; and 4) substantial reduction in the inspector manpower associated with cylinder verification.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Low-Intrusion Techniques and Sensitive Information Management for Warhead Counting and Verification: FY2011 Annual Report

Future arms control treaties may push nuclear weapons limits to unprecedented low levels and may entail precise counting of warheads as well as distinguishing between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Such advances will require assessment of form and function to confidently verify the presence or absence of nuclear warheads and/or their components. Imaging with penetrating radiation can provide such an assessment and could thus play a unique role in inspection scenarios. Yet many imaging capabilities have been viewed as too intrusive from the perspective of revealing weapon design details, and the potential for the release of sensitive information poses challenges in verification settings. A widely held perception is that verification through radiography requires images of sufficient quality that an expert (e.g., a trained inspector or an image-matching algorithm) can verify the presence or absence of components of a device. The concept of information barriers (IBs) has been established to prevent access to relevant weapon-design information by inspectors (or algorithms), and has, to date, limited the usefulness of radiographic inspection. The challenge of this project is to demonstrate that radiographic information can be used behind an IB to improve the capabilities of treaty-verification weapons-inspection systems.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Enrichment Assay Methods Development for the Integrated Cylinder Verification System

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors currently perform periodic inspections at uranium enrichment plants to verify UF 6 cylinder enrichment declarations. Measurements are typically performed with handheld high-resolution sensors on a sampling of cylinders taken to be representative of the facility's entire product-cylinder inventory. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing a concept to automate the verification of enrichment plant cylinders to enable 100 percent product-cylinder verification and potentially, mass-balance calculations on the facility as a whole (by also measuring feed and tails cylinders). The Integrated Cylinder Verification System (ICVS) could be located at key measurement points to positively identify each cylinder, measure its mass and enrichment, store the collected data in a secure database, and maintain continuity of knowledge on measured cylinders until IAEA inspector arrival. The three main objectives of this FY09 project are summarized here and described in more detail in the report: (1) Develop a preliminary design for a prototype NDA system, (2) Refine PNNL's MCNP models of the NDA system, and (3) Procure and test key pulse-processing components. Progress against these tasks to date, and next steps, are discussed.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Safeguards Approaches for Very Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel

Many States are considering interim very long-term storage (VLTS) strategies for spent fuel storage while final disposition options are developed. Under the VLTS approach, spent fuel will be stored for periods that could exceed 50 to 100 years. The long-term storage of spent fuel — and the increasing stockpile of plutonium contained in this spent fuel — exacerbate the international safeguards and verification needs for spent fuel. In particular, significant delays in any verification of the contents of spent fuel assemblies prior to disposition may cause even further delays in the final disposition (or reprocessing) of spent fuel. As a result, the resources required by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguard the increasing stockpile of spent fuel will increase. Safeguarding these interim storage facilities and subsequently, the transportation of long-term stored fuel, will place additional demands on IAEA resources if the current approach, which relies heavily upon inspectors being present at the facility, is to be continued. Current IAEA approaches to safeguarding above ground dry storage sites do not take into account the challenges associated with longer-term storage and are also very dependent on inspector presence. The IAEA is moving toward remote and unattended monitoring systems for safeguards and these systems should be utilized at VLTS facilities as much as possible. The research and development of various monitoring systems should be continued.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Opportunities for Process Monitoring Techniques at Delayed Access Facilities

Except for specific cases where the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) maintains a continuous presence at a facility (such as the Japanese Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant), there is always a period of time or delay between the moment a State is notified or aware of an upcoming inspection, and the time the inspector actually enters the material balance area or facility. Termed by the authors as “delayed access,” this period of time between inspection notice and inspector entrance to a facility poses a concern. Delayed access also has the potential to reduce the effectiveness of measures applied as part of the Safeguards Approach for a facility (such as short-notice inspections). This report investigates the feasibility of using process monitoring to address safeguards challenges posed by delayed access at a subset of facility types.

Delayed access↗