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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber-Informed Engineering for Nuclear Reactor Digital Instrumentation and Control

As nuclear reactors transition from analog to digital technology, the benefits of enhanced operational capabilities and improved efficiencies are potentially offset by cyber risks. Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is an approach that can be used by engineers and staff to characterize and reduce new cyber risks in digital instrumentation and control systems. CIE provides guidance that can be applied throughout the entire systems engineering lifecycle, from conceptual design to decommissioning. In addition to outlining the use of CIE in nuclear reactor applications, this chapter provides a brief primer on nuclear reactor instrumentation and control and the associated cyber risks in existing light water reactors as well as the digital technology that will likely be used in future reactor designs and applications.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber-Resilient Design Methodology for Microgrids

Recent advancement in tools has helped with microgrid design, development, planning and operation. Microgrids offer a unique application based on users with different requirements for tools. The process of designing, constructing, commissioning, and assessing a microgrid is not always straightforward due to these distinct requirements. Additionally, metrics are needed for performance evaluation. This panel will offer an overview and description of tools that helps with microgrid design, construction, planning, operation, cyber security, and metrics-driven performance assessment driven by multiple diverse applications and use cases.

CCE↗
DOE OSTI2022

Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework and Cyber Range Integration

Distributed energy resource (DER) systems feature complex, data-driven communications networks that require careful system coordination and constant vigilance to ensure that grid assets are secure. Because DERs are an important component of the decarbonization strategy, agencies need to secure energy data that could implicate issues of national security if compromised. To help federal energy managers assess, monitor, and manage cybersecurity while achieving decarbonization, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's (NREL's) Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) offers a comprehensive, web-based assessment tool focusing on cyber governance or policies, technical management, and physical security. The DER-CF currently presents users with a series of pertinent cybersecurity questions that are used to generate a site-specific report and recommendations. This paper outlines a plan to integrate the DER-CF with another key asset-NREL's cyber range-to visualize cybersecurity resilience and compliance and to enhance the usability and accessibility of the DER-CF for federal facility energy managers and planners. This integration will result in a visualization environment to interpret and interact with compliance data. Its development will include regular conversations with stakeholders to assess the effectiveness of these efforts, refine the visualization capability, and ensure its value to our partners.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Cyber-Resilience Risk Management Architecture for Distributed Wind

Distributed wind is an electric energy resource segment with strong potential to be deployed in many applications, but special consideration of resilience and cybersecurity is needed to address the unique conditions associated with distributed wind. Distributed wind is a strong candidate to help meet renewable energy and carbon-free energy goals. However, care must be taken as more systems are installed to ensure that the systems are reliable, resilient, and secure. The physical and communications requirements for distributed wind mean that there are unique cybersecurity considerations, but there is little to no existing guidance on best practices for cybersecurity risk management for distributed wind systems specifically. This research develops an architecture for the consideration of cyber risks associated with distributed wind systems. The architecture takes into account the configurations, challenges, and standards for distributed wind to create a risk-focused perspective that considers of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, with special emphasis on what sets distributed wind systems apart from other distributed energy resources (DER). We discuss common distributed wind architectures and how they are interconnected to larger power systems. Because cybersecurity cannot exist independently, the cyber-resilience architecture must consider the system holistically. Finally, we discuss the implementation of a risk assessment process that uses the cyber-resilience framework to address challenges specific to distributed wind.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2018

Laboratory Directed Research and Development 2017 Annual Summary Report

The Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Program at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) reports its status to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) by March of each year. The program operates under the authority of DOE Order 413.2C, “Laboratory Directed Research and Development” (April 19, 2006), which establishes DOE’s requirements for the program while providing the laboratory director broad flexibility for program implementation. LDRD funds are obtained through a charge to all INL programs. This report includes summaries of all INL LDRD research activities supported during Fiscal Year (FY) 2017.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Transmission Technologies –GETs and HPCs Session 3: HPCs and Building Actions Plans to Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) program, held on November 11, 2025, centered on High Performance Conductors (HPCs) and the formulation of action plans to address digital assurance risks associated with Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs). This session convened experts from utilities, vendors, and government agencies to examine the technical, operational, and cybersecurity aspects of HPC deployment. Discussions highlighted the benefits of HPCs, such as their ability to rapidly increase transmission capacity using existing corridors, improve grid resilience, reduce system losses, and align with FERC Orders 2023 and 1920. Participants evaluated supply chain and digital assurance risks, including reliance on imported materials, limited domestic manufacturing capacity, workforce shortages, and traceability issues. The session also emphasized the importance of digital trust, integration-layer cybersecurity, and unified risk frameworks, introducing tools like intrusion detection systems, encryption, zero trust networking, and firmware integrity. Recaps of earlier workshops on Dynamic Line Ratings (DLRs), Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC), and Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO) underscored institutional barriers and integration challenges. Action plans were proposed to mitigate issues such as inconsistent cybersecurity practices, SBOM usage, supply chain visibility, operator trust, and misaligned incentives. Additionally, INL presented its supply chain risk management tools and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to support secure procurement and system design. The session concluded with a commitment to share key takeaways, incorporate cohort feedback into future policy development, and continue collaborative engagement through upcoming pilot activities. Session 3 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Digital Engineering and Cybersecurity Decision Analysis in Early Phases of SMR-Driven IES Projects

Considerable efforts are underway to ensure cybersecurity is integrated into the systems engineering lifecycle. Cyber-informed engineering and security-by-design frameworks are intended to identify and engineer out cybersecurity risks throughout the lifecycle. While these approaches are valuable for promoting the need to include cybersecurity considerations in early design phases to create more secure systems, they may not consider the entirety of digital risks. Digital risks in a digital instrumentation and control system include adversarial and unintentional risks from internal and external factors, such as human performance errors, design flaws, environmental conditions, and equipment degradation or failure. This report provides a detailed discussion on digital risk prior to describing the background and concept of operations for a small modular reactor-driven integrated energy system connected to industrial applications. The challenges of competing objectives and competing stakeholder requirements are discussed and the impacts on digital engineering, security considerations, and interdependencies are evaluated for mission-level, facility-level, and system-level decisions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2017

LDRD Strategic R&D Fund – Fiscal Year 2018 Research Priorities

Proposals are now being accepted for the Fiscal Year 2018 Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Director’s Strategic Research and Development (R&D) Fund. This call seeks high-quality proposals that address the Laboratory’s research priorities identified within the attached document LDRD Strategic R&D Fund - Fiscal Year 2018 Research Priorities.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

On the Application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE)

The 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy has recommended a transition to secure-by-design methodologies in critical infrastructure. This paper presents the adoption of the National Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Strategy as initiated by the U.S. DOE’s CESER office, advocating for the integration of cybersecurity at the earliest stages of system design. The strategy targets design engineers responsible for energy infrastructure to embed CIE principles within the engineering lifecycle, thus enhancing cyber resilience. This paper discusses the expansion of secure-by-design concepts to cyber-physical systems, moving beyond traditional IT security to include engineering considerations that can mitigate cyber risks through design choices. The paper introduces Digital Risk Management, balancing traditional cybersecurity with CIE to reduce both likelihood and impact of cyber threats. A set of CIE starter questions derived from 12 core principles is detailed, aiding engineers to consider cybersecurity in their designs and highlights the importance of CIE in anticipating and reducing the impacts of cyber attacks, suggesting that such integration is essential for national security and infrastructure resilience.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Integrated Energy Systems White Paper

This analysis compares how the existing critical infrastructure continues to be vulnerable and with smart grid technologies being implemented exposes IES, power systems, the grid, and renewable energy in new ways. Continued work in cybersecurity will thwart efforts against adversaries having an opportunity to penetrate these systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

CCE Case Study: Stinky Cheese Company

This document explores how to apply Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE) to identify and mitigate catastrophic effects resulting from cyber-enabled sabotage in a case study. For this case study, we will examine a fictional organization named the Stinky Cheese Company.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Cybersecurity Workforce Training for SMR Integration into Distribution Grids: A Competency Framework and Containerized Hands-On Lab for the SMR/DER/Microgrid Boundary

Small modular reactors (SMRs) and microreactors are entering the U.S. distribution grid as synchronous generation on feeders designed for loads and inverter-based distributed energy resources (DERs). No existing cybersecurity training program addresses this intersection of nuclear operations, DER management, and operational technology security. As subcontractor to Iowa State University on the CyDERMS Center, Argonne analyzed the relevant standards and training landscape, translated the resulting gaps into a twelve-objective competency framework across distribution-operator and graduate-analyst role tracks, and built a containerized training lab using a ∼400-bus composite grid model behind a realistically simulated Modbus TCP SCADA stack. The analysis isolates the balance-of-plant / energy-management-system (BOP/EMS) boundary as the critical jurisdictional seam where, as of March 2026, neither NRC nor NERC CIP cleanly claims cybersecurity responsibility for distribution-connected SMRs. The framework maps each objective across NIST CSF 2.0, ISA/IEC 62443, NIST NICE Task–Knowledge–Skill statements, and NRC RG 5.71 awareness-and-training controls. The training lab implements operator-recognition assessment scenarios spanning grid-side disturbances and telemetry-layer anomalies.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Electrification FY2020 Annual Progress Report

The Electric Drive Technologies (EDT) program’s mission is to conduct early-stage research and development on transportation electrification technologies that accelerate the development of cost-effective and compact electric traction drive systems that meet or exceed performance and reliability requirements of internal combustion engine (ICE)-based vehicles, thereby enabling electrification across all light-duty vehicle types.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2026

SDN-Based Smart Cyber Switching (SCS) for Cyber Restoration of a Digital Substation

In recent years, critical infrastructure and power grids have increasingly been targets of cyber-attacks, causing widespread and extended blackouts. Digital substations are particularly vulnerable to such cyber incursions, jeopardizing grid stability. This paper addresses these risks by proposing a cybersecurity framework that leverages software-defined networking (SDN) to bolster the resilience of substations based on the IEC- 61850 standard. The research introduces a strategy involving smart cyber switching (SCS) for mitigation and concurrent intelligent electronic device (CIED) for restoration, ensuring ongoing operational integrity and cybersecurity within a substation. The SCS framework improves the physical network’s behavior (i.e., leveraging commercial SDN capabilities) by incorporating an adaptive port controller (APC) module for dynamic port management and an intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect and counteract malicious IEC-61850-based sampled value (SV) and generic object-oriented system event (GOOSE) messages within the substation’s communication network. The framework’s effectiveness is validated through comprehensive simulations and a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed, demonstrating its ability to sustain substation operations during cyber-attacks and significantly improve the overall resilience of the power grid.

Liu, Chen-Ching (ORCID:0000000289417958)↗
DOE OSTI2022

Advanced Reactor Control and Operations (ARCO): A University Research Facility for Developing Optimized Digital Control Rooms

The Advanced Reactor Control and Operations (ARCO) facility was constructed in January 2018 to serve as a test bed for advanced reactor control rooms and operator support systems. Since then, it has supported human-machine interface user experience research, fault detection and mitigation technology development, control room concept of operations development, and remote operations research. ARCO serves as the control room for the Compact Integral Effects Test (CIET) facility, which replicates the primary-side flow paths and thermal-hydraulic behavior of a fluoride-salt-cooled high-temperature reactor (FHR) using simulant fluids and scaling principles. New reactor designs feature different operating conditions and scenarios than those in existing reactors. ARCO supports the research and development of digital tools for operator communications, intuitive real-time data analysis, online health monitoring and prognostics, and control room cybersecurity. By integrating these different technologies, ARCO acts as a prototypical control system to iteratively develop methods and tools of operation in advanced small modular nuclear reactors. This paper describes the features of and challenges to operating advanced small modular reactors underlying the design basis for ARCO and its operator support systems.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2017

IEC 62859: A new international standard on the coordination between safety and cybersecurity for nuclear I and C systems - 160

Cybersecurity requirements and controls for digital I and C systems are increasingly added to well-established safety-oriented provisions. Interactions and potential side-effects are possible and must be mastered, taking into account the nuclear I and C system specificities as well as their normative and regulatory contexts. The new international standard IEC 62859 'Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and control systems - Requirements for coordinating safety and cyber security' aims to optimize the integration of cybersecurity provisions in nuclear I and C architecture and systems, to prevent conflicts between safety and cybersecurity provisions, and to aid the identification and the leveraging of the potential synergies between safety and cybersecurity. The paper presents the structure and the key aspects of this standard. IEC 62859 is structured along three main sections: one dealing with the overall I and C architecture, a second one focusing on the system level, a third one dealing with organizational and procedural issues. The paper also discusses related work in the nuclear industry, and in other sectors. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Evaluation and Demonstration of Blockchain Applicability Framework

Blockchain technology has been gaining great interest from a variety of industry sectors, including financial, food processing, and power and energy markets. Realizing the strength of blockchain technology beyond the successful application in the cryptocurrency arena, researchers have been evaluating and using blockchain for applications such as supply chain management, transactive industry (both financial and energy), system integrity, device cybersecurity, identity management, and much more. One of the unique elements of the blockchain technology that made it such a captivating technology to researchers is its plethora of features. Some of the features include smart contracts, cryptocurrency and tokenizing, immutable distributed ledger, cryptographic hashing, and digital signature. In addition, there are multiple types of blockchains, such as permissioned/private and permissionless/public, and various consensus models, such as proof-of-work, proof-of-authority, proof-of-burn, and proof-of-stake. Therefore, it is often non-trivial to determine if an application requires a blockchain. If so, what kind of blockchain and consensus is most appropriate? This paper discusses the blockchain applicability framework (BAF), which was specifically designed with the purpose to answer those questions. BAF is divided into five domains, 18 subdomains, and about 100 controls. It is designed to ingest detailed user requirements to perform a weighted evaluation that is built on mathematical constructs to determine the ideal combination of blockchain that is appropriate for an application. Along with the core logical formulation of BAF, this paper depicts the efficacy of BAF through two use cases

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil G.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Smart Packaging for Critical Energy Shipment (SPaCES)

Recent technical advances have brought forth revolutionary Smart Packaging (SP) technology. SP incorporates multiple electronics, chemical, and mechanical sensing technologies into packaging materials, and utilizes them to monitor and display package content status. SP can also employ embedded micro actuators to react to undesirable package conditions such as moisture/temperature anomalies or harmful chemical reactions and neutralize it. When further integrated with wireless sensing and secure networking, SP provides wholistic system-wide remote situation awareness capability for real-time crisis management. Finally, we also see that SP can be further integrated with 3D printing technology to offer form-factor customization and application specific solutions suitable for DOE (Department of Energy) NNSA’s (National Nuclear Security Administration) R/N (radiological/nuclear) material shipment and management needs; this has the potential to improve safety, security, and overall operation process quality. This report surveys SP technology as the state of the art (SOTA) and analyzes how it can integrate with cybersecurity and 3D printing to address NNSA’s critical R/N material shipment and storage requirements. This report further presents our FY23/24 investigation plan describing project background, goal, motivation, proposed work, and statement of work and cost.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗