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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 91 records · Page 5

Resilient Control System Execution Agent (ReCoSEA)

In an increasingly networked world, critical infrastructure systems suffer from two types of vulnerability. The first is the traditionally recognized problem of monitoring the systems for faults and failures, recognizing and analyzing data, and responding with real understanding to the problems of the system. Increasingly complex systems create the opportunity for single points of failure to cascade when inaccurate assessment of system health increases response time or leads to faulty analysis of the problems involved. A second problem involves vulnerability to cyber intrusion, in which bad actors can mask system deterioration or present false data about system status. A resilient system will protect stability, efficiency, and security. To ensure these three states, the system must react to changing conditions within the system with coordination: no one component of the system can be allowed to react to problems without real consideration of the effects of that action on other components within the system. Systems with multi-agent design typically have three layers of action, a management layer, a coordination layer, and an execution layer. A resilient multi-agent system will emphasize functions of the execution layer, which has the responsibility of initiating actions, monitoring, analyzing, and controlling its own processes, while feeding information back to the higher levels of management and coordination. The design concept of a resilient control system execution agent (ReCoSEA) grows out of these underpinnings, and through the use of computational intelligence techniques, this paper suggests an associated design methodology.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Characterization of Porous Transport Layers Towards the Development of Efficient Proton Exchange Membrane Water Electrolysis

The current goals for implementing the hydrogen economy have highlighted a need to further optimize water-splitting technologies for clean hydrogen production. Proton exchange membrane water electrolysis (PEMWE) is a leading technology, but further optimizations of anode materials including the porous transport layer (PTL) and the adjacent catalyst layer (CL) are required to increase overall cell performance and reduce cost. This literature review describes advances in PTL development and characterization, highlighting early PTL characterization work and most common methods including capillary flow porometry and mercury intrusion porometry, optical imaging, neutron and x-ray radiography, and x-ray computed tomography. The article also discusses PTL protective coatings and their characterizations, focusing on platinum group metal (PGM)-based coatings, alternative non-PGM-based coatings, post-treated PTLs, and investigations into thin PGM-based coatings. Furthermore, it highlights the integration of the PTL and the adjacent CL along with associated characterization challenges. Lastly, this review discusses future developments in the characterization needed to improve PEMWE's performance and long-term durability are discussed.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Enhanced thermal stability of phosphate capped magnetite nanoparticles

We have studied the effect of phosphate capping on the high temperature thermal stability and magnetic properties of magnetite (Fe{sub 3}O{sub 4}) nanoparticles synthesized through a single-step co-precipitation method. The prepared magnetic nanoparticles are characterized using various techniques. When annealed in air, the phosphate capped nanoparticle undergoes a magnetic to non-magnetic phase transition at a temperature of 689 °C as compared to 580 °C in the uncoated nanoparticle of similar size. The observed high temperature phase stability of phosphate capped nanoparticle is attributed to the formation of a phosphocarbonaceous shell over the nanoparticles, which acts as a covalently attached protective layer and improves the thermal stability of the core material by increasing the activation energy. The phosphocarbonaceous shell prevents the intrusion of heat, oxygen, volatiles, and mass into the magnetic core. At higher temperatures, the coalescence of nanoparticles occurs along with the restructuring of the phosphocarbonaceous shell into a vitreous semisolid layer on the nanoparticles, which is confirmed from the small angle X-ray scattering, Fourier transform infra red spectroscopy, and transmission electron microscopy measurements. The probable mechanism for the enhancement of thermal stability of phosphocarbonaceous capped nanoparticles is discussed.

77 NANOSCIENCE AND NANOTECHNOLOGY↗

Attack-resilient algorithms and testbed federation for wide-area protection and control in smart grid

Today’s energy infrastructure is undergoing a massive transformation across all generation, transmission, and distribution systems to provide reliability, efficiency, and sustainability to the power system network. During the past 10 years, there has been a remarkable enhancement in developing close-loop wide-area protection and control (WAPAC) applications, such as automatic generation control (AGC), wide-area protection scheme (WAPS), synchrophasor-based wide-area voltage control system (WAVCS), etc., in the energy management system (EMS) to provide an adequate situational awareness to control center operators during physical disturbances and natural events. The rapid digitalization, unencrypted communication, and numerous data-sharing devices have increased digital access points that have exposed the grid network to countless cyberattacks pertinent to the WAPAC cybersecurity. Given the amount of complex grid network coupled with legacy infrastructures, it is untrustworthy to completely rely on information technology (IT)-based conventional security measures to defend against evolving cyberattacks. Hence, there is a compelling need to go beyond the traditional paradigm of ‘security by obscurity’ and ‘bolt-on’ security measures, and develop a suite of innovative security solutions at multiple layers to transform the current “fault-resilient” grid into “fault and attack-resilient” grid of the future. This dissertation specifically focuses on developing application-specific attack-resilient solutions for critical WAPAC applications in the smart grid. The first part of the study, Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Protection Scheme, presents a cyber-physical attack-resilient system (CPARS) for WAPS, where two anomaly detection methods are proposed to detect multi-level cyberattacks followed by the rules-based intrusion mitigation system (RIMS) to initiate effective mitigation strategies, tailored to these attacks, to restore the normal grid operation after disturbances. The first anomaly detection component, Machine learning-based Anomaly Detection for Centralized WAPS, discusses a novel architecture and methodology for developing a machine-learning-based anomaly detection system (ADS) for the centralized wide-area protection system (CWAPS) by applying the variational mode decomposition (VMD) technique and decision tree (DT) algorithms using cyber logs and synchrophasor measurements. The second component, Multi-Agent-based Anomaly Detection for Decentralized WAPS, presents a two-level hierarchical multi-agent-based decentralized WAPS against the system-aware stealthy cyber-attacks. Finally, for the RIMS, the state transition diagram-based mitigation measures are defined based on the grid operation states and experimental testing and evaluation are presented in a cyber-physical testbed environment. The second part of the study, Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Voltage Control System, addresses the existing vulnerabilities in the wide-area voltage control system (WAVCS), presents the methodology for performing an impact analysis during data integrity attacks, and proposes a data-driven attackresilient system (DARS) by incorporating machine learning-based ADS and rules-based anomaly mitigation system (RAMS) to detect these attacks and provide necessary mitigation actions to maintain the transient voltage stability after disturbances. Finally, the third part, Networked Federation Testbed (NEFTSec) for Smart Grid Cybersecurity, focuses on developing an interconnected federated testbed through a common network like the internet, describes its conceptual architectures, and also presents its design components for experimental testing, validation, and evaluation. Further, it presents the co-simulation interface algorithm (CIA) to facilitate the geographically-dispersed real-time distributed simulation (GD-RTDS) during the cyber-physical federation. In general, this dissertation presents innovative attack-resilient solutions for WAPAC applications that are experimentally tested and evaluated using the PowerCyber testbed and NEFTSec platform to accelerate the transition of state-of-the-art research works to the real-field deployments.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Investigations of degradation and encapsulation of plastic scintillator

Studies have revealed that plastic scintillators such as polyvinyl toluene and polystyrene can undergo environmentally related material damage (“fogging”) that adversely affects detection performance under certain conditions and histories. A significant decrease in sensitivity has been seen in some gamma-ray detectors as they age as a result of this damage. Performance degradation due to such damage is characterized by a signal change from the detector, which shifts to lower energy, and ultimately a reduction in the ability to detect gamma radiation. This degradation is due to the permeation of water into the plastic, which can then cause temporary fogging and permanent damage to the material. As an example, a 1-mm thick barrier of high-density polyethylene with an area of 1 m 2 would allow 5 g per year of water transmission at 100% relative humidity. Thus, significant amounts of water can penetrate plastics over time and provide the potential for damage to the plastic. Such damage to plastic scintillator can cause problems for radiation detection applications in uncontrolled environments. Mitigation approaches that have been proposed to prevent damage to plastic scintillator include encapsulation of the plastic scintillator to prevent water intrusion that leads to damage during cold cycles. It is concluded that an encapsulation material with a moisture vapor transmission rate on the order of 10 -4 g∙m -2 ∙d -1 or better is needed for protecting large pieces of plastic scintillator from fogging over years of use. This article presents information on testing of bare and encapsulated plastic scintillator samples and on diagnostic approaches to measure the nature and progression of the fogging condition. It is shown that several encapsulation approaches fail to prevent water intrusion, while a couple methods can successfully encapsulate plastic and prevent water from penetrating the plastic and producing fogging.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Passive Noise Analysis for Advanced Tamper Indication. End of Year Report 2015

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is part of a multi-lab project assessing front-end electronics for unattended measurement (FEUM) being developed for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) unattended systems. The FEUM development activity provides an opportunity to address tampering detection between FEUM and the detector, signal integrity from FEUM to the data acquisition systems, and data validity – long-standing challenges for the IAEA. This report summarizes the INL activities in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 to characterize and test passive noise analysis as a potential tamper-indicating approach for implementation into FEUM or as a stand-alone method. The project’s primary objectives in FY-15 were to (1) determine detectable tamper scenarios using four pre-amplifier/detector systems, (2) perform tests of tampering scenarios with three common cable types used by the IAEA, (3) separate radio-frequency-induced events from inherent effect by means of an anechoic chamber, and (4) perform tests at an industrial facility. General conclusions were reached in several areas.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

WISP: Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies (Final Technical Report)

The complex interdependencies of cyber systems (sensors and communications), physical grids and associated electricity market operations make protecting electric power grids a significant challenge. The energy sector is constantly under new, targeted, advanced and dangerous cyber-attacks that have the potential to result in the loss of human life. These threats are further exacerbated by our need to modernize the grid. One focus of cyber security research in smart grids is the securing of the SCADA system through advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) and bad data detection algorithms in state estimation. These methods either require full knowledge of the system topology and parameters or fail to understand the physical behaviors under attack. WISP (Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies) is designed to provide additional protection to the power grid using only publicly available data. In particular, WISP exploits the spatio-temporal nature of the real time locational marginal prices (LMPs), in conjunction with other information such as bids, weather, outages and load data to analyze anomalous power pricing behaviors and then correlate those observations to localize regions of interest and identify potential cyber events. WISP is non-intrusive as the tool is deployed as a service in the Cloud or on premise and provides reliable information to system operators for enhanced situational awareness, without impeding energy delivery functions. The WISP technology comprises three modules: the data-driven anomaly detection core, the vulnerability and risk analysis and the root cause analysis. The data-driven anomaly detection core performs the tasks of feature selection, anomaly detection and attack region localization. The vulnerability and risk analysis module provides system level information of the vulnerable variables and times, assisting the operators in selecting monitoring and protection nodes. The root cause analysis module takes the detection results and identifies potential operational conditions that contribute to the detected anomalies. In Phase I, we have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of WISP. We developed a realistic electricity market simulator capable of generating normal and attack market data under various operational conditions. We developed a series of cyber-attack detection and analysis algorithms and evaluated them under multiple data sources. Finally, we integrated all modules into an end-to-end software, providing functions for data management, data analytics and visualization. Specifically, we have achieved: (i) real-time data acceptance from external utility interfaces with >99% acceptance rate; (ii) high performance anomaly detection algorithms with >98% detection accuracy and <0.1% false alarm rate; and (iii) ultra-low computing delay <50 milliseconds. Additionally, our team developed algorithms to identify the vulnerable variables in electricity market operations and root cause analysis functions to identify major contributors to the price spikes. These ancillary modules are necessary when deploying WISP in real world industry environment. In Phase II, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of WISP software on realistic largescale power systems. We performed red team testing for the Phase I WISP software and identified software vulnerabilities and implemented corresponding mitigation solutions. We adapted the electricity market simulator for the Texas synthetic 2000-bus system and generated datasets for the false data injection attacks. We created database and visualization interfaces for the Texas system and the ISO New England system. We performed software optimization in terms of operation efficiency, computing speed and detection accuracy. Finally, we tested the software on the Texas system and the ISO New England system and evaluated the detection performance. Overall, we achieved above 89% detection rate, below 3% false alarm rate and below 37 seconds of end-to-end detection delay.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Vehicle Cybersecurity Threats and Mitigation Approaches

Federal fleet managers and the information technology teams working with them need to understand the threats associated with modern vehicles. As vehicles become safer overall, the dangers change from distracted drivers to privacy intrusion and compromised operation. While fleet managers cannot necessarily change the configurations of manufacturer settings in mass market vehicles, they can influence what protective measures are taken in supplemental equipment or pilot-project vehicles. This report identifies security concerns, mitigation techniques, and procurement language that may be applicable in certain cases.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Managing information technology security risk

Information Technology (IT) Security Risk Management is a critical task for the organization to protect against the loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability of IT resources. As systems bgecome more complex and diverse and and attacks from intrusions and malicious content increase, it is becoming increasingly difficult to manage IT security risk. This paper describes a two-pronged approach in addressing IT security risk and risk management in the organization: 1) an institutional enterprise appraoch, and 2) a project life cycle approach.

security toolset↗

Access Control of Web- and Java-Based Applications

Cybersecurity has become a great concern as threats of service interruption, unauthorized access, stealing and altering of information, and spreading of viruses have become more prevalent and serious. Application layer access control of applications is a critical component in the overall security solution that also includes encryption, firewalls, virtual private networks, antivirus, and intrusion detection. An access control solution, based on an open-source access manager augmented with custom software components, was developed to provide protection to both Web-based and Javabased client and server applications. The DISA Security Service (DISA-SS) provides common access control capabilities for AMMOS software applications through a set of application programming interfaces (APIs) and network- accessible security services for authentication, single sign-on, authorization checking, and authorization policy management. The OpenAM access management technology designed for Web applications can be extended to meet the needs of Java thick clients and stand alone servers that are commonly used in the JPL AMMOS environment. The DISA-SS reusable components have greatly reduced the effort for each AMMOS subsystem to develop its own access control strategy. The novelty of this work is that it leverages an open-source access management product that was designed for Webbased applications to provide access control for Java thick clients and Java standalone servers. Thick clients and standalone servers are still commonly used in businesses and government, especially for applications that require rich graphical user interfaces and high-performance visualization that cannot be met by thin clients running on Web browsers

Tso, Kam S.↗

Resilient U.S. Land Ports of Entry

The continued operation of Land Ports of Entry (LPOE), managed by the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and General Services Administration% is vital to the U.S. economy and security. Border faculties are included in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Government Facilities Sector2, one of the 16 critical infrastructures "whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.'" Specifically, disruptions to the flow of border crossing traffic, in the form of closures or increased border crossing wait times, impact the economy and security of all countries involved. This paper describes a process for analyzing and improving the resilience of U.S. Land Ports of Entry. For LPOE, the team believes that energy resilience is the primary objective due to the complete reliance on the e-manifest system and the increasing use of Multi-Energy Portals (MEPs). Emanifests are part of CPB's Automated Commercial Environment (ACE). They document several key pieces of information about cargo vehicles wishing to cross the border into the United States and are submitted before arriving at the port. Vehicles can be flagged for more invasive inspection based on the content of the e-manifest. MEPs are a non-intrusive inspection (NII) technology used to scan the contents of the cargo. Together MEPs and ACE serve an important role in aiding CBP with their mission to protect "the public from dangerous people and materials", and "enabling legitimate trade and travel.'" To analyze resilience of a port, the team would need to understand the port's current energy usage, which systems depend on energy and what backup systems exist, and any emergency operation plans that dictate how systems are operated in the event of a power outage. The team would also need to determine the design basis threats (DBTs) for the LPOE which could include natural disasters, manmade events, and accidents. The magnitudes of the DBTs are calculated and are then translated to expected impacts on the infrastructure and systems at the port. With this information gathered, existing LPOE models developed here at Sandia National Laboratories could be extended to support decisions about resilience. Current models are implemented in FlexSim, a 3rd party discrete event simulator. FlexSim provides 3-D visuals of physical layout that can reveal valuable insights, allows input to be variable (e.g. time it takes to interact with the CBP officer at primary inspection can vary) so that a whole range of possibilities can be captured in the results, and can be used to collect user-defined output metrics. Current LPOE models focus on cargo vehicle traffic, and process changes caused by the installation of new drive-through MEPs. Extending them to address resilience questions would require the addition of key pieces of information learned during the resilience analysis including critical systems, failure rates, and process changes for when failures occur. The primary output metric for current models is border crossing wait time. Additional metrics would also be added to the model to gain a more complete understanding of impacts related to resilience, for example, MEP scan rate. Once complete, the model could be used to analyze the effectiveness of mitigation strategies representing some future state.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Cybersecurity through Real-Time Distributed Control Systems

Critical infrastructure sites and facilities are becoming increasingly dependent on interconnected physical and cyber-based real-time distributed control systems (RTDCSs). A mounting cybersecurity threat results from the nature of these ubiquitous and sometimes unrestrained communications interconnections. Much work is under way in numerous organizations to characterize the cyber threat, determine means to minimize risk, and develop mitigation strategies to address potential consequences. While it seems natural that a simple application of cyber-protection methods derived from corporate business information technology (IT) domain would lead to an acceptable solution, the reality is that the characteristics of RTDCSs make many of those methods inadequate and unsatisfactory or even harmful. A solution lies in developing a defense-in-depth approach that ranges from protection at communications interconnect levels ultimately to the control system s functional characteristics that are designed to maintain control in the face of malicious intrusion. This paper summarizes the nature of RTDCSs from a cybersecurity perspec tive and discusses issues, vulnerabilities, candidate mitigation approaches, and metrics.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Protecting Intelligent Distributed Power Grids against Cyber Attacks

Like other industrial sectors, the electrical power industry is facing challenges involved with the increasing demand for interconnected operations and control. The electrical industry has largely been restructured due to deregulation of the electrical market and the trend of the Smart Grid. This moves new automation systems from being proprietary and closed to the current state of Information Technology (IT) being highly interconnected and open. However, while gaining all of the scale and performance benefits of IT, existing IT security challenges are acquired as well. The power grid automation network has inherent security risks due to the fact that the systems and applications for the power grid were not originally designed for the general IT environment. In this paper, we propose a conceptual layered framework for protecting power grid automation systems against cyber attacks. The following factors are taken into account: (1) integration with existing, legacy systems in a non-intrusive fashion; (2) desirable performance in terms of modularity, scalability, extendibility, and manageability; (3) alignment to the 'Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in the Energy Sector' and the future smart grid. The on-site system test of the developed prototype security system is briefly presented as well.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Security in Full-Force

When fully developed for NASA, Vanguard Enforcer(TM) software-which emulates the activities of highly technical security system programmers, auditors, and administrators-was among the first intrusion detection programs to restrict human errors from affecting security, and to ensure the integrity of a computer's operating systems, as well as the protection of mission critical resources. Vanguard Enforcer was delivered in 1991 to Johnson Space Center and has been protecting systems and critical data there ever since. In August of 1999, NASA granted Vanguard exclusive rights to commercialize the Enforcer system for the private sector. In return, Vanguard continues to supply NASA with ongoing research, development, and support of Enforcer. The Vanguard Enforcer 4.2 is one of several surveillance technologies that make up the Vanguard Security Solutions line of products. Using a mainframe environment, Enforcer 4.2 achieves previously unattainable levels of automated security management.

Source record↗

Cathodic Protection Modeling for Hanford Underground Double-Shell Tank Farms

Hanford stores millions of gallons of radioactive and chemically hazardous waste from the production of weapon materials in tank farms consisting of underground carbon-steel storage tanks surrounded by reinforced concrete. Six of these Hanford tank farms use double-shell storage tanks (DSTs). The DST farms were constructed from 1968 to 1986 with a planned 40–50 year design life, so some are already operating beyond their initial life expectancy. Ultrasonic testing (UT) has indicated significant thinning on the bottom of the secondary (outer) liner of these tanks, believed to arise from groundwater intrusion driving concrete side corrosion. There is no direct access to the steel/concrete interface between the tank and the concrete pad, making it difficult to apply a chemical-based mitigation strategy or to conduct repairs, but cathodic protection (CP) is a possible method to inhibit further concrete-side corrosion. Hanford already uses CP to protect below grade steel piping within the tank farms and connected to the tanks, but this system was not designed to protect the tank bottoms. CP design must account for the structures surrounding the DSTs, including the steel reinforcing bars (rebar) within the concrete pad and vault, various process lines, and the existing CP system. In this study, finite element analysis (FEA) modeling was carried out to simulate CP protection of 1) a single tank and CP anode to develop options for modeling the rebar and to compare to a simpler circuit model and 2) the entire Hanford AN tank farm as a representative example consisting of seven tanks, associated piping, and both existing and new CP anodes. Both circuit and FEA models predict that significant protective current could be delivered to the bottoms of the tanks with the addition of tank-protection anodes below the depth of the tanks. Simulations with only the existing pipe-protection anodes active confirmed that only a very small current to the tank bottoms is predicted under present conditions. Multiple simplified representations of the dome and wall rebar were tested to reduce the computational complexity of the tank-farm simulations, resulting in modeling the rebar as edge elements with a prescribed effective circumference that matches the real rebar surface area. The geometry of the rebar is also simplified into horizontal hoops around the tank walls and radial rebar over the dome with increased effective circumference to retain the target surface area. This simplification was found to greatly reduce the complexity and solution time of the models without large changes in current distributions, especially to the tank bottom. A range of values were tested for model parameters such as soil and concrete resistivities and polarization resistance to investigate their impact on the current and electric potential distributions. Depending on the parameters used, FEA simulations predict some risk of overprotection, particularly on the piping system; since overprotection can also lead to surface damage associated with hydrogen gas generation at the interface (e.g. hydrogen embrittlement or damage to coatings), this needs to be considered when refining the design of the new CP system. Comparison between the FEA models and the circuit model representation demonstrated that the circuit model could not match the predicted FEA current distribution, even when using the exact same surface areas. This discrepancy appeared to be at least partly attributable to the impact of the relative positions of the tank components and anodes to each other and to the ground surface. The FEA model accounts for the relative positions since it solves the governing equations in three dimensions, but the circuit model cannot account for the positioning. In particular, the circuit model underpredicts the current to the tank bottom and overpredicts the current to the dome compared to FEA for the baseline geometry. The FEA models omitted the electrically isolated rebar in the bottom concrete slab. However, a circuit based stray current model estimated that only 2.1% of the total current through the slab would stray into the rebar, corresponding to ~0.21 A for a target current density of 2 mA/ft2 to the tank bottom. The estimated corrosion driven by this amount of stray current is predicted to yield a lifetime of >400 years for the minimum rebar diameter, assuming an acceptable cross-section area loss of 10%.

d'Entremont, Anna [Savannah River National Laborat↗

Equipment Testing Environment (ETE) Process Specification

This document is intended to be utilized with the Equipment Test Environment being developed to provide a standard process by which the ETE can be validated. The ETE is developed with the intent of establishing cyber intrusion, data collection and through automation provide objective goals that provide repeatability. This testing process is being developed to interface with the Technical Area V physical protection system. The document will overview the testing structure, interfaces, device and network logging and data capture. Additionally, it will cover the testing procedure, criteria and constraints necessary to properly capture data and logs and record them for experimental data capture and analysis.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Exe-Guard Project

The exe-Guard Project is an alliance between Dominion Virginia Power (DVP), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Dartmouth University, and Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories (SEL). SEL is primary recipient on this project. The exe-Guard project was selected for award under DE-FOA-0000359 with CFDA number 81.122 to address Topic Area of Interest 4: Hardened platforms and Systems. The exe-Guard project developed an antivirus solution for control system embedded devices to prevent the execution of unauthorized code and maintain settings and configuration integrity. This project created a white list antivirus solution for control systems capable of running on embedded Linux® operating systems. White list antivirus methods allow only credible programs to run through the use of digital signatures and hash functions. Once a system’s secure state is baselined, white list antivirus software denies deviations from that state because of the installation of malicious code as this changes hash results. Black list antivirus software has been effective in traditional IT environments but has negative implications for control systems. Black list antivirus uses pattern matching and behavioral analysis to identify system threats while relying on regular updates to the signature file and recurrent system scanning. Black list antivirus is vulnerable to zero day exploits which have not yet been incorporated into a signature file update. System scans hamper the performance of high availability applications, as revealed in NIST special publication 1058 which summarizes the impact of blacklist antivirus on control systems: Manual or “on-demand” scanning has a major effect on control processes in that they take CPU time needed by the control process (Sometimes close to 100% of CPU time). Minimizing the antivirus software throttle setting will reduce but not eliminate this effect. Signature updates can also take up to 100% of CPU time, but for a much shorter period than a typical manual scanning process. Control systems are vulnerable to performance losses if off-the-shelf blacklist antivirus solutions aren’t implemented with care. This investment in configuration in addition to constant decommissioning to perform manual signature file updates is unprecedented and impractical. Additionally, control systems are often disconnected or islanded from the network making the delivery of signature updates difficult. Exe-Guard project developed a white list antivirus solution that mitigated the above drawbacks and allows control systems to cost-effectively apply malware protection while maintaining high reliability. The application of security patches can also be minimized since white listing maintains constant defense against unauthorized code execution. Security patches can instead be applied in less frequent intervals where system decommissioning can be scheduled and planned for. Since control systems are less dynamic than IT environments, the feasibility of maintaining a secure baselined state is more practical. Because upgrades are performed in infrequent, calculated intervals, it allows a new security baseline to be established before the system is returned to service. Exe-Guard built on the efforts of SNL under the Code Seal project. SNL demonstrated prototype Trust Anchors on the project which are independent monitoring and control devices that can be integrated into untrustworthy components. The exe-Guard team started with the lessons learned under this project then designed commercial solution for white list malware protection. Malware is a real threat, even on islanded or un-networked installations, since operators can unintentionally install infected files, plug in infected mass storage devices, or infect a piece of equipment on the islanded local area network that can then spread to other connected equipment. Protection at the device level is one of the last layers of defense in a security-in-depth defense model before an asset becomes compromised. This project provided non-destructive intrusion, isolation and automated response solution, achieving a goal of the Department of Energy (DOE) Roadmap to Secure Control Systems. It also addressed CIP-007-R4 which requires asset owners to employ malicious software prevention tools on assets within the electronic security perimeter. In addition, the CIP-007-R3 requirement for security patch management is minimized because white listing narrows the impact of vulnerabilities and patch releases. The exe-Guard Project completed all tasks identified in the statement of project objective and identified additional tasks within scope that were performed and completed within the original budget. The cost share was met and all deliverables were successfully completed and submitted on time. Most importantly the technology developed and commercialized under this project has been adopted by the Energy sector and thousands of devices with exe-Guard technology integrated in them have now been deployed and are protecting our power systems today

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

FATE: The drifting Fish Aggregating Device (dFAD) TrajEctory Modeling Tool for Marine Protected Area Management

Drifting fish aggregating devices (dFADs) routinely enter marine protected areas (MPAs) and may undermine MPA protections by drifting out of the MPA with the aggregated fish biomass, or grounding and damaging sensitive coral reef habitats. MPA managers must decide whether to deploy resources in response to dFAD intrusions. To address this issue, we propose to quantify dFAD activity in relation to ocean currents, fish biomass, and animal telemetry at Palmyra Atoll, part of the Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument in the central Pacific Ocean. Specifically, we propose to develop the dFAD TrajEctory Tool (FATE). FATE is an innovative decision support tool that will use NASA observations and numerical models to predict future dFAD trajectories and inform TNC and USFWS whether they should deploy tactical resources (boats, personnel) to monitor, intercept, or retrieve dFADs that have entered the Refuge. The objectives are to use NASA observational constraints on ocean winds and currents to assist with the ecological management of the Palmyra Atoll NWR and MPA. Specifically, we will deliver an operational software tool that quantifies the grounding risk associated with each tracked dFAD and decision support for grounding risk mitigation via intercept at sea. This project addresses Element 3.3: Protected area management of the 2022 Ecological Conservation Solicitation by developing a tool needed by MPA managers to make tactical and strategic decisions focused on improving the effectiveness of MPAs. By quantifying the riskof dFADs, this project will help monitor and better inform the deployment of tactical (ships/personnel) and strategic (legislative) resources to better manage MPAs. This project is a collaboration between The Nature Conservancy, who operate long-term projects within the Palmyra MPA, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, who have the authority to make decisions related to its management. We expect that the results of our proposal will benefit marine resources within the Palmyra MPA and could be transferred to other remote MPAs within the US and other island nations within the Pacific Ocean.

TrajEctory↗