Results for “LIABILITIES” — Page 5

NASA NTRS2004

Muscle Research and Human Space Exploration: Current Progress and Future Challenges

Since the beginning of human space flight, there has been serious concern over the exposure of human crewmembers to the microgravity of space due to the systemic effects on terrestrially-evolved creatures that are adapted to Earth gravity. Humans in the microgravity environment of space, within our currently developed space vehicles, are exposed to various periods of skeletal muscle unloading (unweighting). Unloading of skeletal muscle both on Earth and during spaceflight results in remodeling of muscle (atrophic response) as an adaptation to the reduced loads placed upon it. As a result, there are decrements in skeletal muscle strength, fatigue resistance, motor performance, and connective tissue integrity. This normal adaptive response to the microgravity environment is for the most part of little consequence within the space vehicle per se but may become a liability resulting in an increased risk of crewmember physical failure during extravehicular activities or abrupt transitions to environments of increased gravity (such as return to Earth or landing on another planetary body).

Feedback, Daniel L.↗

NASA NTRS1978

Radiation Hazard Detector

NASA technology has made commercially available a new, inexpensive, conveniently-carried device for protection, of people exposed to potentially dangerous levels of microwave radiation. Microwaves are radio emissions of extremely high frequency. They can be hazardous but the degree of hazard is not yet well understood. Generally, it is believed that low intensity radiation of short duration is not harmful but that exposure to high levels can induce deep internal burns, affecting the circulatory and nervous systems, and particularly the eyes. The Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has established an allowable safe threshold of exposure. However, people working near high intensity sources of microwave energy-for example, radar antennas and television transmitters-may be unknowingly exposed to radiation levels beyond the safe limit. This poses not only a personal safety problem but also a problem for employers in terms of productivity loss, workman's compensation claims and possible liability litigation. Earlier-developed monitoring devices which warn personnel of dangerous radiation levels have their shortcomings. They can be cumbersome and awkward to use while working. They also require continual visual monitoring to determine if a person is in a dangerous area of radiation, and they are relatively expensive, another deterrent to their widespread adoption. In response to the need for a cheaper and more effective warning system, Jet Propulsion Laboratory developed, under NASA auspices, a new, battery-powered Microwave Radiation Hazard Detector. To bring the product to the commercial market, California Institute Research Foundation, the patent holder, granted an exclusive license to Cicoil Corporation, Chatsworth, California, an electronic components manufacturer.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2006

Spinoff 2006

NASA seeks to create industry partnerships to develop technology that both applies to NASA mission needs and contributes to competitiveness in global markets. As part of NASA s mission, the Agency facilitates the transfer and commercialization of NASA-sponsored research and technology. These efforts not only support NASA, they enhance the quality of life here on Earth. While NASA does not manufacture, market or sell commercial products, many commercial products are derived from NASA technology. Many NASA originated technologies are adapted by private industry for use by consumers like you. Spinoff developments highlighted in this publication are based on information provided by individual and private industry users of NASA originated aerospace technology who acknowledge that such technology contributed wholly or in part to development of the product or process described. NASA cannot accept responsibility or liability for the misinterpretation or misrepresentation of the enclosed information provided by these third party users. Publication herein does not constitute NASA endorsement of the product or process, nor confirmation of manufacturers performance claims related to any particular spinoff development.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2007

Unofficial Road Building in the Brazilian Amazon: Dilemmas and Models for Road Governance

Unofficial roads form dense networks in landscapes, generating a litany of negative ecological outcomes, but unofficial roads in frontier areas are also instrumental in local livelihoods and community development. This trade-off poses dilemmas for the governance of unofficial roads. Unofficial road building in frontier areas of the Brazilian Amazon illustrates the challenges of 'road governance.' Both state-based and community based governance models exhibit important liabilities for governing unofficial roads. Whereas state-based governance has experienced difficulties in adapting to specific local contexts and interacting effectively with local interest groups, community-based governance has a mixed record owing to social inequalities and conflicts among local interest groups. A state-community hybrid model may offer more effective governance of unofficial road building by combining the oversight capacity of the state with locally grounded community management via participatory decision-making.

Perz, Stephen G.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Alternate Fuels for Use in Commercial Aircraft

The engine and aircraft Research and Development (R&D) communities have been investigating alternative fueling in near-term, midterm, and far-term aircraft. A drop in jet fuel replacement, consisting of a kerosene (Jet-A) and synthetic fuel blend, will be possible for use in existing and near-term aircraft. Future midterm aircraft may use a biojet and synthetic fuel blend in ultra-efficient airplane designs. Future far-term engines and aircraft in 50-plus years may be specifically designed to use a low- or zero-carbon fuel. Synthetic jet fuels from coal, natural gas, or other hydrocarbon feedstocks are very similar in performance to conventional jet fuel, yet the additional CO2 produced during the manufacturing needs to be permanently sequestered. Biojet fuels need to be developed specifically for jet aircraft without displacing food production. Envisioned as midterm aircraft fuel, if the performance and cost liabilities can be overcome, biofuel blends with synthetic jet or Jet-A fuels have near-term potential in terms of global climatic concerns. Long-term solutions address dramatic emissions reductions through use of alternate aircraft fuels such as liquid hydrogen or liquid methane. Either of these new aircraft fuels will require an enormous change in infrastructure and thus engine and airplane design. Life-cycle environmental questions need to be addressed.

Daggett, David L.↗

NASA NTRS2011

NASA-DoD Lead-Free Electronics Project

Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). depots. and support contractors have to be prepared to deal with an electronics supply chain thaI increasingly provides parts with lead-free finishes. some labeled no differently and intenningled with their SnPb counterparts. Allowance oflead-free components presents one of the greatest risks to the reliability of military and aerospace electronics. The introduction of components with lead-free lenninations, tennination finishes, or circuit boards presents a host of concerns to customers. suppliers, and maintainers of aerospace and military electronic systems such as: 1. Electrical shorting due to tin whiskers; 2. Incompatibility oflead-free processes and parameters (including higher melting points of lead-free alloys) with other materials in the system; and 3. Unknown material properties and incompatibilities that could reduce solder joint re liability.

Kessel, Kurt↗

NASA NTRS2012

LightForce: An Update on Orbital Collision Avoidance Using Photon Pressure

We present an update on our research on collision avoidance using photon-pressure induced by ground-based lasers. In the past, we have shown the general feasibility of employing small orbit perturbations, induced by photon pressure from ground-based laser illumination, for collision avoidance in space. Possible applications would be protecting space assets from impacts with debris and stabilizing the orbital debris environment. Focusing on collision avoidance rather than de-orbit, the scheme avoids some of the security and liability implications of active debris removal, and requires less sophisticated hardware than laser ablation. In earlier research we concluded that one ground based system consisting of a 10 kW class laser, directed by a 1.5 m telescope with adaptive optics, could avoid a significant fraction of debris-debris collisions in low Earth orbit. This paper describes our recent efforts, which include refining our original analysis, employing higher fidelity simulations and performing experimental tracking tests. We investigate the efficacy of one or more laser ground stations for debris-debris collision avoidance and satellite protection using simulations to investigate multiple case studies. The approach includes modeling of laser beam propagation through the atmosphere, the debris environment (including actual trajectories and physical parameters), laser facility operations, and simulations of the resulting photon pressure. We also present the results of experimental laser debris tracking tests. These tests track potential targets of a first technical demonstration and quantify the achievable tracking performance.

Stupl, Jan↗

NASA NTRS2014

The Orbital Debris Problem and the Challenges for Environment Remediation

LEO debris population will continue to increase even with a good implementation of the commonly-adopted mitigation measures. The root-cause of the increase is catastrophic collisions involving large/massive intact objects (rocket bodies or spacecraft). The major mission-ending risks for most operational spacecraft, however, come from impacts with debris just above the threshold of the protection shields (~5-mm to 1-cm). A solution-driven approach is to seek: Concepts for removal of massive intacts with high P(collision); Concepts capable of preventing collisions involving intacts; Concepts for removal of 5-mm to 1-cm debris; Enhanced impact protection shields for valuable space assets. Key questions for remediation consideration of orbital debris: What is the acceptable threat level? What are the mission objectives? What is the appropriate roadmap/timeframe for remediation? Support advanced technology development when an economically viable approach is identified. Address non-technical issues, such as policy, coordination, ownership, legal, and liability at the national and international levels.

Liou, J.-C.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Thermal Coatings Seminar Series Training Part 1: Properties of Thermal Coatings

This course will present an overview of a variety of thermal coatings-related topics, including: coating types and availability, thermal properties measurements, environmental testing (lab and in-flight), environmental impacts, contamination impacts, contamination liabilities, determination of BOLEOL values, and what does specularity mean to the thermal engineer.

Triolo, Jack↗

NASA NTRS2015

Thermal Coatings Seminar Series Training Part 2: Environmental Effects

This course will present an overview of a variety of thermal coatings-related topics, including: coating types and availability, thermal properties measurements, environmental testing (lab and in-flight), environmental impacts, contamination impacts, contamination liabilities, determination of BOLEOL values, and what does specularity mean to the thermal engineer.

Triolo, Jack↗

NASA NTRS2016

Plasma Cleaning

NASA's Kennedy Space Center has developed two solvent-free precision cleaning techniques: plasma cleaning and supercritical carbon dioxide (SCCO2), that has equal performance, cost parity, and no environmental liability, as compared to existing solvent cleaning methods.

supercritical fluid cleaning↗

NASA NTRS2017

Remediation Technology Collaboration Development - A Compendium

During its multi-year period of performance, the Remediation Technology Collaboration Development (RTCD) task orders initial goals were to enhance the capability to specifically target reductions in the long-term liabilities associated with NASAs most challenging remediation sites. This was accomplished by identifying existing remediation processes and conditions, researching site-specific technologies (both past and present) while simultaneously looking for parallel situations where these technologies could be applied. In addition, the most promising of these solutions were developed from comprehensive research and bench studies into pilot studies or demonstration projects, which contributed significantly to the success of the RTCD program.

Olsen, W.↗

NASA NTRS2016

The IOAG Recommendations on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support

In 2014, the Inter-agency Operations Advisory Group (IOAG) chartered a multi-agency team effort to study how to best handle spacecraft emergency as part of cross support among network assets. The original intent is to put in place for the first time a process and guidelines to make emergency support as part of a permanent cross-support capability between space agencies. From the perspective of space communications service providers, a few key issues, common to all agencies, concerning the Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support (SECS) have been explored. They are: context of emergency support, provision of emergency support under a cross-support agreement, provision of emergency support with no cross-support agreement, legal and liability issues, response time, support priority, services provided, sustaining emergency support capabilities, and charge for the support. The positions of the various participating agencies with respect to these issues have been collected, analyzed, and finally harmonized to form the recommended IOAG positions. A central challenge most communications service providers are facing is that since the spacecraft emergency is an unplanned critical event, it typically requires fast response to the emergency call, hence lacking an international standard process for the operational interfaces seems to exacerbate the difficulty in providing SECS. For reducing the response time, i.e. from the time of accepting a request for SECS to the readiness for support, it is recommended that a “cross-support emergency system” be established by IOAG member agencies. Along with it, the IOAG core services, just-in-time ground communications line, cross support service management (CSSM), and standard operations procedures (SOP) for operational interfaces form the basic foundation of the “cross support emergency system”. Of the above, new to the cross support conducted thus far in the IOAG community is the concept of the SOP specifically for the interfaces between the service provider and service user during the SECS. Use cases, salient features, and definition of the key operational activities/tasks relevant to the interfaces are addressed by the effort. Underpinning such a system is the availability of the RF license granted by the local authority, at national and/or regional level, for a given ground station to communicate with and track the spacecraft in emergency mode at the uplink and downlink frequencies assigned to that spacecraft. That means it is critical for the IOAG member agencies to obtain a priori all-band licenses (for the entire X-band or S-band) for some, if not all, of their ground stations that are most capable of or likely to provide SECS. It is also recommended that certain prior arrangements be made with the relevant local licensing authorities for a process that will allow expedited authorization to transmit/receive signals to/from the declared spacecraft over the declared ground stations specifically and solely for the emergency case. Our analysis of the SECS has also uncovered a few fundamental programmatic issues. Recognizing any IOAG positions reached on these issues do not necessarily lead to any binding authority, it is recommended that they, along with those key attributes of the cross support emergency system, be explicitly stated as multi-agency guidelines to guide the implementation and provision of the SECS. The paper will present the results of the working group on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support and, in particular, its findings, products and recommendations. It will also identify the next steps of this work that may include the production of some international standards as an extension of this work, or the process to make this emergency system usable by other spacecraft operators beyond the space agencies.

Tai, Wallace S.↗

NASA NTRS2016

The IOAG Recommendations on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support

In 2014, the Inter-agency Operations Advisory Group (IOAG) chartered a multi-agency team effort to study how to best handle spacecraft emergency as part of cross support among network assets. The original intent is to put in place for the first time a process and guidelines to make emergency support as part of a permanent cross-support capability between space agencies. From the perspective of space communications service providers, a few key issues, common to all agencies, concerning the Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support (SECS) have been explored. They are: context of emergency support, provision of emergency support under a cross-support agreement, provision of emergency support with no cross-support agreement, legal and liability issues, response time, support priority, services provided, sustaining emergency support capabilities, and charge for the support. The positions of the various participating agencies with respect to these issues have been collected, analyzed, and finally harmonized to form the recommended IOAG positions. A central challenge most communications service providers are facing is that since the spacecraft emergency is an unplanned critical event, it typically requires fast response to the emergency call, hence lacking an international standard process for the operational interfaces seems to exacerbate the difficulty in providing SECS. For reducing the response time, i.e. from the time of accepting a request for SECS to the readiness for support, it is recommended that a “cross-support emergency system” be established by IOAG member agencies. Along with it, the IOAG core services, just-in-time ground communications line, cross support service management (CSSM), and standard operations procedures (SOP) for operational interfaces form the basic foundation of the “cross support emergency system”. Of the above, new to the cross support conducted thus far in the IOAG community is the concept of the SOP specifically for the interfaces between the service provider and service user during the SECS. Use cases, salient features, and definition of the key operational activities/tasks relevant to the interfaces are addressed by the effort. Underpinning such a system is the availability of the RF license granted by the local authority, at national and/or regional level, for a given ground station to communicate with and track the spacecraft in emergency mode at the uplink and downlink frequencies assigned to that spacecraft. That means it is critical for the IOAG member agencies to obtain a priori all-band licenses (for the entire X-band or S-band) for some, if not all, of their ground stations that are most capable of or likely to provide SECS. It is also recommended that certain prior arrangements be made with the relevant local licensing authorities for a process that will allow expedited authorization to transmit/receive signals to/from the declared spacecraft over the declared ground stations specifically and solely for the emergency case. Our analysis of the SECS has also uncovered a few fundamental programmatic issues. Recognizing any IOAG positions reached on these issues do not necessarily lead to any binding authority, it is recommended that they, along with those key attributes of the cross support emergency system, be explicitly stated as multi-agency guidelines to guide the implementation and provision of the SECS. The paper will present the results of the working group on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support and, in particular, its findings, products and recommendations. It will also identify the next steps of this work that may include the production of some international standards as an extension of this work, or the process to make this emergency system usable by other spacecraft operators beyond the space agencies.

Tai, Wallace S.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

On the Moral Hazard of Autonomy

This paper describes the concept of moral hazard as applied to technologies that incorporate automation and autonomy. Moral hazard is said to exist when a party to a transaction feels more comfortable taking undue risks because another party will bear the costs if things go badly. As opposed to regular physical hazards, a moral hazard comes from within a person. In this paper, we reveal two categories of moral hazards related to autonomy. The first category of moral hazard occurs when the owner of the autonomy introduces an autonomous system without accepting the full responsibility for improper operation thereby shifting the risks from one party to another party. This category of moral hazard is similar to moral hazards experienced in other industries and can often be addressed through appropriate policy and establishing liability for irresponsible behavior. The issue becomes more complicated in cases where the operator of the autonomy may not have a full understanding of the system behavior. In the second category of moral hazard, risks are shifted from people to autonomy. In this category, the humans in proximity to the autonomous system begin to trust its behavior. Their behavior may change in that they may believe they are more insulated from harm and subsequently exhibit more risky behavior towards increasingly autonomous technologies. Mitigating this type of moral hazard may require the autonomy to possess certain design features to discourage this type of harmful human behavior so that humans do not suffer needlessly in their interactions with autonomous systems by placing inappropriate trust where that trust is neither warranted nor deserved.

Cybernetics↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Analysis of Alternative Jettison Design Concepts for Deep-space Missions

The management of waste generated onboard spacecraft during future long-duration, deep-space missions will require different solutions from those currently implemented on the International Space Station, which consist exclusively of collecting, storing, and returning the waste to Earth. Alternative options for managing spacecraft waste are to process it for recycling and recovering resources, and to jettison it overboard. The waste generated during a deep-space mission is derived mainly from spacecraft logistics supplies, food and beverage residues, personal or scientific items used by the crew, and unused spare components. Uncontained and unprocessed trash is a health hazard and a habitat volume liability, which makes onboard long-term storage a nonviable option. Jettison of solid, processed waste appear, on the other hand, to be an effective solution for crewed deep-space missions, leading not only to volume reduction and habitat safening, but also to considerable mass savings in the spacecraft’s propulsion system. However, the disposal of trash overboard also creates a navigation hazard for spacecraft and the risk of collisions with planetary bodies. This paper investigates alternative jettison design concepts for L2 libration orbit, Mars conjunction-class, and Mars opposition-class missions.

Jurek Parodi↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Review of Existing Policies Affecting the Jettison of Waste in Low Earth Orbit and Deep Space

The management of waste generated onboard spacecraft during future long-duration deep-space missions will require different solutions from those currently implemented on the International Space Station which consist exclusively of collecting, storing, and returning the waste to Earth. Alternative options for managing spacecraft waste are to process it for recycling and recovery of resources, and to jettison it overboard in a solid form (such as a compacted tile) or in a gaseous form after torrefaction or other trash-to-gas technologies. The waste generated during a deep-space mission is derived mainly from spacecraft logistics supplies, food and beverage residues, personal or scientific items used by the crew, human metabolic waste, and unused spare components. Uncontained and unprocessed trash is a potential health hazard and a habitat volume liability, which makes onboard long-term storage an inefficient and non-optimal option. However, the jettison of solid, processed waste appears to be an effective solution for crewed deep-space missions, leading not only to volume reduction and habitat safening, but also to considerable mass savings in the spacecraft’s propulsion system. However, the disposal of trash overboard also creates a navigation hazard for spacecraft and the potential risk of contamination of planetary bodies, interfering with the search for life. This paper investigates the requirements covered by existing policies that could affect the jettison concept of operations and system design.

Jettison↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Interoperable Services to Mitigate Lunar Position, Navigation, and Timing Challenges

Across the Earth, both civilian and government endeavors enjoy a built-in reliance on a position, navigation, and timing (PNT) infrastructure to which they are largely blind. Whether walking, driving, flying, or orbiting, Earth-centric PNT systems that have evolved over decades provide a core functionality to which we have grown accustomed for these pursuits. As NASA joins with other government space agencies and commercial partners to return humans to the Moon in a sustained manner within the current decade, expectations for PNT knowledge and timeliness at the Moon rival those on Earth. The need exists to develop a viable lunar-centric PNT infrastructure to support the planned human and robotic exploits. Navigating within the influence of the Moon presents its own set of challenges. Identification, understanding, and use of a unified reference frame and time system on which navigation is based becomes a fundamental need at the Moon. In addition to the unified foundational elements, measurement liability, dynamic conditions that require Earth-independent autonomous operations, and standards for PNT signals and message-based data exchange each represent distinct challenges to navigation in a burgeoning operational lunar environment. The PNT services planned as part of the lunar communications and navigation relay architecture known as LunaNet aid in surmounting the challenges. LunaNet interoperability specifications stipulate standards for signal parameters, messages, and lunar reference systems for PNT services. Within LunaNet’s defined interoperability resides the concept of a Reference Signal to provide communication signals specifically structured to enable measurement of pseudorange, Doppler, and time transfer by the recipient. One such signal type, the Augmented Forward Signal (AFS), functions as the mainstay for LunaNet PNT, while also serving the data needs for ubiquitous broadcast of network access and rapid unscheduled dissemination of alerts and messages. The presence of a geometrically distributed network of orbiting nodes transmitting the AFS forms the basis for the Lunar Augmented Navigation System (LANS), that delivers both radio navigation and data to multiple users in the lunar environment simultaneously. After reviewing the challenges associated with lunar navigation, this paper will describe the concepts and rationale behind the LunaNet PNT services. By borrowing techniques from Earth-centric Global Navigation Satellite Services (GNSS), the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System, and the Consultative Committee for Space Data Standards, PNT from LunaNet aids to overcome challenges faced for accurate lunar navigation.

LunaNet↗