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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA's Office Safety Mission Assurance Efforts to Improve Non-destructive Evaluation Methods for Additive Manufacturing and In-Space Inspection

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) continues to push the boundary of manned flight. Current mission profiles include flights to the Moon and Mars. Many of these missions require advance manufacturing and planned off planet resource utilization. As NASA continues to develop highly advance materials and manufacturing techniques to meet these mission profiles, inspection of these increasingly complex parts has had to evolve as well. Additive manufacturing is coming to the forefront as a primary manufacturing technique but offers unique challenges when inspection and certification are required. NASA has been working diligently to be a leader in developing and utilizing inspection techniques capable of inspecting these highly advanced parts. Additionally additive manufacturing techniques can also be used to build parts in space and provides a vehicle for in-situ resource utilization for off world missions. As NASA and its commercial crew partners move forward, inspection techniques will need to continue to advance to ensure safe manned space flight. In this talk NASA will highlight many of the advanced nondestructive evaluation efforts going on across the agency, as well as providing highlights for points of infusion for helping NASA meet its future mission goals.

NDE↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance IAASS Conference Keynote Presentation

This next wave of lunar exploration will be fundamentally different than the past. The goal today is long term human presence in Earth orbit, exploration around the Moon, exploration anywhere on the Moon, and challenging exploration missions beyond the Moon. Sustainability is the key to enabling human expansion across the solar system and bringing back to Earth new knowledge and opportunities, and requires the early engagement of scientific, international, and U.S. commercial interests, innovations, and new approaches. The Gateway’s agile acquisition strategy will shape the entire system life cycle, from design and analysis through production, verification, launch, logistics and operations. This strategy will encourage new ways of doing business to accommodate new techniques, technologies and approaches; improving affordability and maximizing Gateway utility. The full range of acquisition authorities and contracting mechanisms available to NASA will be considered and appropriately tailored in response to the unique demands of each procurement activity. Gateway will provide scientific and research benefits, in addition to providing a sustainable staging location for crewed lunar surface landings and technology demonstrations that help NASA develop the knowledge and technology needed for Mars missions. These payloads are expected to provide operational and scientific benefit for the duration of their stay on Gateway, as the hardware will provide data during the transit to the Gateway and while in lunar orbit as changes in solar activity occur over time. Gateway is designed to support a variety of utilization activities during both crewed and uncrewed periods and is planned for continuous operations throughout its lifetime. These operations include demonstrating key exploration capabilities in a relevant deep space environment, conducting science beyond the influence of Earth, and providing opportunities for Gateway partners and customers for deep space exploration. Located in cislunar orbit, the Gateway capabilities can be further leveraged to enhance lunar and Mars exploration. With the Gateway and other elements of the Artemis Program, NASA is encouraging new ways of doing business to accommodate new techniques, technologies and approaches, consider affordability, and encourage innovation from U.S. industry.

Terri Castillo↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Program Safety And Mission Assurance Integration - The Future Of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

This next wave of lunar exploration will be fundamentally different than the past. The goal today is long term human presence in Earth orbit, exploration around the Moon, exploration anywhere on the Moon, and challenging exploration missions beyond the Moon. Sustainability is the key to enabling human expansion across the solar system and bringing back to Earth new knowledge and opportunities, and requires the early engagement of scientific, international, and U.S. commercial interests, innovations, and new approaches. The Gateway’s agile acquisition strategy will shape the entire system life cycle, from design and analysis through production, verification, launch, logistics and operations. This strategy will encourage new ways of doing business to accommodate new techniques, technologies and approaches; improving affordability and maximizing Gateway utility. The full range of acquisition authorities and contracting mechanisms available to NASA will be considered and appropriately tailored in response to the unique demands of each procurement activity. Gateway will provide scientific and research benefits, in addition to providing a sustainable staging location for crewed lunar surface landings and technology demonstrations that help NASA develop the knowledge and technology needed for Mars missions. These payloads are expected to provide operational and scientific benefit for the duration of their stay on Gateway, as the hardware will provide data during the transit to the Gateway and while in lunar orbit as changes in solar activity occur over time. Gateway is designed to support a variety of utilization activities during both crewed and uncrewed periods and is planned for continuous operations throughout its lifetime. These operations include demonstrating key exploration capabilities in a relevant deep space environment, conducting science beyond the influence of Earth, and providing opportunities for Gateway partners and customers for deep space exploration. Located in cislunar orbit, the Gateway capabilities can be further leveraged to enhance lunar and Mars exploration. With the Gateway and other elements of the Artemis Program, NASA is encouraging new ways of doing business to accommodate new techniques, technologies and approaches, consider affordability, and encourage innovation from U.S. industry.

Helen Vaccaro↗
NASA NTRS2012

Smart Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel - Integrated Structural Health Monitoring System to Meet Space Exploration and International Space Station Mission Assurance Needs

Currently there are no integrated NDE methods for baselining and monitoring defect levels in fleet for Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs) or related fracture critical composites, or for performing life-cycle maintenance inspections either in a traditional remove-and-inspect mode or in a more modern in situ inspection structural health monitoring (SHM) mode. Implicit in SHM and autonomous inspection is the existence of quantitative accept-reject criteria. To be effective, these criteria must correlate with levels of damage known to cause composite failure. Furthermore, implicit in SHM is the existence of effective remote sensing hardware and automated techniques and algorithms for interpretation of SHM data. SHM of facture critical composite structures, especially high pressure COPVs, is critical to the success of nearly every future NASA space exploration program as well as life extension of the International Space Station. It has been clearly stated that future NASA missions may not be successful without SHM [1]. Otherwise, crews will be busy addressing subsystem health issues and not focusing on the real NASA mission

Saulsberry, Regor↗
NASA NTRS2008

SiC vs. Si for High Radiation Environments: NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program Office of Safety and Mission Assurance

Commercial silicon carbide and silicon Schottky barrier power diodes have been subjected to 203 MeV proton irradiation and the effects of the resultant displacement damage on the I-V characteristics have been observed. Changes in forward bias I-V characteristics are reported for fluences up to 4 x 10(exp 14) p/cm2. For devices of both material types, the series resistance is observed to increase as the fluence increases. The changes in series resistance result from changes in the free carrier concentration due to carrier removal by the defects produced. A simple model is presented that allows calculation of the series resistance of the device and then relates the carrier removal rate to the changes in series resistance. Using this model to calculate the carrier removal rate in both materials reveals that the carrier removal rate in silicon is less than that in silicon carbide, indicating that silicon is the more radiation tolerant material.

Schottky barrier power diodes↗
NASA NTRS2008

Ares First Stage "Systemology" - Combining Advanced Systems Engineering and Planning Tools to Assure Mission Success

Ares is an integral part of NASA s Constellation architecture that will provide crew and cargo access to the International Space Station as well as low earth orbit support for lunar missions. Ares replaces the Space Shuttle in the post 2010 time frame. Ares I is an in-line, two-stage rocket topped by the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, its service module, and a launch abort system. The Ares I first stage is a single, five-segment reusable solid rocket booster derived from the Space Shuttle Program's reusable solid rocket motor. The Ares second or upper stage is propelled by a J-2X main engine fueled with liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen. This paper describes the advanced systems engineering and planning tools being utilized for the design, test, and qualification of the Ares I first stage element. Included are descriptions of the current first stage design, the milestone schedule requirements, and the marriage of systems engineering, detailed planning efforts, and roadmapping employed to achieve these goals.

Seiler, James↗
NASA NTRS2010

JSC Safety and Mission Assurance Data Analysis Overview

These slides describe the data analysis methods that are used to determine inputs for probabilistic risk models supporting the Space Shuttle Program. Other applications can follow a similar path probably using different data sources. Statistical approaches are different and not addressed here. Topics included here: 1) Prior Distribution; 2) Likelihood Data; 3) Bayesian Updating; and 4) Uncertainty and Error. Note: This is a high-level discussion and is not intended to be a tutorial.

Roelant, Henk↗
NASA NTRS2011

Safety and Mission Assurance for In-House Design Lessons Learned from Ares I Upper Stage

This viewgraph presentation identifies lessons learned in the course of the Ares I Upper Stage design and in-house development effort. The contents include: 1) Constellation Organization; 2) Upper Stage Organization; 3) Presentation Structure; 4) Lesson-Importance of Systems Engineering/Integration; 5) Lesson-Importance of Early S&MA Involvement; 6) Lesson-Importance of Appropriate Staffing Levels; 7) Lesson-Importance S&MA Team Deployment; 8) Lesson-Understanding of S&MA In-Line Engineering versus Assurance; 9) Lesson-Importance of Close Coordination between Supportability and Reliability/Maintainability; 10) Lesson-Importance of Engineering Data Systems; 11) Lesson-Importance of Early Development of Supporting Databases; 12) Lesson-Importance of Coordination with Safety Assessment/Review Panels; 13) Lesson-Implementation of Software Reliability; 14) Lesson-Implementation of S&MA Technical Authority/Chief S&MA Officer; 15) Lesson-Importance of S&MA Evaluation of Project Risks; 16) Lesson-Implementation of Critical Items List and Government Mandatory Inspections; 17) Lesson-Implementation of Critical Items List Mandatory Inspections; 18) Lesson-Implementation of Test Article Safety Analysis; and 19) Lesson-Importance of Procurement Quality.

Anderson, Joel M.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Investigation of the Semicoa SCF9550 and the International Rectifier IRHM57260SE for Single-Event Gate Rapture and Single-Event Burnout : NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program Office of Safety and Mission Assurance

Single-event-effect test results for hi-rel total-dose-hardened power MOSFETs are presented in this report. TheSCF9550 from Semicoa and the IRHM57260SE from International Rectifier were tested to NASA test condition/standards and requirements.The IRHM57260SE performed much better when compared to previous testing. These initial results confirm that parts from the Temecula line are marginally comparable to the El Segundo line. The SCF9550 from Semicoa was also tested and represents the initial parts offering from this vendor. Both parts experienced single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB). All of the SEGR was from gate to drain.

Single Event Gate Rupture↗
NASA NTRS2011

Independent Verification and Validation (IV and V) - Adding Mission Assurance to NASA Flight Software

The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Facility objective is to identify potential defects in flight software using independent analysis techniques. This paper describes the tailored IV&V techniques that have been developed in support of critical interactions on the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) project, scheduled to launch in November, 2011. The IV&V techniques for interface analysis use independently developed sequence diagrams of critical scenarios. The results from these analyses have had a positive impact on the requirements flow down, consistency amongst MSL requirements and identification of missing requirements. The results of these analyses and the positive impact to the MSL project are provided.

performance evaluation↗
NASA NTRS2011

Users Guide on Scaled CMOS Reliability: NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program Office of Safety and Mission Assurance

Reliability of advanced CMOS technology is a complex problem that is usually addressed from the standpoint of specific failure mechanisms rather than overall reliability of a finished microcircuit. A detailed treatment of CMOS reliability in scaled devices can be found in Ref. 1; it should be consulted for a more thorough discussion. The present document provides a more concise treatment of the scaled CMOS reliability problem, emphasizing differences in the recommended approach for these advanced devices compared to that of less aggressively scaled devices. It includes specific recommendations that can be used by flight projects that use advanced CMOS. The primary emphasis is on conventional memories, microprocessors, and related devices.

Scaled CMOS↗
NASA NTRS2011

Single-Event Effect (SEE) Survey of Advanced Reconfigurable Field Programmable Gate Arrays: NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program Office of Safety and Mission Assurance

The NEPP Reconfigurable Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) task has been charged to evaluate reconfigurable FPGA technologies for use in space. Under this task, the Xilinx single-event-immune, reconfigurable FPGA (SIRF) XQR5VFX130 device was evaluated for SEE. Additionally, the Altera Stratix-IV and SiliconBlue iCE65 were screened for single-event latchup (SEL).

Xilinx Single-Event Effects (SEE) Test Consortium↗
NASA NTRS2013

Parts Quality Management: Direct Part Marking via Data Matrix Symbols for Mission Assurance

A United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of twelve NASA programs found widespread parts quality problems contributing to significant cost overruns, schedule delays, and reduced system reliability. Direct part-marking with Data Matrix symbols could significantly improve the quality of inventory control and parts lifecycle management. This paper examines the feasibility of using 15 marking technologies for use in future NASA programs. A structural analysis is based on marked material type, operational environment (e.g., ground, suborbital, orbital), durability of marks, ease of operation, reliability, and affordability. A cost-benefits analysis considers marking technology (data plates, label printing, direct part marking) and marking types (two-dimensional machine-readable, human-readable). Previous NASA parts marking efforts and historical cost data are accounted for, including in-house vs. outsourced marking. Some marking methods are still under development. While this paper focuses on NASA programs, results may be applicable to a variety of industrial environments.

Moss, Chantrice↗
NASA NTRS2013

Parts Quality Management: Direct Part Marking of Data Matrix Symbol for Mission Assurance

A United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of twelve NASA programs found widespread parts quality problems contributing to significant cost overruns, schedule delays, and reduced system reliability. Direct part marking with Data Matrix symbols could significantly improve the quality of inventory control and parts lifecycle management. This paper examines the feasibility of using direct part marking technologies for use in future NASA programs. A structural analysis is based on marked material type, operational environment (e.g., ground, suborbital, Low Earth Orbit), durability of marks, ease of operation, reliability, and affordability. A cost-benefits analysis considers marking technology (label printing, data plates, and direct part marking) and marking types (two-dimensional machine-readable, human-readable). Previous NASA parts marking efforts and historical cost data are accounted for, including inhouse vs. outsourced marking. Some marking methods are still under development. While this paper focuses on NASA programs, results may be applicable to a variety of industrial environments.

Moss, Chantrice↗