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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2002

Pyrotechnically Operated Valves for Testing and Flight

Pyrovalves still warrant careful description of their operating characteristics, which is consistent with the NASA mission - to assure that both testing and flight hardware perform with the utmost reliability. So, until the development and qualification of the next generation of remotely controlled valves, in all likelihood based on shape memory alloy technology, pyrovalves will remain ubiquitous in controlling flow systems aloft and will possibly see growing use in ground-based testing facilities. In order to assist NASA in accomplishing this task, we propose a three-phase, three-year testing program. Phase I would set up an experimental facility, a 'test rig' in close cooperation with the staff located at the White Sands Test Facility in Southern New Mexico.

Conley, Edgar G.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Structural Requirements for the Space Propulsion Engine Systems

In January 2004, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was given a vision for Space Exploration by President Bush, setting our sight on a bold new path to go back to the Moon, then to Mars and beyond. As NASA gets ready to meet the vision set by President Bush, failures are not an option. Reliability of the propulsion engine systems will play an important role in establishing an overall safe and reliable operation of these new space systems. A new standard, NASA-STD-5012, Strength and Life Assessment for Space Propulsion System Engines, has been developed to provide structural requirements for assessment of the propulsion systems engine. This standard is a complement to the current NASA-wide standard NASA-STD-5001, Structural Design and Test Factors of Safety for Spaceflight Hardware, which excluded the requirement for the engine systems (rotatory structures) along with pressure vessels. As developed, this document builds on the heritage of the multiple industrial standards related to strength and life assessment of the structures. For assuring a safe and reliable operation of a product and/or mission, establishing a set of structural assessment requirements is a key ingredient. Hence, a concentrated effort was made to improve the requirements where there are known lessons learned during the design, test, and operation phases of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) and other engine development programs. Requirements delineated in this standard are also applicable for the reusable and/or human missions. It shall be noted that "reliability of a system cannot be tested and inspected but can only be achieved if it is first designed into a system." Hence, these strength and life assessment requirements for the space propulsion system engines shall be used along with other good engineering practices, requirements, and policies.

Aggarwal, Pravin K.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Probabilistic Survivability Versus Time Modeling

This technical paper documents Kennedy Space Centers Independent Assessment team work completed on three assessments for the Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) Program to assist the Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer (CSO) and GSDO management during key programmatic reviews. The assessments provided the GSDO Program with an analysis of how egress time affects the likelihood of astronaut and worker survival during an emergency. For each assessment, the team developed probability distributions for hazard scenarios to address statistical uncertainty, resulting in survivability plots over time. The first assessment developed a mathematical model of probabilistic survivability versus time to reach a safe location using an ideal Emergency Egress System at Launch Complex 39B (LC-39B); the second used the first model to evaluate and compare various egress systems under consideration at LC-39B. The third used a modified LC-39B model to determine if a specific hazard decreased survivability more rapidly than other events during flight hardware processing in Kennedys Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB).Based on the composite survivability versus time graphs from the first two assessments, there was a soft knee in the Figure of Merit graphs at eight minutes (ten minutes after egress ordered). Thus, the graphs illustrated to the decision makers that the final emergency egress design selected should have the capability of transporting the flight crew from the top of LC 39B to a safe location in eight minutes or less. Results for the third assessment were dominated by hazards that were classified as instantaneous in nature (e.g. stacking mishaps) and therefore had no effect on survivability vs time to egress the VAB. VAB emergency scenarios that degraded over time (e.g. fire) produced survivability vs time graphs that were line with aerospace industry norms.

Joyner, James J., Sr.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Dynamic Adjustment of Simulation Parameters for Efficient Vehicle Prognostics

Model-based diagnostics and prognostics rely on state estimation and uncertainty management algorithms to produce useful information for system operators and maintainers. This information enables more informed operational decisions, condition-based maintenance, and overall mission safety assurance. Typically, uncertainty is associated with vehicle state-of-health estimation and prediction results because of modeling errors, internal or external sources of noise, and sensor inaccuracy. Probabilistic uncertainty management methods including Sequential Monte Carlo simulation are commonly used to reason about state-of-health estimates and predictions in the presence of these sources of uncertainty. However, such algorithms can be computationally expensive as they require a very large number of samples to obtain a sufficiently accurate quantification of the end of life probability distribution. As a result, highly mobile autonomous systems that leverage the prognostic results for mission-level replanning are often constrained in their processing capability because of these computationally expensive simulation approaches. Therefore, in this paper, we investigate algorithmic methods for dynamically adjusting simulation time step as well as number of samples to achieve highly efficient prognostic results while maintaining results accuracy. Results obtained from simulated flight experiments of an electric unmanned aerial vehicle are presented to verify the efficacy of such algorithms.

Prognostics↗
NASA NTRS1994

International mission planning for space Very Long Baseline Interferometry

Two spacecraft dedicated to Very Long Baseline Interferometry (VLBI) will be launched in 1996 and 1997 to make observations using baselines between the space telescopes and many of the world's ground radio telescopes. The Japanese Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS) will launch VSOP (VLBI Space Observatory Program) in September 1996, while the Russian Astro Space Center (ASC) is scheduled to launch RadioAstron in 1997. Both spacecraft will observe radio sources at frequencies near 1.7, 4.8, and 22 GHz; RadioAstron will also observe at 0.33 GHz. The baselines between space and ground telescopes will provide 3-10 times the resolution available for ground VLBI at the same observing frequencies. Ground tracking stations on four continents will supply the required precise frequency reference to each spacecraft measure the two-way residual phase and Doppler on the ground-space link, and record 128 Megabit/s of VLBI data downlinked from the spacecraft. The spacecraft data are meaningless without cross-correlation against the data from Earth-bound telescopes, which must take place at special-purpose VLBI correlation facilities. Therefore, participation by most of the world's radio observatories is needed to achieve substantial science return from VSOP and RadioAstron. The collaboration of several major space agencies and the ground observatories, which generally follow very different models for allocation of observing time and for routine operations, leads to great complexity in mission planning and in day-to-day operations. This paper describes some of those complications and the strategies being developed to assure productive scientific missions.

Ulvestad, James S.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Interpreting Space-Mission LET Requirements for SEGR in Power MOSFETs

Single-event gate rupture (SEGR) is a potentially catastrophic failure mechanism of power MOSFETs biased in the off-state. In part due to the severity of-SEGR consequences and in part due to the difficulty of accurated SEGR rate estimation, SEGR mitigation me1hodologies emphasize risk avoidance, using heavy-ion accelerator testing to define safe operating conditions for a surface-incident linear energy transfer {LET). This "safe-operating area" (SOA) within which the device may be biased without experiencing SEGR is then often derated by a prescribed factor to ensure low risk of SEGR. Although research in 1996 indicated that such LET-based SEGR hardness requiremen1s could provide false assurance of safe operation unless one also considered· ion energy], most mission SEGR requirements are still specified in terms of surface-incident LET. Moreover, terrestrial SEGR tests at a given surface-incident LET are limited by the small number of ion species and energies available at heavy-ion accelerators. In comparison, the on-orbit radiation environment is composed of all of the naturally-occurring elements with peak fluxes at nearly GeV/nucleon energies. The primary objective of this study is to examine whether typical derating of high-energy heavy-ion accelerator test data bounds the risk for SEGR from higher-energy on-orbit ions with the mission LET requirement.

Lauenstein, Jean-Marie↗
NASA NTRS2009

Stability of Dosage Forms in the Pharmaceutical Payload Aboard Space Missions

Efficacious pharmaceuticals with adequate shelf lives are essential for successful space medical operations. Stability of pharmaceuticals, therefore, is of paramount importance for assuring the health and wellness of astronauts on future space exploration missions. Unique physical and environmental factors of space missions may contribute to the instability of pharmaceuticals, e.g., radiation, humidity and temperature variations. Degradation of pharmaceutical formulations can result in inadequate efficacy and/or untoward toxic effects, which could compromise astronaut safety and health. Methods: Four identical pharmaceutical payload kits containing 31 medications in different dosage forms (liquid, tablet, capsule, ointment and suppository) were transported to the International Space Station aboard the Space Shuttle (STS-121). One of the 4 kits was stored on the Shuttle and the other 3 were stored on the International Space Station (ISS) for return to Earth at 6-month interval aboard a pre-designated Shuttle flight for each kit. The kit stored on the Shuttle was returned to Earth aboard STS-121 and 2 kits from ISS were returned on STS 117 and STS-122. Results: Analysis of standard physical and chemical parameters of degradation was completed for pharmaceuticals returned by STS-121 after14 days, STS - 117 after11 months and STS 122 after 19 months storage aboard ISS. Analysis of all flight samples along with ground-based matching controls was completed and results were compiled. Conclusion: Evaluation of results from the shuttle (1) and ISS increments (2) indicate that the number of formulations degraded in space increased with duration of storage in space and was higher in space compared to their ground-based counterparts. Rate of degradation for some of the formulations tested was faster in space than on Earth. Additionally, some of the formulations included in the medical kits were unstable, more so in space than on the ground. These results indicate that the space flight environment may adversely affect the shelf life of pharmaceuticals aboard space missions.

Du, Brian J.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Varying Levels of Automation on UAS Operator Responses to Traffic Resolution Advisories in Civil Airspace

Continuing demand for the use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) has put increasing pressure on operations in civil airspace. The need to fly UAS in the National Airspace System (NAS) in order to perform missions vital to national security and defense, emergency management, and science is increasing at a rapid pace. In order to ensure safe operations in the NAS, operators of unmanned aircraft, like those of manned aircraft, may be required to maintain separation assurance and avoid loss of separation with other aircraft while performing their mission tasks. This experiment investigated the effects of varying levels of automation on UAS operator performance and workload while responding to conflict resolution instructions provided by the Tactical Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II) during a UAS mission in high-density airspace. The purpose of this study was not to investigate the safety of using TCAS II on UAS, but rather to examine the effect of automation on the ability of operators to respond to traffic collision alerts. Six licensed pilots were recruited to act as UAS operators for this study. Operators were instructed to follow a specified mission flight path, while maintaining radio contact with Air Traffic Control and responding to TCAS II resolution advisories. Operators flew four, 45 minute, experimental missions with four different levels of automation: Manual, Knobs, Management by Exception, and Fully Automated. All missions included TCAS II Resolution Advisories (RAs) that required operator attention and rerouting. Operator compliance and reaction time to RAs was measured, and post-run NASA-TLX ratings were collected to measure workload. Results showed significantly higher compliance rates, faster responses to TCAS II alerts, as well as less preemptive operator actions when higher levels of automation are implemented. Physical and Temporal ratings of workload were significantly higher in the Manual condition than in the Management by Exception and Fully Automated conditions.

Kenny, Caitlin↗
NASA NTRS2007

Organization, Management and Function of International Space Station (ISS) Multilateral Medical Operations

Long duration crews have inhabited the ISS since November of 2000. The favorable medical outcomes of its missions can be largely attributed to sustained collective efforts of all ISS Partners medical organizations. In-flight medical monitoring and support, although crucial, is just a component of the ISS system of Joint Medical Operations. The goal of this work is to review the principles, design, and function of the multilateral medical support of the ISS Program. The governing documents, which describe the relationships among all ISS partner medical organizations, were evaluated, followed by analysis of the roles, responsibilities, and decision-making processes of the ISS medical boards, panels, and working groups. The degree of integration of the medical support system was evaluated by reviewing the multiple levels of the status reviews and mission assurance activities carried out throughout the last six years. The Integrated Medical Group, consisting of physicians and other essential personnel in the mission control centers represents the front-line medical support of the ISS. Data from their day-to-day activities are presented weekly at the Space Medicine Operations Team (SMOT), where known or potential concerns are addressed by an international group of physicians. A broader status review is conducted monthly to project the state of crew health and medical support for the following month, and to determine measures to return to nominal state. Finally, a comprehensive readiness review is conducted during preparations for each ISS mission. The Multilateral Medical Policy Board (MMPB) issues medical policy decisions and oversees all health and medical matters. The Multilateral Space Medicine Board (MSMB) certifies crewmembers and visitors for training and space flight to the Station, and physicians to practice space medicine for the ISS. The Multilateral Medical Operations Panel (MMOP) develops medical requirements, defines and supervises implementation of operational countermeasures, environmental monitoring, medical care, and emergency medical services. MMOP assures the medical readiness of the Station for each subsequent mission or critical event. All boards and panels have functioned effectively and without interruptions even in various challenging circumstances. Based on the experience of the authors, consensus has prevailed as the primary nature of decisions made by all ISS medical groups, at all levels. The six first years of piloted operation have demonstrated the ability of the ISS medical authority groups and the medical infrastructure to implement medical policies and requirements, effectively interface with non-medical groups, and maintain the health and productivity of the crew in an integrated, multilaterally coordinated fashion. The medical support system appears to be mature and ready for further expansion of all Partners roles, and for the anticipated increase in the size of ISS crews.

Duncan, James M.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Mission to Planet Earth. Strategic enterprise plan, 1995-2000

Mission to Planet Earth (MTPE) provides long-term understanding of the earth system needed to protect and improve our environment, now and for future generations. This MTPE Strategic Enterprise Plan states how NASA intends to meet its responsibility to the Nation for developing a long-term, integrated program of environmental observation in support of informed decision-making. This plan implements the NASA Strategic Plan for the MTPE Enterprise; it is the first version of a rolling 5-year plan that will be updated annually. It is consistent with the interagency program developed by the Committee on Environment and Natural Resources of the National Science and Technology Council and implemented in large part through the U.S. Global Change Research Program. This report consists of the following sections: (1) introduction; (2) scientific foundation; (3) mission (destination and purposes); (4) principle of operation (ethical and quality assurance standards); (5) customer base (to ensure that the right products and services are delivered); (6) internal and external assessments; (7) assumptions; (8) goals, objectives, and strategies; (9) linkages to other strategic enterprises; and (10) summary.

Source record↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Analysis of Observed Propulsion Failure Modes Following NASA’s Artemis I Mission

In 2022, NASA’s Artemis program returned the agency to lunar space, propelled by the Orion European Service Module (ESM). Through rigorous ground test campaigns for Artemis I and II and the collection and transmission of operational data during the Artemis I flight, the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) team created and maintained a robust database of component nonconformances. This study analyzes in-flight and ground processing findings on the Artemis ESM propulsion subsystem to track reliability and safety metrics, as well as comparing the data to that of previous human spaceflight programs, Apollo and Space Shuttle. In drawing a comparison to the Artemis I flight, recommendations can be made for the Artemis II crewed mission to ensure best practices for flight safety, including redundancy and failure tolerance in the system. The results reinforce a need for robust safety standards and caution against the complacency of a single successful test flight.

human spaceflight safety↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Analysis of Observed Propulsion Failure Modes Following NASA’s Artemis I Mission

In 2022, NASA’s Artemis program returned the agency to lunar space, propelled by the Orion European Service Module (ESM). Through rigorous ground test campaigns for Artemis I and II and the collection and transmission of operational data during the Artemis I flight, the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) team created and maintained a robust database of component nonconformances. This study analyzes in-flight and ground processing findings on the Artemis ESM propulsion subsystem to track reliability and safety metrics, as well as comparing the data to that of previous human spaceflight programs, Apollo and Space Shuttle. In drawing a comparison to the Artemis I flight, recommendations can be made for the Artemis II crewed mission to ensure best practices for flight safety, including redundancy and failure tolerance in the system. The results reinforce a need for robust safety standards and caution against the complacency of a single successful test flight.

human spaceflight safety↗
NASA NTRS2014

Assuring Ground-Based Detect and Avoid for UAS Operations

One of the goals of the Marginal Ice Zones Observations and Processes Experiment (MIZOPEX) NASA Earth science mission was to show the operational capabilities of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) when deployed on challenging missions, in difficult environments. Given the extreme conditions of the Arctic environment where MIZOPEX measurements were required, the mission opted to use a radar to provide a ground-based detect-and-avoid (GBDAA) capability as an alternate means of compliance (AMOC) with the see-and-avoid federal aviation regulation. This paper describes how GBDAA safety assurance was provided by interpreting and applying the guidelines in the national policy for UAS operational approval. In particular, we describe how we formulated the appropriate safety goals, defined the processes and procedures for system safety, identified and assembled the relevant safety verification evidence, and created an operational safety case in compliance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requirements. To the best of our knowledge, the safety case, which was ultimately approved by the FAA, is the first successful example of non-military UAS operations using GBDAA in the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS), and, therefore, the first nonmilitary application of the safety case concept in this context.

Detect-and-Avoid↗
NASA NTRS2015

Applied Operations Research: Operator's Assistant

NASA operates high value critical equipment (HVCE) that requires trouble shooting, periodic maintenance and continued monitoring by Operations staff. The complexity HVCE and information required to maintain and trouble shoot HVCE to assure continued mission success as paper is voluminous. Training on new HVCE is commensurate with the need for equipment maintenance. LaRC Research Directorate has undertaken a proactive research to support Operations staff by initiation of the development and prototyping an electronic computer based portable maintenance aid (Operator's Assistant). This research established a goal with multiple objectives and a working prototype was developed. The research identified affordable solutions; constraints; demonstrated use of commercial off the shelf software; use of the US Coast Guard maintenance solution; NASA Procedure Representation Language; and the identification of computer system strategies; where these demonstrations and capabilities support the Operator, and maintenance. The results revealed validation against measures of effectiveness and overall proved a substantial training and capability sustainment tool. The research indicated that the OA could be deployed operationally at the LaRC Compressor Station with an expectation of satisfactorily results and to obtain additional lessons learned prior to deployment at other LaRC Research Directorate Facilities. The research revealed projected cost and time savings.

Cole, Stuart K.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Flight Testing of In-Time Safety Assurance Technologies for UAS Operations

Ongoing research at NASA is driven by a strategic plan defined by the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate and a vision for future In-Time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS) as described by the National Academies. In both visions, system safety awareness and provision are expanded through increased access to relevant data; integrated analysis and predictive capabilities; improved real-time detection and alerting of domain-specific hazards; decision support, and in some cases, automated risk mitigation strategies. One primary research focus is to develop means by which more timely (i.e., “in-time”) actions may be taken to mitigate precursors, anomalies, or trends that are observed during operations. In this paper, we describe such means as a collection of Services, Functions, and Capabilities (SFCs) that are supported by an underlying information system. For example, an integrated risk assessment capability is envisioned that continuously monitors safety-related metrics and margins and recommends timely operational changes. Assessment functions and/or services can be based on data analytics and predictive models derived from heterogeneous data sets that span relevant indicator metrics and their time histories. Likewise, on-board functions can identify and reduce susceptibility to precursor conditions that have led (and can lead) to aircraft loss-of-control or out-of-control accidents. This paper summarizes development and testing of such an information system tailored to hazards anticipated for future highly autonomous flight missions near and over densely populated areas. Testing is accomplished via simulation and by using small, unmanned aircraft operating over a test range at NASA’s Langley Research Center. Flight plans and test scenarios are defined to emulate several use-cases, including package delivery; reconnaissance; fire management; and urban air taxi vertiport operations. Two test phases are summarized with Phase 1 occurring in (2019-2020) and Phase 2 ongoing (2021-present). Results focus on SFC performance, technology readiness level assessment, and requirements discovery/validation. Companion papers are cited throughout for additional details on the recent testing.

safety management↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

AI/Ml Assurance

Presentation of the AI/ML (Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning) design assurance work done under the System-Wide Safety project to INCAS (Romanian National Institute for Aerospace Research). The meeting was organized by the Airspace Operations & Safety program (AOSP) in the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate. The presentation gave an overview of why assurance is needed for AI/ML applications, the industry and governmental drivers and a list of the assurance technology themes explored in SWS.

Safety↗
NASA NTRS1994

Scientific and Technical Publishing at Goddard Space Flight Center in Fiscal Year 1994

This publication is a compilation of scientific and technical material that was researched, written, prepared, and disseminated by the Center's scientists and engineers during FY94. It is presented in numerical order of the GSFC author's sponsoring technical directorate; i.e., Code 300 is the Office of Flight Assurance, Code 400 is the Flight Projects Directorate, Code 500 is the Mission Operations and Data Systems Directorate, Code 600 is the Space Sciences Directorate, Code 700 is the Engineering Directorate, Code 800 is the Suborbital Projects and Operations Directorate, and Code 900 is the Earth Sciences Directorate. The publication database contains publication or presentation title, author(s), document type, sponsor, and organizational code. This is the second annual compilation for the Center.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2006

Radiation and Plasma Environments for Lunar Missions

Space system design for lunar orbit and extended operations on the lunar surface requires analysis of potential system vulnerabilities to plasma and radiation environments to minimize anomalies and assure that environmental failures do not occur during the mission. Individual environments include the trapped particles in Earth s radiation belts, solar energetic particles and galactic cosmic rays, plasma environments encountered in transit to the moon and on the lunar surface (solar wind, terrestrial magnetosheath and magnetotail, and lunar photoelectrons), and solar ultraviolet and extreme ultraviolet photons. These are the plasma and radiation environments which contribute to a variety of effects on space systems including total ionizing dose and dose rate effects in electronics, degradation of materials in the space environment, and charging of spacecraft and lunar dust. This paper provides a survey of the relevant charged particle and photon environments of importance to lunar mission design ranging from the lowest (approx.few 10 s eV) photoelectron energies to the highest (approx.GeV) cosmic ray energies.

Minow, Joseph I.↗