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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2017

A Retrospective Assessment of Correlation between Occupational and Public Radiation Protection Programs Performance Metrics at a FUSRAP Site - 17546

A retrospective assessment of the occupational and environmental radiation protection programs includes the consideration of performance metrics at the qualitative and quantitative level. When key radiation protection (RP) program metrics are tracked over the course of several years, correlations may present themselves. Strong correlations between variables may be considered when establishing or validating baseline RP Program elements (i.e., controls, monitoring regimes, and additional ALARA measures) for the safe excavation and handling of naturally occurring radioactive materials comingled in soil-like wastes at FUSRAP sites. (authors)

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2019

A Comparison of GoldSim, RESRAD-Onsite, and NORMALYSA Modeling Tools at Radioactive Waste Sites - 19480

Radioactive waste disposal and associated decision making is a challenging problem around the world. A strong performance assessment model plays a crucial role in making good management and remediation decisions and in optimizing the performance of a site. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) MODARIA II Working Group 1 (WG1) is comparing the performance of various modeling platforms used at Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM) and legacy waste sites to support risk-informed decision making. Neptune and Company, Inc. (Neptune) has developed probabilistic performance assessment models using the GoldSim system modeling software at a variety of radioactive waste sites. This paper presents a comparison between GoldSim and two other tools used to evaluate radiation exposure and their associated risks: the NORM And Legacy Site Assessment (NORMALYSA) tool used to assess risk at the Zapadnoe mill tailings site, and the residual radioactivity (RESRAD-Onsite) computer program used to calculate Authorized Limits at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supported development of NORMALYSA based off of Ecolego 6.0, in which the user connects several universal modules, representing various environmental transport and exposure pathways, and enters in site-specific data. Further work with NORMALYSA has continued under the MODARIA II WG 1. A radionuclide transport and dose calculation model of the Zapadnoe uranium mill tailings site at the Pridneprovsky Chemical Plant in the Ukraine has been configured by MODARIA II WG1 to test the capabilities of NORMALYSA. Under this test case, contaminant transport and effective dose calculations were performed for two exposure scenarios. The onsite worker is exposed via external ground irradiation and radon and radioactive dust inhalation. The offsite resident defines a residence established 300 years after institutional control has ended, 800 meters downstream from the site with exposure pathways including: ingestion of garden vegetables irrigated by contaminated ground water, ingestion of fish from the Konoplyanka River and agricultural activities in the contaminated garden. GoldSim modeling software is a dynamic probabilistic modeling platform that evaluates uncertainty in a robust and transparent manner. Although GoldSim provides contaminant and radionuclide transport modules to facilitate integrated modeling of radionuclide migration in the environment, these features are not embedded in an existing modeling framework, except as created by the user. Neptune developed a GoldSim model for the two exposure scenarios of the Zapadnoe test case. Neptune's Generic PA Model was used as a starting point for the Zapadnoe site. Input parameters for the GoldSim model include site-specific parameters from the MODARIA Working Group as well as parameters from the Generic PA Model and other PA models created by Neptune. For the other comparison, Version 7.0 of RESRAD-Onsite, developed by Argonne National Laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), was used to calculate Authorized Limits for LANL. Authorized Limits are concentrations of radionuclides in soil that support the evaluation process to clear land for release under different uses. The RESRAD-Onsite computer code was used to calculate Authorized Limits because this program was specifically designed to derive radionuclide soil guidelines corresponding to a specific dose criterion. The scope of the RESRAD dose or risk evaluation is constrained to the transport and exposure pathways that have been included in the computer code. To assist in illustrating the capability of GoldSim modeling software, a GoldSim model was created to replicate the calculation of LANL's Authorized Limits for soil. The main exposure pathways in this model are inhalation of dust and gas, plant ingestion, soil ingestion, and external ground irradiation. All of the processes and outputs of RESRAD-Onsite and NORMALYSA can be created in a GoldSim model, but the value of GoldSim lies in its flexibility for application to any of a wide variety of environmental modeling problems. GoldSim allows development of site-specific inventory, transport mechanisms and risk assessment scenarios. If all potentially complete release, transport, and exposure pathways are addressed in an existing dose and risk assessment computer code, and if the code's capabilities fulfill the project modeling objectives, then expending resources to create a GoldSim model may not be necessary. Site optimization and good decision making about site management are often best when supported with the flexibility of GoldSim as a modeling tool. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

GPS-Based Gamma Survey for Characterizing and Decommissioning NORM Sites - 20389

Gamma survey techniques are an especially powerful decommissioning tool at naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) sites due to both the low cost to obtain data over a large spatial scale and the abundance of gamma emitters in the uranium and thorium decay series. Gamma surveys are executed by coupling a detector - most often a sodium iodide crystal - to a global positioning system (GPS), then reporting a location and gross gamma reading coincidentally to a data logger. Systems may be carried by workers or mounted to a car, all-terrain vehicle, or unmanned aerial system (UAS). The resulting data set provides a high-resolution but low precision map of the gamma radiation field over the area surveyed. Frequently this map is also correlated to soil concentrations of NORM radionuclides (most often, Ra-226) and/or exposure rate. Gamma survey parameters such as movement speed, transect spacing, and data logging frequency define the spatial resolution of the resulting surface, and can be optimized depending on the desired survey sensitivity. This paper examines gamma survey as a tool for decommissioning NORM sites and provides an overview of current gamma survey technology designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the decommissioning process. Topics to be discussed in the paper include: - An overview of gamma survey systems, and the utility of different delivery vehicles depending on desired cost, desired spatial resolution, and site topography. - The influence of physical detector characteristics on detection sensitivity and survey planning. - The tradeoff between high-resolution and large spatial extent, but inherently uncertain data, and low-resolution, low spatial extent, but highly certain data, as well as the specific utility of each of these types of data during NORM facility decommissioning. - Confounding variables that may limit the utility of gamma survey at some sites (e.g., radon gas and spatial heterogeneity / hot spots), and methods to plan for and control these conditions. Results show that the confounding variables, such as radon and data output can greatly influence the overall data quality associated with the decommissioning process. In addition, the use of real-time and aerial survey platforms provides a method for ensuring proper spatial extent of the data. When applied thoughtfully, gamma survey is a powerful tool for detecting NORM radionuclides in the environment and a cost-effective technique for identifying areas requiring remediation. However, entities performing or using gamma survey as a decommissioning tool must be aware of both its advantages and its limitations before basing remediation or regulatory action on gamma survey results. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Distribution Development for Residual Inventory at the New York West Valley Site - 20400

The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) is the owner of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center (WNYNSC), a 1,351 ha site located approximately 48 km south of Buffalo, New York. In 1962, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) entered into Agreements with the Atomic Energy Commission and New York State to construct the first commercial reprocessing plant of nuclear fuel in the United States. NFS, a private company, built and operated the spent fuel reprocessing plant and waste disposal facilities, processing 640 Mg of spent nuclear fuel from 1966 to 1972 under an Atomic Energy Commission license. Nuclear fuel reprocessing operations ended in 1972 and never reopened, leaving behind radioactive and chemical wastes. Operations led to contamination in a number of facilities and locations. Some of that contamination has migrated from waste disposal zones to other layers, formations, and features on and off the WNYNSC. Phase I decommissioning activities are ongoing and involve the removal of a number of areas and structures that have been associated with contamination. The purpose of this work is to outline the approach for characterizing contamination not associated with disposed wastes, contaminated structures, or specific releases. In this work, the term, residual radiological activity, is used to describe environmental contamination that exists subsequent to the completion of Phase I decommissioning activities, that is not associated with disposed wastes, contaminated structures, or specific releases. Contamination from the Site was quantified relative to data that characterize the concentrations of radionuclides that exist in background. Background concentrations are those present in the area but having no influence from Site related activities. The existence of residual radiological activity that is elevated relative to background has the potential to contribute to future risks to human health and the environment. As a consequence, the residual inventory information is used to inform the West Valley Probabilistic Performance Assessment (PPA) model to characterize potential future risks to human health and the environment. The centralized West Valley Data Management System (DMS) was the source of information for the data assembled in this analysis. The DMS is a fairly large compilation consisting of thousands of records from investigation studies, with sample dates ranging from 1990 to present. Samples from monitoring wells, boreholes, geoprobe studies, surface water, surface soils, storm water outfalls, ventilation stack filters, plant and animal tissues, and more are included in the DMS. Results are typically reported in units of activity per unit volume. For the purpose of the analyses presented here, all results were converted into consistent units of pCi per unit volume. Since 1990, data have been collected from various locations across the WNYNSC at different times with varying frequency over the course of several decades. As a consequence, a number of potential issues can arise with respect to the assembly of a dataset that is deemed adequate for the characterization of residual radiological activity. These issues were assessed and resolved to the extent possible through careful consideration of the properties of the distributions. The intent was to use data which characterize the current state of the Site. Radionuclides can be designated to one of several groups depending on their origin. In this work the groups considered were 1) Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM), 2) fallout, and 3) Other (including power plant, medical research, etc). This grouping is a useful construct with respect to the interpretation of fixed laboratory results. For example, NORM radionuclides that exist within a decay chain should have approximately equivalent distributions of concentrations if they are representative of background conditions. Insights such as these can be used as a check to identify sample results that need to be further investigated or omitted due to issues associated with reported results from fixed laboratory analyses. This type of analysis provided a foundation for the assessment of the adequacy of sample results for use in subsequent components of an assessment. The general process for the assessment of residual radiological contamination at the Site consists of a sequence of several steps. First, for each analyte, several statistical tests were performed to assess the weight of evidence against the null hypothesis that the mean of the distribution of concentrations was equal to zero. If the mean of the distribution of concentrations for a given radionuclide was not found to be greater than zero, then it was removed from consideration as a component of the residual radiological contamination. If there was significant evidence to reject the hypothesis of the mean being equal to zero, the second step was to compare the distribution of the data from the Site to that of the corresponding background. A suite of tests was used to compare the distributions of the site and background data. The results of these tests were collectively used to determine if site data are elevated relative to background. The third step was to develop distributions using a Bayesian framework to characterize the distribution of mean of the increment present above background for each of the radionuclides. The Bayesian model implemented allowed for the comparison of site-specific records to background concentrations to better approximate contamination attributed to the Site. A final screening step was employed for radionuclides that exceed background. This screening step compared 95% upper confidence limits (UCLs) from the increment distribution developed in the previous step to the risk screening levels. This approach yields a list of analytes that were determined to be elevated relative to background.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Initial Modeling of Urban Search Measurements

Detection of illicit nuclear materials in urban environments is difficult due to the large amount of background radiation from naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) in the roadways and buildings. Mobile searches suffer from low count rates, so the detection algorithms must be carefully balanced between missing real sources and reporting too many false alarms. The Modeling Urban Scenarios and Experiments (MUSE) project aims to create a virtual testbed for simulation of radiation detection to predict realistic background and threat source detection events so that detection algorithms can be better optimized to find illicit sources. The MUSE project is a collaboration of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), and the Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL). The project also works with staff at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to support the development of the Optimization Planning Tool for Urban Search (OPTUS) software package. The first step in creating a virtual testbed is to determine the level of detail required in the models to match actual measurements. Several measurement campaigns were conducted in 2015 and 2016 at the Fort Indiantown Gap (FTIG) Combined Arms Collective Traming Facility (CACTF). This facility contains a representative urban environment, with a dozen buildings and several streets. Detectors commonly used in search operations - 2 in x 4 in x 16 in NaI(Tl) - were used to measure count rates from background and sources. Measurements with a shielded high-purity germanium detector of the roadways, sidewalks, and building walls were made to determine the concentration of NORM that makes up the bulk of the background radiation. This paper shows some comparisons of modeling simulations to measurements taken during the OPTUS-3 campaign in November 2015. Measurements with and without an 81 {mu}Ci cesium source were made at several points along the center line of the main road. Initial results show good agreement between the measured and simulated spectra above 300 keV. Additional studies to determine the causes of mismatch below 300 keV have been started and will also be discussed.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Disentangling the sources of ionizing radiation in superconducting qubits

Abstract Radioactivity was recently discovered as a source of decoherence and correlated errors for the real-world implementation of superconducting quantum processors. In this work, we measure levels of radioactivity present in a typical laboratory environment (from muons, neutrons, and $$\gamma $$ γ -rays emitted by naturally occurring radioactive isotopes) and in the most commonly used materials for the assembly and operation of state-of-the-art superconducting qubits. We present a GEANT-4 based simulation to predict the rate of impacts and the amount of energy released in a qubit chip from each of the mentioned sources. We finally propose mitigation strategies for the operation of next-generation qubits in a radio-pure environment.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2016

Design and Development of an Automated Instrument for Measuring Radioactivity in an Excavator Bucket - 16246

Increasing interest and emphasis is being given to the presence of radioactive contamination in the environment and the methods by which this contamination can be remediated. Radioactive contamination may arise from industrial process including the operation of nuclear facilities. It may also arise from the enhancement of naturally occurring radioactive material by industrial processes. An area of particular concern is the remediation of soil and rubble with radioactive contamination. Traditional methods of soil remediation involve sampling followed by the excavation of areas where contamination is found. The soil removal process is normally very inefficient and can involve multiple handling of excessive quantities of soil and ultimately an over estimate of the quantity of soil with radioactive contamination. In order to both minimize material handling and to reduce the final volume of contaminated material, which must be handled for disposal, a sensitive instrument has been developed and tested which is designed to measure the radioactive content of an excavator bucket. The instrument detector is positioned automatically just above the open top of the bucket and the measurement employs a high efficiency sodium iodide crystal which has a graded shadow shield to reduce the effect of background radioactivity. The measurement efficiency is enhanced as the detector is located in close proximity to the soil in the bucket and the thick steel shell of the bucket acts as a shield to further reduce the effect of background from the ground below. The method has obvious advantages over methods, which attempt to measure the potentially radioactive soil through the shielding provided by the thick steel bucket shell. As the first stage of the bucket measurement the excavator operator fills the bucket and locates it in a designated position with the open top of the bucket facing upwards, close to the operator cab. A measurement technician, located outside the danger area of the excavator boom, begins the measurement using a tablet computer with a wireless connection to the instrument. The shielded detector is moved from a storage position above the operator cab to the measurement position close to the open surface of the excavator bucket. Once the measurement is completed in typically one to two minutes, the detector is repositioned in its storage location and the measurement data is transmitted to the tablet computer. At this point the measurement technician makes the decision based on the measurement results as to how to disposition the bucket contents. Typically contaminated material will be transferred to a vehicle for off-site disposal. Alternatively, and this is the great advantage of this technique, uncontaminated material may be returned directly to the site of the excavation without the need for further handling. The development, detailed design and preliminary testing of the instrument are described. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Decommissioning, Decontamination, and Disposal of LLW-LL, and ILW-LL at a Former Rare Earths Processing Facility in Malaysia - 19087

Geosyntec Consultants, Inc. (Geosyntec) was the design-build Contractor for a project involving the remediation and disposal of low level (LLW-LL and ILW-LL) NORM and TENORM wastes at a former rare earth processing facility in Malaysia. These sites were associated with a plant that extracted rare earth elements from local tin ores. Because of the naturally occurring radioactivity contained in the raw materials, these productions resulted in by-products and residues containing LLW-LL and ILW-LL thorium hydroxide and uranium hydroxide. The total mass of uranium (∼120 tons) and thorium (∼1,200 tons) managed in a single repository required the project design incorporate requirements related to inventory, security and safeguards around nuclear precursor materials. The requirement to consider a performance over a period of more than 10,000 years led to significant challenges in design and modeling of the disposal facility as this disposal facility was purposely designed and permitted as a final disposal for the LLW-LL and ILW-LL. The first phase of the project was the decommissioning, decontamination, and demolition of the 14- acre former rare earth processing plant and excavation of contaminated soils, construction of an engineered cell at the repository for waste disposal, and transportation and disposal of the waste materials into the cell. Final status surveys were carried out to allow the site to be successfully released by the Malaysian regulatory authorities as a clean site for re-development as common industrial use. Over 11,000 loads of material, including approximately 75,000 cubic meters of excavated soils and plant debris, were transported in specially designed steel transport boxes on public roads for disposal in the engineered cell. The second phase of the project included the design and construction of a second engineered cell, enhanced with protective barrier systems and a final cover system constructed of natural materials. Ancillary facilities such as substations, offices, processing buildings, and wastewater treatment plants were constructed to support retrieval and processing of the materials from more than 87,000 individual drums using a semi-automated process. The drums, waste packages, and other materials in the storage facility were systematically extracted, sorted, inventoried, solidified using Portland cement, transported, and disposed in the cell. All temporary facilities were decontaminated, demolished, and disposed in the cell. Radiological inventory and radiation safety programs were implemented to quantify the waste activity and to control exposure to workers and the public during the project. The total mass of radioactive contaminated waste disposed in the two projects is nearly 200,000 tons. The projects were carried out under a high level of scrutiny from Malaysian and international regulatory bodies. Between 2014 and 2017, performance monitoring and modeling activities were carried out to demonstrate that the disposal facility was performing in accordance with design requirements established by regulatory agencies. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Radiological Scouting, Monitoring and Inspection Using Drones

Human populations and natural ecosystems are bound to be exposed to ionizing radiation from the deposition of artificial radionuclides resulting from nuclear accidents, nuclear devices or radiological dispersive devices (“dirty bombs”). On the other hand, Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material industries such as phosphate production or uranium mining, contribute to the on site storage of residuals with enhanced concentrations of natural radionuclides. Therefore, in the context of the European agreements concerning nuclear energy, namely the European Atomic Energy Community Treaty, monitoring is an essential feature of the environmental radiological surveillance. In this work, we obtain 3D maps from outdoor scenarios, and complete such maps with measured radiation levels and with its radionuclide signature. In such scenarios, we face challenges such as unknown and rough terrain, limited number of sampled locations and the need for different sensors and therefore different tasks. We propose a radiological solution for scouting, monitoring and inspecting an area of interest, using a fleet of drones and a controlling ground station. First, we scout an area with a Light Detection and Ranging sensor onboard a drone to accurately 3D-map the area. Then, we monitor that area with a Geiger–Müller Counter at a low-vertical distance from the ground to produce a radiological (heat)map that is overlaid on the 3D map of the scenario. Next, we identify the hotspots of radiation, and inspect them in detail using a drone by landing on them, to reveal its radionuclide signature using a Cadmium–Zinc–Telluride detector. We present the algorithms used to implement such tasks both at the ground station and on the drones. The three mission phases were validated using actual experiments in three different outdoor scenarios. We conclude that drones can not only perform the mission efficiently, but in general they are faster and as reliable as personnel on the ground.

Pinto, Luís Ramos (ORCID:0000000319975484)↗
DOE OSTI2023

Data Summary Report for Soil and Slab Sampling at Former Building 175

Lawrence Livermore National Security (LLNS) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) are in the process of returning the area where Building 175 existed to beneficial use for future site development. The completed assessment will help LLNS and DOE to outline project scope and costs associated with the removal, characterization, and disposal of materials generated when the concrete slab for the former building and any associated remaining subsurface structures are demolished. Slab removal under the Transition & Disposition process requires full screening for potential site contamination to determine appropriate future land use. Borehole locations and depths were designed to correctly assess DOE’s future liability for characterizing residual vadose zone contamination. If a residual source area is identified at depth, DOE will need to evaluate the additional cost of future subsurface cleanup (with limited access) due to planned development. This is necessary to leave the location in a “ready-to-build” status. As a result, Phase II sampling requirements may in some cases extend beyond the construction zone required for slab removal to ensure the necessary due diligence. To avoid the potential spread of contamination and/or the creation of an environmental release by impacting the integrity of known contamination areas (e.g., pit within room 102 and the east to west boundary seam), these locations were not sampled for this project. During demolition of the slab, these locations and their underlying soils should be further evaluated. The assessment was conducted in accord with the May 2022 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Former Building 175 Assessment Soil Sampling and Analysis Plan / Quality Assurance Plan. Thirty-six, direct-push borings were advanced, along with collecting concrete (where present) and soil samples for laboratory analyses. Thirty-two of the borings were advanced to a depth of 25 feet below ground (bgs), and four borings were advanced to a depth of 55 feet bgs. The concrete slab for former Building 175 ranged from approximately 8 inches to over two feet in thickness. Soils encountered during the investigation consisted primarily of clayey silt, with interbeds of sandy gravel and silty sand to the total depth explored of 55 feet bgs. Field photoionization detector readings – checking for volatile organic compound (VOC) vapors in soils, ranged from zero (0) to a peak of 33 parts per million at 25 feet bgs in boring PC-B175- 028. The cause for the peak reading is unknown, however, no visually discolored or odorous soils were encountered during the assessment and all VOC results were below Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s (LLNL’s) Soil Screening and Management Plan (SSMP) soil screening levels (SSL). Groundwater was not encountered during the assessment and is expected to occur at roughly 65 feet bgs in the project area. No metals were detected at concentrations of concern in the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. Low gross alpha and beta activity concentrations were detected in the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. The detected activity concentrations would appear to be from naturally occurring radioactive isotopes, i.e., potassium 40, present in the raw materials used to make concrete and not artificially added. Tritium was not detected above the testing laboratory's Method Detection Limit (MDL) in any of the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. The radioactive isotopes - actinium 228, bismuth 214, lead 212, lead 214, potassium 40, radium 226, radium 228, and thallium 208, were detected at low activity concentrations in the concrete core samples analyzed. Based on the detected activity concentrations, the isotopes would appear to be naturally occurring in the raw materials used to make concrete and not artificially added. Acetone – a common laboratory contaminant, was detected in nine of the soil samples collected and analyzed. Concentrations of two other volatile organic compounds (benzene and tetrachloroethene) were detected in five of the soil samples analyzed. All concentrations were below SSLs. Total petroleum hydrocarbons as diesel range organics were detected at 43.9 milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg) in the 20-foot bgs duplicate sample from boring PC-B175-007. Total petroleum hydrocarbons as motor oil were detected at 7.20 mg/kg in the 15-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-001, and at 20.7 mg/kg in the 20-foot bgs duplicate sample from boring PC-B175-007. The SSL for diesel-range TPHs is 260 mg/kg. LLNL does not have an SSL for motor oil range TPHs. No indications of a release, e.g., visibly stained, or odorous soil, were present at the boring locations. No samples collected contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in concentrations above the laboratory reporting limit. Arsenic was detected above its SSL of 8.51 mg/kg in the 25-foot bgs routine sample collected from boring PC-B175-023. Nickel was detected above its SSL of 86.0 mg/kg in the 10-foot bgs routine sample from boing PC-B175-005, the 20-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-025, and the 25-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-034. The detected concentrations, however, were well below ten times (10x) their respective STLCs. Gross alpha and/or gross beta were detected above their respective SSL activity concentrations in three routine soil samples. Retesting (two per sample) of the samples showed that the initial reported activity concentrations were anomalous. Tritium was not detected in any of the routine or duplicate soil samples collected and analyzed during the investigation. The radioactive isotopes - actinium 228, bismuth 212 and 214, lead 212 and 214, potassium 40, radium 224, 226 and 228, thallium 208, thorium 234 and uranium, were detected at low activity concentrations in the soil samples analyzed for radioactive constituents. The detected isotopes and their associated activity concentrations are typical of those naturally occurring in the marine-type sedimentary deposits underlying the Livermore Valley. No radiological controls are necessary for the soil evaluated.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2016

Magnetic iron oxide and manganese-doped iron oxide nanoparticles for the collection of alpha-emitting radionuclides from aqueous solutions

Magnetic nanoparticles are well known to possess chemically active surfaces and high surface areas that can be employed to extract a range of ions from aqueous solutions. Additionally, their paramagnetic property provides a convenient means for bulk collection of the material from solution after the targeted ions have been adsorbed. Herein, two nanoscale amphoteric metal oxides, each possessing useful magnetic attributes, were evaluated for their ability to collect both naturally occurring radioactive isotopes (polonium (Po), radium (Ra), and uranium (U)) as well as the transuranic element americium (Am) from a suite of naturally occurring aqueous matrices. The nanomaterials include commercially available paramagnetic magnetite (Fe3O4) and magnetite that was modified to incorporate manganese (Mn) into the crystal structure. The chemical stability of these nanomaterials was evaluated in Hanford Site, WA ground water between the natural pH (~8) and pH 1 (acidified with HCl). Whereas the magnetite was observed to have good stability over the pH range, the Mn-doped material was observed to leach Mn at low pH. The materials were evaluated in parallel to characterize their uptake performance of the aforementioned alpha-emitting radionuclide spikes from Hanford Site ground water across a range of pH (from ~8 down to 2). In addition, radiotracer uptake experiments were performed on Columbia River water, seawater, and human urine at their natural pH and at pH 2. Despite the observed leaching of Mn from the Mn-doped nanomaterial in the lower pH range, it exhibited generally superior analyte extraction performance compared to the magnetite, and analyte uptake was observed across a broader pH range. The uptake behavior of the various radiotracers on these two materials at different pH levels can generally be explained by the amphoteric nature of the nanoparticle surfaces. Finally, the rate of sorption of the radiotracers on the two materials in unacidified groundwater was evaluated. The uptake curves generally indicate that equilibrium is obtained within a few minutes, which is attributed to the high surface areas of the nanomaterials and the high level of dispersion in the liquids. Overall, the results indicate that these nanomaterials may have the potential to be employed for a range of applications to extract radionuclides from aqueous solutions. These applications may include analytical chemistry, waste water treatment and remediation, mining, and in vitro radiobioassay.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2023

Mitigation of Cosmic Rays-Induced Errors in Superconducting Quantum Processors

Environmental radioactivity and cosmic-rays have recently been identified as a source of decoherence in super-conducting quantum bits (qubits). In particular, the absorption of cosmic-ray muons and gamma rays emitted by naturally occurring radioactive isotopes in the qubit substrate leads to correlated errors in superconducting quantum processors, posing significant challenges to quantum error correction. To enable quantum computing to scale, it is therefore necessary the devel-opment of mitigation strategies to prevent, or keep under control, error bursts due to particle impacts in the chip. While most environmental radioactive sources can be effectively suppressed using dedicated shielding, cosmic-ray muons, with their high penetration capability, can only be mitigated by moving the entire facility in a deep underground laboratory. This work explores the potential for developing a novel class of quantum processors equipped with an active veto system to protect superconducting-based quantum computers from the detrimental effects of atmospheric muons. Such a device would enable the identification of an atmospheric muon interaction within the processor and veto all operations performed during the occurrence of such an interaction. By demonstrating high detection efficiency and negligible dead time, we aim to establish that the future of quantum processors can be envisioned in above-around facilities.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2019

Waste is our Product. Developing, Implementing and Optimising Waste Management at Dounreay - 19039

The UK's Fast Breeder Reactor Research programme was centred at Dounreay, in the very north of Scotland, from 1955. Since 1994, the site has been focused on decommissioning, and represents one of the most complex, technically challenging and hazardous nuclear clean-up projects in Europe. Since 2012, Dounreay Site Restoration Ltd (DSRL) has been contracted by the NDA as the Site License Company to deliver the defined scope of work, under a Target Cost contract, to decommission the site to achieve the Interim End State by 2030-2033, whilst managing the transition of its people. All parties, including DSRL's Parent Body Organisation Cavendish Dounreay Partnership Ltd (a consortium of Cavendish Nuclear, AECOM, and Jacobs), recognise that there are significant technical and regulatory challenges to achieve this, as well as safely managing the transition for our workforce on what is effectively a 'closure' contract. The product of decommissioning is waste; over the course of the programme, a full range of higher activity and lower level radioactive wastes will be generated, and must be safely managed. This paper will address: - The Policy issues relating to radioactive waste management at Dounreay, including particular issues relating to implementation of Scottish policy, including how Waste Management is Optimised. - An overview of the decommissioning programme and the delivery of an Interim End State; - The type, range and nature of radioactive wastes requiring safe management at Dounreay; - Higher Activity Wastes (HAW): - Setting higher activity waste strategy; defining products and interim storage requirements; - Technical, regulatory and stakeholder issues for HAW strategy; - Lower Activity Wastes: - Setting Low Level Waste (LLW) strategy; defining a disposal product and development and status for Dounreay's LLW Disposal Vaults; - Implementing LLW strategy; - Technical, regulatory and stakeholder issues for LLW strategy; - Optimising Waste Management -Optimising waste from generation (from decommissioning workfaces) through to disposal -why, and how; - The Waste Informed Decommissioning model as a methodology and approach; - Impact and importance of Waste Management on a target cost contract; - Establishment of a Waste Optimisation Programme to drive ownership, delivery and culture change; - Management responsibilities and informing organisational design; - Sharing and learning from Best Practice; - The Challenge - how to ensure workforce and teams are engaged in delivering optimisation requirements; - Conclusions. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2020

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. Radionuclides in air from NNSS activities have been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this sources dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of manmade radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), specifically the National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities (40 CFR 61, Subpart H, 2020) limits the release of radioactivity from a DOE facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent (EDE) to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by reporting environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS. This alternative was proposed and formerly submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are closer to radionuclide releases than where the public resides so they act as protective substitutes for public receptor locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in Table 2 of 40 CFR 61, Appendix E. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. The EPAapproved air transport model, called the Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88-PC) is also used to calculate the effective dose equivalent to the maximally exposed individual from NNSS air emissions. CAP88-PC was also used to calculate the population dose, or the collective EDE (expressed as person-rem [roentgen equivalent man] per year [person-rem/y]) for all individuals combined who reside within 80 kilometers (km) of NNSS emission sources. In 2020, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by both the air sampling data collected at critical receptor air monitoring stations and CAP88-PC modeling. The average concentrations of radioactivity at air critical receptor stations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 4.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. CAP88-PC modeling of all 2020 NNSS radionuclide emissions showed the maximally exposed individual to be in Amargosa Valley and this individual received a potential dose of 0.063 mrem/y. The collective dose was calculated to be 0.29 person-rem/year for the 521,300 people who lived within 80 km of NNSS emission sources.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2018

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2017

Report submitted to regulators (State of Nevada and EPA Region IV). Required to document compliance with 40 CFR 61 Subpart H. The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since nuclear testing ended in 1992, radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) (CFR 2010a) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] and DOE 1995). This method was approved by the EPA in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations because no member of the public resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2 (CFR 2010a). For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2017, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by air sampling data collected at the critical receptor air monitoring stations which had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values. Concentrations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 5.7% of the allowed NESHAP limit. Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88) was used to model dose to the offsite public from all 2017 NNSS radionuclide emissions. The model showed the maximally exposed individual to be on the adjacent U.S. Air Force Nevada Test and Training Range; this individual received a dose of 0.07 mrem/y. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.0000098 mrem/y, over six orders of magnitude lower than the 10 mrem/y limit.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2019

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclide Emissions (Calendar Year 2018)

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons.The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61Subpart H) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by reporting environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] and DOE 1995). This method was approved by the EPA in 2001 and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations because no member of the public resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2018, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by air sampling data collected at the critical receptor air monitoring stations which had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values. Concentrations ranged from 0.1% to a maximum of 5.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88-PC) was used to model dose to the offsite public from all 2018 NNSS radionuclide emissions. The model showed the maximally exposed individual to be on the northern end of Amargosa Valley; this individual received a potential dose of 0.07 mrem/y. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.000008 mrem/y, over six orders of magnitude lower than the 10 mrem/y limit.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

IRAD-MPE Radiological and Nuclear Security Threats (Day 1) [Slides]

This module is designed to enhance awareness regarding radiological and nuclear security threats and the types of radioactive materials that can be used for criminal purposes or terrorist acts. The goals are to: (1) Review the Threat Assessment Process for MPEs, (2) Recognize Potential Radiological and Nuclear Security Threats, (3) Understand the basics of Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) and Radiological Exposure Devices (RED), (4) Learn about Medical, Commercial, and Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) sources, and (5) Understand the term Material Out of Regulatory Control (MORC).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗