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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Verification of the Generalized Aerospace Simulation in Simulink (R)

NASA uses six-degrees-of-freedom (6-DOF) simulations tools to design, test, develop Guidance Navigation and Control (GN&C) software, and certify vehicle performance prior to flight. Therefore, it is critical that the 6-DOF tools used for vehicle design and certification are validated. The focus of this work is the vali-dation of the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center 6-DOF “GeneraLized Aero-space Simulation in Simulink” (GLASS) framework tool. The GLASS tool framework is currently used to support NASA GN&C insight for the Human Landing System (HLS) project, simulating vehicle dynamics during lunar descent and as-cent. The GLASS framework utilizes the off-the-shelf Mathworks ® Simscape Multibody® toolbox to model vehicle multi-body dynamics. NASA’s Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) provides a set of 6-DOF simulation verification “check cases” that are available to any user needing to verify 6-DOF tools. The check cases contain seventeen atmospheric and twenty-six orbital test scenarios are provided to validate equations of motion, environmental models (e.g., atmosphere, gravitation, and geodesy) and tool propagators. This paper compares GLASS 6-DOF simulation results against the NESC check cases’ results via simulation-to-simulation comparisons. The comparisons demonstrate that GLASS simulation results are “in family” with the outputs of the applicable NASA NESC check cases and verifies the GLASS core framework dynamics and the correct implementation of the check case scenario models.

6-Dof↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Verification of the Generalized Aerospace Simulation in Simulink

NASA uses six-degrees-of-freedom (6-DOF) simulations tools to design, test, develop Guidance Navigation and Control (GN&C) software, and certify vehicle performance prior to flight. Therefore, it is critical that the 6-DOF tools used for vehicle design and certification are validated. The focus of this work is the validation of the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center 6-DOF “GeneraLized Aerospace Simulation in Simulink” (GLASS) framework tool. The GLASS tool framework is currently used to support NASA GN&C insight for the Human Landing System (HLS) project, simulating vehicle dynamics during lunar descent and ascent. The GLASS framework utilizes the off-the-shelf Mathworks (R) Simscape (TM) Multibody (TM) toolbox to model vehicle multi-body dynamics. NASA’s Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) provides a set of 6-DOF simulation verification “check cases” that are available to any user needing to verify 6-DOF tools. The check cases contain seventeen atmospheric and twenty-six orbital test scenarios are provided to validate equations of motion, environmental models (e.g., atmosphere, gravitation, and geodesy) and tool propagators. This paper compares GLASS 6-DOF simulation results against the NESC check cases’ results via simulation-to-simulation comparisons. The comparison demonstrates that GLASS simulation results are “in family” with the outputs of the applicable NASA NESC check-cases and verify the GLASS core framework dynamics and the implementation of the check case scenario models.

6-Dof↗

DOE OSTI2024

Identifying priority ecosystem services in tidal wetland restoration

Classification systems can be an important tool for identifying and quantifying the importance of relationships, assessing spatial patterns in a standardized way, and forecasting alternative decision scenarios to characterize the potential benefits (e.g., ecosystem services) from ecosystem restoration that improve human health and well-being. We present a top-down approach that systematically leverages ecosystem services classification systems to identify potential services relevant for ecosystem restoration decisions. We demonstrate this approach using the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s National Ecosystem Service Classification System Plus (NESCS Plus) to identify those ecosystem services that are relevant to restoration of tidal wetlands. We selected tidal wetland management documents from federal agencies, state agencies, wetland conservation organizations, and land stewards across three regions of the continental United States (northern Gulf of Mexico, Mid-Atlantic, and Pacific Northwest) to examine regional and organizational differences in identified potential benefits of tidal wetland restoration activities and the potential user groups who may benefit. We used an automated document analysis to quantify the frequencies at which different wetland types were mentioned in the management documents along with their associated beneficiary groups and the ecological end products (EEPs) those beneficiaries care about, as defined by NESCS Plus. Results showed that a top combination across all three regions, all four organizations, and all four tidal wetland types was the EEP naturalness paired with the beneficiary people who care (existence). Overall, the Mid-Atlantic region and the land steward organizations mentioned ecosystem services more than the others, and EEPs were mentioned in combination with tidal wetlands as a high-level, more general category than the other more specific tidal wetland types. Certain regional and organizations differences were statistically significant. Those results may be useful in identifying ecosystem services-related goals for tidal wetland restoration. This approach for identifying and comparing ecosystem service priorities is broadly transferrable to other ecosystems or decision-making contexts.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS2004

Anomaly Analysis: NASA's Engineering and Safety Center Checks Recurring Shuttle Glitches

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), set up in the wake of the Columbia accident to backstop engineers in the space shuttle program, is reviewing hundreds of recurring anomalies that the program had determined don't affect flight safety to see if in fact they might. The NESC is expanding its support to other programs across the agency, as well. The effort, which will later extend to the International Space Station (ISS), is a principal part of the attempt to overcome the normalization of deviance--a situation in which organizations proceeded as if nothing was wrong in the face of evidence that something was wrong--cited by sociologist Diane Vaughn as contributing to both space shuttle disasters.

Morring, Frank, Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Technical Consultation of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) System Health Assessment: Analysis of HST Health

The NESC conducted an abridged independent examination of available information and personnel interviews to evaluate the current and anticipated state of the spacecraft subsystems and the parameters that describe the HST's health. These examinations included the projected timeliness of a robotic SM and whether the GSFC baseline concept is likely to provide the capability to extend the useful scientific life of the HST by an additional 5 years. The NESC team collected a broad spectrum of pertinent HST Program analyses, reports, briefings, and the results of the IPAO and the Aerospace Corporation AOA assessments as they relate to the degradation of the HST s health. This review included the state of the HST subsystems having the potential to impact the viability of the HST, but will not be serviced under the baseline robotic SM.

Gentz, Steven J.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Technical Consultation of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Nickel Hydrogen (NiH2) Battery Charge Capacity Prediction

The purpose of the GSFC position paper is to identify critical HST milestone dates for continued science studies followed by the attachment of a re-entry module or a robotic servicing mission. The paper examines the viability of the HST with respect to the NiH2 continued battery charge capacity. In the course of the assessment, it was recognized that the HST battery thermal control system has an average heat dissipation limitation of 30 W per bay per orbit cycle. This thermal constraint will continue to govern options for battery capacity maintenance. In addition, the HST usage represents the longest exposure ofNiH2 batteries to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) at the current level of Depth of Discharge (DOD). Finally, the current battery life is at the limit predicted by the manufacturer, Eaglepicher. Therefore, given these factors, the potential exists that the HST battery capacities could radically degrade at any point. Given this caveat on any life extrapolations, the conservative model proposed in the GSFC position paper was viewed by the NESC as having several technical assumptions such as limited utilization of flight battery capacity data, the susceptibility of the proposed prediction method to large variations when supplemented with additional information, and the failure to qualitatively or quantitatively assess life prediction sensitivities. The NESC conducted an independent evaluation of the supporting information and assumptions to generate the predictions for battery capacity loss and practicality of on-orbit battery conditioning.

Gentz, Steven J.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Searching for 'Unknown Unknowns'

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was established to improve safety through engineering excellence within NASA programs and projects. As part of this goal, methods are being investigated to enable the NESC to become proactive in identifying areas that may be precursors to future problems. The goal is to find unknown indicators of future problems, not to duplicate the program-specific trending efforts. The data that is critical for detecting these indicators exist in a plethora of dissimilar non-conformance and other databases (without a common format or taxonomy). In fact, much of the data is unstructured text. However, one common database is not required if the right standards and electronic tools are employed. Electronic data mining is a particularly promising tool for this effort into unsupervised learning of common factors. This work in progress began with a systematic evaluation of available data mining software packages, based on documented decision techniques using weighted criteria. The four packages, which were perceived to have the most promise for NASA applications, are being benchmarked and evaluated by independent contractors. Preliminary recommendations for "best practices" in data mining and trending are provided. Final results and recommendations should be available in the Fall 2005. This critical first step in identifying "unknown unknowns" before they become problems is applicable to any set of engineering or programmatic data.

Parsons, Vickie S.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Testing of Full Scale Flight Qualified Kevlar Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels

Many decades ago NASA identified a need for low-mass pressure vessels for carrying various fluids aboard rockets, spacecraft, and satellites. A pressure vessel design known as the composite overwrapped pressure vessel (COPV) was identified to provide a weight savings over traditional single-material pressure vessels typically made of metal and this technology has been in use for space flight applications since the 1970's. A typical vessel design consisted of a thin liner material, typically a metal, overwrapped with a continuous fiber yarn impregnated with epoxy. Most designs were such that the overwrapped fiber would carry a majority of load at normal operating pressures. The weight advantage for a COPV versus a traditional singlematerial pressure vessel contributed to widespread use of COPVs by NASA, the military, and industry. This technology is currently used for personal breathing supply storage, fuel storage for auto and mass transport vehicles and for various space flight and aircraft applications. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was recently asked to review the operation of Kevlar 2 and carbon COPVs to ensure they are safely operated on NASA space flight vehicles. A request was made to evaluate the life remaining on the Kevlar COPVs used on the Space Shuttle for helium and nitrogen storage. This paper provides a review of Kevlar COPV testing relevant to the NESC assessment. Also discussed are some key findings, observations, and recommendations that may be applicable to the COPV user community. Questions raised during the investigations have revealed the need for testing to better understand the stress rupture life and age life of COPVs. The focus of this paper is to describe burst testing of Kevlar COPVs that has been completed as a part of an the effort to evaluate the effects of ageing and shelf life on full scale COPVs. The test articles evaluated in this discussion had a diameter of 22 inches for S/N 014 and 40 inches for S/N 011. The time between manufacture and burst was 28 and 22 years. Visual inspection, shearography, heat soak thermography and borescope inspection were performed on vessel S/N 011 and all but shearography was performed on S/N 014 before they were tested and details of this work can be found in a companion paper titled, "Nondestructive Methods and Special Test Instrumentation Supporting NASA Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel Assessments." The vessels were instrumented so that measurements could be made to aid in the understanding of vessel response. Measurements made on the test articles included girth, boss displacement, internal volume, multiple point strain, full field strain, eddy current, acoustic emission (AE) pressure and temperature. The test article before and during burst is shown with the pattern used for digital image correlation full field strain measurement blurring as the vessel fails.

Greene, Nathanael↗

NASA NTRS2007

GN&C Engineering Best Practices For Human-Rated Spacecraft Systems

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) recently completed an in-depth assessment to identify a comprehensive set of engineering considerations for the Design, Development, Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) of safe and reliable human-rated spacecraft systems. Reliability subject matter experts, discipline experts, and systems engineering experts were brought together to synthesize the current "best practices" both at the spacecraft system and subsystems levels. The objective of this paper is to summarize, for the larger Community of Practice, the initial set of Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) engineering Best Practices as identified by this NESC assessment process.

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗

NASA NTRS2007

GN&C Engineering Best Practices for Human-Rated Spacecraft Systems

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗

NASA NTRS2008

International Space Station (ISS) S-Band Corona Discharge Anomaly Consultation

The Assembly and Contingency Radio Frequency Group (ACRFG) onboard the International Space Station (ISS) is used for command and control communications and transmits (45 dBm or 32 watts) and receives at S-band. The system is nominally pressurized with gaseous helium (He) and nitrogen (N2) at 8 pounds per square inch absolute (psia). MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. (MDA) was engaged to analyze the operational characteristics of this unit in an effort to determine if the anomalous behavior was a result of a corona event. Based on this analysis, MDA did not recommend continued use of this ACRFG. The NESC was requested to provide expert support in the area of high-voltage corona and multipactoring in an S-Band RF system and to assess the probability of corona occurring in the ACRFG during the planned EVA. The NESC recommended minimal continued use of S/N 002 ACRFG until a replacement unit can be installed. Following replacement, S/N 002 will be subjected to destructive failure analysis in an effort to determine the proximate and root cause(s) of the anomalous behavior.

Kichak, Robert A.↗

NASA NTRS2008

GN&C Engineering Best Practices for Human-Rated Spacecraft System

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗

NASA NTRS2007

NASA Engineering Safety Center NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group 2007 Proactive Task Status

In 2007, the NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) chartered the NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group to bring forth and address critical battery-related performance/manufacturing issues for NASA and the aerospace community. A suite of tasks identifying and addressing issues related to Ni-H2 and Li-ion battery chemistries was submitted and selected for implementation. The current NESC funded are: (1) Wet Life of Ni-H2 Batteries (2) Binding Procurement (3) NASA Lithium-Ion Battery Guidelines (3a) Li-Ion Performance Assessment (3b) Li-Ion Guidelines Document (3b-i) Assessment of Applicability of Pouch Cells for Aerospace Missions (3b-ii) High Voltage Risk Assessment (3b-iii) Safe Charge Rates for Li-Ion Cells (4) Availability of Source Material for Li-Ion Cells (5) NASA Aerospace Battery Workshop This presentation provides a brief overview of the tasks in the 2007 plan and serves as an introduction to more detailed discussions on each of the specific tasks.

Manzo, Michelle A.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Evaluation of Risk and Possible Mitigation Schemes for Previously Unidentified Hazards

In April 2004, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was commissioned by NASA's Chief Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Officer to review and render a technical opinion on the probability of a catastrophic failure related to this scenario: The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) recognized a zero-fault-tolerant design related to an inadvertent firing of the primary reaction control system (RCS) jets on the Orbiter during mated operations with the International Space Station (ISS). It was determined that an un-commanded firing of an RCS jet could cause serious damage or loss of both the SSP Orbiter and the ISS. Several scenarios were suggested in which an un-commanded firing of the RCS jet is possible. These scenarios include an arc track event in the 28-volt heater circuits that could result in a wire-to-wire short to the adjacent reaction control jet wire. In this worst-case scenario, enough current and power could be applied to activate the reaction control jet valves and fire a thruster. The following report summarizes the work that was sponsored by the NESC as part of their assessment of the Orbiter inadvertent firing of a RCS thruster while attached to the ISS.

Linzey, William↗

NASA NTRS2008

Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C): Best Practices for Human-Rated Spacecraft Systems

In 2007 the NESC completed an in-depth assessment to identify, define and document engineering considerations for the Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) of human-rated spacecraft systems. This study had been requested by the Astronaut Office at JSC to help them to better understand what is required to ensure safe, robust, and reliable human-rated spacecraft systems. The 22 GN&C engineering Best Practices described in this paper are a condensed version of what appears in the NESC Technical Report. These Best Practices cover a broad range from fundamental system architectural considerations to more specific aspects (e.g., stability margin recommendations) of GN&C system design and development. 15 of the Best Practices address the early phases of a GN&C System development project and the remaining 7 deal with the later phases. Some of these Best Practices will cross-over between both phases. We recognize that this set of GN&C Best Practices will not be universally applicable to all projects and mission applications.

Lebsock, Ken↗

NASA NTRS2009

Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Launch Complex 39 (LC-39) Gaseous Hydrogen (GH2) Vent Arm Behavior Prediction Model Review Technical Assessment Report

The NESC Assessment Team reviewed a computer simulation of the LC-39 External Tank (ET) GH2 Vent Umbilical system developed by United Space Alliance (USA) for the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) and designated KSC Analytical Tool ID 451 (KSC AT-451). The team verified that the vent arm kinematics were correctly modeled, but noted that there were relevant system sensitivities. Also, the structural stiffness used in the math model varied somewhat from the analytic calculations. Results of the NESC assessment were communicated to the model developers.

Wilson, Timmy R.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Avionics Integration Laboratory (CAIL) Independent Analysis

Two approaches were compared to the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Avionics Integration Laboratory (CAIL) approach: the Flat-Sat and Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL). The Flat-Sat and CAIL/SAIL approaches are two different tools designed to mitigate different risks. Flat-Sat approach is designed to develop a mission concept into a flight avionics system and associated ground controller. The SAIL approach is designed to aid in the flight readiness verification of the flight avionics system. The approaches are complimentary in addressing both the system development risks and mission verification risks. The following NESC team findings were identified: The CAIL assumption is that the flight subsystems will be matured for the system level verification; The Flat-Sat and SAIL approaches are two different tools designed to mitigate different risks. The following NESC team recommendation was provided: Define, document, and manage a detailed interface between the design and development (EDL and other integration labs) to the verification laboratory (CAIL).

Davis, Mitchell L.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Cassini/Huygens Probe Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) at Titan Independent Technical Assessment

Starting in January 2004, the NESC has received several communications from knowledgeable technical experts at NASA expressing shared concerns (mainly at the Langley Research Center (LaRC) and Ames Research Center (ARC)) about Huygens mission success. It was suggested that NASA become more technically involved directly in the analysis of Huygens' entry, descent and landing (EDL) focusing on the parachute deployment trigger performance and the resultant effects on the operation of the parachute system, and the determination of the radiative heating environment at Titan by ESA and the corresponding thermal protection system (TPS) response. A NESC Team was formed and tasked to provide an independent assessment of these concerns. The results of that assessment are documented in this report.

Powell, Richard W.↗