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Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges

The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversion of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Export Controls and International Safeguards: Strengthening Nonproliferation through Interdisciplinary Integration

International safeguards and export controls are central to ensuring international confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear materials and technologies and to achieving adequate oversight on the transfer and use of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment required for the development of proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Although the independent strengths of international safeguards and export controls rely largely on universal adherence, there may be opportunities to exploit the shared strengths of these systems. This article provides background information on the separate evolution of export controls and international safeguards, considers how these two elements of the nonproliferation regime interact, and identifies some possible avenues that could, over time, lead to wholly integrated activities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Preliminary results of calculations for heavy-water nuclear-power-plant reactors employing {sup 235}U, {sup 233}U, and {sup 232}Th as a fuel and meeting requirements of a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

A physical design is developed for a gas-cooled heavy-water nuclear reactor intended for a project of a nuclear power plant. As a fuel, the reactor would employ thorium with a small admixture of enriched uranium that contains not more than 20% of {sup 235}U. It operates in the open-cycle mode involving {sup 233}U production from thorium and its subsequent burnup. The reactor meets the conditions of a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons: the content of fissionable isotopes in uranium at all stages of the process, including the final one, is below the threshold for constructing an atomic bomb, the amount of product plutonium being extremely small.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterterrorism: Impacts on Public Health

Reducing the risks of nuclear war, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles are key national and international security goals. They are pursued through a variety of international arms control, nonproliferation and counter-terrorism treaties and agreements. These legally binding and political commitments, together with the institutional infrastructure that supports them, work to establish global norms of behavior and have limited the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Beyond the primary security objectives, reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, preventing environmental releases of radioactive material, increasing the availability of safe and secure nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and providing scientific data relevant to predicting and managing the consequences of natural or human-caused disasters world-wide provide significant benefits to global public health.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Building an Effective Nonproliferation Program: US Support of IAEA Safeguards

A central pillar of international efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. From the inception of the IAEA, the United States has supported the development and evolution of both the safeguards system itself and devices and systems approaches used by inspectors. The IAEA safeguards system comprises an extensive set of technical measures by which the IAEA Secretariat independently verifies the correctness and the completeness of the declarations made by States to the IAEA about their nuclear programs. From Iran to Syria, to the more than 190 other countries that accept IAEA safeguards, the IAEA safeguards system enhances international security, seeking to assure compliance with international nuclear agreements. The cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime is the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). IAEA safeguards largely have evolved to ensure non-nuclear weapon state compliance with the NPT.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

U232 Nonproliferation Features

U232 ( 232 U) as a contaminant in U233 ( 233 U) can play a role in nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and still allow U233 to be used in the nuclear fuel cycle. This note describes the two features of U232, its gamma radiation and its heat release, both of which causes problems for use in nuclear weapons. The gamma radiation at low levels causes health problems and even death for people nearby after prolonged exposures. At high levels it causes degradation of the high explosives of the weapons after a sufficiently long exposure. The heat causes problems in weapons design, for example, thermal degradation of high explosives. We quantify these properties of U232 in this note. The role of U232 as a potential nuclear weapon contaminant is similar to that of Pu238 ( 238 Pu) in that both give off troublesome heat, U232 much more than Pu238, but the strong radiation from U232 makes its role unique as Pu238 has little radiation associated with it. The gamma dose to a worker at 1 m from 5 kg of U233 with 2.4% U232 would be 100 rem/hr, 1 year after chemical separation. The dose would be 4 rem after 65 hours of exposure, the limit for annual exposure to workers and a fatal dose of 300 rem would occur in 300 hours of exposure after separation. The high explosive is predicted to degrade owing to ionizing radiation after a little over ½ year. The heat rate is 77 W just after separation and climbs to over 600 W ten years later.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Selected Examples of LDRD Projects Supporting Test Ban Treaty Verification and Nonproliferation

The Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Program at the DOE National Laboratories was established to ensure the scientific and technical vitality of these institutions and to enhance the their ability to respond to evolving missions and anticipate national needs. LDRD allows the Laboratory directors to invest a percentage of their total annual budget in cutting-edge research and development projects within their mission areas. We highlight a selected set of LDRD-funded projects, in chronological order, that have helped provide capabilities, people and infrastructure that contributed greatly to our ability to respond to technical challenges in support of test ban treaty verification and nonproliferation.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Improving Capture-gamma Libraries for Nonproliferation Applications

This report describes the measurement, evaluation and incorporation of new -ray spectroscopic data into the Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF) for nonproliferation applications. Analysis and processing techniques are described along with key deliverables that have been met over the course of this project. A total of nine new ENDF libraries have been submitted to the National Nuclear Data Center at the Brookhaven National Laboratory and are now available in the ENDF/B-VIII.beta2 release. Furthermore, this project has led to more than ten peer-reviewed publications and provided theses for ve graduate students. This project is a component of the NA-22 venture collaboration on \Correlated Nuclear Data in Fission Events" (LA14-V-CorrData-PD2Jb).

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Report of a Workshop on Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC November 30, 2017

At a time which some view as the end of the post-Cold War era, geopolitics is increasingly fluid, complex and dangerous, including Russian and Chinese modernization of their nuclear and conventional forces nuclear and their increasingly aggressive foreign policies; North Korean nuclear and missile tests and provocations; Iran’s missile tests, regional ambitions and support for terrorism; Syria’s civil war and use of chemical weapons; and the growing global threat of Islamic terrorism. In this new security environment, potential adversaries are emboldened. Allies are reacting to more concrete and tangible threats. They are demanding greater assurances and, in some cases, questioning the credibility of the guarantees we offer and debating the pursuit of nuclear arms in ways we have not seen since the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was created.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

16-098 – Nuclear Nonproliferation Applications of 14 C Analyses by Accelerator Mass Spectrometry

In January 2015 the Idaho National Laboratory installed a 0.5 MV Accelerator Mass Spectrometer (AMS). The INL AMS is ideally suited for ultra-trace isotopic analyses supporting national security applications including nuclear forensics and nonproliferation. This LDRD seeks to develop INL’s sample preparation and AMS analysis capability to analyze the isotopic composition of carbon containing samples for ultratrace 14 C.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Nuclear Nonproliferation

Presentation in nuclear nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and disarmament.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament and Extended Deterrence in the New Security Environment

To address the challenges of the emerging security environment and its impact on extended deterrence and assurance, there has been an effort in the United States to ensure it maintains capabilities for extended deterrence, to enhance assurances and to continue to pursue with allies non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorism - including defenses and consequence management-as priorities. These and other activities are important to the US and its allies, and are essential to maintaining and strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) bargain. As the developments leading to the ban treaty suggest, the political requirement for dealing with calls for disarmament in the NPT context is indisputable. This may not have been the understanding of the negotiators of the treaty, but it is today's reality.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NSSC-LANL Nonproliferation Science Summer Program (Slides)

Students will spend the majority of their time working either individually or in small teams with a LANL staff member on a research project that has a strong connection to nuclear security science and nonproliferation.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

ARIES team achieves major milestone in support of nonproliferation

The Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) Program is a great example of LANL’s Weapons and Global Security programs working together to achieve important nuclear security mission goals. Executed at PF-4, a facility better known for its pit production mission, the ARIES Program is helping the nation meet its nonproliferation commitments by preparing surplus weapons-grade plutonium for final disposition. ARIES recently met a major milestone of producing 1 metric ton of plutonium oxide from material removed from surplus pits. The milestone was celebrated in an awards ceremony at LANL on January 28.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗