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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Mitigation for the Demolition of Dormitory Buildings 12-32, 12-34, 12-35, and 12-37 in the Area 12 Camp Historic District, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to document the mitigation of adverse effects of a proposed undertaking in compliance with the stipulations in the Programmatic Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25554 Among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada, hereafter referred to as the NNSS PA. The proposed undertaking would demolish Buildings 12-32 (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B18291), 12-34 (SHPO Resource No. B18292), 12-35 (SHPO Resource No. B18293), and 12-37 (SHPO Resource No. B18294) in the Area 12 Camp Historic District (SHPO Resource No. D372) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The Area 12 Camp Historic District has been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A and C (Reed 2021; Reno et al. 2021).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Repatriated Desert Bighorn Sheep Population on the Nevada National Security Site

Ecological studies have been conducted on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) since the 1960s. Desert bighorn sheep (Ovis canadensis nelsoni) were considered rare visitors on the NNSS, with only 9 recorded observations between 1963 and 2009, all of which were males. Females and young were not documented definitively until winter 2011, when several were killed by a radio-collared female mountain lion (Puma concolor). Following these observations, we initiated a study of desert bighorn sheep on the NNSS to better understand their movements/interactions with other populations, prevalence of disease, population size, origin, radionuclide burdens and potential radiological dose to humans that may consume harvested animals away from the NNSS. We captured and radio-collared 6 sheep (2 females, 4 males) in November 2015, and 15 (7 females, 8 males) in November 2016. We sampled blood for genetic and disease testing and collected nasal swabs for respiratory disease testing. Sheep from the NNSS spent most of their time around Shoshone Mountain, Fortymile Canyon, and Yucca Mountain but also moved to Bare Mountain, Thirsty Canyon, and Black Mountain. Females greatly expanded their core and overall home ranges during spring, whereas males expanded their home ranges during summer. Of 18 sheep sampled for disease, 12 showed an immune response to Mycoplasma ovipneumoniae, and 5 had the bacteria present. Genetic testing revealed that the ancestry of NNSS sheep is from the Bare Mountain (1991-1995, within 24 km of our study area), Specter Range (1990-1995, within 32 km of our study area), and Stonewall Mountain (1975-1983, within 72 km of our study area) reintroduced populations. Radionuclide burden in NNSS sheep was minimal with no significant difference from sheep captured on the Nevada Test and Training Range and northern Nevada. One marked adult male was legally harvested off the NNSS north of Bare Mountain. Finally, this recently colonized reproducing population of sheep on the NNSS warrants further monitoring, protection, and inclusion in resource management plans.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Nuclear Deactivation and Downgrade of Enriched Uranium Facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex

Buildings 9206 and 9212 at the Y-12 National Security Complex are both Hazard Category 2 nuclear facilities from the Manhattan Project era that supported various missions over the decades, including the processing of enriched uranium. The production mission for Building 9206 ended in the 1990s, while Building 9212 is still an active production facility. The disposition process for contaminated excess facilities is generally described in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Guide DOE O 430.1A, Life Cycle Asset Management, which provides guidance on facility surveillance and maintenance, deactivation, decommissioning, and transition in supplemental guides DOE G 430.1-2 through 430.1-5. Historically, production facilities similar to Buildings 9206 and 9212 have not always been cleaned out and deactivated prior to being excessed, which significantly complicates the decommissioning phase. Many legacy facilities were shut down before the formal DOE guidance was established. This paper presents the practical application and implementation of the DOE guidance for the nuclear deactivation of Buildings 9206 and 9212, and summarizes the lessons learned for application across the DOE enterprise.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Nuclear Deactivation and Downgrade of Enriched Uranium Facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex

Buildings 9206 and 9212 at the Y-12 National Security Complex are both Hazard Category 2 nuclear facilities from the Manhattan Project era that supported various missions over the decades, including the processing of enriched uranium. The production mission for Building 9206 ended in the 1990s, while Building 9212 is still an active production facility. The disposition process for contaminated excess facilities is generally described in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Guide DOE O 430.1A, Life Cycle Asset Management, which provides guidance on facility surveillance and maintenance, deactivation, decommissioning, and transition in supplemental guides DOE G 430.1-2 through 430.1-5. Historically, production facilities similar to Buildings 9206 and 9212 have not always been cleaned out and deactivated prior to being excessed, which significantly complicates the decommissioning phase. Many legacy facilities were shut down before the formal DOE guidance was established. This paper presents the practical application and implementation of the DOE guidance for the nuclear deactivation of Buildings 9206 and 9212, and summarizes the lessons learned for application across the DOE enterprise.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Photographic Mitigation Documentation Related to the Engine Assembly and Disassembly Facility, Area 25, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This letter report provides documentation in partial fulfillment of the mitigation of adverse effects to the Engine Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly (E-MAD) facility, a major component of the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Construction of the E-MAD facility began in 1962 for the purpose of disassembling and maintaining nuclear-powered rocket engines. Once the building was complete in 1967, the E-MAD facility remained in continuous operation until the nuclear rocket program was terminated in 1973. The mothballed facility was repurposed in 1977 for spent nuclear fuel handling and packaging activities. By the mid-1980s, all activities at the E-MAD facility had ceased (Reno et al. 2019). This submission is intended to comply with Stipulation III.D.1 of the Memorandum of Agreement DE-GM58-20NA25534 between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Corrective Action Activities and Demolition of the Engine Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly Facility and the Test Cell C Historic District, Major Components of the Nuclear Rocket Development Station Historic District Located in Area 25 at the Nevada National Security Site Nye County (hereafter referred to as the MOA). Stipulation III.D.1 states the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) will submit the existing supplementary collection of the large-format, black-and-white photographic prints taken during the 1996 Historic American Engineering Record (HAER) documentation of the E-MAD facility to the Nuclear Testing Archive (NTA), located on the second floor of the Rogers Building at Desert Research Institute (DRI) in Las Vegas, Nevada.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Analysis of Exposure during Transportation of Waste to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) - 20445

Safety is a priority for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program. This commitment to safety is integrated into requirements and work procedures at DOE sites across the U.S. that generate low-level radioactive waste, mixed low-level radioactive waste, and classified waste that is transported to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) for permanent disposal. Generators of this waste are responsible for ensuring it is packaged and transported in a safe and compliant manner. These generators and their contracted commercial carriers must comply with U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations; the Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC); and other applicable federal, state, and local regulations and requirements. This includes packaging and shipping the waste to meet DOT regulatory radiation dose limits to ensure public safety during transportation. NNSS waste generators have a solid safety record for complying with these stringent regulations as demonstrated by the fact that no shipments exceeding DOT dose rate limits were received at the NNSS Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) during FY 2014 through FY 2018. A 2005 study conducted by the Desert Research Institute validated shipments to the NNSS comply with DOT radiation dose limits. In response to recent Nevada stakeholder requests for an updated study, an analysis was conducted to verify and provide evidence that the public continues to be safe from exposure to radioactive waste shipment to the NNSS. Radiation exposure from radioactive waste shipments in transit to the NNSS was evaluated. Three studies were performed: 1. Confirm compliance of waste shipments to the DOT radiation limits using dose rate surveys taken at the generator site and at the disposal site. 2. Estimate the dose to the public from waste shipments using the dosimetry results for disposal site personnel by comparing time of exposure for various individuals/scenarios. 3. Estimate the truck driver dose using the receipt dose rate surveys and time of exposure, and from dosimetry results. Study 1 confirmed compliance with the DOT dose rate limits for a sample of waste shipments (123 of 1,038) received during fiscal year (FY) 2017. Study 2 showed that the average annual radiation equivalent dose for disposal site personnel during FY 2017 was approximately 6.7% [0.415 mSv (41.5 millirem)] of the annual average dose that a person living in the U.S. receives from all sources [6.2 mSv (620 mrem)]. Maximum dose to a member of the public, a person resting/sleeping in an adjacent truck at a rest area to a waste shipment, was 0.0166 mSv (1.66 mrem), which is less than the dose received from a person taking a round trip from the east coast to the west coast of the continental U.S. on an airplane [0.07 mSv (7 mrem) per round trip]. Study 3 showed that the truck driver who made the most shipments of radioactive waste to the NNSS, who drove the most hours (estimated time of exposure 2,520 hours), during FY 2017 had a total dose of 0.15 mSv (15 mrem), which was obtained from their personal dosimeter. The annual dose recorded for disposal site personnel, the dose estimates for the public, and the truck driver dose were all a small percentage of the average radiation dose a person receives from all sources (e.g., background and medical radiation). At these levels, risk should only be described qualitatively. Radiation exposure from radioactive waste shipments to the NNSS were shown to be compliant with the DOT dose rate limits, safe, and very low (i.e., within background levels). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Strengthening U.S. National Security Through Advanced Energy Innovation

NREL's work in strategic energy security is focused on keeping the United States secure and its citizens safe by applying expertise in advanced energy systems and technologies to prevent energy system disruptions from any source, natural or human. NREL pursues national security objectives by providing partners an accurate understanding of national and international security implications of global energy trends; novel installation, facility, and operational energy solutions; access to NREL R&D capabilities to incorporate advanced energy technologies and biomaterials into mission requirements; and the ability to test future technologies using large-scale grid modeling.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Calendar Year 2020 Post-Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev. 1)

This report presents the results of monitoring conducted for water quality, water levels, and institutional controls in calendar year (CY) 2020 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM), at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. This report also presents analytical laboratory results (including results of quality assurance/quality control samples, such as field duplicates [FDs]), and verification of use restrictions (URs), institutional controls, and water usage. Groundwater samples were collected; water levels were measured; and well site surveillance was conducted in support of the Underground Test Area Closure Report (CR) for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (DOE/EMNV, 2020). Rainier Mesa (RM) was the site of 61 underground nuclear tests, and Shoshone Mountain (SM) was the site of 6 underground nuclear tests. As a result of these activities, which took place from 1957 to 1992, radionuclides (RNs) were released in the subsurface in the vicinity of the detonations. These 67 underground nuclear tests are associated with 66 specific corrective action site (CAS) numbers, as listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). Two tests, HURON LANDING and DIAMOND ACE (conducted simultaneously), are included within one CAS. The CR (DOE/EMNV, 2020) establishes the regulatory boundaries and regulatory boundary objectives, monitoring program, UR boundaries and URs, and other institutional controls agreed to by EM Nevada Program and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for closure of CAU 99. Regulatory boundaries for the RM/SM CAU were established to protect receptors of groundwater from RN contamination within the three downgradient groundwater basins that receive recharge from RM. The SM regulatory boundary was established to verify that RN contamination does not reach the lower carbonate aquifer below SM. The UR boundaries were established based on contaminant simulation forecasts from the flow and transport simulations with consideration of site-specific topographical controls. The URs associated with the UR boundaries were identified to protect onsite workers and the public from inadvertent exposure to contaminated groundwater as forecasted to occur assuming current conditions. The UR is intended to restrict activities that might expose workers to contaminated groundwater within the UR area. In addition to the URs, other institutional controls are established to monitor and limit access to groundwater. These include federal ownership and management in perpetuity, controlled access of the NNSS and surrounding areas, and reporting water use on the NNSS and surrounding hydrographic basins.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

CY2020 Annual Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (January 2020–December 2020, Revision 1)

This report presents the results of monitoring conducted for water quality, water levels, and institutional controls in calendar year (CY) 2020 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98, Frenchman Flat (FF), at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada (Figure 1-1). This report also presents analytical laboratory results (including results of quality assurance/quality control samples, such as field duplicates [FDs]); and verification of use restrictions (URs), institutional controls, and water use. Groundwater samples were collected; water levels were measured; and well site surveillance was conducted in support of the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (NNSA/NFO, 2016) and its ensuing Records of Technical Change (ROTCs).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Dense Seismic Array Study of a Legacy Underground Nuclear Test at the Nevada National Security Site

The complex postdetonation geologic structures that form after an underground nuclear explosion are difficult to constrain because increased heterogeneity around the damage zone affects seismic waves that propagate through the explosion site. Generally, a vertical rubble-filled structure known as a chimney is formed after an underground nuclear explosion that is composed of debris that falls into the subsurface cavity generated by the explosion. Compared with chimneys that collapse fully, leaving a surface crater, partially collapsed chimneys can have remnant subsurface cavities left in place above collapsed rubble. The 1964 nuclear test HADDOCK, conducted at the Nevada test site (now the Nevada National Security Site), formed a partially collapsed chimney with no surface crater. Understanding the subsurface structure of these features has significant national security applications, such as aiding the study of suspected underground nuclear explosions under a treaty verification. In this study, we investigated the subsurface architecture of the HADDOCK legacy nuclear test using hybrid 2D–3D active source seismic reflection and refraction data. The seismic data were acquired using 275 survey shots from the Seismic Hammer (a 13,000 kg weight drop) and 65 survey shots from a smaller accelerated weight drop, both recorded by ~1000 three-component 5 Hz geophones. First-arrival, P-wave tomographic modeling shows a low-velocity anomaly at ~200 m depth, likely an air-filled cavity caused by partial collapse of the rock column into the temporary postdetonation cavity. A high-velocity anomaly between 20 and 60 m depth represents spall-related compaction of the shallow alluvium. Hints of low velocities are also present near the burial depth (~364 m). The reflection seismic data show a prominent subhorizontal reflector at ~300 m depth, a short-curved reflector at ~200 m, and a high-amplitude reflector at ~50 m depth. Comparisons of the reflection sections to synthetic data and borehole stratigraphy suggest that these features correspond to the alluvium–tuff contact, the partial collapse cavity, and the spalled layer, respectively.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Report series: Evaluation, Finding of Effect, and Mitigation Documentation for the 1960s Dormitories and 1950s Quonset Hut Foundations, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada [3 Reports Consolidated]

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to modernize the town of Mercury at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada, to meet current and future National Weapons Science, Global and Homeland Security Programs, and Environmental Management mission requirements. These plans—including anticipated demolitions, consolidations, and rebuilding at Mercury—are considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 U.S.C. § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 U.S.C. § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, 36 C.F.R. Part 800. Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of Mercury in 2017. This effort resulted in the identification, recording, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District, as well as the identification of its contributing components. This district was recommended eligible to the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP or National Register) under Criteria A and C, but was unevaluated under Criteria B and D at that time. The Mercury Historic District contains 153 individual landscapes, buildings, and structures. Of these resources, DRI recommends all except one as contributing elements of the historic district during its period of significance corresponding to nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. During most of the Cold War, the land now called the NNSS was referred to as the Nevada Test Site (NTS). This report evaluates resources dating to the 1950s and 1960s between Jangle and Knothole Streets and south of Ranger Avenue in Mercury prior to the proposed demolition of all resources in that area between Sandstone and Greenhouse Avenues as a phase of the larger modernization program mentioned above. Although the Mercury Historic District as a whole is eligible to the National Register, further evaluation of these properties, as detailed in this report, indicates that none are individually eligible under any of the Secretary of Interior’s Significance Criteria, either at the national or local level.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Underground Test Area (UGTA) Sampling Plan for Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

The purpose of this groundwater sampling plan (referred to herein as “the Plan”) is to describe the approach for collecting and analyzing groundwater samples to meet the objectives of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity. The Plan is focused on the Central and Western Pahute Mesa corrective action units (CAUs 101 and 102). The remaining UGTA CAUs are in the final stage of the UGTA strategy (Closure Report [CR] stage), and monitoring requirements for these CAUs are described in their respective CRs. The Plan supersedes the Nevada National Security Site Integrated Groundwater Sampling Plan and its ensuing Record of Technical Change (ROTC) (DOE/EMNV, 2019b). The Plan is designed to ensure compliance with the UGTA Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) and its ensuing ROTC (DOE/EMNV, 2018), and the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). The Plan is implemented by the Environmental Program Services (EPS) contractor. Implementation of the Plan provides data to complete corrective actions prescribed by the FFACO to protect the public from groundwater contaminated by historical underground nuclear testing. The Plan’s scope comprises sample collection and analysis requirements for assessing the extent of groundwater contamination from underground nuclear testing. Sampling wells located in the communities surrounding the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) is performed by other organizations (e.g., management and operating [M&O] contractor) and is therefore not included within the Plan. The results of the community sampling are presented in the annual NNSS environmental reports.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Finding of adverse effect and proposed mitigation for the removal of three primary resources and twenty-four accessory resources within the mercury historic district, area 23, nevada national security site, nye county, nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) proposes the removal of three primary resources and 24 accessory resources in Mercury on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The majority of the resources are concrete pads that have previously been recorded as either primary resources or accessory resources thereof within the Mercury Historic District (MHD). They represent the former locations of environmental support program buildings including a greenhouse (MHD Resource C312), warehouses (Resource C293), offices (Resource C314), dormitories (Resource C298), and two of unknown purpose (Resource C292). The other resources include a buried storage tank and sidewalks.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of Building 23-117, Administration Building, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to update the façade of Building 23-117, Administration Building (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15256), at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The NNSA/NFO is implementing a long-term project to modernize the town of Mercury for future mission needs. The project is considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 of United States Code (USC) § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 USC § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR) Part 800.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLCSite 300: Toxic Emissions Inventory Plan for ABA 2588 California Air Toxics "Hot Spots" Information and Assessment Act of 1987 (Revision 3.0)

The Air Toxics "Hot Spots" Information and Assessment Act (AB 2588 or the “Act”) was enacted in September 1987. Under the Act, stationary sources are required to report the types and quantities of certain toxic substances their facilities routinely release into the air. AB 2588 is designed to provide information to state and local agencies and to the general public on the extent of airborne emissions from stationary sources and the potential public health impacts of those emissions. The San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District (the District) is mandated by the State to implement AB 2588. On March 6, 2015, The State Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) adopted changes to the Air Toxics Hot Spots Program Guidance Manual for the Preparation of Health Risk Assessments. These revisions were designed to incorporate three technical support documents and to provide enhanced protection of children as required under state law (SB 25, Escutia, 1999). Due to these recent changes, and the corresponding potential increases in calculated health risk, the District notified LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL SECURITY, LLC that we must be re-evaluated under AB 2588. Pursuant to the Air Toxics "Hot Spots" Information and Assessment Act of 1987, we have prepared a comprehensive, site-specific Toxics Emissions Inventory Plan. The plan specifies in detail how LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL SECURITY, LLC will inventory our facility's emissions of all toxic substances on the list of substances subject to the Act. The plan provides a comprehensive and detailed description of the methods that will be used to quantify air releases or potential air releases of listed substances from all points of release. The plan also includes quantification methods which result in accurate and comprehensive characterization of releases and comply with all applicable requirements of the “Hot Spots” regulation.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Radionuclide Screening Analysis and Transport Parameters for Pahute Mesa Detonations, Nevada National Security Site

A “screening analysis” is implemented at Pahute Mesa (PM), Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), to determine subsets of the 43 radionuclides listed in the radionuclide inventory of Finnegan et al. (2016) that are of relevance or potential relevance to the hydrologic source term (HST) for assessment of radionuclide transport in groundwater. Consideration is added to how levels of contamination are defined and whether any other radionuclides not in the inventory are relevant to the HST. A model is developed to estimate a range of possible source concentrations in groundwater that account for uncertainty in partitioning into melt glass and sorption into surrounding rock of the exchange zone for the 82 PM underground nuclear tests detonated in vertical shafts. The model also accounts for the varied hydrogeochemical settings. Transport parameters needed for the screening model calculations are developed from databases for hydrogeologic units, chemistry, mineralogy, fracture spacing, fracture aperture, fracture openness, matrix porosity, bulk density, saturation, and alteration. Of key importance is consideration of diagenetic zonation of the mineralogy related to hydrothermal alteration. The screening analysis compares model results with available groundwater radiochemistry data. Consistency between screening model results and available data helps validate the model for application to all 43 radionuclides, most of which have no measurements or only non-detect measurements of concentration in groundwater. The screening analysis determines that ten radionuclides – tritium, Sr-90, I-129, Cs-137, U-232, U-233, U-234, U-238, and the total of Pu-239 and Pu-240 are relevant to the HST. Determination of relevance is primarily based on data and/or model results indicating source concentration exceeding a maximum contaminant level (MCL) out to 100 years since the time of detonation. U-238 is relevant to assessment of contamination relative to MCLs for uranium and gross alpha particle activity. Five other radionuclides – C-14, Cl-36, Tc-99, Np-237, and Pu-238 – are determined potentially relevant to the HST based on a 0.1 MCL threshold. The screening analysis recommends additional attention to the natural daughter radionuclides of the uranium series (U-238) and thorium series (Th-232) decay chains, particularly Ra-226 and Ra-228, that were not included the inventory.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗