Design and Development IER:516 - Zirconium Test Assembly (ZTA) - Critical Experiments for Zr Nuclear Data Verification and Validation
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The safety evaluation conducted for licensing a Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) may require modeling transients with best-estimate calculation tools that must first be validated against real-world measurements. To provide the community with a valuable benchmarking opportunity for validating SFR analysis tools and methods, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) initiated a coordinated research project (CRP) in 2018 for the analysis of the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) Loss of Flow Without Scram (LOFWOS) Test #13. The impact of nuclear data uncertainties on neutronics parameters was previously investigated based on the COMMARA-2.0 covariance matrix. Since the transient simulation results are very sensitive to certain reactivity coefficients, it was decided to employ rigorous uncertainty propagation methods to quantify the impact of nuclear data uncertainties on the best-estimate predication of FFTF LOFWOS Test #13. The DAKOTA code is used to propagate neutronic uncertainties through SAS4A/SASSYS-1 transient simulations, while taking into account spatial and reaction-wise correlations within these uncertainties. This study shows that the remaining discrepancies observed between the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) best-estimate results and the experimental measurements can be partly explained by the uncertainty associated with Gas Expansion Module (GEM) worth, which contributes the majority of the overall nuclear data uncertainty on the output from the FFTF LOFWOS Test #13 transient simulation. This study also confirmed the importance of including spatial and reaction-wise correlations of nuclear data uncertainties on feedback coefficients in the uncertainty propagation to avoid under-estimating their impact during the transient simulations.
In the 1960's and early 1970's, three underground nuclear tests were conducted on Amchitka Island, Alaska. In 1965, the US Department of Defense-in conjunction with the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)-conducted the first of these nuclear tests, Long Shot, to provide data that would improve US capabilities for detecting underground nuclear explosions. In 1969, AEC conducted the second test, Milrow, to explore the feasibility of detonating a much larger device. In 1971, AEC conducted the third test, Cannikin, which was the largest underground test ever conducted by the US. The Long-Term Surveillance Plan (LTSP) for the Amchitka, Alaska, Site details how the US Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management (LM) intends to fulfill its mission to protect human health and the environment at and around the Amchitka Island site. The LTSP calls for monitoring to be performed every 5 years, at least during the initial phase of the project. The purpose of the monitoring is to develop a baseline of activity concentrations for selected radionuclides in biota, water, and soil, both on Amchitka Island and at the reference location on Adak Island, approximately 322 kilometers (200 miles) northeast of Amchitka. In addition to the environmental monitoring activities, seven mud pit caps that contain diesel-contaminated soils are inspected. The plan for biological and water sampling (both seawater and freshwater) during the May 2016 sampling event was developed through close coordination with the primary stakeholders, including the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, the Aleutian Pribilof Islands Association, and the US Fish and Wildlife Service. The environmental sampling in 2016 is a continuation of LM's evaluation of Amchitka Island's environment. Previous results from similar monitoring programs in 2004 and 2011 indicate that the environment is not being impacted by radionuclide migration and uptake from the underground nuclear testing conducted beneath Amchitka Island; consequently, subsistence and commercial-catch seafood is safe for human consumption. The collection of biota samples (rockfish, Irish lords, greenling, and rockweed) for cesium-134 ({sup 134}Cs), cesium-137 ({sup 137}Cs), plutonium-239 ({sup 239}Pu), plutonium-240 ({sup 240}Pu), and freshwater and seawater samples for {sup 134}Cs, {sup 137}Cs, and tritium ({sup 3}H) was the primary objective of the 2016 sampling effort. Rockfish, Irish lords, and greenling are resident, nonmigratory fish species that spend their entire life cycle in the marine environment, and rockweed is an inter-tidal species that may concentrate cesium. The seawater samples were collected primarily to determine if leakage from the Long Shot detonation could be detected and, secondarily, to compare with the background seawater samples collected from Adak Island. Cesium isotopes are also being analyzed to better understand the potential impact that the Fukushima-Daiichi release might have on the Amchitka and Adak environments. The target detection limits used for the 2016 sampling are lower than those used in previous studies. The lower detection limits make it possible for LM to delineate background activity levels for the radionuclides of interest. Data from the 2016 sampling event go beyond assessing food safety and focus on detecting leakage from the underground nuclear explosions. Additionally, the baseline activity concentrations obtained for the reference area (Adak Island) will enable identification of quantitative statistical trends in the results of future sampling programs. Sampling programs conducted in 2021 and beyond will have an objective to assess the statistical trends of radioactivity levels in the Amchitka Island environment. (authors)
Advancement in additively manufactured strain gauges help address critical technology gaps to accurately monitor real-time materials behavior in reactor experiments. This is critical as it provides data to inform predictive models and simulations that enhance the development of reactors and fuel cycle systems. In this report, additively manufactured strain gauges are exposed to a neutron irradiation environment at the Ohio State University Research Reactor. This report goes over a 2-week campaign for neutron irradiating printed resistive strain gauges and capacitive strain gauges. These results complement the prior separate effects (i.e., mechanical strain, temperature, etc.) testing that were performed on these additive manufactured sensors and presented in prior milestone reports. These results also help progress our understanding of their usage in harsh environment applications. The outcome of developing advanced sensing and instrumentation capabilities plays an important role in increasing the safety, reliability, and energy efficiency of both next-generation and existing nuclear reactors.
Examination of regional distance seismic data from historic nuclear test sites has led to a variety of very effective discriminants between explosions, earthquakes, and collapses. We focus on the body–wave methods. We show that ratios between P– and S–wave amplitudes (P/S ratios) above about ~2 Hz very effectively separate the six Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) declared nuclear tests between 2006 and 2017 from natural earthquakes in the region. Similarly, P/S ratios separate historic Nevada Test Site (NTS) nuclear explosions from western U.S. earthquakes. We show that combining P/S ratios with ratios of low–frequency to high–frequency S–wave amplitudes can effectively separate postexplosion collapse events, such as the 1982 NTS Atrisco collapse, and the apparent collapse that followed about eight and a half minutes after the 3 September 2017 DPRK explosion. Explosions often produce fewer and smaller aftershocks than comparably sized earthquakes, which has been proposed as a potential discriminant. We apply the body–wave techniques to the recent seismicity following the largest DPRK event, after first using correlation methods to build a more complete catalog of these events. Despite the empirical effectiveness of the regional body–wave discriminants, the physical basis for the generation of explosion S waves, and therefore the predictability of P/S and low/high frequency techniques, as a function of path, frequency, and event properties such as size, depth, and geology, remains incompletely understood. Furthermore, a goal of current research, such as the Source Physics Experiments (SPE), is to improve our physical understanding of the mechanisms of explosion S–wave generation and advance our ability to numerically model and predict them.
VALID continues as a library of high-quality models used for testing SCALE and nuclear data. Recent expansion of VALID was the largest impactful change in a decade. Adding 233 U experiments circa 2017 added more cases. There are a huge number of cases in the pipeline, but a lack of qualified staff and funding to complete reviews. Future plans should simplify the process and increase the availability of models and results for external users.
The ENDF71x library [1] is the most thoroughly tested set of ACE-format data tables ever released by the Nuclear Data Team at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). It is based on ENDF/B-VII. 1, the most recently released set of evaluated nuclear data files produced by the US Cross Section Evaluation Working Group (CSEWG). A variety of techniques were used to test and verify the ENDF7 1x library before its public release. These include the use of automated checking codes written by members of the Nuclear Data Team, visual inspections of key neutron data, MCNP6 calculations designed to test data for every included combination of isotope and temperature as comprehensively as possible, and direct comparisons between ENDF71x and previous ACE library releases. Visual inspection of some of the most important neutron data revealed energy balance problems and unphysical discontinuities in the cross sections for some nuclides. Doppler broadening of the total cross sections with increasing temperature was found to be qualitatively correct. Test calculations performed using MCNP prompted two modifications to the MCNP6 source code and also exposed bad secondary neutron yields for {sup 231,233}Pa that are present in both ENDF/B-VII.1 and ENDF/B-VII.0. A comparison of ENDF71x with its predecessor ACE library, ENDF70, showed that dramatic changes have been made in the neutron cross section data for a number of isotopes between ENDF/B-VII.0 and ENDF/B-VII.1. Based on the results of these verification tests and the validation tests performed by Kahler, et al. [2], the ENDF71x library is recommended for use in all Monte Carlo applications. (authors)
This paper documents the development of failure criteria for both pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel rod failure due to pellet cladding mechanical interaction (PCMI) during a reactivity insertion accident (RIA). This study was initiated to use cladding mechanical properties using data from separate effects tests to provide a basis to translate nuclear safety research reactor (NSRR) test data to commercial light water reactor conditions. The approach employed for the revised licensing criteria combined elements of experimental results and analytical evaluations to develop a fundamental understanding of fuel behavior during RIA events. The transient behavior of intermediate and high burnup fuel rods using well characterized RIA simulation tests was established. Cladding mechanical properties using data from separate effects tests was also developed. The Zircaloy cladding mechanical properties database of separate effects tests was used to develop the cladding integrity models. The cladding integrity models were then used in combination with the application of the Falcon fuel behavior code to translate NSRR test data to commercial light water reactor conditions. Because of the complex manner in which burnup influences fuel rod failure, it was not possible to develop a fuel rod failure threshold directly from the experimental data. An alternative approach was required that combined analytical modeling and experimental data to develop the PCMI-related contribution to the failure threshold. The analytical approach computed the radial average peak fuel enthalpy required to cause cladding failure by PCMI as a function of hydrogen content. This was accomplished by applying a critical strain energy density (CSED)-based cladding integrity model using data from total and uniform elongation tests of irradiated low-tin Zircaloy-4, ZIRLO, and Zircaloy-2 cladding materials. The CSED was developed as a function of cladding hydrogen content because hydrogen induced embrittlement is a primary effect of burnup. It was found that the failure threshold decreased with hydrogen content due to the increase in PCMI loading as a result of gap closure effects and by the decrease in cladding ductility with hydrogen accumulation. (authors)
This report documents the ENDF/B-VIII.0 covariance data development and testing performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory performed under the auspices of the US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy. This work supports modeling and simulation of advanced reactor designs in the US by analyzing, validating and improving the nuclear data that provide underlying physics for calculations. This report assesses nuclear data uncertainty information for neutron cross sections, provided in the form of covariance matrices, in the 2018 ENDF/B-VIII.0 library. A review and interpretation of some of the issues with the current covariance library is provided. A new approach to augment the ENDF/B-VIII.0 covariance matrix to accurately reflect uncertainties in the results of modeling and simulation reliant on the current nuclear data library is documented. Rigorous testing of the ENDF/B-VIII.0 covariance data is documented. Finally, the performance of the ENDF/B-VIII.0 covariance data for advanced reactor applications is assessed.
The Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD) within the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) established the Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) campaign to conduct research and development (R&D) activities related to the storage, transportation, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste. The SFWST program was created within SFWD to address issues of extended or long-term SNF storage and transportation. Some near-term objectives of SFWST are to use a science-based, engineering-driven approach to: Support the enhancement of the technical bases to support the continued safe and secure dry storage of SNF for extended periods; Support the enhancement of the technical bases for retrieving SNF after extended dry storage; Support the enhancement of the technical bases for transporting high burnup (HBU) fuel and transporting low burnup fuel and HBU fuel after dry storage DOE-NE, in partnership with the Electric Power Research Institute, developed the High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project to perform a large-scale demonstration and laboratory-scale testing of HBU pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuels (exceeding 45 gigawatt-days per metric ton of uranium [GWd/MTU]). Under this project, 25 sister rods—which are rods that have the same design, power histories, and other characteristics—were removed from assemblies at the North Anna Nuclear Power Station and sent to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in January 2016. ORNL performed detailed nondestructive examination (NDE) on all 25 rods. The NDE consisted of visual examinations, gamma and neutron scanning, profilometry and rod length measurements, and eddy current examinations. After completing the NDE, 10 of the sister rods were delivered to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in a NAC International, Inc. legal-weight truck cask in September 2018 for destructive examination (DE). To date, SFWD work has focused on the PWR fuel that is part of the Sister Rod Test program. No boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel has been tested in the program, and the data needs that were identified for the PWR fuel have not been collected for BWR fuel. The goal to obtain six to nine BWR rods and test them at ORNL will support closing this important data gap. BWR fuel comprises approximately 56% of the total fuel assemblies currently in storage at nuclear power plants in the United States. BWR nuclear fuel and cladding designs and manufacturing are significantly different from PWRs. Differences include the following: BWR fuel pellets are larger than PWR pellets; Variations of Zircaloy-2 (including liners) are used instead of the Zircaloy-4 cladding materials used in PWRs; Clad manufacturing and stress-relief processes are different between PWRs and BWRs; The fuel rod dimensions are different because larger rod diameters and thicker cladding are used in BWRs; BWR fuel typically has lower internal rod pressures and sees vastly different operating conditions than PWR fuel (i.e., two-phase flow); BWR assemblies are “canned,” meaning each assembly is surrounded by a metal fuel channel; BWR cladding is often composed of an inner pure Zr liner that has widely different mechanical properties than the Zircaloy-2 alloy and exhibits a stronger affinity for hydrogen; The BWR SNF generally has more total hydrogen in the cladding/liner than typical PWR fuel; The construction of the PWR and BWR assemblies is vastly different; BWR rods are solidly attached to the assembly nozzles and experience a much different vibration and shock load than PWR rods, which are “floating” within a grid system attached to guide tubes, and the rods sit loosely on the bottom end plates. These numerous differences will affect the way the BWR SNF responds under dry storage preparation processes (e.g., vacuum drying) and during transportation. The results collected in the PWR experimental program must be compared with a subset of similar data collected on BWR SNF to establish a technical basis for whether the larger PWR database is sufficient to bound the BWR SNF end-of-life conditions as is currently assumed for several fuel/clad properties. Changes that occur in both fuel types at HBU could exacerbate any mechanical property differences. As the fuel burnup increases, several changes occur that might affect the performance of the fuel, cladding, and assembly hardware in storage and transportation. These changes include increased cladding corrosion layer thickness, increased cladding hydrogen content, increased cladding creep strains, increased fission gas release, and the formation of the HBU structure at the surface of the fuel pellets. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) limits the current maximum rod-averaged burnup to 62 GWd/MTU due to these changes and the lack of data at higher burnups.
This report provides the data qualification status of Advanced Gas Reactor-2 (AGR-2) fuel irradiation experimental data from Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Cycle 154B as recorded in the Nuclear Data Management and Analysis System (NDMAS). This is the last cycle of AGR-2 irradiation, as the test train was pulled from the ATR core during the outage portion of ATR Cycle 155A. The AGR-2 data streams addressed in this report include thermocouple (TC) temperatures, sweep gas data (flow rates including new Fission Product Monitoring (FPM) downstream flows from Fission Product Monitoring System (FPMS) detectors, pressure, and moisture content), and FPMS data (release rates and release-to-birth rate ratios [R/Bs]) for each of the six capsules in the AGR-2 experiment. The final data qualification status for these data streams is determined by a Data Review Committee (DRC) comprised of AGR technical leads, Sitewide Quality Assurance (QA), and NDMAS analysts. The Data Review Committee reviewed the data acquisition process, considered whether the data met the requirements for data collection as specified in QA-approved Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR) data collection plans, examined the results of NDMAS data testing and statistical analyses, and confirmed the qualification status of the data as given in this report.
Validation in criticality safety is performed by comparing the results of critical experiments with the calculated results from models of the experiments using the computational method to be validated. Laboratory critical experiments are controlled systems that achieve a k eff of approximately 1 and enable investigation of the parameters at which such a critical condition is achieved. For the critical experiments used in a validation to capture the biases of the materials and neutron energy spectra of interest, those materials must be included in the experiment such that they influence k eff or another observable parameter with statistical significance. This paper discusses the use of sensitivity uncertainty (S/U) methods to develop critical experiments for various purposes. S/U techniques are useful for understanding the underlying components of nuclear data which affect the k eff or another parameter of a given configuration. S/U calculations are most commonly used to compare existing experiments to applications of interest; however, S/U techniques can also be used to identify, optimize, or assess features of proposed experiments so that they can better test specific portions of nuclear data or match an application of interest. The S/U techniques discussed here are from the TSUNAMI code system. The two primary codes discussed in this work are TSUNAMI-3D, which implements the KENO criticality code to calculate the sensitivity of k eff to nuclear data, and TSAR, which calculates the sensitivity of a reactivity difference between two configurations based on their TSUNAMI-3D generated sensitivity profiles. The methods used in these tools are discussed in more detail in the SCALE manual. This paper is one of a series on the development and use of TSUNAMI tools. The other papers address development of TSUNAMI methods and a review of TSUNAMI applications.
This report presents a historical evaluation of the U15 Complex on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Three underground nuclear tests and two underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were conducted at the complex. The nuclear tests were Hard Hat in 1962, Tiny Tot in 1965, and Pile Driver in 1966. The Hard Hat and Pile Driver nuclear tests involved different types of experiment sections in test drifts at various distances from the explosion in order to determine which sections could best survive in order to design underground command centers. The Tiny Tot nuclear test involved an underground cavity in which the nuclear test was executed. It also provided data in designing underground structures and facilities to withstand a nuclear attack. The underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were Heater Test 1 from 1977 to 1978 and Spent Fuel Test - Climax from 1978 to 1985. Heater Test 1 was used to design the later Spent Fuel Test - Climax experiment. The latter experiment was a model of a larger underground storage facility and primarily involved recording the conditions of the spent fuel and the surrounding granite medium. Fieldwork was performed intermittently in the summers of 2011 and 2013, totaling 17 days. Access to the underground tunnel complex is sealed and unavailable. Restricted to the surface, four buildings, four structures, and 92 features associated with nuclear testing and fuel storage experiment activities at the U15 Complex have been recorded. Most of these are along the west side of the complex and next to the primary access road and are characteristic of an industrial mining site, albeit one with scientific interests. The geomorphological fieldwork was conducted over three days in the summer of 2011. It was discovered that major modifications to the terrain have resulted from four principal activities. These are road construction and maintenance, mining activities related to development of the tunnel complex, site preparation for activities related to the tests and experiments, and construction of drill pads and retention ponds. Six large trenches for exploring across the Boundary geologic fault are also present. The U15 Complex, designated historic district 143 and site 26NY15177, is eligible to the National Register of Historic Places under Criteria A, C, and D of 36 CFR Part 60.4. As a historic district and archaeological site eligible to the National Register of Historic Places, the Desert Research Institute recommends that the area defined for the U15 Complex, historic district 143 and site 26NY15117, be left in place in its current condition. The U15 Complex should also be included in the NNSS cultural resources monitoring program and monitored for disturbances or alterations.
This report presents a historical evaluation of the U15 Complex on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Three underground nuclear tests and two underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were conducted at the complex. The nuclear tests were Hard Hat in 1962, Tiny Tot in 1965, and Pile Driver in 1966. The Hard Hat and Pile Driver nuclear tests involved different types of experiment sections in test drifts at various distances from the explosion in order to determine which sections could best survive in order to design underground command centers. The Tiny Tot nuclear test involved an underground cavity in which the nuclear test was executed. It also provided data in designing underground structures and facilities to withstand a nuclear attack. The underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were Heater Test 1 from 1977 to 1978 and Spent Fuel Test - Climax from 1978 to 1985. Heater Test 1 was used to design the later Spent Fuel Test - Climax experiment. The latter experiment was a model of a larger underground storage facility and primarily involved recording the conditions of the spent fuel and the surrounding granite medium. Fieldwork was performed intermittently in the summers of 2011 and 2013, totaling 17 days. Access to the underground tunnel complex is sealed and unavailable. Restricted to the surface, four buildings, four structures, and 92 features associated with nuclear testing and fuel storage experiment activities at the U15 Complex have been recorded. Most of these are along the west side of the complex and next to the primary access road and are characteristic of an industrial mining site, albeit one with scientific interests. The geomorphological fieldwork was conducted over three days in the summer of 2011. It was discovered that major modifications to the terrain have resulted from four principal activities. These are road construction and maintenance, mining activities related to development of the tunnel complex, site preparation for activities related to the tests and experiments, and construction of drill pads and retention ponds. Six large trenches for exploring across the Boundary geologic fault are also present. The U15 Complex, designated historic district 143 and site 26NY15177, is eligible to the National Register of Historic Places under Criteria A, C, and D of 36 CFR Part 60.4. As a historic district and archaeological site eligible to the National Register of Historic Places, the Desert Research Institute recommends that the area defined for the U15 Complex, historic district 143 and site 26NY15117, be left in place in its current condition. The U15 Complex should also be included in the NNSS cultural resources monitoring program and monitored for disturbances or alterations.
This report presents a historical evaluation of the U15 Complex on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Three underground nuclear tests and two underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were conducted at the complex. The nuclear tests were Hard Hat in 1962, Tiny Tot in 1965, and Pile Driver in 1966. The Hard Hat and Pile Driver nuclear tests involved different types of experiment sections in test drifts at various distances from the explosion in order to determine which sections could best survive in order to design underground command centers. The Tiny Tot nuclear test involved an underground cavity in which the nuclear test was executed. It also provided data in designing underground structures and facilities to withstand a nuclear attack. The underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were Heater Test 1 from 1977 to 1978 and Spent Fuel Test - Climax from 1978 to 1985. Heater Test 1 was used to design the later Spent Fuel Test - Climax experiment. The latter experiment was a model of a larger underground storage facility and primarily involved recording the conditions of the spent fuel and the surrounding granite medium. Fieldwork was performed intermittently in the summers of 2011 and 2013, totaling 17 days. Access to the underground tunnel complex is sealed and unavailable. Restricted to the surface, four buildings, four structures, and 92 features associated with nuclear testing and fuel storage experiment activities at the U15 Complex have been recorded. Most of these are along the west side of the complex and next to the primary access road and are characteristic of an industrial mining site, albeit one with scientific interests. The geomorphological fieldwork was conducted over three days in the summer of 2011. It was discovered that major modifications to the terrain have resulted from four principal activities. These are road construction and maintenance, mining activities related to development of the tunnel complex, site preparation for activities related to the tests and experiments, and construction of drill pads and retention ponds. Six large trenches for exploring across the Boundary geologic fault are also present. The U15 Complex, designated historic district 143 and site 26NY15177, is eligible to the National Register of Historic Places under Criteria A, C, and D of 36 CFR Part 60.4. As a historic district and archaeological site eligible to the National Register of Historic Places, the Desert Research Institute recommends that the area defined for the U15 Complex, historic district 143 and site 26NY15117, be left in place in its current condition. The U15 Complex should also be included in the NNSS cultural resources monitoring program and monitored for disturbances or alterations.
This report presents a historical evaluation of the U15 Complex on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Three underground nuclear tests and two underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were conducted at the complex. The nuclear tests were Hard Hat in 1962, Tiny Tot in 1965, and Pile Driver in 1966. The Hard Hat and Pile Driver nuclear tests involved different types of experiment sections in test drifts at various distances from the explosion in order to determine which sections could best survive in order to design underground command centers. The Tiny Tot nuclear test involved an underground cavity in which the nuclear test was executed. It also provided data in designing underground structures and facilities to withstand a nuclear attack. The underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were Heater Test 1 from 1977 to 1978 and Spent Fuel Test - Climax from 1978 to 1985. Heater Test 1 was used to design the later Spent Fuel Test - Climax experiment. The latter experiment was a model of a larger underground storage facility and primarily involved recording the conditions of the spent fuel and the surrounding granite medium. Fieldwork was performed intermittently in the summers of 2011 and 2013, totaling 17 days. Access to the underground tunnel complex is sealed and unavailable. Restricted to the surface, four buildings, four structures, and 92 features associated with nuclear testing and fuel storage experiment activities at the U15 Complex have been recorded. Most of these are along the west side of the complex and next to the primary access road and are characteristic of an industrial mining site, albeit one with scientific interests. The geomorphological fieldwork was conducted over three days in the summer of 2011. It was discovered that major modifications to the terrain have resulted from four principal activities. These are road construction and maintenance, mining activities related to development of the tunnel complex, site preparation for activities related to the tests and experiments, and construction of drill pads and retention ponds. Six large trenches for exploring across the Boundary geologic fault are also present. The U15 Complex, designated historic district 143 and site 26NY15177, is eligible to the National Register of Historic Places under Criteria A, C, and D of 36 CFR Part 60.4. As a historic district and archaeological site eligible to the National Register of Historic Places, the Desert Research Institute recommends that the area defined for the U15 Complex, historic district 143 and site 26NY15117, be left in place in its current condition. The U15 Complex should also be included in the NNSS cultural resources monitoring program and monitored for disturbances or alterations.
Here, research on molten salt reactor (MSR) neutronics continues in Research Centre Rez (Czech Republic) with experimental work being conducted using fluoride salt that was originally used in the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE). Previous results identified significant variations in the neutron spectrum measured in LiF-NaF salt. These variations could originate from the fluorine description in current nuclear data sets. Subsequent experiments were performed to try to confirm this phenomenon. Therefore, another fluorine-rich compound, Teflon, was used for testing. Critical experiments showed slight discrepancies in C/E-1 for both compounds, Teflon and FLIBE, and systematic overestimation of criticality was observed in calculations. Different nuclear data libraries were used for data set testing. For Teflon, the overestimation is higher when using JENDL-3.3, JENDL-4, and RUSFOND-2010 libraries, all three of which share the same inelastic-to-elastic scattering cross section ratio. Calculations using other libraries (ENDF/B-VII.1, ENDF/B-VII.0, JEFF-3.2, JEFF-3.1, and CENDL-3.1) tend to be closer to the experimental value. Neutron spectrum measurement in both substances revealed structure similar to that seen in previous measurements using LiF-NaF salt, which indicates that the neutron spectrum seems to be strongly shaped by fluorine. Discrepancies between experimental and calculational results seem to be larger in the neutron energy range of 100–1300 keV than in higher energies. In the case of neutron spectrum calculation, none of the tested libraries gives overall better results than the others.