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DOE OSTI2022

Nuclear Remote System Design: Radiation and Electronics

Idaho National Laboratory has unique opportunities to examine fuels, materials, and experiment inside of the available radiological hot cells. Due to the uninhabitable nature of a hot cell environment, everything done inside of the hot cell is operated remotely. Remote operations are optimized by Nuclear Remote System Design (NRSD). NRSD is the designing, altering, or configuring of structures, items, and systems that will be placed into radiological environments.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Multidisciplinary Approach to Integrated Energy Systems: Advanced Nuclear Plants with Thermal Storage for Dynamic and Flexible Operation in Diverse Markets

Energy supply, distribution, and demand are continuously evolving in accordance with the integration of new power generation sources. In the United States, there is a progressive shift toward incorporating fluctuating energy sources such as wind and solar into the energy mix, alongside the distributed generation. Simultaneously, we are seeing a revolution in consumer technologies such as electric vehicles, energy devices for both residential and commercial use, and industrial processes—all contributing to a fundamental change in energy consumption dynamics. These scenarios have led to huge demand for enhanced flexibility from nuclear power plants (NPPs), requiring them to operate with unprecedented adaptability. Furthermore, advanced NPPs (A-NPPs) could potentially apply to scenarios in which power generation flexibility is prioritized over its current and conventional baseload generation capacity for traditional demand patterns. The present work covers several configurations for coupling nuclear energy production with thermal energy storage (TES). Previous work evaluated systems entailing a simple nuclear-TES configuration that used steam as a heat source for the TES of three different advanced reactors (ARs), but its heat diversion ratio (HDR) for charging was limited. The present work proposes a new configuration that features full decoupling of the nuclear reactor and the power cycle, using reactor coolant (i.e., gas) as a heat source for the TES and offering a theoretically unlimited HDR. This configuration is, however, more complex, as both high- and low-temperature TES (HT-TES and LT-TES) systems are required in order to cover the extended temperature range. Although this configuration imposes certain limitations on the discharge system configuration, it also presents the opportunity to design a more efficient system. For this case in particular, a steam reheat cycle is advantageous. Conventional TES systems take advantage of nominal efficiency when discharging, whereas the reheat cycle in the fully decoupled TES system affords a significant efficiency increase over conventional cases. Material selection, component/equipment sizing, and costing analyses were performed, followed by economic dispatch and size optimization. Dynamic models were developed for the decoupled system in order to generate insights into aspects of off design operation (e.g., drops in cycle efficiency), and these models enable exploration of potential mitigation strategies for addressing such drops. The models also highlight the need to design fail-safes that ensure continuous operational stability and minimize the impact of power ramping on the reactor parameters.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

INTEGRATED RISK ASSESSMENT OF DIGITAL I&C SAFETY SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Upgrading the existing analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems to state-of-the-art digital I&C (DI&C) systems provides the foremost means to improve performance and reduce costs for existing light-water reactors (LWRs). However, qualification of digital technologies remains a challenge?especially the issue of software common cause failure (CCF), which has been difficult to address. Existing analyses of CCFs in I&C systems mainly focus on hardware failures. With the application and upgrading of new DI&C systems, software CCFs due to design flaws might become a potential threat to plant safety, considering that most redundancy designs use similar digital platforms or software in their operating and application systems. With complex multi-layer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of particular concern in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. In 2019, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway of the U.S. Department of Energy?s (DOE?s) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment for the DI&C (RADIC) process was proposed for this strategy to identify potential key digital-induced failures, implement reliability analyses of related digital safety I&C systems, and evaluate the unanalyzed sequences introduced by these failures (particularly software CCFs) at the plant level. This paper summarizes these RISA efforts in the risk analysis of safety-related DI& systems at Idaho National Laboratory.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

An Integrated Risk Assessment Process of Safety-Related Digital I&C Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

Upgrading the existing analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems to state-of-the-art digital I&C (DI&C) systems will greatly benefit existing light water reactors. However, the issue of software common cause failure (CCF) remains an obstacle in terms of qualification for digital technologies. Existing analyses of CCFs in I&C systems mainly focus on hardware failures. With the application and upgrading of new DI&C systems, design flaws could cause software CCFs to become a potential threat to plant safety, considering that most redundancy designs use similar digital platforms or software in their operating and application systems. With complex multilayer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of particular concern in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing procedures. In Fiscal Year 2019, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades and designs. An integrated risk assessment for the DI&C process was proposed for this strategy to identify potential key digital-induced failures, implement reliability analyses of related digital safety I&C systems, and evaluate the unanalyzed sequences introduced by these failures (particularly software CCFs) at the plant level. Here this paper summarizes these RISA efforts in the risk analysis of safety-related DI&C systems at Idaho National Laboratory.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Case Study: Hybridizing Nuclear Energy Systems in the U.S.

This case study was presented at the ICTP-IAEA VIRTUAL Course on Nuclear-Renewable Integrated Energy Systems: Phenomenology, Research and Development. It provides preliminary results on an analysis of hybridizing the two nuclear power plants owned by Xcel Energy and located in Minnesota. The analysis extends previous analyses that provided only price-taker results. Those assume adjusting the generation sold to the grid does not impact locational marginal electricity prices nor do they estimate impacts on the total net cost to serve the load. This presentation summarizes the new technique that was developed to both optimize the size and operations of the hybridized system and the resulting impacts on the grid when it is operated optimally.

ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Scaling for Nuclear Reactor System: Overview

A scaling analysis is essential for predicting the behavior of a reactor system under various operating conditions, as well as for ensuring safe and reliable experimentation and adequate dataset generation for supporting the system code model development and assessment in accordance with USNRC guidelines 1.203. Testing and modeling can be carried out at various scales, from small test units to full-scale reactors, to validate the predictions produced by the analysis. However, due to the cost and challenges associated with full-scale testing, the nuclear industry uses scaled test facilities—integral effect test (IET) and separate effect test (SET)—to identify potential design issues and optimize the design to ensure regulatory compliance for safer operation and anticipated accident management. In general, IET facilities are non-nuclear thermal hydraulics test facilities. In contrast, SET facilities can be non-nuclear testing (e.g., steam generator, containment, pump system SETs) and nuclear testing (mostly fuel-material irradiation testing). IETs are used to study the system-level thermal-hydraulic behavior of the reactor coolant system (RCS) under different anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs) and design basis accidents (DBAs) such as loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) and loss-of-power (i.e., station blackout) and loss-of-flow (i.e., failure of RCS pump). Several LOCA scenarios could happen in reactor DBAs, such as main steam line break (MSLB), SG tube rapture (SGTR), break in direct vessel injection (DVI), and other small breaks LOCA. Scaling analysis determines the appropriate size and operating conditions for the test facility. This involves analyzing the system's thermal-hydraulic behavior at different scales and identifying the key parameters that affect the thermal-hydraulic behavior of the reactor. These key parameters can be identified so that the scaled facility can replicate the expected conditions in a prototypical setting. The scaled facility can simulate the same flow rates, pressure gradients, heat transfer coefficients, and fluid properties as the prototype. Scaling analysis is used to ensure that the results from these tests can be scaled up to predict the behavior of a full-scale prototype with an acceptable range of scaling distortions.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Application of the Redlich-Kister expansion for estimating the density of molten fluoride psuedo-ternary salt systems of nuclear industry interest

The development of next-generation molten salt reactors relies on accurate knowledge of the thermophysical properties of the candidate coolant and fueled molten salts. These thermophysical properties include density, viscosity, thermal conductivity, and heat capacity. Because of difficulties in measuring thermophysical properties of molten salts, there are many gaps in the current state of thermophysical property knowledge of these salts, particularly those that contain actinides or beryllium. Therefore, leveraging modeling techniques to estimate unknown molten salt thermophysical properties and guide future experimental measurements has high value for the nuclear industry. Here, the densities of molten fluoride pseudo-ternary salt systems, which are of interest to the nuclear industry, were estimated using Redlich-Kister expansion and Muggianu interpolation techniques. The pseudo-ternary systems considered for estimation in this study were NaF-LiF-ZrF 4 , LiF-BeF 2 -ZrF 4 , LiF-BeF 2 -ThF 4 , NaF-LiF-BeF 2 , NaF-KF-BeF 2 , NaF-ZrF 4 -UF 4 , and NaF-BeF 2 -UF 4 . This Redlich-Kister estimation approach accounts for nonideal mixing behavior based on pseudo-binary subsystem interaction parameters determined from experimentally measured pseudo-binary system density data sets. The Redlich-Kister estimation was compared with the method of additive molar volumes, which assumes ideal mixing. Additionally, the Redlich-Kister approach was used to determine previously unknown binary and ternary interaction parameters based on experimentally measured density data sets for select pseudo-ternary salt systems. The results of this study show improvement in density estimation using the Redlich-Kister approach for all systems considered compared with estimation by additive molar volumes. Furthermore, this analysis allowed for the estimation of nonideal density behavior in experimentally unstudied ZrF 4 -UF 4 and BeF 2 -UF 4 , as well as the quantification of ternary interaction in NaF-LiF-ZrF 4 , NaF-BeF 2 -UF 4 , and NaF-ZrF 4 -UF 4 .

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2022

An Integrated Framework for Risk Assessment of High Safety Significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants: Methodology and Demonstration

This report documents the activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a technical basis to support effective and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. A framework was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the risk impact of plant modernization, considering the introduction of high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals, the framework provides a means to address relevant technical issues by: (1) defining a risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, that integrates hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Machine-Learning Enabled Evaluation of Probability of Piping Degradation In Secondary Systems of Nuclear Power Plants

The transition to condition-based, risk-informed automated maintenance will contribute to a significant reduction of operations and maintenance costs that account for the majority of nuclear power generation costs. Furthermore, of the operations and maintenance costs in U.S. plants, approximately 80% are labor costs. To address the issue of rising operating costs and economic viability, technologies used to perform online monitoring of piping and other secondary system structural components in commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) are under evaluation. These online monitoring systems have the potential to identify when a more detailed inspection is needed using real time measurements, rather than at a pre-determined inspection interval thus reducing the maintenance cost. This paper describes distributed high-temperature stable fiber sensors fabricated in optical fibers through a roll-to-roll laser direct writing process using femtosecond lasers. Using phase-sensitive optical time domain reflectometry, distributed acoustic and vibration sensors can be developed and deployed to critical components and systems in NPPs to perform active measurements with spatial resolution down to 0.5-meter throughout the piping systems. Complex acoustic and vibration signatures harnessed by distributed sensors are registered and analyzed by artificial intelligence algorithms for degradation detection and flaw identification. Piping elbows with machined-in flaws were instrumented with fiber sensors. High-spatial-resolution data were used to develop and validate machine learning algorithms, including both linear and nonlinear regression, and classification. Additionally, classification and sensor analysis were also performed for data analysis. The paper concludes with recommendations and future work on applications of machine learning enabled high-resolution fiber sensors for piping degradation monitoring in current or future NPPs.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2023

The research challenges in security and safeguards for nuclear fission batteries

This paper discusses the nuclear security and safeguards research challenges presented by the development and deployment of nuclear fission batteries. These are defined as easily transportable and deployable nuclear systems which are designed to operate either unattended or autonomously. We start by defining the current landscape of domestic and international safeguards and security and discuss how it can be affected by the introduction these new nuclear systems. We then specifically discuss the technology gaps and technologies to be developed to facilitate their practical deployment. We find that, as expected, we can leverage conclusions from existing security and safeguards studies for small modular rectors and develop bespoke target set analyses to inform security postures based on probabilistic risk assessment. We find also that specific fission battery security economic analysis tools are needed and security by design must be applied early. However, the most important finding is that these new systems will require a new comprehensive set of cyber tools covering transportation, installation, operation, maintenance security of the fission battery systems. Altogether, we find that the development of the necessary security and safeguards requirements at the design phase of such a technology will be of great benefit in the smooth deployment of this modern nuclear energy system.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2023

An Integrated Framework for Risk Assessment of Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants: Methodology Refinement and Exploration

This report documents activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a technical basis to support effective, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. A risk assessment-informed framework was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk informed capability to quantitatively estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for safety-related DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing risk informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of safety-related DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals, the LWRS-developed framework provides a means to address relevant technical issues by: (1) defining a risk informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade that integrates hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying risk informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies in nuclear power plants (NPPs). Adding diversity within a system or components is the primary means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases system complexity and may not address all sources of systematic failures. Optimization of diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the proposed framework provides: (a) A best-estimate, risk informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, focusing on software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; (b) A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems; (c) Technical bases and risk informed insights to assist users address the risk informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; and (d) A risk informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The research and development efforts of this project in FY 2023 are focused on refining current methods on software CCF modeling and estimation and exploring additional innovative approaches to risk assessment of DI&C systems to enable a more comprehensive and complete assessment of various safety-related DI&C design architectures. The primary audience of this report are DI&C designers, engineers, and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) practitioners. This includes stakeholders, such as the nuclear utilities and regulators who consider the deployment and upgrade of DI&C systems, DI&C software developers and reviewers, and cybersecurity specialists. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the methodology, not for the evaluation of an actual digital control system. Results are obtained based on limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Zero Trust Strategies for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Detection Systems: D.1 Cyber Scenarios

The evolving landscape of cybersecurity necessitates a paradigm shift to a Zero Trust (ZT) model, which assumes breaches and continuously verifies trust. This approach reshapes how trust boundaries are established, focusing on identities, devices, networks, applications, and data, rather than solely relying on perimeter defenses such as firewalls. Central to this transformation is the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Special Publication 800-207, outlining the Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA), along with Executive Order 14028, which mandates federal agencies to adopt ZT principles. Complementary to these efforts, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) developed the Zero Trust Maturity Model (ZTMM), providing a framework with five pillars and three cross-cutting capabilities to guide agencies toward enhanced cybersecurity maturity. In support of these initiatives, the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) is applying ZT principles to secure Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) detection systems. Recognizing the diverse deployment models and network connectivity of these systems—from stationary, non-networked units to mobile, cloud-connected devices—the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing cybersecurity scenarios specifically for CBRN environments. These scenarios examine various configurations and technological capabilities, offering insights into the application of ZTMM pillars in enhancing the security postures of CBRN devices. The cybersecurity scenarios presented by PNNL are hypothetical, crafted to explore theoretical situations and stimulate discussion on the potential use or compromise of CBRN detection systems in varied contexts. These narratives are illustrative and do not reference any real events or actual networks. Instead, they employ generalized reference models to highlight concepts and potential issues within CBRN security, focusing on how Zero Trust strategies can be adapted to address these challenges effectively.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗