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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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80 records · Page 5
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

HUMAN FACTORS AND BEHAVIORAL PERFORMANCE EXPLORATION MEASURES: ASSESSING ASTRONAUT RISK

INTRODUCTION: The Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Exploration Measures (HFBP-EM) suite is a set of standardized measures to assess behavioral health and performance risk related to future exploration class missions, and to support reduction of the Human Research Program’s (HRP) Behavioral Medicine (BMed), Team, Sleep, and Human Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA) risks. This presentation will provide an overview of the HFBP-EM program, describe its implementation across spaceflight analogs and the international space station (ISS), and discuss its applicability to audience members. TOPIC: HFBP-EM is a research program designed to develop a standard set of measures that can be used in space and space-analog research to characterize BMed, Team, Sleep, and HSIA risks. It is an ongoing research project that is used examine the validity and reliability of HFBP measures, as well as their shorter forms. It also serves as a test bed for HFBP measures being considered for the spaceflight standard measures. The suite of measures is used to test the efficacy of countermeasures. To date, HFBP-EM has been collected in Human Exploration Research Analogs campaigns 4 and 5, and the SIRIUS 19 mission in the Russian Ground Based Experiment Complex. A subset of the HFBP-EM suite was collected during spaceflight as part of HRP’s Standard Measures in Spaceflight Project. Data was collected from a total of 55 multinational astronaut and astronaut-like crewmembers (mean age: 39.5, SD = 7.6; 31% female; 91% with advanced degrees). Three broad categories of HFBP-EM measures and their relevance to HRP risks will be discussed: 1) surveys that assess team functioning (Teams risk) as well as mood and affect (Bmed risk), 2) performance-based tasks of cognitive functioning and operationally relevant performance (Bmed risk), and 3) physiological biomarkers of sleep (sleep risk) and heart rate (Bmed risk). We will provide an overview of the background of the HFBP-EM program, what the suite currently includes, and next steps in its future development. We will also discuss the application to aerospace practitioners and researchers. APPLICATION: Astronaut teams selected for future space exploration missions will face several challenges that pose significant yet still unknown risks to the behavioral health and performance of astronauts. The HFBP-EM suite provides a comprehensive assessment of behavioral health and performance in space analog and spaceflight settings. This suite can be applied to both operational and research settings to advance risk reduction research for long duration space exploration missions.

S T Bell↗
NASA NTRS2020

Hardware Verification and Validation for a Navigation Sensor Software Model in Support of Flight Vehicle Performance Analysis

… or, “It’s in the details, how to make complicated software perform like complicated hardware.” In attempts to minimize development time and quickly build an operational vehicle, NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) has had to be intentional about integrated testing. Constraints on budget and schedule have required balance between testing needs and the desire for an integrated flight vehicle as soon as possible. To provide key insights early in design and analysis cycles, a large amount of effort has shifted into maturing and validating models at the component level with integrated testing as a means to validate their integration. In terms of SLS Navigation, this, and the model-based design approach have pushed explicit requirements for sensor models to be validated against flight hardware to high precision. This paper covers the approach taken to verify and validate the models for the two key navigation sensors on the SLS vehicle, the Redundant Inertial Navigation Sensor and the Rate Gyro Assembly. These models are used in performance evaluation, fault detection, and operations development extensively. Using a mix of data from hardware vendor documentation and testing reports, limited in-house testing, and integration activities, these models were able to be validated against flight hardware at multiple levels, from the internal software design to statistical behavior at the raw sensor and integrated box levels. The high level of insight into the hardware elements is instrumental to support flight certification activities and building confidence in SLS Navigation capability. Focused testing enabled additional insight and validation that proved invaluable and the resulting insights were used to focus and mature models. Additionally, of having validated performance-based hardware models enables a wide breadth of activities including detailed fault detection studies and integration into future vehicle frameworks, such as an upper stage and provide a valuable asset to continued SLS analysis and design.

Evan J Anzalone↗
NASA NTRS2020

Hardware Verification and Validation for a Navigation Sensor Software Model in Support of Flight Vehicle Performance Analysis

… or, “It’s in the details, how to make complicated software perform like complicated hardware.” In attempts to minimize development time and quickly build an operational vehicle, NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) has had to be intentional about integrated testing. Constraints on budget and schedule have required balance between testing needs and the desire for an integrated flight vehicle as soon as possible. To provide key insights early in design and analysis cycles, a large amount of effort has shifted into maturing and validating models at the component level with integrated testing as a means to validate their integration. In terms of SLS Navigation, this, and the model-based design approach have pushed explicit requirements for sensor models to be validated against flight hardware to high precision. This paper covers the approach taken to verify and validate the models for the two key navigation sensors on the SLS vehicle, the Redundant Inertial Navigation Sensor and the Rate Gyro Assembly. These models are used in performance evaluation, fault detection, and operations development extensively. Using a mix of data from hardware vendor documentation and testing reports, limited in-house testing, and integration activities, these models were able to be validated against flight hardware at multiple levels, from the internal software design to statistical behavior at the raw sensor and integrated box levels. The high level of insight into the hardware elements is instrumental to support flight certification activities and building confidence in SLS Navigation capability. Focused testing enabled additional insight and validation that proved invaluable and the resulting insights were used to focus and mature models. Additionally, of having validated performance-based hardware models enables a wide breadth of activities including detailed fault detection studies and integration into future vehicle frameworks, such as an upper stage and provide a valuable asset to continued SLS analysis and design.

Thomas Park↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Energy and Momentum in Mechanical Impact Testing

The ASTM G86 method is used to determine the ignition sensitivity of materials to mechanical impact in oxygen. It has long been known that different systems built to the standard produce different results. Given the current push towards direct comparison of numerical results from different systems rather than just material rankings, it is desirable to normalize the systems to some performance-based metric. Normalization is complicated by the fact that the energy and momentum of a particular impact scale differently with plummet mass and drop height, and therefore adjusting the mass and height to account for system differences would result in a different impact. The standard uses dent blocks to assess impacts. However, it was unknown if the differences in momentum could be identified during dent block impacts. To determine this, dent blocks were impacted with constant energy and different momentums, using instrumented and non-instrumented plummets. The dent blocks showed statistically significant differences in the penetration function when subjected to impacts with the same energy but different momentum. Further, the instrumented plummet showed drastic differences in the power delivery with different momentums. System configuration was also shown to have an effect on the response of the penetration function to different momentums.

Energy↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Planetary Protection is Not a One Size Fits All Missions Approach: Enabling the Planetary Protection Programmatic and Engineering Process

Missions have a wide range of variables that change their management and engineering structure (e.g., competed vs directed missions, multiple NASA centers, international partnerships, increased commercial collaborations, etc.). Why would an identical planetary protection approach and structure for each mission make sense in this evolving landscape? Missions do not fit in a one-size-fits-all approach, likewise their planetary protection process should not be a one-size-fits-all approach. During the significant update to NPR 8715.24 and NASA-STD-8719.27 planetary protection policies, the programmatic execution and engineering implementation processes were changed to provide clarification, streamlining, and expansion to include alternative approaches. From a programmatic perspective, these changes include the flexibility in timing and combination of gate products in addition to providing varying levels of technical depth commensurate and appropriate with the mission categorization. From a technical perspective, these changes include the ability to A) leverage either a performance-based and/or a prescriptive-based approach, B) identify applicable international consensus standards for verification, and C) propose alternative methods that adhere to sound scientific and engineering consensus. This presentation will directly highlight the culture shift in planetary protection, areas of flexibility available to the technical community for mission program and engineering execution, and feature some of the specific mission scenarios that have already leveraged such processes.

Nick Benardini↗
NASA NTRS2024

Evolution of NASA’s Nuclear Flight Safety Program to Infuse Risk Leadership and Assurance Framework Concepts

In recent years, the United States (U.S.) Government has issued several new National policies that fundamentally change the approach to nuclear flight safety for aerospace applications, including the complete revision of the Federal policy for handling launch of spacecraft containing space nuclear systems. In response, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is updating its nuclear flight safety program while still maintaining consistency with other Federal policies, international conventions, and NASA’s own policies. To achieve this evolution, NASA is factoring in an objectives-driven and assurance case mindset to develop a risk-informed and performance-based program. NASA and others have successfully applied this mindset in other disciplines and contexts and it is being pursued here via broad cooperation within NASA and with external stakeholders. This paper will briefly describe how the NASA nuclear flight safety program is evolving to meet these changing needs.

Matthew J. Forsbacka↗
NASA NTRS2024

Energy and Momentum in Mechanical Impact Testing

The ASTM G86 method is used to determine the ignition sensitivity of materials to mechanical impact in oxygen. It has long been known that different systems built to the standard produce different results. Given the current push towards direct comparison of numerical results from different systems rather than just material rankings, it is desirable to normalize the systems to some performance-based metric. Normalization is complicated by the fact that the energy and momentum of a particular impact scale differently with plummet mass and drop height, and therefore adjusting the mass and height to account for system differences would result in a different impact. The standard uses dent blocks to assess impacts. However, it was unknown if the differences in momentum could be identified during dent block impacts. To determine this, dent blocks were impacted with constant energy and different momentums, using instrumented and non-instrumented plummets. The dent blocks showed statistically significant differences in the penetration function when subjected to impacts with the same energy but different momentum. Further, the instrumented plummet showed drastic differences in the power delivery with different momentums. System configuration was also shown to have an effect on the response of the penetration function to different momentums.

Energy↗