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At least 91 records · Page 5

Fukushima Daiichi—A Case Study for BWR Instrumentation and Control Systems Performance During a Severe Accident, Rev 1

This report provides an assessment of the performance of various instrumentation and control (I&C) and monitoring systems, with a focus on the first few days of the Fukushima Daiichi accident starting on March 11, 2011. Similar to what occurred at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) accident in 1979, operator responses were challenged when information on key parameters was lost, erroneous, or misleading. While numerous improvements in instrumentation capabilities have been made since the TMI-2 event, the accident at Fukushima Daiichi suggests the potential for further improvement. The objective of this research is to review the performance of the Fukushima Daiichi Units 1–3 instrumentation systems that could have helped ensure that plant operators and emergency responders had relevant, accurate, and timely knowledge of plant conditions as they managed the accident response. As was the case with TMI-2, forensic analyses of plant instrumentation failures will be a long-term effort. As an introduction to this long-term research, this report focuses on the information available in the control room during the accident and illustrates the challenges to operators in their understanding of plant conditions during the progression of the accident. I&C systems monitor the success or failure of achievement of light water reactor safety principles in which the protection of the reactor fuel, reactor coolant system, and reactor containment is accomplished. This report (1) provides an overview of the safety principles; (2) notes parameters associated with the boiling water reactor (BWR)/3 and BWR/4 protection, actuation, and monitoring systems as they relate to the achievement of these principles; (3) presents data from past research on predicted instrumentation performance during severe accidents, and (4) assesses performance of the key I&C and monitoring systems associated with BWR/3 and BWR/4 reactors like those at Fukushima Daiichi. Lessons learned or potential improvements associated with the performance of these systems in the context of severe accidents are delineated. As background information, an overview of key BWR/3- and BWR/4-Mark I reactor designs (BWR/3 and BWR/4 with a Mark I containment) reactor protection, engineered safety features actuation, and accident monitoring systems is provided. A brief description of plant safety systems used to prevent or mitigate reactor accidents is also provided. This background information provides context for the brief discussion of previous research that has been conducted on BWR severe accidents and for the discussion of the accident sequences, which led to core damage at Fukushima Daiichi Units 1–3. The progression of the accident sequences at Fukushima Daiichi Units 1–3 occurred very much as predicted in prior severe accident research conducted in the United States and internationally, given the complete station blackout that occurred when the tsunami generated by one of the most powerful earthquakes ever recorded rolled onshore.

Accident Tolerant Equipment↗

Development of a First-of-a-Kind Deterministic Decision-Making Tool for Supervisory Control System

Decision-making is the process of identifying and choosing alternatives where each alternative offers a different approach or path to move from a given state or condition to a desired state or condition. The generation of consistent decisions requires that a structured, coherent process be defined, immediately leading to a decision-making framework. The overall objective of the generalized framework is for it to be adopted into an autonomous decision-making framework and tailored to specific requirements for various applications. In this context, automation is the use of computing resources to make decisions and implement a structured decision-making process with limited or no human intervention. The overriding goal of automation is to replace or supplement human decision makers with reconfigurable decision- making modules that can perform a given set of tasks reliably. Risk-informed decision making requires a probabilistic assessment of the likelihood of success given the status of the plant/systems and component health, and a deterministic assessment between plant operating parameters and reactor protection parameters to prevent unnecessary trips and challenges to plant safety systems. The implementation of the probabilistic portion of the decision-making engine of the proposed supervisory control system was detailed in previous milestone reports. Once the control options are identified and ranked based on the likelihood of success, the supervisory control system transmits the options to the deterministic portion of the platform. The deterministic multi-attribute decision-making framework uses variable sensor data (e.g., outlet temperature) and calculates where it is within the challenge state, its trajectory, and margin within the controllable domain using utility functions to evaluate current and projected plant state space for different control decisions. Metrics to be evaluated include stability, cost, time to complete (action), power level, etc. The integration of deterministic calculations using multi-physics analyses (i.e., neutronics, thermal, and thermal-hydraulics) and probabilistic safety calculations allows for the examination and quantification of margin recovery strategies. This also provides validation of the control options identified from the probabilistic assessment. Thus, the thermal-hydraulics analyses are used to validate the control options identified from the probabilistic assessment. Future work includes evaluating other possible metrics and computational efficiencies.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Annual Report on Institutional Computing Resources: Multi-scale Modeling of Green House Gas Emissions Performed on Institutional Computing Project HIGRADchem

Agreements to limit greenhouse gas emissions require scientifically valid methods for monitoring and validating anthropogenic emissions. The task of monitoring CO 2 emissions is difficult because relatively small increases need to be detected against CO 2 's variable and large background concentrations. To ensure fair compliance everywhere on the globe, remotely sensed measurements and an understanding of the atmospheric transport of CO 2 from its sources are required. The climate treaty verification LDRD project addresses these challenges. The Remote Sensing Verification Project (RSVP) test2bed located in the Four Corners region of Arizona, Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico offers a unique opportunity to develop new approaches for estimating emissions of CO 2 . Two major power plants located in this area produce very large signals of co-emitted CO 2 and NO 2 in this rural region. In addition to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) maintaining Continuous Emissions Monitoring Systems (CEMS) on each of the power plant stacks, the RSVP program has deployed an array of in-situ and remote sensing instruments, which provide both point and integrated measurements.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Air pollution control systems in WtE units: An overview

Highlights: • The paper describes in brief terms the development of gas cleaning in waste incineration. • The main technologies for pollutant removal are described including their basic mechanisms. • Their respective efficiencies and their application are discussed. • A cautious outlook regarding future developments is made. - Abstract: All WtE (waste-to-energy) plants, based on combustion or other thermal processes, need an efficient gas cleaning for compliance with legislative air emission standards. The development of gas cleaning technologies started along with environment protection regulations in the late 1960s. Modern APC (air pollution control) systems comprise multiple stages for the removal of fly ashes, inorganic and organic gases, heavy metals, and dioxins from the flue gas. The main technologies and devices used for abatement of the various pollutants are described and their basic principles, their peculiarities, and their application are discussed. Few systems for cleaning of synthesis gas from waste gasification plants are included. Examples of APC designs in full scale plants are shown and cautious prospects for the future development of APC systems are made.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Safeguards and security modeling for electrochemical plants

Safeguards and security design for reprocessing plants can lead to excessive costs if not incorporated early in the design process. The design for electrochemical plants is somewhat uncertain since these plants have not been built at a commercial scale in the past. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratories, has been used for safeguards design and evaluation for multiple reprocessing plant types. The SSPM includes the following capabilities: -) spent fuel source term library, -) mass tracking of elements 1-99 and bulk solid/liquids, -) tracking of heat load and activity, -) customisable measurement points, -) automated calculation of ID and error propagation, -) alarm conditions and statistical tests, and -) user-defined diversion scenarios. Materials accountancy and process monitoring data can provide more timely detection of material loss specifically to protect against the insider threat. While the SSPM is capable of determining detection probabilities and examining detection times for material loss scenarios, it does not model the operations or spatial effects for a plant design. The STAGE software was chosen to model the physical protection system. STAGE provides a framework to create end-to-end scalable force-on-force combat simulations. It allows for a complete 3D model of a facility to be designed along with the design of physical protection elements. This software, then, can be used to model operations and response for various material loss scenarios. The future integration of the SSPM model data with the STAGE software will provide a more complete analysis of diversion scenarios to assist plant designers.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safeguards by Design Challenge

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Ion Exchange Processing of AP-105 Hanford Tank Waste through Crystalline Silicotitanate in a Staged 2- then 3-Column System

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is working to expedite processing of Hanford tank waste supernate at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). To support this goal, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS, Richland, WA) is designing a system for suspended solids and cesium (Cs/ 137 Cs) removal from Hanford tank waste supernate. The effluent will then be sent to the WTP Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Facility for vitrification. The Cs removal is critical for eliminating the high dose rate associated with 137 Cs and facilitating a contact maintenance philosophy for the LAW Facility. The maximum 137 Cs concentration in the LAW sent to the WTP is targeted to be below the 3.18E-5 Ci 137 Cs/mole of Na waste acceptance criteria (WAC) limit. The filtration and ion exchange systems will be placed near the Hanford tanks and are collectively termed the Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) system.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Application of a bayesian belief network model to reliability assessment of nuclear safety-related software - 207

As the instrumentation and control (I and C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) have been replaced with digital-based systems, the need to incorporate software failures into NPP probabilistic risk assessments has arisen. In order to assess the probability of software failure on demand, a Bayesian belief network (BBN) model was developed which estimates the number of defects and the resulting probability of software failure on demand in nuclear safety-related software. To assess the feasibility of the BBN framework, the BBN model was applied to the prototype Integrated Digital Protection System-Reactor Protection System (IDiPS-RPS) to estimate the number of remaining faults and the software failure probability of a target software. The developmental- and V and V-activities carried out during the IDiPS-RPS development process were evaluated based on the well-defined checklist derived by the V and V team and were estimated based on expert elicitation. In addition, the attribute evaluations and the number of FPs of the target software is provided as the inputs for the BBN model. The application results showed the feasibility of using BBNs for quantifying software failure probabilities and several insights were gained from the applications of the BBN model. The proposed BBN framework can be applied to estimate the software failure probability for other safety-related NPP software and provide an insight on modeling the software development process that involves iterations between different development phases. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Human reliability-based MC&A models for detecting insider theft.

Material control and accounting (MC&A) safeguards operations that track and account for critical assets at nuclear facilities provide a key protection approach for defeating insider adversaries. These activities, however, have been difficult to characterize in ways that are compatible with the probabilistic path analysis methods that are used to systematically evaluate the effectiveness of a site's physical protection (security) system (PPS). MC&A activities have many similar characteristics to operator procedures performed in a nuclear power plant (NPP) to check for anomalous conditions. This work applies human reliability analysis (HRA) methods and models for human performance of NPP operations to develop detection probabilities for MC&A activities. This has enabled the development of an extended probabilistic path analysis methodology in which MC&A protections can be combined with traditional sensor data in the calculation of PPS effectiveness. The extended path analysis methodology provides an integrated evaluation of a safeguards and security system that addresses its effectiveness for attacks by both outside and inside adversaries.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Computer Security for I and C Systems at Nuclear Facilities - 116

Cyber-attacks on Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems may jeopardize the safety and security of nuclear facilities by contributing to sabotage or aiding in the unauthorized removal of nuclear material. The effects of cyber-attacks on I and C systems important to safety to safety may result in a wide range of consequences, such as a temporary loss of process control or unacceptable radiological consequences. Public awareness of cyber-attacks that affect I and C systems may also undermine confidence in the safety and security of nuclear facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recognizes the need for the guidance on the protection of I and C systems that provide safety, security, or auxiliary functions at nuclear facilities from cyber-attacks. To meet this need, The IAEA has developed a new Nuclear Security Series publication with the provisional title Computer Security of Instrumentation and Control Systems at Nuclear Facilities which builds upon and expands the guidance published in Nuclear Security Series No. 17 Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (2011) . This publication will be formally released in 2017 as Technical Guidance and will be the second international consensus publication dedicated to Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities. It was developed in parallel with the new IAEA Nuclear Safety publications providing recommendations on I and C systems at research reactors (RR) and nuclear power plants (NPP) . The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of this publication and its application. The paper will also discuss its relation to other IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS) publications on computer security. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Greenhouse production contributes to pesticide occurrences in Swedish streams

Greenhouse and other covered cultivation systems have increased globally over the past several decades, leading to considerably improved product quality and productivity per land area unit. However, there is a paucity in information regarding the environmental impacts of covered production systems, especially regarding pesticides entering the surrounding environment. Aiming to address this knowledge gap, we collected grab samples downstream of greenhouses from seven Swedish streams every 14 days during a 12 month period. In three of the streams, samples were also taken upstream of the greenhouses and in four of the streams time-integrated samples were collected by TIMFIE samplers in the period between grab sampling occasions. The samples were analyzed for 28 substances (27 that were permitted for use in greenhouse production systems in Sweden and one degradation product to a permitted substance). Pesticide use journals were collected from the greenhouse producers for the 12 month period. The results were examined for indications of greenhouse contributions to detection frequencies, maximum and average concentrations, and potential ecotoxicicity in several ways: (1) comparing locations downstream of greenhouses with registered use of a substance with those without registered use, (2) comparing results from this study with those from the Swedish environmental monitoring program of pesticides in surface water from catchments with no greenhouses from the same period and region, (3) comparing concentration trends with registered pesticide application times in the greenhouses, and (4) comparing up- and downstream concentrations. The results strongly suggest that greenhouse applications do contribute to pesticide occurrences, maximum and median concentrations for most of the pesticides included in this study, and to potential toxicity to aquatic organisms for several of them, most notably imidacloprid, acetamiprid, carbendazim, and pirimicarb.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Integrated Risk-Informed Decision-Making for an ALMR PRISM

Decision-making is the process of identifying decision alternatives, assessing those alternatives based on predefined metrics, selecting an alternative (i.e., making a decision), and then implementing that alternative. The generation of decisions requires a structured, coherent process, or a decision-making process. The overall objective for this work is that the generalized framework is adopted into an autonomous decision-making framework and tailored to specific requirements for various applications. In this context, automation is the use of computing resources to make decisions and implement a structured decision-making process with limited or no human intervention. The overriding goal of automation is to replace or supplement human decision makers with reconfigurable decision-making modules that can perform a given set of tasks rationally, consistently, and reliably. Risk-informed decision-making requires a probabilistic assessment of the likelihood of success given the status of the plant/systems and component health, and a deterministic assessment between plant operating parameters and reactor protection parameters to prevent unnecessary trips and challenges to plant safety systems. The probabilistic portion of the decision-making engine of the supervisory control system is based on the control actions associated with an ALMR PRISM. Newly incorporated into the probabilistic models are the prognostic/diagnostic models developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. These allow decisions to incorporate the health of components into the decision–making process. Once the control options are identified and ranked based on the likelihood of success, the supervisory control system transmits the options to the deterministic portion of the platform. The deterministic portion of the decision-making engine uses thermal-hydraulic modeling and components for an advanced liquid-metal reactor Power Reactor Inherently Safe Module. The deterministic multi-attribute decision-making framework uses various sensor data (e.g., reactor outlet temperature, steam generator drum level) and calculates its position within the challenge state, its trajectory, and its margin within the controllable domain using utility functions to evaluate current and projected plant state space for different control decisions. The metrics that are evaluated are based on reactor trip set points. The integration of the deterministic calculations using multi-physics analyses and probabilistic safety calculations allows for the examination and quantification of margin recovery strategies. This also provides validation of the control options identified from the probabilistic assessment. Thus, the thermalhydraulics analyses are used to validate the control options identified from the probabilistic assessment. Future work includes evaluating other possible metrics and computational efficiencies, and developing a user interface to mimic display panels at a modern nuclear power plant.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Protecting and Defending against Autonomous Control Systems and Digital Twin Cyber Attacks: Response Strategy for Hyperparameter attacks of Digital Twin Machine Learning Models in Nuclear Power Plants (Final)

Navigating through the complex tapestry of technological advancements, "Response Strategy for Hyperparameter attacks of Digital Twin Machine Learning Model in Nuclear Power Plants" stands at the intersection of cybersecurity and nuclear power plant operations, embarking on a journey through the intricacies of securing digital twins against malicious cyber activities. As nuclear power plants progressively integrate digital twin technology and machine learning models to optimize operations and ensure system reliability, they inadvertently expose themselves to a new spectrum of vulnerabilities, notably in the realm of hyperparameter attacks. Hyperparameters, integral in machine learning model tuning and optimal performance of digital twins, have emerged as a target for adversaries aiming to destabilize the predictive capabilities and therefore, the operational accuracy of these digital entities within critical infrastructures like nuclear plants. This paper, therefore, meticulously threads the needle through the development of a robust response strategy, poised to shield these digital reflections against calculated hyperparameter manipulations, ensuring that the digital twin can effectively and securely function as a reliable proxy for its physical counterpart. The ensuing sections delve into the orchestrated maelstrom of multi-rate time-changing intelligent coordinated hyperparameter attacks and the implementation of event-triggered predictive control, laying down a structured, predictive, and responsive framework that safeguards the nexus where the digital and physical realms of nuclear power plants coalesce. The operational integrity of digital twins in nuclear power plants depends critically on the security of machine learning hyperparameters. This study makes two different contributions. First, a decision-based idea known as a multi-rate time changing intelligent coordinated hyperparameter attack is put forth. In this attack, many hyperparameters are repeatedly changed using both random and intelligent optimal techniques by the attacker. These assaults introduce varied rates at different attack steps, compromise various amounts of hyperparameters, and improve stealth and flexibility. Second, a technique is developed for event triggered predictive control to rapidly respond to potential hyperparameter attacks. This control integrates a sliding window framework, retaining a history of previous data points and employing linear regression to predict the next data point from the current dataset. The control gain K is determined using the Lyapunov-Krasovskii method, and subsequently, an action is developed. Finally, the outcome of the simulation demonstrates the viability of the proposed method for defending nuclear power plant digital twins from hyperparameter attacks.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Genome assembly of the fungus Cochliobolus miyabeanus , and transcriptome analysis during early stages of infection on American wildrice ( Zizania palustris L.)

Here, the fungus Cochliobolus miyabeanus causes severe leaf spot disease on rice ( Oryza sativa ) and two North American specialty crops, American wildrice ( Zizania palustris ) and switchgrass ( Panicum virgatu ). Despite the importance of C. miyabeanus as a disease-causing agent in wildrice, little is known about either the mechanisms of pathogenicity or host defense responses. To start bridging these gaps, the genome of C. miyabeanus strain TG12bL2 was shotgun sequenced using Illumina technology. The genome assembly consists of 31.79 Mbp in 2,378 scaffolds with an N 50 = 74,921. It contains 11,000 predicted genes of which 94.5% were annotated. Approximately 10% of total gene number is expected to be secreted. The C. miyabeanus genome is rich in carbohydrate active enzymes, and harbors 187 small secreted peptides (SSPs) and some fungal effector homologs. Detoxification systems were represented by a variety of enzymes that could offer protection against plant defense compounds. The non-ribosomal peptide synthetases and polyketide synthases (PKS) present were common to other Cochliobolus species. Additionally, the fungal transcriptome was analyzed at 48 hours after inoculation in planta . A total of 10,674 genes were found to be expressed, some of which are known to be involved in pathogenicity or response to host defenses including hydrophobins, cutinase, cell wall degrading enzymes, enzymes related to reactive oxygen species scavenging, PKS, detoxification systems, SSPs, and a known fungal effector. This work will facilitate future research on C. miyabeanus pathogen-associated molecular patterns and effectors, and in the identification of their corresponding wildrice defense mechanisms.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

West Valley Demonstration Project Annual Site Environmental Report (CY2019)

The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2019. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2019 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

AP1000{sup R} nuclear power plant safety overview for spent fuel cooling

The AP1000{sup R} plant is an 1100-MWe class pressurized water reactor with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications that enhance construction, operation, maintenance, safety and costs. The AP1000 design uses passive features to mitigate design basis accidents. The passive safety systems are designed to function without safety-grade support systems such as AC power, component cooling water, service water or HVAC. Furthermore, these passive features 'fail safe' during a non-LOCA event such that DC power and instrumentation are not required. The AP1000 also has simple, active, defense-in-depth systems to support normal plant operations. These active systems provide the first level of defense against more probable events and they provide investment protection, reduce the demands on the passive features and support the probabilistic risk assessment. The AP1000 passive safety approach allows the plant to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in case of an accident for 72 hours without operator action, meeting the expectations provided in the U.S. Utility Requirement Document and the European Utility Requirements for passive plants. Limited operator actions are required to maintain safe conditions in the spent fuel pool via passive means. In line with the AP1000 approach to safety described above, the AP1000 plant design features multiple, diverse lines of defense to ensure spent fuel cooling can be maintained for design-basis events and beyond design-basis accidents. During normal and abnormal conditions, defense-in-depth and other systems provide highly reliable spent fuel pool cooling. They rely on off-site AC power or the on-site standby diesel generators. For unlikely design basis events with an extended loss of AC power (i.e., station blackout) or loss of heat sink or both, spent fuel cooling can still be provided indefinitely: - Passive systems, requiring minimal or no operator actions, are sufficient for at least 72 hours under all possible pool heat load conditions. - After 3 days, several different means are provided to continue spent fuel cooling using installed plant equipment as well as off-site equipment with built-in connections. Even for beyond design basis accidents with postulated pool damage and multiple failures in the passive safety-related systems and in the defense-in-depth active systems, the AP1000 multiple spent fuel pool spray and fill systems provide additional lines of defense to prevent spent fuel damage. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Nanoscale Reinforced, Polymer Derived Ceramic Matrix Coatings

The goal of this project was to explore and develop a novel class of nanoscale reinforced ceramic coatings for high temperature (600-1000 C) corrosion protection of metallic components in a coal-fired environment. It was focused on developing coatings that are easy to process and low cost. The approach was to use high-yield preceramic polymers loaded with nano-size fillers. The complex interplay of the particles in the polymer, their role in controlling shrinkage and phase evolution during thermal treatment, resulting densification and microstructural evolution, mechanical properties and effectiveness as corrosion protection coatings were investigated. Fe-and Ni-based alloys currently used in coal-fired environments do not possess the requisite corrosion and oxidation resistance for next generation of advanced power systems. One example of this is the power plants that use ultra supercritical steam as the working fluid. The increase in thermal efficiency of the plant and decrease in pollutant emissions are only possible by changing the properties of steam from supercritical to ultra supercritical. However, the conditions, 650 C and 34.5 MPa, are too severe and result in higher rate of corrosion due to higher metal temperatures. Coating the metallic components with ceramics that are resistant to corrosion, oxidation and erosion, is an economical and immediate solution to this problem. Good high temperature corrosion protection ceramic coatings for metallic structures must have a set of properties that are difficult to achieve using established processing techniques. The required properties include ease of coating complex shapes, low processing temperatures, thermal expansion match with metallic structures and good mechanical and chemical properties. Nanoscale reinforced composite coatings in which the matrix is derived from preceramic polymers have the potential to meet these requirements. The research was focused on developing suitable material systems and processing techniques for these coatings. In addition, we investigated the effect of microstructure on the mechanical properties and oxidation protection ability of the coatings. Coatings were developed to provide oxidation protection to both ferritic and austentic alloys and Ni-based alloys. The coatings that we developed are based on low viscosity pre-ceramic polymers. Thus they can be easily applied to any shape by using a variety of techniques including dip-coating, spray-coating and painting. The polymers are loaded with a variety of nanoparticles. The nanoparticles have two primary roles: control of the final composition and phases (and hence the properties); and control of the shrinkage during thermal decomposition of the polymer. Thus the selection of the nanoparticles was the most critical aspect of this project. Based on the results of the processing studies, the performance of selected coatings in oxidizing conditions (both static and cyclic) was investigated.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Operational performance risk assessment in support of a supervisory control system - 251

A supervisory control system is being developed for multiunit advanced small modular reactors to minimize human interventions during normal and abnormal operations. In the supervisory control system, control action decisions are made based on a probabilistic risk assessment that employs event trees and fault trees. Although traditional probabilistic risk assessment tools are implemented, their scope is extended to normal operations, and the application is reversed to assess the success of non-safety related systems and to enable continued operation of the plant. This extended probabilistic risk assessment approach is called operational performance risk assessment (OPRA). OPRA helps to identify available paths, combine control actions for maintaining plant conditions within operational limits, and to quantify the likelihood of success of these operational trajectories to optimize the selection of alternative actions without activating reactor protection system. In this paper, a case study of OPRA in a supervisory control system is demonstrated for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor (ALMR) Power Reactor Inherently Safe Module (PRISM) design, specifically the power conversion system. The scenario investigated involved a condition in which the feedwater control valve that was observed to be drifting to the closed position. Alternative plant configurations that would allow the plant to continue to operate at full or reduced power were identified using OPRA. Dynamic analyses were performed with a thermal-hydraulic model of the ALMR PRISM system using Modelica to evaluate the magnitude of safety margins. Successful recovery paths for the selected scenario were identified and quantified using the supervisory control system. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗