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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Probabilistic Assessment of Structural Integrity

A probability-based approach, combining deterministic and probabilistic methods, was developed for analyzing building and component failures, which are especially crucial for complex structures like nuclear power plants. This method links finite element and probabilistic software to assess structural integrity under static and dynamic loads. This study uses NEPTUNE software, which is validated, for a deterministic transient analysis and ProFES software for probabilistic models. In a case study, deterministic analyses with varied random variables were transferred to ProFES for probabilistic analyses of piping failure and wall damage. A Monte Carlo Simulation, First-Order Reliability Method, and combined methods were employed for probabilistic analyses under severe transient loading, focusing on a postulated accident at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant. The study considered uncertainties in material properties, component geometry, and loads. The results showed the Monte Carlo Simulation method to be conservative for high failure probabilities but less so for low probabilities. The Response Surface/Monte Carlo Simulation method explored the impact load–failure probability relationship. Given the uncertainties in material properties and loads in complex structures, a deterministic analysis alone is insufficient. Probabilistic analysis is imperative for extreme loading events and credible structural safety evaluations.

Mathematics↗
DOE OSTI2020

Initial development of a high temperature life prediction method directly accounting for variability in material properties

This report presents the initial development of a life prediction method that accounts for the variability of the material properties in Grade 91 steel. We account for material variability by both fitting a variable 3-parameter Weibull distribution to the rupture data of the material and by quantifying the effect that the creep deformation properties have on stresses via a Monte Carlo approach. To ensure a reasonable time frame when applying Monte Carlo to the creep stress, we propose a methodology that models the material as an extremely viscous Stokes flow with a non-Newtonian viscosity, therefore solving the problem in a single step. We use the final probabilistic model for structural failure developed in this document to evaluate a Flat Head Vessel designed with the Section III, Division 5 ASME Boiler Pressure and Vessel Code rules with a 100,000h design life and assess its probability of premature failure.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS1997

Mechanical System Reliability and Cost Integration Using a Sequential Linear Approximation Method

The development of new products is dependent on product designs that incorporate high levels of reliability along with a design that meets predetermined levels of system cost. Additional constraints on the product include explicit and implicit performance requirements. Existing reliability and cost prediction methods result in no direct linkage between variables affecting these two dominant product attributes. A methodology to integrate reliability and cost estimates using a sequential linear approximation method is proposed. The sequential linear approximation method utilizes probability of failure sensitivities determined from probabilistic reliability methods as well a manufacturing cost sensitivities. The application of the sequential linear approximation method to a mechanical system is demonstrated.

Kowal, Michael T.↗
NASA NTRS2010

The Importance of HRA in Human Space Flight: Understanding the Risks

Human performance is critical to crew safety during space missions. Humans interact with hardware and software during ground processing, normal flight, and in response to events. Human interactions with hardware and software can cause Loss of Crew and/or Vehicle (LOCV) through improper actions, or may prevent LOCV through recovery and control actions. Humans have the ability to deal with complex situations and system interactions beyond the capability of machines. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is a method used to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the occurrence of human failures that affect availability and reliability of complex systems. Modeling human actions with their corresponding failure probabilities in a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) provides a more complete picture of system risks and risk contributions. A high-quality HRA can provide valuable information on potential areas for improvement, including training, procedures, human interfaces design, and the need for automation. Modeling human error has always been a challenge in part because performance data is not always readily available. For spaceflight, the challenge is amplified not only because of the small number of participants and limited amount of performance data available, but also due to the lack of definition of the unique factors influencing human performance in space. These factors, called performance shaping factors in HRA terminology, are used in HRA techniques to modify basic human error probabilities in order to capture the context of an analyzed task. Many of the human error modeling techniques were developed within the context of nuclear power plants and therefore the methodologies do not address spaceflight factors such as the effects of microgravity and longer duration missions. This presentation will describe the types of human error risks which have shown up as risk drivers in the Shuttle PRA which may be applicable to commercial space flight. As with other large PRAs of complex machines, human error in the Shuttle PRA proved to be an important contributor (~12 percent) to LOCV. An existing HRA technique was adapted for use in the Shuttle PRA, but additional guidance and improvements are needed to make the HRA task in space-related PRAs easier and more accurate. Therefore, this presentation will also outline plans for expanding current HRA methodology to more explicitly cover spaceflight performance shaping factors.

Hamlin, Teri↗
NASA NTRS2010

The Importance of Human Reliability Analysis in Human Space Flight: Understanding the Risks

HRA is a method used to describe, qualitatively and quantitatively, the occurrence of human failures in the operation of complex systems that affect availability and reliability. Modeling human actions with their corresponding failure in a PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) provides a more complete picture of the risk and risk contributions. A high quality HRA can provide valuable information on potential areas for improvement, including training, procedural, equipment design and need for automation.

Hamlin, Teri L.↗
NASA NTRS1992

A probabilistic fracture mechanics approach for structural reliability assessment of space flight systems

A probabilistic fracture mechanics approach for predicting the failure life distribution due to subcritical crack growth is presented. A state-of-the-art crack propagation method is used in a Monte Carlo simulation to generate a distribution of failure lives. The crack growth failure model expresses failure life as a function of stochastic parameters including environment, loads, material properties, geometry, and model specification errors. A stochastic crack growth rate model that considers the uncertainties due to scatter in the data and mode misspecification is proposed. The rationale for choosing a particular type of probability distribution for each stochastic input parameter and for specifying the distribution parameters is presented. The approach is demonstrated through a probabilistic crack growth failure analysis of a welded tube in the Space Shuttle Main Engine. A discussion of the results from this application of the methodology is given.

Sutharshana, S.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Design of Critical Components

Critical component design is based on minimizing product failures that results in loss of life. Potential catastrophic failures are reduced to secondary failures where components removed for cause or operating time in the system. Issues of liability and cost of component removal become of paramount importance. Deterministic design with factors of safety and probabilistic design address but lack the essential characteristics for the design of critical components. In deterministic design and fabrication there are heuristic rules and safety factors developed over time for large sets of structural/material components. These factors did not come without cost. Many designs failed and many rules (codes) have standing committees to oversee their proper usage and enforcement. In probabilistic design, not only are failures a given, the failures are calculated; an element of risk is assumed based on empirical failure data for large classes of component operations. Failure of a class of components can be predicted, yet one can not predict when a specific component will fail. The analogy is to the life insurance industry where very careful statistics are book-kept on classes of individuals. For a specific class, life span can be predicted within statistical limits, yet life-span of a specific element of that class can not be predicted.

Hendricks, Robert C.↗
DOE OSTI2023

Analyzing Hardware and Software Common Cause Failures in Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems using Dual Error Propagation Method

This paper develops a methodology for quantifying software common cause failures (CCFs) in digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems of nuclear power plants. To support the transition of analog I&C systems to digital in nuclear power plants, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques are used. The hardware components of the I&C systems have reliability databases that can be used in the PRA studies. However, the failure data for redundant software components of the systems is sparse. Failure of components constitutes a CCF, wherein two or more components or systems fail due to a single shared cause and coupling mechanism. This paper proposes a quantification approach that can simultaneously model hardware and software components, incorporate the CCFs of software systems in the models, and bridge the gap between the failure quantification of models and the development of CCF parametric databases. We demonstrate the dual error propagation method (DEPM) by developing I&C systems failure models for a representative digital reactor trip system. The DEPM models are built to simulate the control and data flows within the systems and can accommodate failure states. By expanding DEPM to software CCFs, we generated alpha factor parameter estimates for each of the modeled error propagation mechanisms.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2007

Design for Reliability and Safety Approach for the NASA New Launch Vehicle

The United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the midst of a space exploration program intended for sending crew and cargo to the international Space Station (ISS), to the moon, and beyond. This program is called Constellation. As part of the Constellation program, NASA is developing new launch vehicles aimed at significantly increase safety and reliability, reduce the cost of accessing space, and provide a growth path for manned space exploration. Achieving these goals requires a rigorous process that addresses reliability, safety, and cost upfront and throughout all the phases of the life cycle of the program. This paper discusses the "Design for Reliability and Safety" approach for the NASA new crew launch vehicle called ARES I. The ARES I is being developed by NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in support of the Constellation program. The ARES I consists of three major Elements: A solid First Stage (FS), an Upper Stage (US), and liquid Upper Stage Engine (USE). Stacked on top of the ARES I is the Crew exploration vehicle (CEV). The CEV consists of a Launch Abort System (LAS), Crew Module (CM), Service Module (SM), and a Spacecraft Adapter (SA). The CEV development is being led by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). Designing for high reliability and safety require a good integrated working environment and a sound technical design approach. The "Design for Reliability and Safety" approach addressed in this paper discusses both the environment and the technical process put in place to support the ARES I design. To address the integrated working environment, the ARES I project office has established a risk based design group called "Operability Design and Analysis" (OD&A) group. This group is an integrated group intended to bring together the engineering, design, and safety organizations together to optimize the system design for safety, reliability, and cost. On the technical side, the ARES I project has, through the OD&A environment, implemented a probabilistic approach to analyze and evaluate design uncertainties and understand their impact on safety, reliability, and cost. This paper focuses on the use of the various probabilistic approaches that have been pursued by the ARES I project. Specifically, the paper discusses an integrated functional probabilistic analysis approach that addresses upffont some key areas to support the ARES I Design Analysis Cycle (DAC) pre Preliminary Design (PD) Phase. This functional approach is a probabilistic physics based approach that combines failure probabilities with system dynamics and engineering failure impact models to identify key system risk drivers and potential system design requirements. The paper also discusses other probabilistic risk assessment approaches planned by the ARES I project to support the PD phase and beyond.

Safie, Fayssal, M.↗
DOE OSTI2025

First-of-a-Kind Risk-Informed Digital Twin for Operational Decision Making

A digital twin (DT) is a digital model or a collection of models of a physical entity. DTs in the nuclear arena can be used from plant design through decommissioning. Decisions are typically a priori or made offline. Risk-informed decision making is identifying what can go wrong, its frequency, and the consequences of its failure. Ideally risk-informed decision making reflects the current state of the plant and provides a decision in real time. Traditionally, probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) evaluate the failures of safety systems, the risk of core damage, and the offsite dose as the consequence. However, this DT evaluates the decisions on the control side rather than the protection side. It uses the same risk methods to probabilistically inform the decision-making process but in a different way. Rather than evaluating the risk of core damage, this DT evaluates the likelihood of avoiding a trip set point while maintaining plant safety. Performance-based assessments are identified via its probabilistic evaluation of operational alternatives based on system status. Because the purpose of the control system is to maintain system variables within prescribed operating ranges, upsets or challenges that can exceed a trip set point resulting in a plant transient and a challenge to plant mitigating systems based on actual plant conditions, are evaluated to safely maintain the plant within the operating ranges. The probabilistic portion of the model is autonomously and automatically adjusted, and the metric of interest (i.e. likelihood of avoiding a trip set point) is recalculated. The digital representation of the physical system (i.e. the DT) performs a deterministic performance–based assessment of the probabilistically identified alternatives identified to validate the probabilistic assessment. A decision-making algorithm selects the appropriate option based on the probabilistic and deterministic assessments and transmits a control signal to a component(s) to initiate a corrective action or informs an operator of its decision.

digital twin↗
NASA NTRS1996

The Study of the Relationship between Probabilistic Design and Axiomatic Design Methodology

Structural failure is rarely a "sudden death" type of event, such sudden failures may occur only under abnormal loadings like bomb or gas explosions and very strong earthquakes. In most cases, structures fail due to damage accumulated under normal loadings such as wind loads, dead and live loads. The consequence of cumulative damage will affect the reliability of surviving components and finally causes collapse of the system. The cumulative damage effects on system reliability under time-invariant loadings are of practical interest in structural design and therefore will be investigated in this study. The scope of this study is, however, restricted to the consideration of damage accumulation as the increase in the number of failed components due to the violation of their strength limits.

Onwubiko, Chin-Yere↗
NASA NTRS1997

Ion Engine Service Life Validation by Analysis and Testing

Assessment of the NSTAR ion engine service life is being accomplished through a combination of long duration testing and probabilistic analyses of the credible failure modes. A literature review that examined 65 ion engine endurance tests perfromed over the past 35 years was conducted to compile a list of possible ion engine failure modes.

Ion Engine↗
NASA NTRS1996

Ion Engine Service Life Validation by Analysis and Testing

Assessment of the NSTAR ion engine service life is being accomplished through a combination of long duration testing and probabilistic analyses of the credible failure modes. A literature review that examined 65 ion engine endurance tests perfromed over the past 35 years was conducted to compile a list of possible ion engine failure modes.

Ion Engine↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA Applications and Lessons Learned in Reliability Engineering

Since the Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986, communities across NASA have been developing and extensively using quantitative reliability and risk assessment methods in their decision making process. This paper discusses several reliability engineering applications that NASA has used over the year to support the design, development, and operation of critical space flight hardware. Specifically, the paper discusses several reliability engineering applications used by NASA in areas such as risk management, inspection policies, components upgrades, reliability growth, integrated failure analysis, and physics based probabilistic engineering analysis. In each of these areas, the paper provides a brief discussion of a case study to demonstrate the value added and the criticality of reliability engineering in supporting NASA project and program decisions to fly safely. Examples of these case studies discussed are reliability based life limit extension of Shuttle Space Main Engine (SSME) hardware, Reliability based inspection policies for Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) turbine disc, probabilistic structural engineering analysis for reliability prediction of the SSME alternate turbo-pump development, impact of ET foam reliability on the Space Shuttle System risk, and reliability based Space Shuttle upgrade for safety. Special attention is given in this paper to the physics based probabilistic engineering analysis applications and their critical role in evaluating the reliability of NASA development hardware including their potential use in a research and technology development environment.

Safie, Fayssal M.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Life Qualification of Hall Thrusters By Analysis and Test

High power Hall thrusters under development for deep space robotic and human exploration missions have demanding lifetime and operational requirements that make thruster life qualification challenging. The required burn times make it infeasible to conduct multiple tests with durations exceeding the life requirement, and complex wearout phenomena and the need for power throttling during missions complicate analyses and testing. The traditional qualification approach, a single life test that typically demonstrates 50 to 100% margin on the required lifetime, does not provide enough information to demonstrate low failure risk. It is a weak source of statistical information about the location of the peak in the failure probability distribution and provides no information on the width of the distribution. Testing does provide information that can be used to validate physics-based models of failure processes, however, and the combination can be used to assess mission risk. Validated, conservative, deterministic analysis can be used to demonstrate that most failure processes have such large margins that more detailed analysis is unnecessary. For a subset of the failure modes a more detailed probabilistic analysis is required. Pole erosion in a 12.5 kW Hall thruster is used as a detailed example of this qualification process.

Brophy, John R.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Failure Tolerance, High Reliability and Correlated Failure History

In a half century of human spaceflight, NASA has continuously refined agency safety and reliability requirements in response to mission demands, critical failures, and technology development. Early spacecraft, including Mercury, Gemini and Apollo vehicles, were highly reliant on dissimilar redundancy and demonstrated test margins. Later programs, such as the reusable Space Transportation System (STS) and International Space Station (ISS), introduced probabilistic studies and isolated two-failure tolerance to improve robustness at the expense of added complexity. More recently, the Orion Multi-Program Crew Vehicle (MPCV) program adopted universal single-failure tolerance with two categorical exceptions; Zero-Failure Tolerant (0FT) and Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) hardware. Failure tolerance variances are defined and managed in accordance with agency human-rating requirements, and require concurrence from program Technical Authorities (TA) as well as the MPCV Safety and Mission Assurance Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP). To understand and reaffirm standards applied to Apollo, Space Shuttle and Orion vehicles, Orion and Deep Space Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) representatives conducted accelerated research to compare unique safety and reliability criteria against ground and flight anomalies, based on information contained in post-mission reports and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) database. In some cases, high-profile failures and narrow escapes have reinforced decisions to maintain or adapt safety requirements. In others, empirical trends have highlighted the need for vigilance and innovative safety guidelines. Given the inability to achieve absolute compliance with evolving safety and reliability requirements, the team conducted a targeted review of DFMR and 0FT propulsion elements within the framework of changing system design, inspection, materials and process developments to formulate conclusions on technological maturity, failure density, and net changes in safety risk. Based on the aggregate performance of high-reliability and failure-tolerant systems, the authors have attempted to establish best practices and guidelines to inform future program decisions. On a somewhat cautionary note, this study is not intended to direct a universal set of requirements for future missions based on prior lessons learned. Spacecraft safety is a multi-variable problem, and attempts to mitigate past failures will not guarantee future success. However, this assessment offers a retrospective review of policy changes, implementation and effectiveness. In the future, NASA, European Space Agency (ESA) and industry partners may benefit from a more robust correlation between requirements and performance, as space-faring nations work toward more challenging, complex and long-duration commercial and deep-space ventures.

Green, Carrie↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Assessment of Crew Time for Maintenance and Repair Activities for Lunar Surface Missions

NASA is currently evaluating different methods to predict how much time crewmembers will spend conducting repair and maintenance activities on future space missions. As mission scope and spacecraft architectures change, understanding how crew repair and maintenance timelines are impacted by mission operations and technology changes is vital for future mission planning. Past work has been done using historical International Space Station (ISS) data to accurately predict crew habitation and operation timelines, resulting in the development of NASA’s Exploration Crew Time Model (ECTM). However, understanding crew maintenance and repair requirements has posed a unique challenge due to the complexity of available datasets, the probabilistic nature of sub-system failures, and the impacts of reliability growth on failure rates. This paper presents a methodology to collect and condition empirical repair and maintenance time data from available datasets, to extrapolate from that data to estimate projected maintenance and repair times for a lunar Surface Habitat (SH), and to assess how uncertainty in repair time could impact utilization time on the lunar surface. NASA ISS maintenance and crew time data are logged into two central databases: the Maintenance Data Collection (MDC) and the Operations Planning Timeline Integration System (OPTimIS). Separately, each of these two datasets capture only portions of the complete set of data required to generate an accurate assessment of crew time spent on maintenance activities at a sub-system level. To create a more useful crew time estimate for maintenance timelines, the authors developed a methodology to capture relevant data from each set and combine and utilize that data by linking crew time requirements to specific components. The authors compare the failure logs in the MDC to crew activity logs pulled from OPTimIS and then process the data to estimate required repair time for each failure and repair event. The entire maintenance activity dataset is then categorized based on the class of failed component to ensure a significant sample size for each class and accurate crew time estimates for any components lacking relevant data. This resultant component repair time data can be used in the future to generate Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) estimates and confidence intervals for each class of component based on a probabilistic distribution of documented maintenance events. These improved MTTR values can then be applied to candidate element sub-system architectures, along with component Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) data to generate distributions for potential required system crew repair time estimates for a given mission. The authors applied these modeling methods to a case study of a crewed mission to the planned SH and produced expected corrective maintenance crew time distributions. The results produced an expected corrective maintenance crew time at over 24 hours per mission, and a maintenance crew time distribution that reflects the importance of planning for sufficient maintenance requirements each mission. Repair time distributions can then be used to develop more accurate crew schedules and to assess potential available utilization time.

Crew Time↗
NASA NTRS2001

Creep/Rupture Behavior of Melt-Infiltrated SiC/SiC Composites Being Investigated

The failure behavior of melt-infiltrated SiC/SiC ceramic matrix composites is under investigation at the NASA Glenn Research Center as part of NASA's Ultra-Efficient Engine Technology Program. This material was originally developed under the High Speed Research Office's Enabling Propulsion Materials Program. Creep and rupture data provide accelerated testing information to predict material behavior under engine use situations (1500 to 2400 F). This information gives insights into various material development paths to improve composites as well as improve understanding of failure mechanisms. The left figure shows the fracture surface of a CMC material following over 200 hr of testing at 2400 F. This surface demonstrates the kind of fibrous pullout desirable for maximum crack deflection, hence non-brittle failure. Microscopy suggests that creep and rupture of these materials can best be considered as a probabilistic property, rather than a material property. Fiber failure occurs first in isolated regions, while stronger adjacent fibers remain intact. The right figure shows a region where oxide deposits blur and round the fiber images. Because the oxidation kinetics of SiC are well understood, this oxide scale can be used as a measure of the length of time various regions of the composites have been exposed to the environment, hence providing vital information regarding the sequence of failure. The oxide scale in the right figure indicates an early failure of this tow of fibers, whereas adjacent tows remain oxide free, suggesting failure much later in time. The path of various cracks can be followed throughout the composite in this manner, suggesting failure mechanisms.

Hurst, Janet B.↗