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DOE OSTI2020

Limitations of traditional tools for beyond design basis external hazard PRA

Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is being used increasingly by the nuclear industry for safety during normal operations as well as for the protection against external hazards. Computation of total risk in an external hazard PRA is dependent on hazard assessment, fragility assessment, and systems analysis. A systems analysis for propagation of component fragilities is conducted using event and fault trees. The event and fault trees for an actual power plant can be fairly large in size, which imposes computational challenges. Hence, certain assumptions are employed for computational efficiency. These assumptions typically represent the conditions imposed during the design basis (DB) scenario. The traditional PRA tools based on these assumptions are also widely applied to perform risk assessment in the context of beyond design basis (BDB) scenarios. However, some of these assumptions may not be valid for certain BDB scenarios. In addition, the probability of dependent failures also increases in BDB scenarios due to common cause failures (CCF) which usually results from design modifications, human errors, etc. In this manuscript, a simple and a relatively more complex illustrative examples are used to show the limitation of these assumptions in the numerical quantification of risk for the case of BDB conditions. Case studies with CCF events across multiple fault trees are also presented to illustrate the effect of these assumptions when traditional approach is used in BDB risk assessment. It is shown that the assumptions are valid for the case of DB conditions but may lead to excessively conservative risk estimates in the case of BDB conditions. Finally, a Bayesian network based top-down algorithm is proposed as an alternative tool for accurate numerical quantification of total risk in systems analysis.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Development of Dry Cask Risk Tools

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has repeatedly expressed a desire to increase the use of risk in its decision-making. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Policy Statement published in 1995 formalized the Commission’s commitment to risk-informed regulation through the expanded use of PRA. While a great deal of work has been done to incorporate risk insights into the regulatory framework for at-power nuclear reactors. Far less progress has been made to risk inform the dry-casks and nuclear waste transportation areas of the nuclear fuel cycle. INL was tasked with incorporating the information from the two completed dry cask PRAs as well as any additional available information into a tool that helps the NRC use those insights to identify levels of risk at various stages in the nuclear waste cycle. The first task was to address the License Amendment Request (LAR) Process for Dry Cask storage, the second task is for the incorporate transportation into the tool, and the third and final task will be incorporate any additional regulatory applications for dry cask storage. This report covers the first task of the tool and will eventually incorporate the remaining two tasks may be completed in the future and built off the model described here. Task 1 specifically asked to incorporate the risk insights into the process for determining and prioritizing review of license amendment changes related to storage applications by outlining a resource allocation strategy and defining recommendations of for the depth and breadth of the LAR review. It was requested that the tool be similar in design to the SDP notebooks/worksheets and contain quantitative, qualitative, or semi-quantitative approaches to assessing the risk of the change. The final tool that was selected by INL to be developed was a flowchart and associated rationale document that allows the reviewer to quickly assess potential LAR changes and their associated risks as well as the rationale behind the risk categorization. This risk categorization will lead to specific actionable recommendations to expect from a change of that specific category. This allows for a more consistent review process as well as improving the overall efficiency of the review itself.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2024

The Meaning of Risk for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in the Design of Advanced Nuclear Reactors

What is the meaning of risk as it applies to the design of advanced reactors in the disciplines of safety, security, and safeguards? How can we find common terminology for the concept of risk and how can we find interfaces between these disciplines? These are important questions that should be explored in order that they may be applied in an integrated manner for the most effective and efficient design approaches. Eliminating or minimizing risks is a key design driver that motivates and informs the development of nuclear reactors. For safety, risk is well understood and applied in Probabilistic Risk Assessments. For security, the risk-based concepts of vulnerability assessments and vital areas are all considered in designing security systems. For safeguards, the concept of risk is not formally defined, as it relates to the design and operation of nuclear reactors. International nuclear safeguards seek to reduce the risk of proliferation in the nuclear fuel cycle and as such the concept of risk does exist. Therefore, the current understanding of the “3S’ approach, which seeks to find the interfaces and conflicts between safety, security, and safeguards requires a thorough understanding of the role that the reduction of risk plays in all three disciplines. The intersection of risk for safety and security is now being developed as there is a strong correlation between reactor design and operations and their vulnerability to sabotage. The intersection of risk for security and safeguards has to date chiefly been focused on the nuclear material control and accounting systems, which are relied on by both the operator (State) and the IAEA. This paper explores the concept of risk in each of the three disciplines, how they interact, potential conflicts and interfaces , how these might be addressed and leveraged, and a notional framework for how this could be achieved.

Kovacic, Donald N↗

DOE OSTI2023

Causal CCF Parameter Estimations 2020

This report documents the quantitative results of the causal common-cause failure (CCF) parameter estimations for the failure cause groups “component,” “design,” “environment,” “human,” and “other,” based on CCF data through 2020 in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) CCF database: https://rads.inl.gov/Pages/CCF.aspx. This report utilizes the same data period (2006–2020) and CCF templates as INL/EXT-21-62940, Revision 1, CCF Parameter Estimations, 2020 Update. The 2015 causal CCF prior distributions for the specific failure cause groups (instead of the 2015 generic CCF prior distributions) were used in this report to estimate the associated causal CCF parameters. All the 2015 causal CCF prior distributions and generic CCF prior distributions were developed in INL/EXT-21-43723, Developing Generic Prior Distributions for Common Cause Failure Alpha Factors and Causal Alpha Factors, using CCF data from 1997 to 2015. These quantitative results were developed to support the causal alpha factor model and should be used as appropriate in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) studies such as the NRC Significance Determination Process for commercial nuclear power plants in the United States.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2020

MASTODON: An Open-Source Software for Seismic Analysis and Risk Assessment of Critical Infrastructure

Seismic analysis and risk assessment of safety-critical infrastructure like hospitals, nuclear power plants, dams, and facilities handling radioactive materials involve computationally intensive numerical models and coupled multiphysics scenarios. They are also performed in a strict regulatory environment that requires high software quality assurance standards, and in the case of safety-related nuclear facilities, a conformance to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA-1) standard. This paper introduces the open-source finite-element software, MASTODON (Multi-hazard Analysis of Stochastic Time-Domain Phenomena), which implements state-of-the-art seismic analysis and risk assessment tools in a quality-controlled environment. MASTODON is built on MOOSE (Multi-physics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment), which is a highly parallelizable, NQA-1 conforming, coupled multiphysics, finite-element framework developed at Idaho National Laboratory. MASTODON is capable of fault rupture and source-to-site wave propagation using the domain reduction method, nonlinear site response, and soil-structure interaction analysis, implicit and explicit time integration, automated stochastic simulations, and seismic probabilistic risk assessment. When coupled with other MOOSE applications, MASTODON can also solve strongly and weakly coupled multiphysics problems. This paper presents a summary of the capabilities of MASTODON and some demonstrative examples.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2026

Hazard and risk analysis framework for nuclear power plant–based integrated energy systems

Employing integrated energy systems (IESs) with nuclear power plants (NPPs) can improve NPP utilization by leveraging dedicated thermal and electric power delivery, but it may also increase operational safety risks. This paper presents a framework to identify and quantify hazards and risks for such IESs. The framework combines accidentology to review past industrial accidents with failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) to identify potential future incidents. Hydrogen explosion and toxic chemical release hazards are of particular concern. Explosion consequences are quantified using the Bauwens-Dorofeev (Bauwens) and trinitrotoluene equivalent mass (TNT-EM) methods, while chemical release consequences are computed using the Gaussian atmospheric dispersion method. Operational disturbances from direct electrical and thermal integration that may affect NPP safety are modeled using probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Hazards and risks are then evaluated for regulatory compliance. The framework is applied to IESs comprising pressurized or boiling water reactors supplying three levels of thermal and electrical power to industrial customers. Case studies include high-temperature steam electrolysis hydrogen plants of varying capacities and a synthetic fuel production plant. Sensitivity analysis examines piping component failures in the PRA model as a precursor to cost estimation for thermal extraction line design. Additionally, Fussel-Vessely (FV) and risk increase importance (RII) measures identify risk-informed design improvements for the thermal extraction system. FMEA highlights hazards such as loss of offsite power, prompt loss of electrical load, loss of thermal output, and immediate steam diversion, in addition to hydrogen explosions and toxic chemical releases. Both Bauwens and TNT-EM methods suggest maintaining several hundred meters of separation between the NPP and hydrogen facility to mitigate explosion risks. PRA results show a maximum initiating event frequency increase of 1.15% and an overall risk increase of 0.28%. Importance measure analysis identifies upstream pipe leak isolation components as critical. Evaluating the results against safety regulations, it is concluded that hazards and risks can be managed to comply with regulations through risk-informed thermal and electrical connection designs, component selection, maintenance programs, and safe separation distances between NPPs and integrated industrial facilities.

08 - HYDROGEN↗

DOE OSTI2021

CCF Parameter Estimations, 2020 Update

This report documents the quantitative results of the common-cause failure (CCF) data collection effort (which included data through 2020) and summarizes the results of the parameter estimation quantification process performed on CCF data in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) CCF database. This is the 2020 update to NUREG/CR-5497, updating data and parameter estimations for CCFs. This release, CCF Parameter Estimation 2020, reflects the CCF data contained within the CCF database, https://rads.inl.gov/Pages/CCF.aspx, by executing (in August 2021) the CCF query rules in the folder SPAR Rules 2020. The data covers the period from 1/1/2006 to 12/31/2020, the most recent 15-year period in which data are available. The use of the most recent rolling 15-year data in parameter estimation differs from previous updates, in which 1/1/1997 was used as the starting date (e.g., 1/1/1997 to 12/31/2015 for the 2015 update, 1/1/1997 to 12/31/2012 for the 2012 update). The new date range (i.e., the most recent 15-year period), was selected for this CCF update so as to be consistent with the date range chosen for the component reliability parameter estimation, and with the effort to include sufficient data for analysis while simultaneously reflecting the most recent industry performance. These results are appropriate for use in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) studies, including the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models of commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the U.S. This update may be referred as: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "CCF Parameter Estimations, 2020 Update," https://nrcoe.inl.gov/publicdocs/CCF/ccfparamest2020.pdf, November 2021.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Operating Experience Data Analysis for Digital Instrumentation and Control System Reliability and Risk Assessment in Nuclear Power Plants

The implementation of advanced digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems in U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs) can bring significant advancements in reliability, monitoring, and control capabilities. However, these systems also introduce new challenges, particularly in assessing risks such as common-cause failures (CCFs) and establishing robust reliability estimates for DI&C components. Addressing these challenges is critical for ensuring the safe and efficient operation of NPPs. Recently, Idaho National Laboratory was tasked by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to conduct a DI&C reliability study using operating experience data from the nuclear industry. The two operating experience data sources for the study are the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations’ Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS) and the NRC’s Licensee Event Report database which is hosted at Idaho National Laboratory at https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx. This report provides a comprehensive examination of DI&C systems, including their architecture, operational advantages, and associated challenges. It reviews existing industry DI&C studies and failure mode taxonomies, along with reliability data from various industries. Through a detailed analysis of these databases, the study provides insights into DI&C system performance. Considerations should be given to incorporate DI&C failure data into the NRC's Integrated Data Collection and Coding System and updating the Reliability and Availability Data System to support ongoing DI&C reliability studies. Recommendations are also provided for modeling DI&C reliability and CCF in probabilistic risk assessment, thereby supporting risk-informed decision-making and enhancing the reliability and safety of NPPs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Root Cause Correlation Analysis of Software Failures via Orthogonal Defect Classification and Natural Language Processing

Systems theoretic process analysis (STPA) is becoming an increasingly popular technique to assess how complex digital software systems can fail. Rather than defining failures by their observable failure events, which may be sparse especially for safety rated nuclear digital instrumentation and control systems (DI&C), failures are defined as postulated unsafe actions under specific contextual conditions. This permits a top-down analysis of system hazards and identifies whether imposed constraints and requirements can sufficiently address undesirable hazards. However, STPA is a qualitative approach at identifying inadequacies in the development process and cannot currently be used to quantify unsafe action likelihoods for probabilistic risk assessment. Therefore, in this work, we examine the root causes of software failure and explore whether a consistent correlation can be linked to specific unsafe action classes. We implement Lbl2Vec, an unsupervised document classification and retrieval algorithm, on a database of 4,096 software defect reports acquired from various open-source software systems. By analyzing sentence structure, embedded labels, and word vectors, we show that certain defect types positively correlate to specific unsafe action classes over others. The correlations developed can be used to estimate the failure probability of safety intended DI&C systems which provides a licensing basis for nuclear plant modernization efforts.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Root Cause Correlation Analysis of Software Failures via Orthogonal Defect Classification and Natural Language Processing

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Survey of Cyber Risk Analysis Techniques for Use in the Nuclear Industry

Using traditional probabilistic risk analysis methods for severe accident safety risk management on non-digital systems, structures, and components at nuclear power plants is well-established. In contrast, cyber risk analysis of digital assets is still an immature field with unproven techniques due, in part, to the continuously changing threat environment and the challenge of digital assets failing in unexpected ways. As the nuclear fleet continues to adopt digital instrumentation and control systems, it is increasingly important to have effective and efficient cyber risk analysis techniques to support risk management decisions, such as risk elimination by system redesign or risk mitigation by implementation of prioritized security controls. To understand the state of the art in cyber risk analysis for future research, we surveyed 36 publications across ten application domains. We describe our survey methodology and rate each technique based upon scope, adoptability, and repeatability. In this work, we examine the unique constraints of the nuclear industry and outline the strengths and weaknesses of using the cyber risk analysis techniques in the industry, highlighting gaps with current techniques. We also discuss challenges and potential research directions for advancing the science for both existing and new advanced reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Predicting High Energy Arcing Fault Zones of Influence for Aluminum Using an Arc Flash Modeling Approach: Evaluation of a model bias, uncertainty, parameter sensitivity and zone of influence estimation

This report documents the development of an arc flash hazard model to calculate the incident energy and zone of influence from high energy arcing faults involving aluminum. The NRC has identified the potential for (HEAFs) involving aluminum to increase the damage zone beyond what is currently postulated in fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodologies. To estimate the hazard from HEAFs involving aluminum an arc flash model was developed. Differences between the initial model and nuclear power plant (NPP) fire PRA scenarios were identified. Modification of the initial model established from existing literature and test data was used to minimize these differences. The developed model was evaluated against NRC datasets to understand the model prediction and relative uncertainties. Finally, a range of fire PRA zone of influences (ZOI) were developed based on the developed model, target fragility estimates and update HEAF PRA methodology. The results were developed to support an NRC LIC-504 evaluation in tandem with other modeling efforts. The report documents the effort and provides a reference for any future advancements in arc flash modeling.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Analyzing Hardware and Software Common Cause Failures in Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems using Dual Error Propagation Method

This paper develops a methodology for quantifying software common cause failures (CCFs) in digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems of nuclear power plants. To support the transition of analog I&C systems to digital in nuclear power plants, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques are used. The hardware components of the I&C systems have reliability databases that can be used in the PRA studies. However, the failure data for redundant software components of the systems is sparse. Failure of components constitutes a CCF, wherein two or more components or systems fail due to a single shared cause and coupling mechanism. This paper proposes a quantification approach that can simultaneously model hardware and software components, incorporate the CCFs of software systems in the models, and bridge the gap between the failure quantification of models and the development of CCF parametric databases. We demonstrate the dual error propagation method (DEPM) by developing I&C systems failure models for a representative digital reactor trip system. The DEPM models are built to simulate the control and data flows within the systems and can accommodate failure states. By expanding DEPM to software CCFs, we generated alpha factor parameter estimates for each of the modeled error propagation mechanisms.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Analysis of historic fires to determine most frequent challenging events

The fire probabilistic risk assessment framework for nuclear power plants relies on experimental data to determine expected fire behavior or to validate models to predict fire conditions in the plant. To support reducing the uncertainty in this experimental data, a research effort was conducted to identify the most frequent and challenging fire scenarios using historic fire data from nuclear power plants in the United States. To support this effort, an electronic version of the publicly available Updated Fire Event Database developed by Electric Power Research Institute was produced resulting in data on 2111 fire events, 540 events were labelled as being challenging fires with 74.2% of these challenging fire events being due to eleven selected fire types. In conclusion, of these fire types, electrical and electronic equipment, transient combustibles, and liquid fires were the most frequent of the challenging fires. The fire scenario specifics were characterized for each of the eleven selected types and then related to existing fire experiments.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Linking classical PRA models to a dynamic PRA

Here, this paper presents a series of methods designed to incorporate classical Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models such as Event Trees (ETs) and Fault Trees (FTs) into dynamic PRA. In contrast to classical PRA, dynamic PRA couples stochastic methods with system simulators to determine the risks associated with complex systems such as nuclear power plants. Compared with classical PRA methods, they can evaluate with higher resolution the safety impact of timing and sequencing of events on the progression of the accident. As part of a dynamic PRA analysis, it is not uncommon that parts of the system to be analyzed might not require a computationally expensive simulation model. These parts could be in fact modeled by employing classical PRA models (e.g., a FT). Here, we present a set of methods and tools that can be used to link the most common classical PRA models (ETs, FTs, reliability block diagrams and Markov models) to simulation codes such as RELAP5-3D: creating a “hybrid PRA.” In order to show the potential of such an hybrid PRA we employ this method to verify ET modeling assumptions (e.g., success criteria) using a large break loss of coolant accident initiating event as a test case. In this respect, we link a set of FTs from the original PRA to the RELAP5-3D code and perform a hybrid PRA. The FTs are employed to model the control logic of several safety systems and to propagate component failures throughout the system. Provided the generated dynamic PRA data, we show how conservative assumptions in the original PRA can be identified and how such original PRA can be modified by updating success criteria captured by the set of RELAP5-3D simulation runs.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2021

Report on High Energy Arcing Fault Experiments: Experimental Results from Open Box Enclosures

This report documents an experimental program designed to investigate High Energy Arcing Fault (HEAF) phenomena. The experiments focus on providing data to better characterize the arc to improve the prediction of arc energy emitted during a HEAF event. An open box experiment allow for direct observation of the arc, which allows diagnostic instrumentation to record the phenomenological data needed for better characterization of the arc energy source term. The data collected supports characterization of the arc and arc jet, enclosure breach, material loss, and electrical properties. These results will be used to better characterizing the hazard for improvements in fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) realism. The experiments were performed at KEMA Labs located in Chalfont, Pennsylvania. The experimental design, setup, and execution were completed by staff from the NRC, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and KEMA Labs. In addition, representatives from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) observed some of the experimental setup and execution. The HEAF experiments were performed between August 22, 2020 and September 18, 2020 on near-identical 51 cm (20 in) cube metal boxes suspended from a Unistrut support structure. The three-phase arcing fault was initiated at the ends of the conductors oriented vertically and located at the center of the box. Either aluminum or copper conductors were used for the conductors. The low-voltage experiments used 1 000 volts AC, while the medium-voltage experiments used 6 900 volts AC consistent with other recently completed experiments. Durations of the experiment ranged from 1 s to 5 s with fault currents ranging from 1 kA to 30 kA. Real-time electrical operating conditions, including voltage, current and frequency, were measured during the experiments. Heat fluxes and incident energies were measured with plate thermometers, radiometers, and slug calorimeters at various locations around the electrical enclosures. The experiments were documented with normal and high-speed videography, infrared imaging and photography.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Report on High Energy Arcing Fault Experiments: Experimental Results from Low-Voltage Switchgear Enclosures

This report documents an experimental program designed to investigate High Energy Arcing Fault (HEAF) phenomena for low-voltage metal enclosed switchgear containing aluminum conductors. This report covers full-scale laboratory experiments using representative nuclear power plant (NPP) three-phase electrical equipment. Electrical, thermal, and pressure data were recorded for each experiment and documented in this report. This report covers experiments performed on two low-voltage switchgear units with each unit consisting of two vertical sections. The data collected supports characterization of the low-voltage HEAF hazard and these results will be used to support potential improvements in fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods. The experiments were performed at KEMA Labs located in Chalfont, Pennsylvania. The experimental design, setup, and execution were completed by staff from the NRC, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and KEMA. In addition, representatives from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) observed some of the experimental setup and execution. The HEAF experiments were performed between August 26 and Augsut 29, 2019 on nearidentical Westinghouse Type DS low-voltage metal-enclosed indoor switchgear. The threephase arcing fault was initiated on the aluminum main bus or in select cases on the copper bus stabs near the breaker. These experiments used either nominal 480 volts AC or 600 volts AC. Durations of the experiments ranged from approximately 0.4 s to 8.3 s with fault currents ranging from approximately 9.2 kA to 19.3 kA. Real-time electrical operating conditions, including voltage, current and frequency, were measured during the experiments. Heat fluxes and incident energies were measured with plate thermometers, radiometers, and slug calorimeters at various locations around the electrical enclosures. Environmental measurements of breakdown, conductivity and electromagnetics were also taken. The experiments were documented with normal and high-speed videography, infrared imaging and photography. The results, while limited, indicated the difficulty in maintaining and sustaining low-voltage arcs on aluminum components of sufficient duration and at a single point as observed operating experience.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2020

NRAP Toolkit Screening for CarbonSAFE Illinois - Macon County

In this report we take stratigraphic data from the ISGS-led Macon County Phase 2 CarbonSAFE’s proposed site in Christian County, Illinois, and conduct reservoir simulations to generate pressure and CO 2 saturation plume data as a function of time. We then use this plume data along with the stratigraphic data as inputs to the NRAP Open-source Integrated Assessment Model (NRAP-Open-IAM) to evaluate project risks. For this report we focus on the probabilistic risk associated with hypothetical leakage of CO 2 and brine along the injection well and one monitoring well. We also study the resulting impact to two overlying aquifers, which could be used to inform monitoring technology selection.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗