Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “RADIOACTIVE DATING”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 91 records · Page 5

Nuclear Structure and Decay Data for A=31 Isobars

Here, experimental nuclear spectroscopic data are evaluated for 11 known nuclides of mass 31 (F, Ne, Na, Mg, Al, Si, P, S, Cl, Ar, K). Detailed evaluated information is presented for each reaction and decay experiment. Combining all the available data, recommended values are provided for energies, spins and parities, and half-lives of levels, with energies, branching ratios and multipolarities of γ radiations, and characteristics of β and α radiations in radioactive decays. 31 P is the most extensively studied one among all nuclides via various reactions and decays, followed by 31 S, 31 Si, 31 Mg and 31 Al. Information for excited states in 31 Ne, 31 Na, 31 Cl, 31 Ar and 31 K are limited; no excited states have yet been identified in 31 F, even its ground-state half-life is unknown. Significant new data have become available for the structure of 31 S, with its relevance to astrophysical applications. This work supersedes the earlier evaluation of A=31 by 2013Ou01, with literature cutoff date of Feb 15, 2013.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Cesium Removal from 5.5 and 7.0 M Na AP-105 Using Crystalline Silicotitanate

The Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) system, currently operational by Washington River Protection Solutions LLC (WRPS), prepares initial low-activity Hanford waste tank supernate feeds for the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Facility. In addition to entrained solids removal from the supernate, the primary goal of TSCR is to remove cesium-137 ( 137 Cs) by ion exchange, allowing contact handling of the liquid effluent product at the WTP as governed by a waste acceptance criterion (WAC). Specific to 137 Cs, this requirement is < 3.18E-5 Ci 137 Cs/mole of Na. Crystalline silicotitanate (CST) ion exchange media, manufactured by Honeywell UOP, LLC (product IONSIVTM R9140-B), has been selected as the ion exchange media for TSCR. CST is a non-elutable inorganic material that has demonstrated robust chemical, physical, and radiation tolerance while maintaining functionality. However, testing to date on actual tank waste samples has been limited to Na concentrations between 5 and 6 M Na (Fiskum et al. 2019a, 2021b and Westesen et al. 2021a, 2021b, 2022) while actual tank conditions can reach upwards of 9 M Na. Testing with feed from Hanford tank AP-105 incorporated testing at both 5.5 and 7 M Na in order to evaluate the impact of Na concentration on volume of waste processed before reaching the WAC. A 6-L volume of 5.5 M Na AP-105 and an 8-volume of 7 M Na AP-105 was processed through the Radioactive Waste Test Platform system, established at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to support small-scale waste qualification efforts. The columns consisted of 6- to 9-mL CST beds (CST Lot 2002009604, sieved to screen out >30-mesh particles) placed in 1.5-cm-inner-diameter columns. Feed was processed at 1.9 bed volumes (BV) per hour; the flowrate, in terms of contact time with the CST bed, matched the expected flowrate at TSCR. Table S.1 and Figure S.1 summarize the measured AP-105 Cs load performance for each feed condition.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Lessons Learned from Demolition of Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant - 20507

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC), a Jacobs owned company, is making significant progress demolishing the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), which has long been known as one of the most hazardous buildings in the DOE Environmental Management Complex (DOE Complex). The facility is located on the Hanford Site and produced plutonium metal during the Cold War. Production was stopped in 1989, the facility was formally shut down in 1996, and material processing was completed in 2004. After approximately 25 years of demolition preparations, open-air demolition of the main portions of the Hazard Category II nuclear facility began in November 2016. To prepare the PFP for demolition, CHPRC employees performed some of the most hazardous work across the DOE Complex. In addition to extensive demolition preparations, including a wide-reaching communication strategy across the Hanford Site, CHPRC implemented robust controls and monitoring during demolition, and when necessary, adjusted demolition practices and sequence to maintain employee safety and project efficiency. Demolition of the main PFP building began in November 2016. The technical complexity, high hazards and radiological concerns have all led to a difficult demolition environment. Following a spread of contamination at the project site beyond the radiological boundaries in December 2017, work was halted and a recovery plan was generated to allow the demolition work to continue. After the implementation of additional controls and concurrence from regulatory agencies and DOE, the demolition was ready to resume work and reinitiated in August 2018. There are a number of lessons learned from the demolition activities and recovery plan process. This paper allows CHPRC and DoE's Richland Operations Office (RL) to share lessons learned and progress to date with other challenging and hazardous projects across the DOE Complex. Understanding the risk acceptance level is critical to execution of any open-air demolition project and is unique to each facility. Four key lessons learned from this project include: 1) plan execution issues, 2) stakeholder communication issues, 3) watching for summit fever and 4) minimizing exposed contaminated surfaces during demolition. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Distribution Development for Residual Inventory at the New York West Valley Site - 20400

The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) is the owner of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center (WNYNSC), a 1,351 ha site located approximately 48 km south of Buffalo, New York. In 1962, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) entered into Agreements with the Atomic Energy Commission and New York State to construct the first commercial reprocessing plant of nuclear fuel in the United States. NFS, a private company, built and operated the spent fuel reprocessing plant and waste disposal facilities, processing 640 Mg of spent nuclear fuel from 1966 to 1972 under an Atomic Energy Commission license. Nuclear fuel reprocessing operations ended in 1972 and never reopened, leaving behind radioactive and chemical wastes. Operations led to contamination in a number of facilities and locations. Some of that contamination has migrated from waste disposal zones to other layers, formations, and features on and off the WNYNSC. Phase I decommissioning activities are ongoing and involve the removal of a number of areas and structures that have been associated with contamination. The purpose of this work is to outline the approach for characterizing contamination not associated with disposed wastes, contaminated structures, or specific releases. In this work, the term, residual radiological activity, is used to describe environmental contamination that exists subsequent to the completion of Phase I decommissioning activities, that is not associated with disposed wastes, contaminated structures, or specific releases. Contamination from the Site was quantified relative to data that characterize the concentrations of radionuclides that exist in background. Background concentrations are those present in the area but having no influence from Site related activities. The existence of residual radiological activity that is elevated relative to background has the potential to contribute to future risks to human health and the environment. As a consequence, the residual inventory information is used to inform the West Valley Probabilistic Performance Assessment (PPA) model to characterize potential future risks to human health and the environment. The centralized West Valley Data Management System (DMS) was the source of information for the data assembled in this analysis. The DMS is a fairly large compilation consisting of thousands of records from investigation studies, with sample dates ranging from 1990 to present. Samples from monitoring wells, boreholes, geoprobe studies, surface water, surface soils, storm water outfalls, ventilation stack filters, plant and animal tissues, and more are included in the DMS. Results are typically reported in units of activity per unit volume. For the purpose of the analyses presented here, all results were converted into consistent units of pCi per unit volume. Since 1990, data have been collected from various locations across the WNYNSC at different times with varying frequency over the course of several decades. As a consequence, a number of potential issues can arise with respect to the assembly of a dataset that is deemed adequate for the characterization of residual radiological activity. These issues were assessed and resolved to the extent possible through careful consideration of the properties of the distributions. The intent was to use data which characterize the current state of the Site. Radionuclides can be designated to one of several groups depending on their origin. In this work the groups considered were 1) Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM), 2) fallout, and 3) Other (including power plant, medical research, etc). This grouping is a useful construct with respect to the interpretation of fixed laboratory results. For example, NORM radionuclides that exist within a decay chain should have approximately equivalent distributions of concentrations if they are representative of background conditions. Insights such as these can be used as a check to identify sample results that need to be further investigated or omitted due to issues associated with reported results from fixed laboratory analyses. This type of analysis provided a foundation for the assessment of the adequacy of sample results for use in subsequent components of an assessment. The general process for the assessment of residual radiological contamination at the Site consists of a sequence of several steps. First, for each analyte, several statistical tests were performed to assess the weight of evidence against the null hypothesis that the mean of the distribution of concentrations was equal to zero. If the mean of the distribution of concentrations for a given radionuclide was not found to be greater than zero, then it was removed from consideration as a component of the residual radiological contamination. If there was significant evidence to reject the hypothesis of the mean being equal to zero, the second step was to compare the distribution of the data from the Site to that of the corresponding background. A suite of tests was used to compare the distributions of the site and background data. The results of these tests were collectively used to determine if site data are elevated relative to background. The third step was to develop distributions using a Bayesian framework to characterize the distribution of mean of the increment present above background for each of the radionuclides. The Bayesian model implemented allowed for the comparison of site-specific records to background concentrations to better approximate contamination attributed to the Site. A final screening step was employed for radionuclides that exceed background. This screening step compared 95% upper confidence limits (UCLs) from the increment distribution developed in the previous step to the risk screening levels. This approach yields a list of analytes that were determined to be elevated relative to background.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Literature Review on Next Generation Solvent Isopar ® L Vapor Pressure Curve and the Partitioning of its Modifier and Extractant

The Next Generation Solvent (NGS) is set to replace the Original Caustic Side Solvent Extractant (CSSX) at the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was requested by Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC), formerly Savannah River Remediation (SRR), to perform a literature review on the following topics to address flammability concerns with the current solvent: Isopar ® L vapor pressure curve for NGS, partitioning ratio for the extractant MaxCalix and the modifier Cs-7SB, and high cesium concentration impacts on NGS radiolysis and potential solvent degradation rates in high cesium concentrations. The following conclusions and recommendations are made based on previous experimental work and literature: (1) Current SWPF flammable gas generation calculations use an Isopar ® L vapor pressure curve based on experimental testing with the Original CSSX solvent. No such testing to date has been performed with NGS. It is suggested that the decrease in Cs-7SB concentration for NGS compared to the Original CSSX solvent would lead to a slightly higher vapor pressure at all temperatures in SWPF vessels. A bounding NGS vapor pressure curve has been provided; it is recommended to see if these values would challenge current flammability controls and to perform testing if needed.(2) The partitioning ratio for Cs-7SB is known in the Original CSSX solvent with dilute nitric acid and caustic solutions. No tests could be found for the partitioning of Cs-7SB to dilute boric acid solutions; however, a similar partitioning ratio is expected. Due to the lipophilic alkyl chains on MaxCalix, it is expected to be even less soluble than BOBCalixC6 in the aqueous phase and should not be considered a significant contributor to the f organic term. Additionally, the reaction rate of N,N’,N’’-Tris(3,7-dimethyloctyl)guanidine (TiDG) or its degradation products with a hydrogen radical should be estimated/determined if they are found to be significant contributors to the f organic term. (3) NGS is expected to see much higher Cs concentrations at SWPF in comparison to its use at the Modular CSSX Unit (MCU). These higher Cs concentrations could influence radiolytic degradation rates of the solvent. NGS appears to be fairly stable to radiolytic degradation based on previous testing and its use at MCU. However, there has not been radiolytic flammable gas generation testing with NGS to date. There is a risk that the continued use of G-values obtained for flammable gases produced from the irradiation of the Original CSSX solvent is not bounding for NGS, but this is considered a very low risk due to the similarities in the composition of the solvents, as well as the conservatisms in the experimental design of the Original CSSX testing.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Systems Engineering and Analysis in Support of a US Federal Staging Facility for UNF

The US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) Office of Spent Fuel and High-Level Waste Disposition is examining a set of system options and conducting supporting analyses to inform the development of an integrated waste management system, which may include one or more federal staging facilities (FSFs) for used nuclear fuel (UNF ) sited using a collaborative siting process. This paper focuses on the ongoing activities in two systems engineering and analysis work areas: (1) data and tools development, validation, and maintenance and (2) systems engineering execution. Within the first work area, the STANDARDS 5.0 UNF data and analysis tool, formerly known as UNF-ST&DARDS, is being developed as a foundational resource to assist in the management of UNF data. It has the key capability to model UNF throughout the entire back end of the fuel cycle. STANDARDS also includes several compatible analysis tools for the time-dependent characterization of UNF and related systems by interfacing with the SCALE code system for nuclear analysis and COBRA-SFS for thermal analysis. Also, within the data and tools area is the Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM), which is an agent-based simulation software tool expressly designed to be capable of modeling the waste management system, including the transportation of UNF to and from a FSF. NGSAM has been developed to enable informed decision-making by providing the capability to analyze various potential system options for the management of UNF and high-level radioactive waste. Finally, in the systems engineering execution area, the team has begun to apply a disciplined systems engineering approach at the system level along with supporting analysis to guide the development of the FSF project requirements (including associated transportation infrastructure). Systems engineering principles and practices and their adaptation/application to design and development activities will ensure that the waste management system is effectively implemented as work proceeds. Other activities include investigating the implications of changes in various assumptions and parameters related to waste management systems, such as UNF acceptance rates, receipt logic, facility capacities and capabilities, use of standardized canisters, and different assumed facility operation start dates. Keywords: federal staging facility (FSF), used nuclear fuel (UNF), integrated waste management (IWM) system, Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM), STANDARDS, systems engineering

Joseph, Robert↗

Flammable Gas Generation and Control at the Idaho Completion Project Legacy Combustible Gas Generation - 20191

On April 11, 2018, four drums containing transuranic waste at the Idaho National Laboratory underwent over-pressurization, ejecting their lids and spreading radiological waste within a facility. An investigation has found that waste in the drums generated methane gas, which contributed to the event. Subsequent to the investigation, the potential for drums to have methane and other flammable analytes whose concentrations could approach or exceed the lower flammability limit (LFL) and the adequacy of the controls to prevent or mitigate a possible deflagration was evaluated. An extensive review of the historical records was performed to determine how many drums exceed the LFL. The historical record identified a small quantity of drums that exceeded the LFL for xylene, hydrogen, and methane. The primary codified applicable code or standard for handling drums is 29 CFR 1910.120 (j) 'Handling Drums and Containers.' It is used throughout the commercial and government sector. This code is integrated throughout the Fluor Idaho safety management programs and procedures to control the Standard Industrial Hazards (SIHs) associated with drum and container handling. Example requirements include: - Drums and containers are inspected, and their integrity assured prior to being moved. - Site operations are organized to minimize the amount of drum or container movement. - When there is a reasonable possibility of flammable atmospheres being present, material handling equipment and hand tools are of the type to prevent sources of ignition. Drums and containers under pressure, as evidenced by bulging or swelling, are not moved until the cause for excess pressure is determined and appropriate containment procedures have been implemented to protect employees from explosive relief of the drum. Drums which exceed the WIPP FGA limit have NCRs associated with them. Once a drum fails flammable gas sampling, an NCR is initiated. The NCR drives placement into NCR dense pack rows. A standing order drives placement of the FGA failures to a single planer segregation location. These drums are not allowed for further processing or shipment until the NCR has been cleared. Once in the single planer rows, follow-up FGA testing is performed by CCP. The NCR is dispositioned by follow-up sampling occurring after adequate time has been provided for the gas to diffuse through the filter assembly, or, in some cases, the drums are repackaged into additional drums to reduce the source term. To date, the ICP project has performed approximately 1.5 million drums moves without a deflagration event due to combustible gas generation. Flammable gas generation in a transuranic waste drum is not unique to the ICP but is common across the DOE complex. Based on the experience at Idaho, application of industry standards is sufficient to control the risk of drum deflagration due to drum movements. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report – 2020 (Data Cutoff Date 12/31/2019)

The purpose of this Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report (ATWIR) – 2020 is to document the inventory estimate of transuranic (TRU) waste reported by the TRU waste generator sites as of December 31, 2019. This report also notes major changes to the inventory used for the ATWIR-2019 that had a data cutoff date of December 31, 2018. This updated inventory information is available to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) TRU waste complex, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) stakeholders, and regulators. The TRU waste inventory information is used for strategic planning, and supports the DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) input into documents (e.g., WIPP Documented Safety Analysis and National Environmental Policy Act analyses), planned changes, and other design changes as needed for the WIPP project.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report – 2021 (Data Cutoff Date 12/31/2020)

The purpose of this Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report (ATWIR) – 2021 is to document the inventory estimate of transuranic (TRU) waste reported by the TRU waste generator sites as of December 31, 2020. This report also notes major changes to the inventory used for the ATWIR-2020 that had a data cutoff date of December 31, 2019. This updated inventory information is available to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) TRU waste complex, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) stakeholders, and regulators. The TRU waste inventory information is used for strategic planning, and supports the DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) input into documents (e.g., WIPP Documented Safety Analysis and National Environmental Policy Act analyses), planned changes, and other design changes as needed for the WIPP project.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report – 2022 (Data Cutoff Date 12/31/2021)

The purpose of this Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Report (ATWIR) – 2022 is to document the inventory estimate of transuranic (TRU) waste reported by the TRU waste generator sites as of December 31, 2021. This report also notes major changes to the inventory since the ATWIR-2021, which had a data cutoff date of December 31, 2020. This updated inventory information is available to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) TRU waste complex, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) stakeholders, and regulators. The TRU waste inventory information is used for strategic planning, and supports the DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) input into documents (e.g., WIPP Documented Safety Analysis and National Environmental Policy Act evaluations), performance assessments, planned changes, and other design changes as needed for the WIPP project.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Two years of optical and NIR observations of the superluminous supernova UID 30901 discovered by the UltraVISTA SN survey

ABSTRACT We present deep optical and near-infrared photometry of UID 30901, a superluminous supernova (SLSN) discovered during the UltraVISTA survey. The observations were obtained with VIRCAM (YJHKs) mounted on the VISTA telescope, DECam (griz) on the Blanco telescope, and SUBARU Hyper Suprime-Cam (HSC; grizy). These multiband observations comprise +700 d making UID 30901 one of the best photometrically followed SLSNe to date. The host galaxy of UID 30901 is detected in a deep HST F814W image with an AB magnitude of 27.3 ± 0.2. While no spectra exist for the SN or its host galaxy, we perform our analysis assuming z = 0.37, based on the photometric redshift of a possible host galaxy found at a projected distance of 7 kpc. Fitting a blackbody to the observations, the radius, temperature, and bolometric light curve are computed. We find a maximum bolometric luminosity of 5.4 ± 0.34 × 1043 erg s−1. A flattening in the light curve beyond 600 d is observed and several possible causes are discussed. We find the observations to clearly favour an SLSN type I, and plausible power sources such as the radioactive decay of 56Ni and the spin-down of a magnetar are compared to the data. We find that the magnetar model yields a good fit to the observations with the following parameters: a magnetic field B = 1.4 ± 0.3 × 1014 G, spin period of P = 6.0 ± 0.1 ms, and ejecta mass $M_{\mathrm{ ej}} = 11.9^{+4.8}_{-6.4} \,\mathrm{ M}_{\odot }$.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

MODELING A SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL CASK SEISMIC TEST

The US Department of Energy Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) program is planning to conduct a series of full-scale shake table tests to simulate hypothetical earthquake conditions and record the response of surrogate spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies in a canister dry storage system mockup. The shake table motions will represent a range of hypothetical earthquake conditions at hypothetical locations in the continental US to generally define the range of mechanical loads that SNF can be expected to experience during extended dry storage periods. The earthquake conditions will represent seismic hazards in the 2,000-to-20,000-year return period range. The test will use instrumented pressurized water reactor fuel assemblies with surrogate mass inside the fuel rods instead of radioactive fuel pellets. Dummy assemblies with similar mass and dimensions to actual fuel assemblies will occupy the rest of the fuel assembly locations in a SNF canister that holds 32 fuel assemblies. The canister will be located inside a mockup vertical concrete cask. Instrumentation will record the motion of the major components of the complex dynamic system, and strain gauges will be used to record the cladding strain at select locations. Preparations for the test require modeling predictions to identify the range of response of the system and to help select specific earthquake cases to be simulated on the shake table from a large set of potential cases. This paper describes the pretest nonlinear finite element modeling efforts that have been completed to date, including cask system level modeling and fuel assembly modeling in LS-DYNA. The cask system level models are critical for anticipating sliding or tipping of an unanchored cask during the test. The fuel assembly model is needed to estimate the range of cladding strain response and fuel assembly structural response to be expected during the test and cladding strain measurements will be key metrics for model validation and the development of modeling best practices after the test is concluded.

Klymyshyn, Nicholas A.↗

Preliminary IHLW Formulation Algorithm Description

This report documents the initial algorithm that could be used by the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) in batching high-level waste (HLW) and glass-forming chemicals (GFCs) in the HLW melter feed preparation vessel (MFPV) (HFP-VSL-00001 and -00005). Not all Hanford tank waste can be accommodated by the models developed for this report and significant expansion of the model boundaries could be achievable to reduce the WTP mission life and total canister production count. The immobilized HLW (IHLW) must meet a series of constraints to be acceptable for disposal in the Monitored Geologic Repository, which are contained in the Specification 1 of the Contract (DOE 2000), the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (WAPS, DOE 1996), and the Waste Acceptance System Requirements Document (WASRD, DOE 2007). The IHLW Waste Form Compliance Plan (WCP, 24590-HLW-PL-RT-07-0001, Rev 3) specifies that the formulation algorithm will be developed and used to comply with the constraints associated with glass composition and properties. This report is not an engineering calculation, does not provide design input, and is not an engineering study. Algorithm inputs include the chemical analyses of the blended HLW in the HLW blend vessel (HBV) (HLP-VSL-00028, the volume and composition of the MFPV heel, the volume and composition of the MFPV after waste addition, the volume and composition of MFPV batch after GFC addition, the compositions of individual GFCs, and the mass of glass in each canister. In addition to these inputs, uncertainties in the HLW composition and processing parameters are included in the algorithm. Using the above inputs, the algorithm calculates the following outputs: 1) the volume of HLW to be transferred from the HBV to the MFPV, 2) the mass of each GFC for addition to the MFPV, 3) the composition of the glass that will be produced along with uncertainties, and 4) the predicted properties, with associated uncertainties, of the resulting IHLW. The algorithm uses the property-composition models to calculate properties with associated uncertainties and compares them with various constraints to ensure that a processable feed is formulated and a compliant IHLW is produced. The GFC additions are determined using an optimization approach to provide high confidence that the HLW glass will meet all product quality requirements and key processing constraints. For most HLW batches there are many possible glass compositions that meet all constraints. In these cases, the glass composition is optimized for a series of target component concentrations and target property values. The algorithm also incorporates process measurement and product quality uncertainties, based on the work of Piepel et al. (2005). Estimates of the various process and measurement uncertainties that affect glass compositions and predicted glass properties have been previously reported (Piepel et al. 2005, 2006) and the impacts of these estimated uncertainties on the IHLW composition envelope that meets product quality and processing-related properties with sufficient confidence were evaluated. The details of work performed to date to develop this initial GFC addition and batching algorithm are summarized in Sections 4 and 5. An example data set is used to illustrate the calculations of the algorithm summarized in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7, there is a statement of the required work to achieve a final operational IHLW formulation control algorithm. This report is not an engineering calculation, does not provide design input, and is not an engineering study.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Small-Scale Drying: FY2020 Interim Report

This report documents the interim experimental status of small-scale drying tests currently being performed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. These small-scale drying tests are to develop the technical bases for sensors, techniques, and approaches that will be used to address the challenges faced when determining moisture content from gas samples taken at the North Anna Nuclear Generating Station for the High Burnup Demonstration Project. Specifically, the purpose of these tests is to support Sandia National Laboratories gas sample methods and analyses through a series of small-scale experiments. Key focus areas include performing tests to: • Correlate sample bottle measurements to in-cask conditions • Estimate the amount of trapped and absorbed water on cask features and surfaces that can contribute to water vapor • Assess the accuracy of the hygrometer used in the measurements under similar conditions • Identify additional methods for measuring humidity in casks easily and accurately using lessons-learned from Sandia National Laboratories, including direct gravimetric and isotopic tracer techniques. To address these topics this report outlines a series of five tests and any data collected to date that were planned for FY 2020 that include 1) humidity measurement method development, 2) gas bottle sampling tests, 3) surface drying tests on cladding, 4) small-scale drying of cladding, and 5) small-scale drying of guide-tube/dashpots. This interim report documents the experimental background, design and progress of these small-scale drying tests. Further data gathered will be summarized in the FY 2021 report.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Analysis of Organoiodide Adsorption Mechanisms

If the United States were to engage in the reprocessing of used nuclear fuel, radioactive iodine must be removed from multiple plant off-gas streams to comply with governing regulations. One of these streams is the vessel off-gas (VOG), which arises from the separations process and is expected to contain iodine in primarily organic iodine forms and at parts-per-billion concentrations. The relative lack of knowledge surrounding organic iodine removal from the VOG prompted the US Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy to initiate experimental efforts targeted at understanding organic iodide removal from prototypic VOG streams. At Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), this effort has focused on developing a comprehensive understanding of iodine removal from VOG streams by using silver-based sorbents. An important aspect of this testing is developing an understanding of how the sorption of methyl iodide (CH 3 I), the most studied organic iodide species to date, compares with the sorption of other volatile organic iodide species potentially present in the VOG. The work presented here reflects initial testing that will continue to be developed, and final results will be incorporated into an end-of-year report that details a multiyear testing campaign designed to understand iodine mitigation from VOG streams. The goal of these experiments was to determine whether similar reaction pathways govern both CH 3 I and iodobutane (C 4 H 9 I) sorption onto silver mordenite (AgZ), a common silver-based iodine sorbent. More specifically, the authors hypothesized that the sorption of C 4 H 9 I by AgZ will result in the formation of butanol (C 4 H9OH). Effluent monitoring of CH 3 I sorption testing has confirmed methanol production, but analogous monitoring of effluents from C 4 H 9 I sorption studies has not been performed. A series of tests was completed to test this hypothesis with the aim of detecting C 4 H 9 OH downstream of the AgZ bed. Test conditions varied the bed depth, gas stream humidity, and bed temperature post sorption. The effluent gas stream downstream of the AgZ bed was sampled by using gas-tight syringes, and these samples were analyzed by a gas chromatograph coupled to a mass spectrometer. Thin bed C 4 H 9 I tests conducted at -65 and 0°C dew points did not result in C 4 H 9 OH detection in the effluent. This suggests that the sorption mechanism and subsequent reactions could be different from those observed for CH 3 I. The sorption testing continues; additional results will be included in final end-of-year report and will increase the fundamental understanding of organic iodide sorption by AgZ from VOG streams.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Subject-specific modeling framework for particle deposition using computational fluid dynamics

Quantifying particle deposition and dose in the respiratory tract requires a physiologically realistic representation and reproducible computational workflows. However, existing modeling frameworks, such as the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) compartmental models and the Multiple Path Particle Dosimetry (MPPD) tool, lack detailed deposition profiles and subject-specific capabilities. The combination of advances in computer vision algorithms applied to the respiratory tract and Computational Fluid and Particle Dynamics (CFPD) allows high-fidelity simulations of particle behavior in anatomically accurate geometries derived from individual CT scans. The segmentation, preprocessing, and file preparation task for a CFPD simulation was often time-consuming, and no prior studies to-date have yet presented a fully automated framework. This work presents a fully automated workflow to obtain individualized particle deposition profiles in the human respiratory tract. The pipeline starts with segmenting upper and lower airway geometries using morphological and deep learning-based methods, generating three-dimensional (3D) models from CT imaging data. Next, a series of algorithms are presented to quality check and prepare the 3D geometry for a CFD or CFPD simulation. The preprocessing step includes correcting geometric artifacts, enforcing a physically consistent mesh, and automatically identifying and capping multiple outlets, which is required for CFD/CFPD simulations. These processed models are then input into open-source (OpenFOAM) or commercial (StarCCM+) CFD solvers, where flow and transient particle transport equations — including turbulence and particle–wall interactions are solved under realistic breathing conditions. Finally, the resulting particle deposition profiles can be integrated with Monte Carlo radiation transport codes and state-of-the-art computational phantoms to assess organ-specific absorbed doses in scenarios of radioactive aerosol inhalation. The presented work streamlines respiratory tract segmentation, preprocessing for CFD/CFPD simulations, and integration with dose assessment workflows, reducing manual intervention and improving access to high-fidelity, subject-specific modeling. The high precision in predicted particle deposition and dose distributions can improve personalized treatment strategies in respiratory medicine and refine dose estimates for radiation protection.

AI↗

M3SF-25LL010302052 - Radionuclide Interaction with Hydrothermally Altered Repository Materials

This progress report (Level 3 Milestone Number M3SF-25LL010302052) summarizes research conducted at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) within the Crystalline Host Rock Properties & Processes - LLNL Number SF-25LL01030205. Observed changes in radionuclide sorption after bentonite/clay heating have implications for radionuclide diffusive transport through engineered barriers and must be considered when designing waste disposal repositories. Recent research performed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has provided key insights regarding the hydrothermal alteration behavior of bentonite backfill in the presence of repository materials (steel, concrete, etc.). We are examining how this mineral alteration affects retardation behavior of a suite of radionuclides of interest to repository performance assessment. Sorption experiments and data analysis for 233 U were initiated in FY24 following earlier experiments performed on 243 Am, 90 Sr, 137 Cs. In FY25, we completed the 233 U study and initiated and completed a study of 237 Np sorption. Below, we summarize the results and potential impacts of hydrothermal alteration on radionuclide retardation and assess the importance of this process to radionuclide migration from a GHRDC. We also use statistical tools (i.e. PCA) to help us determine the major drivers in affecting changes in measured Kd values induced by hydrothermal alteration. These experiments also allow us to test the predictive ability of our component additivity approach to surface complexation and ion exchange. Our guiding hypothesis is that a robust surface complexation/ion exchange model and associated database can effectively predict changes in radionuclide sorption behavior resulting from the hydrothermal alteration of mineralogy in a repository near field. In November 2024 the paper “Selenium interaction with iron minerals: Quantitative comparison of sorption and coprecipitation impacts on mobility” was published in Applied Geochemistry. A short update of results to date is presented below. In FY25, we also actively supported the DITUSC project, which is part of the EURADII initiative, as associate partners. We are executing the Migration2025 conference and support associated the NEA-TDB and Thermochimie workshops that will provide critical international engagements and develop consensus and synergy in thermodynamics as it relates to supporting the US nuclear waste repository program.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗