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NASA NTRS2014

NASA GRC UAS Project - Communications Modeling and Simulation Development Status

The integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace represents new operational concepts required in civil aviation. These new concepts are evolving as the nation moves toward the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) under the leadership of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), and through ongoing work by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The desire and ability to fly UAS in the National Air Space (NAS) in the near term has increased dramatically, and this multi-agency effort to develop and implement a national plan to successfully address the challenges of UAS access to the NAS in a safe and timely manner is well underway. As part of the effort to integrate UAS in the National Airspace, NASA Glenn Research Center is currently involved with providing research into Communications systems and Communication system operations in order to assist with developing requirements for this implementation. In order to provide data and information regarding communication systems performance that will be necessary, NASA GRC is tasked with developing and executing plans for simulations of candidate future UAS command and control communications, in line with architectures and communications technologies being developed and or proposed by NASA and relevant aviation organizations (in particular, RTCA SC-203). The simulations and related analyses will provide insight into the ability of proposed communications technologies and system architectures to enable safe operation of UAS, meeting UAS in the NAS project goals (including performance requirements, scalability, and interoperability), and ultimately leading to a determination of the ability of NextGen communication systems to accommodate UAS. This presentation, compiled by the NASA GRC Modeling and Simulation team, will provide an update to this ongoing effort at NASA GRC as follow-up to the overview of the planned simulation effort presented at ICNS in 2013. The objective of presentation will be to describe the progress made in developing both a NAS-Wide simulation architecture application and the detailed radiocomm system models for this research, and will present interim data and information compiled in the process of developing these simulation capabilities to date.

Modeling and Simulation↗
NASA NTRS2009

Mending the Gap, An Effort to Aid the Transfer of Formal Methods Technology

Formal methods can be applied to many of the development and verification activities required for civil avionics software. RTCA/DO-178B, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, gives a brief description of using formal methods as an alternate method of compliance with the objectives of that standard. Despite this, the avionics industry at large has been hesitant to adopt formal methods, with few developers have actually used formal methods for certification credit. Why is this so, given the volume of evidence of the benefits of formal methods? This presentation will explore some of the challenges to using formal methods in a certification context and describe the effort by the Formal Methods Subgroup of RTCA SC-205/EUROCAE WG-71 to develop guidance to make the use of formal methods a recognized approach.

Hayhurst, Kelly↗
NASA NTRS2016

Flight Test Overview for UAS Integration in the NAS Project

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is conducting a series of flight tests intended to support the reduction of barriers that prevent unmanned aircraft from flying without the required waivers from the Federal Aviation Administration. The most recent testing supported two separate test configurations. The first investigated the timing of Detect and Avoid (DAA) alerting thresholds using a radar-equipped unmanned vehicle and multiple live intruders flown at varying encounter geometries. The second configuration included a surrogate unmanned vehicle (flown from a ground control station, with a safety pilot on board) flying a mission in a virtual air traffic control airspace sector using research pilot displays and DAA advisories to maintain separation from live and virtual aircraft. The test was conducted over a seven-week span in the summer of 2015. The data from over 100 encounter sorties will be used to inform the RTCA Phase 1 Detect and Avoid and Command and Control Minimum Operating Performance Standards (MOPS) intended to be completed by the summer of 2016. Follow-on flight-testing is planned for the spring of 2016 to capture remaining encounters and support validation of the MOPS.

UAS↗
NASA NTRS2015

UAS Air Traffic Controller Acceptability Study: Evaluating Detect and Avoid Technology and Communication Delays in Simulation - 2

This study evaluated the effects of communications delays and winds on air traffic controller ratings of acceptability of horizontal miss distances (HMDs) for encounters between Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and manned aircraft in a simulation of the Dallas-Ft. Worth (DFW) airspace. Fourteen encounters per hour were staged in the presence of moderate background traffic. Seven recently retired controllers with experience at DFW served as subjects. Guidance provided to the UAS pilots for maintaining a given HMD was provided by information from Detect and Avoid (DAA) self-separation algorithms (Stratway+) displayed on the Multi-Aircraft Control System. This guidance consisted of amber "bands" on the heading scale of the UAS navigation display indicating headings that would result in a loss of well clear between the UAS and nearby traffic. Winds tested were successfully handled by the DAA algorithms and did not affect the controller acceptability ratings of the HMDs. Voice communications delays for the UAS were also tested and included one-way delay times of 0, 400, 1200, and 1800 msec. For longer communications delays, there were changes in strategy and communications flow that were observed and reported by the controllers. The aim of this work is to provide useful information for guiding future rules and regulations applicable to flying UAS in the NAS. Information from this study will also be of value to the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Special Committee 228 - Minimum Performance Standards for UAS.

Comstock, James R., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2015

UAS Integration into the NAS: Detect and Avoid Display Evaluations in Support of SC-228 MOPS Development

This presentation provides an overview of the work the Human Systems Integration (HSI) sub-project has done on detect and avoid (DAA) displays while working on the UAS Integration into the NAS project. Much of the work has been used to support the ongoing development of minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) for UAS by RTCA Special Committee 228. The design and results of three different human-in-the-loop simulations are discussed, with particular emphasis on the role of the UAS pilot in the Self Separation Timeline.

unmanned aircraft systems↗
NASA NTRS2016

UAS-NAS Project Demo - Mini HITL Week 2 Stats

The UAS-NAS Project demo will showcase recent research efforts to ensure the interoperability between proposed UAS detect and avoid (DAA) human machine interface requirements (developed within RTCA SC-228) and existing collision avoidance displays. Attendees will be able to view the current state of the art of the DAA pilot traffic, alerting and guidance displays integrated with Traffic advisory and Collision Avoidance (TCAS) II in the UAS-NAS Project's research UAS ground control station (developed in partnership with the Air Force Research Laboratory). In addition, attendees will have the opportunity to interact with the research UAS ground control station and "fly" encounters, using the DAA and TCAS II displays to avoid simulated aircraft. The display of the advisories will be hosted on a laptop with an external 30" monitor, running the Vigilant Spirit system. DAA advisories will be generated by the JADEM software tool, connected to the system via the LVC Gateway. A repeater of the primary flight display will be shown on a 55" monitor mounted on a stand at the back of the booth to show the pilot interaction to the passersby.

UAS↗
NASA NTRS2016

Piloted Well Clear Performance Evaluation of Detect and Avoid Systems with Suggestive Guidance

Regulations to establish operational and performance requirements for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are being developed by a consortium of government, industry and academic institutions (RTCA, 2013). Those requirements will apply to the new detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems and other equipment necessary to integrate UAS with the United States (U.S) National Airspace System (NAS) and will be determined according to their contribution to the overall safety case. That safety case requires demonstration that DAA-equipped UAS collectively operating in the NAS meet an airspace safety threshold (AST). Several key gaps must be closed in order to link equipment requirements to an airspace safety case. Foremost among these is calculation of the systems risk ratio, the degree to which a particular system mitigates violation of an aircraft separation standard (FAA, 2013). The risk ratio of a DAA system, in combination with risk ratios of other collision mitigation mechanisms, will determine the overall safety of the airspace measured in terms of the number of collisions per flight hour. It is not known what the effectiveness is of a pilot-in-the-loop DAA system or even what parameters of the DAA system most improve the pilots ability to maintain separation. The relationship between the DAA system design and the overall effectiveness of the DAA system that includes the pilot, expressed as a risk ratio, must be determined before DAA operational and performance requirements can be finalized. Much research has been devoted to integrating UAS into non-segregated airspace (Dalamagkidis, 2009, Ostwald, 2007, Gillian, 2012, Hesselink, 2011, Santiago, 2015, Rorie 2015 and 2016). Several traffic displays intended for use as part of a DAA system have gone through human-in-the-loop simulation and flight-testing. Most of these evaluations were part of development programs to produce a deployable system, so it is unclear how to generalize particular aspects of those designs to general requirements for future traffic displays (Calhoun, 2014). Other displays have undergone testing to collect data that may generalize to new displays, but have not been evaluated in the context of the development of an overall safety case for UAS equipped with DAA systems in the NAS (Bell, 2012). Other research efforts focus on DAA surveillance performance and separation standards. Together with this work, they are expected to facilitate validation of the airspace safety case (Park, 2014 and Johnson, 2015). The contribution of the present work is to quantify the effectiveness of the pilot-automation system to remain well clear as a function of display features and surveillance sensor error. This quantification will help enable selection of a minimum set of DAA design features that meets the AST, a set that may not be unique for all UAS platforms. A second objective is to collect and analyze pilot performance parameters that will improve the modeling of overall DAA system performance in non-human-in-the-loop simulations. Simulating the DAA-equipped UAS in such batch experiments will allow investigation of a much larger number of encounters than is possible in human simulations. This capability is necessary to demonstrate that a particular set of DAA requirements meets the AST under all foreseeable operational conditions.

detect and avoid↗
NASA NTRS2015

2nd Generation ELT Performance Specification Development

NASA Search And Rescue is supporting RTCA SC-229 with research and recommendations for performance specifications for the 2nd generation of emergency locator transmitters. Areas for improvement and methods for collecting data will be presented.

Stimson, Chad M.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Wind Information Uplink to Aircraft Performing Interval Management Operations

Interval Management (IM) is an ADS-B-enabled suite of applications that use ground and flight deck capabilities and procedures designed to support the relative spacing of aircraft (Barmore et al., 2004, Murdoch et al. 2009, Barmore 2009, Swieringa et al. 2011; Weitz et al. 2012). Relative spacing refers to managing the position of one aircraft to a time or distance relative to another aircraft, as opposed to a static reference point such as a point over the ground or clock time. This results in improved inter-aircraft spacing precision and is expected to allow aircraft to be spaced closer to the applicable separation standard than current operations. Consequently, if the reduced spacing is used in scheduling, IM can reduce the time interval between the first and last aircraft in an overall arrival flow, resulting in increased throughput. Because IM relies on speed changes to achieve precise spacing, it can reduce costly, low-altitude, vectoring, which increases both efficiency and throughput in capacity-constrained airspace without negatively impacting controller workload and task complexity. This is expected to increase overall system efficiency. The Flight Deck Interval Management (FIM) equipment provides speeds to the flight crew that will deliver them to the achieve-by point at the controller-specified time, i.e., assigned spacing goal, after the target aircraft crosses the achieve-by point (Figure 1.1). Since the IM and target aircraft may not be on the same arrival procedure, the FIM equipment predicts the estimated times of arrival (ETA) for both the IM and target aircraft to the achieve-by point. This involves generating an approximate four-dimensional trajectory for each aircraft. The accuracy of the wind data used to generate those trajectories is critical to the success of the IM operation. There are two main forms of uncertainty in the wind information used by the FIM equipment. The first is the accuracy of the forecast modeling done by the weather provider. This is generally a global environmental prediction obtained from a weather model such as the Rapid Refresh (RAP) from the National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP). The weather forecast data will have errors relative to the actual, or truth, winds that the aircraft will encounter. The second source of uncertainty is that only a small subset of the forecast data can be uplinked to the aircraft for use by the FIM equipment. This results in loss of additional information. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and RTCA are currently developing standards for the communication of wind and atmospheric data to the aircraft for use in NextGen operations. This study examines the impact of various wind forecast sampling methods on IM performance metrics to inform the standards development.

Ahmad, Nashat N.↗
NASA NTRS2015

DAIDALUS: Detect and Avoid Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems

This paper presents DAIDALUS (Detect and Avoid Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems), a reference implementation of a detect and avoid concept intended to support the integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems into civil airspace. DAIDALUS consists of self-separation and alerting algorithms that provide situational awareness to UAS remote pilots. These algorithms have been formally specified in a mathematical notation and verified for correctness in an interactive theorem prover. The software implementation has been verified against the formal models and validated against multiple stressing cases jointly developed by the US Air Force Research Laboratory, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, and NASA. The DAIDALUS reference implementation is currently under consideration for inclusion in the appendices to the Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Unmanned Aircraft Systems presently being developed by RTCA Special Committee 228.

Munoz, Cesar↗
NASA NTRS2016

Emergency Locator Transmitter System Performance During Three Full-Scale General Aviation Crash Tests

Full-scale crash tests were conducted on three Cessna 172 aircraft at NASA Langley Research Center's Landing and Impact Research facility during the summer of 2015. The purpose of the three tests was to evaluate the performance of commercially available Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) systems and support development of enhanced installation guidance. ELTs are used to provide location information to Search and Rescue (SAR) organizations in the event of an aviation distress situation, such as a crash. The crash tests simulated three differing severe but survivable crash conditions, in which it is expected that the onboard occupants have a reasonable chance of surviving the accident and would require assistance from SAR personnel. The first simulated an emergency landing onto a rigid surface, while the second and third simulated controlled flight into terrain. Multiple ELT systems were installed on each airplane according to federal regulations. The majority of the ELT systems performed nominally. In the systems which did not activate, post-test disassembly and inspection offered guidance for non-activation cause in some cases, while in others, no specific cause could be found. In a subset of installations purposely disregarding best practice guidelines, failure of the ELT-to-antenna cabling connections were found. Recommendations for enhanced installation guidance of ELT systems will be made to the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Special Committee 229 for consideration for adoption in a future release of ELT minimum operational performance specifications. These recommendations will be based on the data gathered during this test series as well as a larger series of crash simulations using computer models that will be calibrated based on these data

Littell, Justin D.↗
NASA NTRS2016

A Vision and Roadmap for Increasing User Autonomy in Flight Operations in the National Airspace

The purpose of Air Transportation is to move people and cargo safely, efficiently and swiftly to their destinations. The companies and individuals who use aircraft for this purpose, the airspace users, desire to operate their aircraft according to a dynamically optimized business trajectory for their specific mission and operational business model. In current operations, the dynamic optimization of business trajectories is limited by constraints built into operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) for reasons of safety and operational needs of the air navigation service providers. NASA has been developing and testing means to overcome many of these constraints and permit operations to be conducted closer to the airspace user's changing business trajectory as conditions unfold before and during the flight. A roadmap of logical steps progressing toward increased user autonomy is proposed, beginning with NASA's Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests (TASAR) concept that enables flight crews to make informed, deconflicted flight-optimization requests to air traffic control. These steps include the use of data communications for route change requests and approvals, integration with time-based arrival flow management processes under development by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), increased user authority for defining and modifying downstream, strategic portions of the trajectory, and ultimately application of self-separation. This progression takes advantage of existing FAA NextGen programs and RTCA standards development, and it is designed to minimize the number of hardware upgrades required of airspace users to take advantage of these advanced capabilities to achieve dynamically optimized business trajectories in NAS operations. The roadmap is designed to provide operational benefits to first adopters so that investment decisions do not depend upon a large segment of the user community becoming equipped before benefits can be realized. The issues of equipment certification and operational approval of new procedures are addressed in a way that minimizes their impact on the transition by deferring a change in the assignment of separation responsibility until a large body of operational data is available to support the safety case for this change in the last roadmap step.This paper will relate the roadmap steps to ongoing activities to clarify the economics-based transition to these technologies for operational use.

Cotton, William B.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Defining the Collision Avoidance Region for DAA Systems

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) will be required to equip with a detect-­‐and-­‐avoid (DAA) system in order to satisfy the federal aviation regulations to maintain well clear of other aircraft, some of which may be equipped with a Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) to mitigate the possibility of mid-­‐air collisions. As such, the minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA systems are being designed with TCAS interoperability in mind by a group of industry, government, and academic institutions named RTCA Special Committee-228 (SC-228). This document will discuss the development of the spatial-­‐temporal volume known as the collision avoidance region in which the DAA system is not allowed to provide vertical guidance to maintain or regain DAA well clear that could conflict with resolution advisories (RAs) issued by the intruder aircraft's TCAS system. Three collision avoidance region definition candidates were developed based on the existing TCAS RA and DAA alerting definitions. They were evaluated against each other in terms of their interoperability with TCAS RAs and DAA alerts in an unmitigated factorial encounter analysis of 1.3 million simulated pairs.

collision avoidance region↗
NASA NTRS2016

Effect of Vertical Rate Error on Recovery from Loss of Well Clear Between UAS and Non-Cooperative Intruders

When an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) encounters an intruder and is unable to maintain required temporal and spatial separation between the two vehicles, it is referred to as a loss of well-clear. In this state, the UAS must make its best attempt to regain separation while maximizing the minimum separation between itself and the intruder. When encountering a non-cooperative intruder (an aircraft operating under visual flight rules without ADS-B or an active transponder) the UAS must rely on the radar system to provide the intruders location, velocity, and heading information. As many UAS have limited climb and descent performance, vertical position andor vertical rate errors make it difficult to determine whether an intruder will pass above or below them. To account for that, there is a proposal by RTCA Special Committee 228 to prohibit guidance systems from providing vertical guidance to regain well-clear to UAS in an encounter with a non-cooperative intruder unless their radar system has vertical position error below 175 feet (95) and vertical velocity errors below 200 fpm (95). Two sets of fast-time parametric studies was conducted, each with 54000 pairwise encounters between a UAS and non-cooperative intruder to determine the suitability of offering vertical guidance to regain well clear to a UAS in the presence of radar sensor noise. The UAS was not allowed to maneuver until it received well-clear recovery guidance. The maximum severity of the loss of well-clear was logged and used as the primary indicator of the separation achieved by the UAS. One set of 54000 encounters allowed the UAS to maneuver either vertically or horizontally, while the second permitted horizontal maneuvers, only. Comparing the two data sets allowed researchers to see the effect of allowing vertical guidance to a UAS for a particular encounter and vertical rate error. Study results show there is a small reduction in the average severity of a loss of well-clear when vertical maneuvers are suppressed, for all vertical error rate thresholds examined. However, results also show that in roughly 35 of the encounters where a vertical maneuver was selected, forcing the UAS to do a horizontal maneuver instead increased the severity of the loss of well-clear for that encounter. Finally, results showed a small reduction in the number of severe losses of well-clear when the high performance UAS (2000 fpm climb and descent rate) was allowed to maneuver vertically, and the vertical rate error was below 500 fpm. Overall, the results show that using a single vertical rate threshold is not advisable, and that limiting a UAS to horizontal maneuvers when vertical rate errors are above 175 fpm can make a UAS less safe about a third of the time. It is suggested that the hard limit be removed, and system manufacturers instructed to account for their own UAS performance, as well as vertical rate error and encounter geometry, when determining whether or not to provide vertical guidance to regain well-clear.

detect and avoid↗
NASA NTRS2016

Airport Traffic Conflict Detection and Resolution Algorithm Evaluation

Two conflict detection and resolution (CD&R) algorithms for the terminal maneuvering area (TMA) were evaluated in a fast-time batch simulation study at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Langley Research Center. One CD&R algorithm, developed at NASA, was designed to enhance surface situation awareness and provide cockpit alerts of potential conflicts during runway, taxi, and low altitude air-to-air operations. The second algorithm, Enhanced Traffic Situation Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF IA), was designed to increase flight crew awareness of the runway environment and facilitate an appropriate and timely response to potential conflict situations. The purpose of the study was to evaluate the performance of the aircraft-based CD&R algorithms during various runway, taxiway, and low altitude scenarios, multiple levels of CD&R system equipage, and various levels of horizontal position accuracy. Algorithm performance was assessed through various metrics including the collision rate, nuisance and missed alert rate, and alert toggling rate. The data suggests that, in general, alert toggling, nuisance and missed alerts, and unnecessary maneuvering occurred more frequently as the position accuracy was reduced. Collision avoidance was more effective when all of the aircraft were equipped with CD&R and maneuvered to avoid a collision after an alert was issued. In order to reduce the number of unwanted (nuisance) alerts when taxiing across a runway, a buffer is needed between the hold line and the alerting zone so alerts are not generated when an aircraft is behind the hold line. All of the results support RTCA horizontal position accuracy requirements for performing a CD&R function to reduce the likelihood and severity of runway incursions and collisions.

Jones, Denise R.↗
NASA NTRS2016

AIAA Aviation UAS DAA Demonstration-Mini HITL Week 2 Stats

The UAS-NAS Project demo will showcase recent research efforts to ensure the interoperability between proposed UAS detect and avoid (DAA) human machine interface requirements (developed within RTCA SC-228) and existing collision avoidance displays. Attendees will be able to view the current state of the art of the DAA pilot traffic, alerting and guidance displays integrated with Traffic advisory and Collision Avoidance (TCAS) II in the UAS-NAS Project's research UAS ground control station (developed in partnership with the Air Force Research Laboratory). In addition, attendees will have the opportunity to interact with the research UAS ground control station and "fly" encounters, using the DAA and TCAS II displays to avoid simulated aircraft. The display of the advisories will be hosted on a laptop with an external 30" monitor, running the Vigilant Spririt system. DAA advisories will be generated by the JADEM software tool, connected to the system via the LVC Gateway. A repeater of the primary flight display will be shown on a 55" tv/monitor mounted on a stand at the back of the booth to show the pilot interaction to the passersby.

UAS↗
NASA NTRS2016

UAS in the NAS Flight Test Series 4 Overview

Flight Test Series 4 (FT4) provides the researchers with an opportunity to expand on the data collected during the first flight tests. Following Flight Test Series 3, additional scripted encounters with different aircraft performance and sensors will be conducted. FT4 is presently planned for Spring of 2016 to ensure collection of data to support the validation of the final RTCA Phase 1 DAA (Detect and Avoid) Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). There are three research objectives associated with this goal: Evaluate the performance of the DAA system against cooperative and non-cooperative aircraft encounters Evaluate UAS (Unmanned Aircraft Systems) pilot performance in response to DAA maneuver guidance and alerting with live intruder encounters Evaluate TCAS/DAA (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System/Detect and Avoid) interoperability. This flight test series will focus on only the Scripted Encounters configuration, supporting the collection of data to validate the interoperability of DAA and collision avoidance algorithms.

flight test↗