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Remote Monitoring System Design Requirements for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) worked with other sites within the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration weapons complex to develop design requirements for a Remote Monitoring System. System objectives include: • Continuous monitoring of packaging (containers) within a Facility's buildings to meet Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) inventory requirements. • Remotely access and receive monitoring data for tamper detection/alarm, tracking information, environmental conditions, equipment metadata (serial number, date of manufacturer, etc.), and assessment video feeds. • All data processing, storage/retrieval, and communications will be protected in a manner commensurate with its trust level and classification. • Remotely collected and processed data will be securely stored, backed up, and archived. • Current and historical data will accessible within and outside of a Building (location). • Automated creation of reports and data visualization. • Design features to facilitate the potential future integration with the Facility's physical security alarm and display system. The requirements may be used to develop an integrated conceptual design or may be used in a modular fashion to inform separate designs. The guiding principles in developing the system objectives include: • For MC&A needs, remotely perform the physical inventory and evidence collection of tamper for Security Category I and II packaged material within a facility and be capable of satisfying guidelines establish by DOE M 470.4-6, “Nuclear Material Control and Accountability.” • For personnel safety needs: o Meet/satisfy Nuclear Explosive Safety requirements. o Minimize the exposure of personnel to radiation to be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) in accordance with NSTec Radiological Controls Manual (Ref TBD). • For DOE nuclear materials, Building environment shall be controlled to meet requirements for packaged nuclear materials specified in weapons laboratory literature.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Radiological Survey and Release Report for 9404-17 & 9404-18

The data quality objective (DQO) process and a graded approach are integrated within the MARSSIM process and within the plan to assure defensible data with cost effectiveness. Surveys were performed by trained Radiological Control Technicians (RCTs) following standard, written procedures and using properly calibrated instruments, sensitive to the potential contaminants. Instrumentation identification and the name of the technicians performing the survey can be found in the referenced radiological surveys.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Oak Ridge 25URC Tandem Accelerator 2007 SNEAP Lab Report

During FY 2008, the 25URC operated for slightly over 3,000 research hours. The radioactive species 80Ge and 17,18F accounted for 763 of these hours. This included an experiment using 17F which was only possible due to an improvement of a factor of 50 in beam intensity over our previous facility record. Twenty stable beam species were provided this year. Operation for the experimental program was at terminal potentials from 2.02 to 23.8 MV. Approximately 200 hours of conditioning were done to return the machine to operation after tank openings. There were six tank openings during the year: three scheduled for general maintenance and three unscheduled. Two of the unscheduled openings were required to correct shorting rod issues and the other was to reestablish communication with one of the major dead sections. On July 28, an event happened that caused all accelerators at the Holifield Radioactive Ion Beam Facility (HRIBF) to suspend operation. At approximately 8 AM on that Monday, during operations with approximately 12 {micro}A of 50-MeV protons on a uranium carbide target, delivering neutron-rich 81Zn beam to the new Low-energy Radioactive Ion Beam Spectroscopy Station (LeRIBSS), a radiological control technician (RCT) reported higher than normal radiation levels just outside the shield door to the IRIS1 vault (the room in which RIBs are produced at HRIBF). The measured dose rate equivalent was 4 mrem/hr. The presence of radiological contamination on the floor just outside the shield door was subsequently noted, as was the possible presence of airborne radioactivity. These observations were reported to facility management. Accelerators were put in standby immediately and the building evacuated. The event was declared a laboratory operational emergency. Parts of the building were cleared for reentry to collect belongings on Monday afternoon. The entire building was cleared for reoccupation on Tuesday morning after a detailed radiological survey found no contamination outside the shielded vaults. No decontamination was required. No individual received any detectable radiological dose as a result of this event. The 25URC tandem accelerator was given permission to resume operation with stable beams in early September, but radioactive ion production is still not allowed. Subsequent analysis indicated a release that consisted entirely of noble gasses (Xe and Kr isotopes). We believe we have identified two unrelated failures, one associated with the HVAC system and the other with the roughing system exhaust which accounts for both the escape of noble gasses into the IRIS1 vault and their migration outside the vault. An investigation team report is expected by October 24. At that time, corrective actions will be determined and the path to future radioactive ion beam production will be known. The break from operations allowed a few upgrades to be implemented. The most notable was the installation and commissioning of a SNICS ion source purchased from National Electrostatics Corporation (NEC). The SNICS replaced the old Alton/Aarhus source that we have used for many years. An ANU style gas cathode holder was purchased also but has not yet been implemented. The first beams have been produced by the source and the biggest problem encountered was reducing the beam for very low current experiments. A new power supply for the injection magnet was installed during this period also. Radioactive ion beam (RIB) development at the High Power Target Laboratory (HPTL) has been delayed this year while installing the platforms, conduits and equipment for the second Injector for Radioactive Ion Species (IRIS2) which is co-located with the HPTL facility. The majority of development activities have been performed at the two off-line ion source test facilities (ISTF1 and ISTF2) and the On-Line Test Facility (OLTF). Both test facilities have been developing systems which will eventually be used with IRIS2. Two new tunable Ti:Sapphire lasers have been ordered for continuing development of an ion source based on laser ionization using all solid-state lasers. When these are delivered, we will have a complete laser system. The other ion source test facility is continuing development of a negative-ion cooler for beam purification using photodetachment. This process has been demonstrated to work well in three systems so far (removing Co from Ni, removing S from Cl, and removing O from F). The original ion cooler has been modified to allow for use on the IRIS2 platform. Testing of this modified device is starting now. The OLTF has been used to test new types of uranium carbide targets for the electron beam plasma source (which are used for neutron-rich RIB campaigns) and to test a novel ion source which may result in purified beams of radioactive strontium isotopes. This ion source uses a quartz tube in the transfer line between the production target and the ion source to selectively slow down some elements such as rubidium and cesium.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Oak Ridge 25URC Tandem Accelerator 2008 SNEAP Lab Report

During FY 2008, the 25URC operated for slightly over 3,000 research hours. The radioactive species {sup 80}Ge and {sup 17,18}F accounted for 763 of these hours. This included an experiment using {sup 17}F which was only possible due to an improvement of a factor of 50 in beam intensity over our previous facility record. Twenty stable beam species were provided this year. Operation for the experimental program was at terminal potentials from 2.02 to 23.8 MV. Approximately 200 hours of conditioning were done to return the machine to operation after tank openings. There were six tank openings during the year: three scheduled for general maintenance and three unscheduled. Two of the unscheduled openings were required to correct shorting rod issues and the other was to reestablish communication with one of the major dead sections. On July 28, an event happened that caused all accelerators at the Holifield Radioactive Ion Beam Facility (HRIBF) to suspend operation. At approximately 8 AM on that Monday, during operations with approximately 12 {micro}A of 50-MeV protons on a uranium carbide target, delivering neutron-rich {sup 81}Zn beam to the new Low-energy Radioactive Ion Beam Spectroscopy Station (LeRIBSS), a radiological control technician (RCT) reported higher than normal radiation levels just outside the shield door to the IRIS1 vault (the room in which RIBs are produced at HRIBF). The measured dose rate equivalent was 4 mrem/hr. The presence of radiological contamination on the floor just outside the shield door was subsequently noted, as was the possible presence of airborne radioactivity. These observations were reported to facility management. Accelerators were put in standby immediately and the building evacuated. The event was subsequently declared a laboratory operational emergency. Parts of the building were cleared for reentry to collect belongings on Monday afternoon. The entire building was cleared for reoccupation on Tuesday morning after a detailed radiological survey found no contamination outside the shielded vaults. No decontamination was required. No individual received any detectable radiological dose as a result of this event. The 25URC tandem accelerator was given permission to resume operation with stable beams in early September, but radioactive ion production is still not allowed. Subsequent analysis indicated a release that consisted entirely of noble gasses (Xe and Kr isotopes). We believe we have identified two unrelated failures, one associated with the HVAC system and the other with the roughing system exhaust which accounts for both the escape of noble gasses into the IRIS1 vault and their migration outside the vault. An investigation team report is expected by October 24. At that time, corrective actions will be determined and the path to future radioactive ion beam production will be known. The break from operations allowed a few upgrades to be implemented. The most notable was the installation and commissioning of a SNICS ion source purchased from National Electrostatics Corporation (NEC). The SNICS replaced the old Alton/Aarhus source that we have used for many years. An ANU style gas cathode holder was purchased also but has not yet been implemented. The first beams have been produced by the source and the biggest problem encountered was reducing the beam for very low current experiments. A new power supply for the injection magnet was installed during this period also. Radioactive ion beam (RIB) development at the High Power Target Laboratory (HPTL) has been delayed this year while installing the platforms, conduits and equipment for the second Injector for Radioactive Ion Species (IRIS2) which is co-located with the HPTL facility. Therefore, the majority of development activities have been performed at the two off-line ion source test facilities (ISTF1 and ISTF2) and the On-Line Test Facility (OLTF). Both test facilities have been developing systems which will eventually be used with IRIS2. Two new tunable Ti:Sapphire lasers have been ordered for continuing development of an ion source based on laser ionization using all solid-state lasers. When these are delivered, we will have a complete laser system. The other ion source test facility is continuing development of a negative-ion cooler for beam purification using photodetachment. This process has been demonstrated to work well in three systems so far (removing Co from Ni, removing S from Cl, and removing O from F). The original ion cooler has been modified to allow for use on the IRIS2 platform. Testing of this modified device is starting now. The OLTF has been used to test new types of uranium carbide targets for the electron beam plasma source (which are used for neutron-rich RIB campaigns) and to test a novel ion source which may result in purified beams of radioactive strontium isotopes.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

On-Site Oxy-Lance Size Reduction of South Texas Project Reactor Vessel Heads - 12324

On-Site Oxy-Lance size reduction of mildly radioactive large components has been accomplished at other operating plants. On-Site Oxy-Lance size reduction of more radioactive components like Reactor Vessel Heads had previously been limited to decommissioning projects. Building on past decommissioning and site experience, subcontractors for South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) developed an innovative integrated system to control smoke, radioactive contamination, worker dose, and worker safety. STP's innovative, easy to use CEDM containment that provided oxy lance access, smoke control, and spatter/contamination control was the key to successful segmentation for cost-effective and ALARA packaging and transport for disposal. Relative to CEDM milling, STP oxy-lance segmentation saved approximately 40 person- REM accrued during 9,000 hours logged into the radiological controlled area (RCA) during more than 3,800 separate entries. Furthermore there were no personnel contamination events or respiratory uptakes of radioactive material during the course of the entire project. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

INL Soil Contamination Areas - Wildland Fire Radiological Hazards

The largest wildland fire on the INL occurred in 2019 and initiated a reassessment of the hazard of wildfires burning through soil contamination areas. In 2020 during the COVID shutdown, the INL Emergency Management Group and the Radiological Control Group worked together to re-evaluate the hazards from these soil contamination areas that were last evaluated in 2001. The new soil sample data was examined, and the areas were mapped for radiation intensity. A new evaluation of the radiological hazards due to wildfire was completed and issued because of this work. This presentation will describe the work and the methodologies used to complete this re-evaluation.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Baseline Radiological Conditions for the Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) Restart

The Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) facility, located on the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), northwest of the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC), has been in programmatic shutdown for more than twenty-three years. Construction of TREAT by the Teller Construction Co., Portland, Oregon, was started in February, 1958, and completed in early November, 1958. The reactor first achieved criticality on February 23, 1959. Operations continued until April 28, 1994, when the reactor was shut down due to the lack of a programmatic mission. Recently, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) identified a need to resume transient testing of new reactor fuels. The Resumption of Transient Testing Program (RTTP) has readied the TREAT facility to resume transient testing operations. The first reactor criticality since the shut down in 1994 was achieved on November 14, 2017. This report details the radiological measurements taken in the TREAT Reactor Building and the surrounding environment prior to and just after its restart in order to characterize the radiological conditions that existed prior to and during the initial restart operations. The authors would like to acknowledge the support from RTTP Management and the TREAT Operations staff for allowing the extensive radiological surveys, as well as the health physics technicians from the INL Radiological Control organization who performed many of the measurements referenced in this report.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Fluor Hanford ALARA Center is a D and D Resource

The mission at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation changed when the last reactor plant was shut down in 1989 and work was started to place all the facilities in a safe condition and begin decontamination, deactivation, decommissioning, and demolition (D and D). These facilities consisted of old shutdown reactor plants, spent fuel pools, processing facilities, and 177 underground tanks containing 53 million gallons of highly radioactive and toxic liquids and sludge. New skills were needed by the workforce to accomplish this mission. By 1995, workers were in the process of getting the facilities in a safe condition and it became obvious improvements were needed in their tools, equipment and work practices. The Hanford ALARA Program looked good on paper, but did little to help contractors that were working in the field. The Radiological Control Director decided that the ALARA program needed to be upgraded and a significant improvement could be made if workers had a place they could visit that had samples of the latest technology and could talk to experienced personnel who have had success doing D and D work. Two senior health physics personnel who had many years experience in doing radiological work were chosen to obtain tools and equipment from vendors and find a location centrally located on the Hanford site. Vendors were asked to loan their latest tools and equipment for display. Most vendors responded and the Hanford ALARA Center of Technology opened on October 1, 1996. Today, the ALARA Center includes a classroom for conducting training and a mockup area with gloveboxes. Two large rooms have a containment tent, several glove bags, samples of fixatives/expandable foam, coating displays, protective clothing, heat stress technology, cutting tools, HEPA filtered vacuums, ventilation units, pumps, hydraulic wrenches, communications equipment, shears, nibblers, shrouded tooling, and several examples of innovative tools developed by the Hanford facilities. See Figures I and II. The ALARA Center staff routinely researches and tests new technology, sponsor vendor demonstrations, and redistribute tools, equipment and temporary shielding that may not be needed at one facility to another facility that needs it. The ALARA Center staff learns about new technology in several ways. This includes past radiological work experience, interaction with vendors, lessons learned, networking with other DOE sites, visits to the Hanford Technical Library, attendance at off-site conferences and ALARA Workshops. Personnel that contact the ALARA Center for assistance report positive results when they implement the tools, equipment and work practices recommended by the ALARA Center staff. This has translated to reduced exposure for workers and reduced the risk of contamination spread. For example: using a hydraulic shear on one job saved 16 Rem of exposure that would have been received if workers had used saws-all tools to cut piping in twenty-nine locations. Currently, the ALARA Center staff is emphasizing D and D techniques on size-reducing materials, decontamination techniques, use of remote tools/video equipment, capture ventilation, fixatives, using containments and how to find lessons learned. The ALARA Center staff issues a weekly report that discusses their interaction with the workforce and any new work practices, tools and equipment being used by the Hanford contractors. Distribution of this weekly report is to about 130 personnel on site and 90 personnel off site. This effectively spreads the word about ALARA throughout the DOE Complex. DOE EM-23, in conjunction with the D and D and Environmental Restoration work group of the Energy Facility Contractors Organization (EFCOG) established the Hanford ALARA Center as the D and D Hotline for companies who have questions about how D and D work is accomplished. The ALARA Center has become a resource to the nuclear industry and routinely helps contractors at other DOE Sites, power reactors, DOD sites, and sites in England, Europe and Indonesia. Other ALARA Centers are located at the Savannah River Site and Los Alamos National Lab.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Tritium behavior intentionally released in the room

To construct a fusion reactor with high safety and acceptability, it is necessary to establish and to ensure tritium safe handling technology. Tritium should be well-controlled not to be released to the environment excessively and to prevent workers from excess exposure. It is especially important to grasp tritium behavior in the final confinement area, such as the room and/or building. In order to obtain data for actual tritium behavior in a room and/or building, a series of intentional Tritium Release Experiments (TREs) were planned and carried out within a radiologically controlled area (main cell) at Tritium System Test Assembly (TSTA) in Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) under US-JAPAN collaboration program. These experiments were carried out three times. In these experiments, influence of a difference in the tritium release point and the amount of hydrogen isotope for the initial tritium behavior in the room were suggested. Tritium was released into the main cell at TSTA/LANL. The released tritium reached a uniform concentration about 30 - 40 minutes in all the experiments. The influence of the release point and the amount of hydrogen isotope were not found to be important in these experiments. The experimental results for the initial tritium behavior in the room were also simulated well by the modified three-dimensional eddy flow analysis code FLOW-3D. (authors)

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Concrete Waste Recycling Process for High Quality Aggregate

Large amount of concrete waste generates during nuclear power plant (NPP) dismantling. Non-contaminated concrete waste is assumed to be disposed in a landfill site, but that will not be the solution especially in the future, because of decreasing tendency of the site availability and natural resources. Concerning concrete recycling, demand for roadbeds and backfill tends to be less than the amount of dismantled concrete generated in a single rural site, and conventional recycled aggregate is limited of its use to non-structural concrete, because of its inferior quality to ordinary natural aggregate. Therefore, it is vital to develop high quality recycled aggregate for general uses of dismantled concrete. If recycled aggregate is available for high structural concrete, the dismantling concrete is recyclable as aggregate for industry including nuclear field. Authors developed techniques on high quality aggregate reclamation for large amount of concrete generated during NPP decommissioning. Concrete of NPP buildings has good features for recycling aggregate; large quantity of high quality aggregate from same origin, record keeping of the aggregate origin, and little impurities in dismantled concrete such as wood and plastics. The target of recycled aggregate in this development is to meet the quality criteria for NPP concrete as prescribed in JASS 5N 'Specification for Nuclear Power Facility Reinforced Concrete' and JASS 5 'Specification for Reinforced Concrete Work'. The target of recycled aggregate concrete is to be comparable performance with ordinary aggregate concrete. The high quality recycled aggregate production techniques are assumed to apply for recycling for large amount of non-contaminated concrete. These techniques can also be applied for slightly contaminated concrete dismantled from radiological control area (RCA), together with free release survey. In conclusion: a technology on dismantled concrete recycling for high quality aggregate was developed. Various tests and evaluation confirmed that the high quality recycled aggregate concrete is almost equal strength and durability to ordinary aggregate concrete. The developed techniques of high quality recycled aggregate production have been applied to several new reinforced concrete buildings in industry since 2002. A practical recycling process for slightly contaminated concrete that consists of high quality recycled aggregate production and radiological survey was proposed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Preliminary Investigation for Corrective Action Unit 572: Test Cell C Ancillary Building and Structures, Corrective Action Site 25-33-05: Building 3901, Engine Transport System Maintenance Building, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Navarro-Intera, LLC (N-I), personnel—assisted by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), radiological control personnel—conducted a preliminary field investigation to obtain information about Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 572, Test Cell C Ancillary Building and Structures; Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-33-05, Building 3901, Engine Transport System Maintenance (ETSM) building. The ETSM building is located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The information learned from the investigation will reduce uncertainty about the nature and scope of potential releases and, therefore, reduce management risk associated with the planning and scheduling of future corrective action investigation activities. Site reconnaissance efforts for CAS 25-33-05 were conducted on June 18 and September 10–11, 2012. Detailed site conditions, building contents, potential waste streams, photographic documentation as well as radiological and chemical survey results are contained within this preliminary investigation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radon Survey of Los Alamos National Laboratory Buildings and Los Alamos County Residential Buildings

A radon survey of office spaces was of interest to LANL for several reasons. First, exposure to natural radon in LANL office spaces has been considered to be outside the regulatory reach of the federal regulations and the U.S. Department of Energy (U.S. DOE) orders, and thus has not been studied as extensively as occupational exposure to other radionuclides and is not subject to the same rigorous radiological controls. Second, a general survey of radon concentrations in LANL workspaces was of interest to management to ensure safe environments for workers and is in keeping with the intent of OSHA requirements. Though radon in LANL offices would not be derived from enhanced radioactive sources, radon exposure in general office spaces has the potential to significantly impact worker risk. The purpose of the 2009 radon survey was to measure and document indoor radon levels across a broad spectrum of office-type workspaces and neighboring homes. The measured concentrations were compared against those measured across the United States and across the world. The results were also compared against a wide variety of radiation protection thresholds such as (1) the action levels of 148 Bq m -3 (the U.S. EPA action level for public housing), (2) ≈1,200 Bq m -3 OSHA threshold for office spaces, (3) effective dose threshold of 1 mSv threshold for defining a radiological worker, (4) 50 mSv occupational effective dose limit, and (5) 0.1 mSv and 1 mSv limits for public exposures from the air pathway and all pathways, respectively.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Advanced Outage and Control Center: Strategies for Nuclear Plant Outage Work Status Capabilities

The research effort is a part of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program. LWRS is a research and development program sponsored by the Department of Energy, performed in close collaboration with industry to provide the technical foundations for licensing and managing the long-term, safe and economical operation of current nuclear power plants. The LWRS Program serves to help the US nuclear industry adopt new technologies and engineering solutions that facilitate the continued safe operation of the plants and extension of the current operating licenses. The Outage Control Center (OCC) Pilot Project was directed at carrying out the applied research for development and pilot of technology designed to enhance safe outage and maintenance operations, improve human performance and reliability, increase overall operational efficiency, and improve plant status control. Plant outage management is a high priority concern for the nuclear industry from cost and safety perspectives. Unfortunately, many of the underlying technologies supporting outage control are the same as those used in the 1980’s. They depend heavily upon large teams of staff, multiple work and coordination locations, and manual administrative actions that require large amounts of paper. Previous work in human reliability analysis suggests that many repetitive tasks, including paper work tasks, may have a failure rate of 1.0E-3 or higher (Gertman, 1996). With between 10,000 and 45,000 subtasks being performed during an outage (Gomes, 1996), the opportunity for human error of some consequence is a realistic concern. Although a number of factors exist that can make these errors recoverable, reducing and effectively coordinating the sheer number of tasks to be performed, particularly those that are error prone, has the potential to enhance outage efficiency and safety. Additionally, outage management requires precise coordination of work groups that do not always share similar objectives. Outage managers are concerned with schedule and cost, union workers are concerned with performing work that is commensurate with their trade, and support functions (safety, quality assurance, and radiological controls, etc.) are concerned with performing the work within the plants controls and procedures. Approaches to outage management should be designed to increase the active participation of work groups and managers in making decisions that closed the gap between competing objectives and the potential for error and process inefficiency.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Temporal Characterization of Tritium Smear Activities

Tritium collection efficiency varies as a function of smear media. The use of porous smear materials leads to an increase in the measured tritium activity as a function of time when the measurement is performed with liquid scintillation counters. Operational inclusion of the efficiency differences and the time dependence of the tritium smear activity is necessary to preclude inadvertently releasing materials or areas. Thomas Jefferson National Laboratory Radiological Control Department identified a contaminated stainless steel containment vessel that previously housed a target containing more than 37 TBq of tritium. The item was systematically sectioned and surveyed to compare three smear types: water-wetted cotton swabs, water-wetted paper smears, and ethanol-wetted Styrofoam wipes (NUC-Wipes™). The total activity of each section was determined using repeated decontamination. The time dependence of the measured activity was also studied. The measured activity of both paper smears and cotton swabs showed significant time dependence. The cotton swabs also showed significantly reduced collection efficiency. Given the widespread use of both of these media in routine contamination surveys, site operational limits were derived using fitted curves for time dependence and average efficiency results. In conclusion, the use of these more restrictive limits allows for rapid measurement of tritium smears while ensuring regulatory compliance.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Investigation of injury/illness data at a nuclear facility. Part II

At Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), there are several nuclear facilities, accelerator facilities, radiological facilities, explosives sites, moderate- and high-hazard non-nuclear facilities, biosciences laboratory, etc. The Plutonium Science and Manufacturing Directorate (ADPSM) provides special nuclear material research, process development, technology demonstration, and manufacturing capabilities. ADPSM manages the LANL Plutonium Facility. Within the Radiological Control Area at TA-55 (PF-4), chemical and metallurgical operations with plutonium and other hazardous materials are performed. LANL Health and Safety Programs investigate injury and illness data. In this study, statistically significant trends have been identified and compared for LANL, ADPSM, and PF-4 injury/illness cases. A previously described output metric is used to measures LANL management progress towards meeting its operational safety objectives and goals. Timelines are used to determine trends in Injury/Illness types. Pareto Charts are used to prioritize causal factors. The data generated from analysis of Injury/Illness data have helped identify and reduce the number of corresponding causal factors.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Carbon Characterization Laboratory Readiness to Receive Irradiated Graphite Samples

The Carbon Characterization Laboratory (CCL) is located in Labs C19 and C20 of the Idaho National Laboratory Research Center. The CCL was established under the Next Generation Nuclear Plant Project to support graphite and ceramic composite research and development activities. The research conducted in this laboratory will support the Advanced Graphite Creep experiments—a major series of material irradiation experiments within the Next Generation Nuclear Plant Graphite program. The CCL is designed to characterize and test low activated irradiated materials such as high purity graphite, carbon-carbon composites, silicon-carbide composite, and ceramic materials. The laboratory is fully capable of characterizing material properties for both irradiated and nonirradiated materials. Major infrastructural modifications were undertaken to support this new radiological facility at Idaho National Laboratory. Facility modifications are complete, equipment has been installed, radiological controls and operating procedures have been established and work management documents have been created to place the CCL in readiness to receive irradiated graphite samples.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Criticality Safety Basics for INL Emergency Responders

This document is a modular self-study guide about criticality safety principles for Idaho National Laboratory emergency responders. This guide provides basic criticality safety information for people who, in response to an emergency, might enter an area that contains much fissionable (or fissile) material. The information should help responders understand unique factors that might be important in responding to a criticality accident or in preventing a criticality accident while responding to a different emergency. This study guide specifically supplements web-based training for firefighters (0INL1226) and includes information for other Idaho National Laboratory first responders. However, the guide audience also includes other first responders such as radiological control personnel. For interested readers, this guide includes clearly marked additional information that will not be included on tests. The additional information includes historical examples (Been there. Done that.), as well as facts and more in-depth information (Did you know …). INL criticality safety personnel revise this guide as needed to reflect program changes, user requests, and better information. Revision 0, issued May 2007, established the basic text. Revision 1 incorporates operation, program, and training changes implemented since 2007. Revision 1 increases focus on first responders because later responders are more likely to have more assistance and guidance from facility personnel and subject matter experts. Revision 1 also completely reorganized the training to better emphasize physical concepts behind the criticality controls that help keep emergency responders safe. The changes are based on and consistent with changes made to course 0INL1226.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Idaho National Laboratory Integrated Safety Management System FY 2013 Effectiveness Review and Declaration Report

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) performed an Annual Effectiveness Review of the Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS), per 48 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 970.5223 1, “Integration of Environment, Safety and Health into Work Planning and Execution.” The annual review assessed Integrated Safety Management (ISM) effectiveness, provided feedback to maintain system integrity, and identified target areas for focused improvements and assessments for Fiscal Year (FY) 2014. Results of the FY 2013 annual effectiveness review demonstrate that the INL’s ISMS program is “Effective” and continually improving and shows signs of being significantly strengthened. Although there have been unacceptable serious events in the past, there has also been significant attention, dedication, and resources focused on improvement, lessons learned and future prevention. BEA’s strategy of focusing on these improvements includes extensive action and improvement plans that include PLN 4030, “INL Sustained Operational Improvement Plan, PLN 4058, “MFC Strategic Excellence Plan,” PLN 4141, “ATR Sustained Excellence Plan,” and PLN 4145, “Radiological Control Road to Excellence,” and the development of LWP 20000, “Conduct of Research.” As a result of these action plans, coupled with other assurance activities and metrics, significant improvement in operational performance, organizational competence, management oversight and a reduction in the number of operational events is being realized. In short, the realization of the fifth core function of ISMS (feedback and continuous improvement) and the associated benefits are apparent.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗