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DOE OSTI2023

Reliability Estimation for One-Shot Devices (Rev. 1)

We present an engineering-oriented summary of statistical methods for estimation of the reliability (or equivalently, failure probability) of one-shot devices such as explosive detonators and other weapon components. Estimates may be given as single points or intervals, based on pass/fail tests, margin analysis, computational models, expert judgment, or a combination of these. We focus on highly reliable devices for which few or no failures are expected to occur in testing.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2023

LAMP Technical Readiness Evaluation Report (Rev. 1)

An internal preliminary evaluation of Critical Technology Elements (CTEs) for the LANSCE Modernization Project (LAMP) was completed. Corresponding Technical Readiness Levels (TRLs) were also determined for all subsystems using the criteria of DOE G 413.3-4A, Technical Readiness Assessment Guide. The scope of the evaluation was limited to the project Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) elements as defined for the RFQ Injector and Drift Tube Linac (DTL) systems only. Integration of Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) and Safety Systems was not considered, although specific technologies as related to the RFQ and DTL systems were included. Other elements of the project such as Shielding, System Design, Technical Management, and additional facility integration needed to enable off-line testing and pre-installation commissioning were also not evaluated. Each technical subsystem element was evaluated for technical readiness, however, not all were found to meet the criteria for a CTE. Only two subsystem elements were determined to meet the CTE criteria. Their associated TRLs are summarized in the table below. These subsystem elements of the project have the lowest technical readiness due to either being new, novel or modified, requiring additional R&D before being capable of meeting the project Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) and subsystem requirements, or present technology exists but has not yet been demonstrated in a relevant environment. All other subsystems were determined to have a TRL of 8, indicating that actual operating systems exist having similar performance requirements as needed for LAMP. Details of the technical readiness evaluation for each subsystem is given in the following sections of this report.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Post-Closure Monitoring Letter Report for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine; CAU 98: Frenchman Flat; and CAU 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, for Calendar Year 2020 (Rev. 1, May 2021)

This letter serves as the annual post-closure letter for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 97, Yucca Flat/Climax Mine (YF/CM); CAU 98, Frenchman Flat (FF); and CAU 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM) for calendar year (CY) 2020. This letter will discuss the post-closure monitoring activities that occurred during CY 2020, identify any triggers reached, and summarize water usage on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and surrounding hydrographic basins at the three CAUs.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2021

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: For Calendar Year 2020 (Rev. 2)

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities in compliance with the requirements listed in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Permit Number NEV HW0101 associated with the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): 1) CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; 2) CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; 3) CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; 4) CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; 5) CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; 6) CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches The locations of the sites are shown in Figure ES-1. This report covers calendar year 2020. The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 and are summarized in each CAU-specific section of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. Site inspections are conducted annually at CAUs 90, 91, and 112; semiannually at CAUs 92 and 110; and quarterly at CAU 111. Additional inspections are conducted at CAUs 92 and 111 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 inch in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units, including covers, fences, signs, gates, and locks. At CAUs 110 and 111, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted in addition to the visual inspections. At CAU 110, the site fence, gate, lock, and use restriction signs are evaluated. At CAU 111, an ecological survey, direct radiation monitoring, air monitoring, radon flux monitoring, and groundwater monitoring are also conducted. This report will address all monitoring item notes above except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. Revision 6 of RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 was issued effective December 10, 2015, and remained in effect until December 10, 2020. At the time of this report submittal, the new RCRA permit application was in review.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2021

Calendar Year 2020 Post-Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev. 1)

This report presents the results of monitoring conducted for water quality, water levels, and institutional controls in calendar year (CY) 2020 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM), at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. This report also presents analytical laboratory results (including results of quality assurance/quality control samples, such as field duplicates [FDs]), and verification of use restrictions (URs), institutional controls, and water usage. Groundwater samples were collected; water levels were measured; and well site surveillance was conducted in support of the Underground Test Area Closure Report (CR) for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (DOE/EMNV, 2020). Rainier Mesa (RM) was the site of 61 underground nuclear tests, and Shoshone Mountain (SM) was the site of 6 underground nuclear tests. As a result of these activities, which took place from 1957 to 1992, radionuclides (RNs) were released in the subsurface in the vicinity of the detonations. These 67 underground nuclear tests are associated with 66 specific corrective action site (CAS) numbers, as listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). Two tests, HURON LANDING and DIAMOND ACE (conducted simultaneously), are included within one CAS. The CR (DOE/EMNV, 2020) establishes the regulatory boundaries and regulatory boundary objectives, monitoring program, UR boundaries and URs, and other institutional controls agreed to by EM Nevada Program and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for closure of CAU 99. Regulatory boundaries for the RM/SM CAU were established to protect receptors of groundwater from RN contamination within the three downgradient groundwater basins that receive recharge from RM. The SM regulatory boundary was established to verify that RN contamination does not reach the lower carbonate aquifer below SM. The UR boundaries were established based on contaminant simulation forecasts from the flow and transport simulations with consideration of site-specific topographical controls. The URs associated with the UR boundaries were identified to protect onsite workers and the public from inadvertent exposure to contaminated groundwater as forecasted to occur assuming current conditions. The UR is intended to restrict activities that might expose workers to contaminated groundwater within the UR area. In addition to the URs, other institutional controls are established to monitor and limit access to groundwater. These include federal ownership and management in perpetuity, controlled access of the NNSS and surrounding areas, and reporting water use on the NNSS and surrounding hydrographic basins.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2022

Calendar Year 2020 Underground Test Area Annual Sampling Report Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev. 1)

This CY 2020 annual sampling report presents the background of the FFACO and Sampling Plan implementation, sampling and analysis methods, sampling results, quality assurance and quality control, regulatory requirements, and analytical data for the CY 2020. Appendix A presents data from samples collected in CY 2020 from the YF/CM CAU and the RM/SM CAU. This sampling was conducted in support of the Sampling Plan at these CAUs prior to approval of the final CRs. Appendix B presents the well completion diagrams for the wells sampled in CY 2020. Appendix C presents data from samples collected in CY 2019. These results were not reported in the previous sampling report because they were not available from the specialized laboratories at the time of the report’s publication.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2023

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Validation with EBR-II Tests Performed During the SHRT Testing Program (Rev. 2)

The EBR-II sodium-cooled fast reactor supported a wide range of fast reactor research activities. The final fifteen years of operations at EBR-II were used for experiments and tests to demonstrate the importance of passive safety in liquid metal reactors and the capability of such systems to provide strong passive responses during off-normal conditions. The Shutdown Heat Removal Test program at EBR-II provided test data supporting the validation of computer codes for design, licensing, and operation of LMRs, among other objectives. The program included nearly sixty tests, most of which were protected and unprotected loss of flow and loss of heat sink tests run at various initial powers and flow rates. This report documents the results of modeling and simulation of tests from the Shutdown Heat Removal Test program to support validation of Argonne’s SAS4A/SASSYS-1 fast reactor safety analysis code. SHRT-17 and SHRT-6 were protected loss of flow tests where a loss of electrical power to all sodium coolant pumps was simulated to demonstrate the effectiveness of natural circulation cooling characteristics. SHRT-45R, SHRT-39, and SHRT-43R were unprotected loss of flow tests where the control rod scram function of the plant protection system was disabled to demonstrate the effectiveness of EBR-II’s passive reactivity feedbacks. BOP-301 and BOP-302R were unprotected loss of heat sink tests that demonstrated how reactivity feedback effects driven by changes to the core inlet temperature can shut down the fission process. PICT-5/6 demonstrated how core power could be increased and decreased via changes in the intermediate sodium and feedwater flow rates. This validation activity leverages modeling and simulation efforts that originated under an International Atomic Energy Agency Coordinated Research Project for benchmark analysis of the EBR-II Shutdown Heat Removal Tests. The SAS4A/SASSYS-1 models originally developed for the CRP have been modernized to utilize new code features and modeling practices. Differences between the predicted and measured test data were explored and the causes of these differences were identified as being due to modeling approximations, uncertainty in transient component behavior, and instrumentation uncertainties. Overall, it was concluded that for all tests simulated there was good agreement between the flow, power, and temperature predictions and the measured data.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Engineering Computational Practices (Rev. 1)

This manual will attempt to motivate the use of an automated build system for the purposes of computational science and engineering. As part of this motivation, the surrounding computational practices of version control, documen tation, compute environment management, and regression testing will also be addressed as applied to the practice of computational engineering. Specifically, this manual intends to motivate the adoption of these traditional software engineering practices for use in research and production engineering simulation projects. This manual is not the first such effort in the greater scientific computing community. In fact, the authors relied heavily on the lesson plans of the Software Carpentry, established to teach computing skills to researchers in 1998. As the intention for this manual is to lay out fundamental practices of engineering computing, it will not attempt to fully teach the underlying concepts and will instead reference the well designed lesson plans of the Software Carpentry. Where possible, this manual will explain to general computing practices and concepts and limit discussion of specific software implementations to examples or vehicles for practice in concrete application. The specific software taught by the Software Carpentry curriculum is an excellent starting point to learn the core concepts of computational engi neering. However, the authors have found that applications to engineering simulation and analysis require translation of these software development concepts into the language and workflows of computational engineers. Adopting these computational tools may require engineers to re-imagine their workflows in some combination of traditional engineer ing and software concepts. It has also been necessary to extend existing software build systems for engineering practices beyond the simple wrap ping of engineering software execution. Where necessary, examples of specific software and their method of extension to engineering simulations will be given, with reference to the User Manual for recommended practical use. Where this manual relies on specific implementation examples, it should be understood that the practicing engineer may find that different software is more amenable to their specific work. It is always the overall collection of computational practices is more important than any specific software implementation. The ability to recognize which concepts are implemented by a software package will make a practicing engineer agile to changing project needs, computing resources, numeric solvers, programming languages, and even available funding.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Professional Development for Technical Managers [Slides] (Rev. 1)

LANL is changing rapidly and requires a leadership development program in order to support the growing and changing workforce. Provide analysis and recommendations for a leadership development program for engineering services within ALDFO: 1) Attrition and churn are up; 2) Younger workforce--loss of organizational knowledge; 3) LANL is geographically isolated; 4) Leadership training is infrequent and one-size-fits-all.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

DOE OSTI2020

Low-Activity Waste Melter Process (LMP) System Design Description (Rev. 4)

This system design description (SDD) defines the technical, functional, and performance requirements of the low-activity waste (LAW) melter process system (LMP). This document details the waste treatment requirements, environmental compliance requirements, and authorization basis requirements of the LMP system as they are currently known and understood. This SDD describes the process and functional design requirements of the LMP, including the following: 1) Services and utility requirements, operating materials and supplies, and other external interfaces; 2) Operations limits and design bases; 3) Other criteria and requirements pertinent to the design of the LMP system; 4) Boundaries, system interfaces, and functional description of the LMP system. The LMP system is composed of two LAW melters of the same design with the contingency to add the third. Also included in the LMP system are the pour spouts, which are positioned under the melter discharge chambers of each melter, and the container level detectors. The boundaries, system interfaces, and functional description of the LMP system are provided in Section 2.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2022

Independent Review of Groundwater Remediation Strategy for Hexavalent Chromium and RDX Groundwater Plumes at Los Alamos National Laboratory (Rev. 1)

Site operations at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) resulted in the release of oxidized chromium, Cr(VI), into Sandia Canyon from cooling tower effluent from 1956 until 1972. The chromium traveled with the surface water approximately 3 miles downstream before migrating below ground surface. Chromium concentrations exceed 50 μg/L in the upper portion of the aquifer. Another LANL groundwater plume of concern is associated with RDX (Royal Demolition Explosives, 1,3,5-trinitro-1,3,5-triazine). Between 1951 and 1996, RDX was released to the mesa-top facilities' process water outfall, adjacent and underlying soils, and alluvial sediments, along with surface water in Cañon de Valle. Between 2000 and 2010, two remedial actions were deployed, removing much of the near-surface RDX, however, recharge due to precipitation has transported RDX into the perched-intermediate zone and into the regional aquifer. The report documents an independent technical review by scientists from the Department of Energy (DOE) Network of National Laboratories for Environmental Management and Stewardship (NNLEMS) to provide recommendations for potential near term actions to address and optimize remediation for both the Cr(VI) and RDX plumes. The proposed near-term remedial actions include design of pump and treat systems for Cr(VI) and monitoring and study for natural attenuation for RDX. The review assesses existing data, conceptual and numerical modeling, and it recommends a technical integration process to support identifying and implementing strategic, effective and efficient remedies. The DOE Environmental Management Los Alamos Field Office (EM-LA) and their cleanup contractor Newport News Nuclear-BWTX, LLC Los Alamos (N3B) provided the information required for the review. Interviews were also conducted with regulators to obtain the full spectrum of technical, regulatory and scientific perspectives. The independent review team was impressed by the capabilities, experiences, innovativeness, and insightfulness of the technical representatives from both the regulator, the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) and N3B. Incorporation of vadose zone flow pathways in the conceptual site model (CSM) and configuring the numerical modeling for the site was generally state-of-the-practice (or better). This could be considered state-of-the-art by addressing uncertainties related to spatial extent of hydraulic windows. The reviews from the regulators were thorough and often provided useful concepts for consideration and future/study resolutions. The overarching consensus recommendation of independent review team is that the LANL groundwater plumes should be addressed in context of the emerging "management of complex sites" paradigm.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2023

Technical Evaluation of Accelerated Basin De-Inventory Material Addition to Sludge Batch 11 (Rev. 1)

The Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program involves discarding spent nuclear fuel that is currently stored in L-Basin to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for vitrification. The first ABD discards will occur during the preparation of Sludge Batch (SB) 11. Savannah River Mission Completion has requested that the Savannah River National Laboratory assess the technical gaps related to the increased gadolinium poisoning requirement and the impacts of performing the Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution (LTAD) process in Tank 51 with H-Canyon discards present. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of increasing the quantity of gadolinium (and related topics) from what was previously evaluated in the SRNL studies of gadolinium-poisoned ABD material solubility, the overall ABD flowsheet review, and increasing the fissile mass loading in glass: 1) Based on literature surveys, there is no indication that organic interactions with gadolinium will be significant at the high pH (typically >13) conditions of the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities. Any interactions of gadolinium with organics in DWPF are not expected to adversely impact DWPF or downstream facilities. Thus, there is little-to-no residual risk from organic interactions with gadolinium [Gap closed]; 2) Adding depleted uranium to ABD material, targeting 235 U enrichment of 4.90% within each transfer window, will mitigate potential impacts from an increase in soluble 235 U enrichment during sludge washing and LTAD. The plan to take advantage of previous transfers and allow 235 U enrichment of >5% during the final transfer window carries a risk that Tank 51 supernate will have a 235 U enrichment of >5%, which should be evaluated for acceptance; 3) Increasing the gadolinium mass ratio to 3.0:1 Gd: 235 U(eq SLU ) should lead to the same or higher partitioning of gadolinium into the solid phase within the DWPF Chemical Process Cell, resulting in both liquid and solid phases with expected partitioning of Gd consistent with the prior solubility study [Gap closed for SB11]; 4) There are no expected impacts on DWPF melt temperature and melter operations due to the minimal ~0.2 weight percent (wt%) increase in Gd concentration relative to previous sludge batches [Gap closed for SB11]; 5) As observed previously, Gd is expected to enter the off-gas system via physical entrainment, but at a slightly higher concentration than what was observed for SB9 melter off-gas pluggage deposits (0.07 wt%) [Gap closed for SB11] ; 6) There are no expected impacts on DWPF recycle or the Recycle Collection Tank glycolate destruction process. [Gap closed for SB11]; 7) Gd is projected to be a trace component in the SB11 glass (<0.5 wt%) and can be ignored for process control. Trace components do not significantly impact glass durability, thus the conclusions of the previous Product Consistency Test evaluation at a fissile mass loading of 2,500 g fissile/m3 glass still applies to SB11. The ~0.1 wt% increase in Gd2O3 concentration relative to the previous study will not impact the predictability of SB11 glass with the DWPF Product Composition Control System (PCCS) models for durability or the acceptability of glass according to the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (WAPS) criterion for product consistency [Gap closed for SB11]; 8) No additional Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure testing is necessary for SB11 and the hazardous waste specification of the SB11 DWPF waste form is unchanged after the addition of the ABD stream [Gap closed for SB11]. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of adding two-thirds of the ABD material to Tank 51 prior to LTAD: 1) The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall aluminum mass from 1.39×10 4 kg to 1.64×10 4 kg (15.5% ABD Al). The form of the insoluble portion of the Al resulting from ABD addition should be the more readily dissolved Al(OH) 3 and amorphous forms. The portion of the ABD aluminum that is processed by LTAD is expected to be completely soluble, thus requiring that less of the boehmite in the sludge be dissolved to reach the same Al target in the SB. [Gap closed for SB11]; The expected LTAD impact on other components, as related primarily to the components in ABD, are discussed. Gd is expected to remain insoluble during LTAD and not impact the solubility of other components. [Gap closed for SB11]; The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 13,100 kg (63% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 89.5 kg (3.9% ABD Pu). The addition of all of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 16,100 kg (70% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 90.4 kg (5.3% ABD Pu). The 235 U enrichment will be ≤5%. The fissile uranium will be adequately poisoned by Gd and the fissile Pu will be adequately poisoned by Fe from the sludge. [Gap closed for SB11]; There is a low risk that ABD addition will impact the rheology or pumpability of the slurry. There is a low but higher risk of ABD addition prior to LTAD impacting the settling rate; Based on the evaluation of adding two-thirds of the ABD material and all of the ABD material prior to the LTAD process, there is no volume or mass limit that would need to be imposed on ABD additions prior to LTAD. [Gap closed for SB11]. Revision 1 of this report addresses a variation on the ABD additions and LTAD strategy where sodium hydroxide additions for LTAD may be performed intermittently or concurrently with an ABD addition window. The proposed change does not alter the conclusions of this evaluation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2022

Vadose Zone Model for B-63 Area for Composite Analysis (Rev. 2)

The objectives of the vadose modeling for the updated Hanford Site composite analysis (CA) are to simulate the flow and transport of water and radionuclide releases from the surface to the water table and to provide radionuclide transfer rates for the plateau to river (P2R) model, version 8.3 (CP-57037, Model Package Report: Plateau to River Groundwater Model, Version 8.3). Water additions include natural recharge and water discharged to the ground as a result of industrial processes associated with Hanford Site operations. Contaminant sources include radionuclides in water discharged to the ground during operations and radionuclides disposed “dry” in solid waste burial grounds or other means. The following 16 radionuclides were selected for this modeling effort; carbon-14 (C-14), chlorine-36 (Cl-36), tritium (H-3), iodine-129 (I-129), neptunium-237 (Np-237), rhenium-187 (Re-187), strontium-90 (Sr-90), technetium-99 (Tc-99), uranium-232 (U-232), uranium-233 (U-233), uranium-234 (U-234), uranium-235 (U-235), uranium-236 (U-236), uranium-238 (U-238), radium-226 (Ra-226), and thorium-230 (Th-230). The simulation time starts in 1943 and ends at 12070, which is 10,000 years after assumed Hanford Site closure in 2070.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2023

Data Analysis of Energy Code Compliance in Commercial Buildings (Rev. 1)

What percent of newly constructed commercial buildings comply with the energy code? How much energy and cost could be saved if the compliance increased? Which code requirements have both low compliance rates and high savings potential? These are the questions U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is trying to answer through its Commercial Energy Code Field Study. Previous commercial studies have been very limited and did not result in a widely accepted and tested methodology. DOE’s goal is to create a standardized methodology that can produce actionable results at a reasonable study cost, that can be used by state and local governments and utilities and provides valuable information to policy makers. The field study team implemented the pilot methodology, compiling a data set of 230 office and retail buildings in two climate zones. The approach is based on identifying lost savings on a total energy cost basis rather than simply counting the quantity of measures that do not meet code. This report is focused on the analysis of the collected data. The primary goal was to analyze the data collected during the field study and determine the actual energy cost impact of each measure in a non-compliance situation. The energy impact results allowed for ranking the measures to identify which have the highest potential for lost savings. These results combined with the time required to verify each measure will allow future compliance verification to focus on measures that had a large impact on energy use over the life of the building and those that have the greatest savings recovery potential per verification hour.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2022

Calendar Year 2021 Post-Closure Monitoring Letter Report (Rev. 1)

This letter serves as the annual post-closure letter for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 97, Yucca Flat/Climax Mine (YF/CM); CAU 98, Frenchman Flat (FF); and CAU 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM) for calendar year (CY) 2021. This letter will discuss the post-closure monitoring activities that occurred during CY 2021, identify any triggers reached, and summarize water usage on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and surrounding hydrographic basins at the three CAUs.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2023

Verification of the DIF3D Software to Support Fast Reactor Analysis (Rev. 3)

Ongoing design activities at Argonne National Laboratory are requiring a thorough verification of the Argonne Reactor Computation codes be performed. DIF3D is central to this system. The driver for this effort requires the 3D Cartesian, triangular-Z, and hexagonal-Z core geometry options of DIF3D be verified. Previous work identified the DIF3D features required to be verified to support current design activities, features of which are generally applicable to hexagonal-Z fast reactor designs. The scope of this verification effort includes verifying DIF3D’s ability to correctly translate the user’s model in to DIF3D’s preferred format, verifying that options planned for use have the desired effect, and verifying the correctness of the eigenvalue, fixed-source, forward, and adjoint solvers in DIF3D-FD and DIF3D-VARIANT. This manuscript provides the verification tasks and their results with respect to the features needed for current design activities. Since analytic solutions of the neutron diffusion and transport equations are either limited in scope or not possible, multiple tiers of problems unique to each solver and geometry type were implemented. Each of these tiers tests features independent and complementary arguments for why the separate testing of functionalities is acceptable. Finally, this separate testing was also supplemented with a high-level integral check of each the diffusion and transport capabilities and applicable geometries. To accommodate cases which an analytic solution is not feasible, MCNP6.2 was relied upon to provide a higher-order reference solution. This therefore required that the capabilities within MCNP6.2 which were relied upon for this work are also verified in this work. No MCNP discrepancies were noted in this effort. Note that the MCNP6.2 verification included in this work does not stand as a full verification of MCNP6.2, but merely verifies the features used in verifying DIF3D. The verification effort identified no issues that are debilitating or otherwise impactful to design usage of DIF3D, and thus DIF3D version 11.0, release 3012 is considered verified. As some additional changes have been made to the ARC software since this point all versions between release 3012 and 3266 can be considered verified as version 3253 was used for all updates in this revision. The types of issues that were identified were predominantly in the areas of: unclear documentation, software bugs which were inconsequential to final results, editing options which were ignored in favor of printing more information than requested, bugs in the outputs of intermediate results, or secondary output binary file information which was not present. While not a bug, this verification report also identified that the algorithm used to evaluate the peak fast flux in a nodal transport solution can be quite unreliable due to the methodology used and the location of the peak within the mesh. The authors of the report therefore recommend the usage of the EvaluateFlux software (distributed with ARC) as a more robust alternative noting that DIF3D will properly notify the user when the peaking values it is providing are potentially incorrect.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Vitrification of Hanford Tank Wastes for Condensate Recycle and Feed Composition Changeover Testing (Rev. 1)

During the vitrification of Hanford Site nuclear waste at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP), which is a part of the safe and efficient retrieval, treatment, and disposal mission of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of River Protection, the offgas condensate generated from the waste-to-glass conversion is currently planned to be concentrated by evaporation in the Effluent Management Facility (EMF). This concentrated condensate can then be recycled back to the incoming waste and vitrified. To test the recycle process, an apparatus was designed and built to mimic the EMF evaporator and was then used to concentrate a volume of condensate produced during the vitrification of a sample of Hanford tank 241-AP-107 (referred to herein as AP-107) waste in a continuous laboratory-scale melter (CLSM). The concentrated condensate was added to an additional sample of AP-107 waste, to mimic one round of the recycle process, and the combined solution was vitrified, producing a second round of recycle condensate. In the current study, the EMF test apparatus was used to concentrate the second-round recycle condensate under evaporation conditions (at 45 °C and 1.4 psia) designed to emulate EMF operation. The condensate was successfully concentrated by a factor of ~10 while retaining over 95 % of the technetium-99 (99Tc), Cs, and I inventories in the concentrate. Another portion of AP-107 waste was retrieved by Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) and transferred to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), where it was pretreated and then combined with the second-round recycle AP-107 condensate concentrate and glass-forming chemicals (GFCs) to form the two-time recycle AP-107 melter feed, approximating a second round to the recycling action to be performed at the WTP. A portion of AP-105 waste was also retrieved by WRPS and provided to PNNL for pretreatment and combining with GFCs to form AP-105 melter feed. The two-time recycle AP-107 and AP-105 melter feeds were processed consecutively in the CLSM. The CLSM run proceeded for 13.63 hours, producing 9.70 kg of glass for an average glass production rate of 1464 kg m 2 d -1 during the two-time recycle AP-107 feed charging and 1568 kg m 2 d -1 during the AP-105 feed charging. The rate during AP-107 charging was essentially equivalent to the rate when processing no-recycle AP-107 feed and lower than that achieved when processing one-time recycle AP-107 feed. However, all rates were within the potential range of variability when processing melter feeds with similar composition in the CLSM. Likewise, the rate during AP-105 charging was higher than the previous rate processing AP-105, but within the potential CLSM range. The cold-cap characteristics changed from the typically thin AP-107 cold cap to a foamy-edged cold cap as previously seen with AP-105 shortly after transitioning to the AP-105 melter feed. The glass produced during the CLSM run was within 10 % of its target composition for the primary glass components. The CaO and Li 2 O targets varied by more than 1 wt% between the two-time recycle AP-107 and AP-105 glass targets and it took about 2 turnovers of the CLSM glass inventory to reach a relative chemical steady state in the glass for CaO and Li 2 O after the melter feed inputs were switched.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2023

2022 LANL Radionuclide Air Emissions Report (Rev. 2)

This report describes the emissions of airborne radionuclides from operations at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for calendar year 2022 and the resulting off-site dose from these emissions. This document fulfills the requirements established by the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants in 40 CFR 61, Subpart H – Emissions of Radionuclides other than Radon from Department of Energy Facilities, commonly referred to as the Radionuclide NESHAP or Rad-NESHAP. Compliance with this regulation and preparation of this document is the responsibility of LANL’s Rad NESHAP compliance program, which is part of the Environmental Protection and Compliance (EPC) Division. The information in this report is required under the Clean Air Act and is being submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Headquarters and EPA Region 6. The highest effective dose equivalent (EDE) to an off-site member of the public was calculated using procedures specified by the EPA and described in this report. LANL’s EDE was 0.45 for 2022. The annual limit is 10 millirem per year, established by the EPA in 40 CFR 61 Subpart H. All measured air emissions are modeled to a single location, known as the Maximally Exposed Individual (MEI). During calendar year 2022, LANL continuously monitored radionuclide emissions at 27 “major” release points, or stacks. The Laboratory estimates emissions from an additional 34 “minor” release points using radionuclide usage source terms in lieu of stack monitoring. Also, LANL uses an EPA approved network of air samplers around the Laboratory perimeter to monitor ambient airborne levels of radionuclides. To provide data for dispersion modeling and dose assessment, LANL maintains and operates several meteorological monitoring towers. From these various systems, a comprehensive evaluation is conducted to calculate the MEI dose for the Laboratory. The MEI can be any member of the public at any off-site location where there is a residence, school, business, or office. In 2022, this MEI location was a business at 95 Entrada Drive, located in the eastern end of Los Alamos town site. The primary contributors to the off-site dose at this location are the ambient air data at that location combined with radioactive gas emissions from the LANSCE facility and the collected potential emissions from unmonitored (minor) sources. Overall, the MEI dose in 2022 is similar to that which has been observed in recent years, and it remains well below the EPA’s 10 millirem per year limit. Doses reported to the EPA for the past 10 years are shown in Table E1.

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