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NASA NTRS1999

Reinventing The Design Process: Teams and Models

The future of space mission designing will be dramatically different from the past. Formerly, performance-driven paradigms emphasized data return with cost and schedule being secondary issues. Now and in the future, costs are capped and schedules fixed-these two variables must be treated as independent in the design process. Accordingly, JPL has redesigned its design process. At the conceptual level, design times have been reduced by properly defining the required design depth, improving the linkages between tools, and managing team dynamics. In implementation-phase design, system requirements will be held in crosscutting models, linked to subsystem design tools through a central database that captures the design and supplies needed configuration management and control. Mission goals will then be captured in timelining software that drives the models, testing their capability to execute the goals. Metrics are used to measure and control both processes and to ensure that design parameters converge through the design process within schedule constraints. This methodology manages margins controlled by acceptable risk levels. Thus, teams can evolve risk tolerance (and cost) as they would any engineering parameter. This new approach allows more design freedom for a longer time, which tends to encourage revolutionary and unexpected improvements in design.

Wall, Stephen D.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Trade Space Assessment for Human Exploration Mission Design

Many human space exploration mission architecture assessments have been performed over the years by diverse organizations and individuals. Direct comparison of metrics among these studies is extremely difficult due to widely varying assumptions involving projected technology readiness, mission goals, acceptable risk criteria, and socio-political environments. However, constant over the years have been the physical laws of celestial dynamics and rocket propulsion systems. A finite diverse yet finite architecture trade space should exist which captures methods of human exploration - particularly of the Moon and Mars - by delineating technical trades and cataloging the physically realizable options of each. A particular architectural approach should then have a traceable path through this "trade tree". It should be pointed out that not every permutation of paths will result in a physically realizable mission approach, but cataloging options that have been examined by past studies should help guide future analysis. This effort was undertaken in two phases by multi-center NASA working groups in the spring and summer of 2004 using more than thirty years of past studies to "flesh out" the Moon-Mars human exploration trade space. The results are presented, not as a "trade tree", which would be unwieldy, but as a "menu" of potential technical options as a function of mission phases. This is envisioned as a tool to aid future mission designers by offering guidance to relevant past analyses.

Joosten, B. Kent↗

NASA NTRS2006

Systems Integration Processes for NASA's Crew Launch Vehicle

NASA's Exploration Initiative will require development of many new elements to constitute a robust system of systems. New launch vehicles are needed to place cargo and crew in stable low earth orbit. This paper examines the systems integration processes NASA is utilizing to ensure integration and control of propulsion and non-propulsion elements within NASA's Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV). The objective of the CLV is to provide the transportation capabilities to meet the Constellation Program requirements for delivering a Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) or other payload to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) in support of the lunar and Mars missions. The CLV must successfully provide the capability within cost and schedule with an acceptable risk approach. This paper will describe in detail the systems engineering management processes that will be applied to assure CLV Project success through complete and efficient technical integration. Discussion of specific processes for requirements development and verification, integrated design and analysis, integrated simulation and testing and the integration of reliability, maintainability and supportability (RMS) into the design will also be included. The CLV Project is broken logically into elements by the major hardware groupings, and associated management, system engineering, and integration functions. The processes to be described herein are designed to integrate within these CLV elements and among the other Constellation projects. Launch vehicle stack integration (CLV to CEV, and Ground and Flight Operations integration) throughout the life cycle, including integrated vehicle performance through orbital insertion, recovery of the first stage, and reentry of the upper stage will also be discussed. The processes for decomposing requirements to the Elements and ensuring that requirements have been correctly validated, decomposed, allocated, and that the verification requirements are properly defined to ensure that the system design meets requirements will be discussed.

Reuter, James L.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Systems Integration Processes for NASA Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle

NASA's Exploration Initiative will require development of many new elements to constitute a robust system of systems. New launch vehicles are needed to place cargo and crew in stable Low Earth Orbit (LEO). This paper examines the systems integration processes NASA is utilizing to ensure integration and control of propulsion and nonpropulsion elements within NASA's Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV), now known as the Ares I. The objective of the Ares I is to provide the transportation capabilities to meet the Constellation Program requirements for delivering a Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) or other payload to LEO in support of the lunar and Mars missions. The Ares I must successfully provide this capability within cost and schedule, and with an acceptable risk approach. This paper will describe the systems engineering management processes that will be applied to assure Ares I Project success through complete and efficient technical integration. Discussion of technical review and management processes for requirements development and verification, integrated design and analysis, integrated simulation and testing, and the integration of reliability, maintainability and supportability (RMS) into the design will also be included. The Ares I Project is logically divided into elements by the major hardware groupings, and associated management, system engineering, and integration functions. The processes to be described herein are designed to integrate within these Ares I elements and among the other Constellation projects. Also discussed is launch vehicle stack integration (Ares I to CEV, and Ground and Flight Operations integration) throughout the life cycle, including integrated vehicle performance through orbital insertion, recovery of the first stage, and reentry of the upper stage. The processes for decomposing requirements to the elements and ensuring that requirements have been correctly validated, decomposed, and allocated, and that the verification requirements are properly defined to ensure that the system design meets requirements, will be discussed.

Taylor, James L.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Human Research Program Requirements Document (Revision C)

The purpose of this document is to define, document, and allocate the Human Research Program (HRP) requirements to the HRP Program Elements. It establishes the flow-down of requirements from Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) and Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) to the various Program Elements of the HRP to ensure that human research and technology countermeasure investments are made to insure the delivery of countermeasures and technologies that satisfy ESMD's and OCHMO's exploration mission requirements. Requirements driving the HRP work and deliverables are derived from the exploration architecture, as well as Agency standards regarding the maintenance of human health and performance. Agency human health and performance standards will define acceptable risk for each type and duration of exploration mission. It is critical to have the best available scientific and clinical evidence in setting and validating these standards. In addition, it is imperative that the best available evidence on preventing and mitigating human health and performance risks is incorporated into exploration mission and vehicle designs. These elements form the basis of the HRP research and technology development requirements and highlight the importance of HRP investments in enabling NASA's exploration missions. This PRD defines the requirements of the HRP which is comprised of the following major Program Elements: Behavioral Health and Performance (BHP), Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC), Human Health Countermeasures (HHC), ISS Medical Project (ISSMP), Space Human Factors and Habitability (SHFH), and Space Radiation (SR).

Vargas, Paul R.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Safety and Mission Assurance Performance Metric

The safety and mission assurance (S&MA) performance metric is a method that provides a process through which the managers of a large, complex program can readily understand and assess the accepted risk, the problems, and the associated reliability of the program. Conceived for original use in helping to assure the safety and success of the International Space Station (ISS) program, the S&MA performance metric also can be applied to other large and complex programs and projects. The S&MA-performance-metric data products comprise one or more tables (possibly also one or more graphs) that succinctly display all of the information relevant (and no information that is irrelevant) to management decisions that must be made to assure the safety and success of a program or project, thereby facilitating such decisions.

Holsomback, Jerry↗

NASA NTRS2010

Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission Four (HST SM4) EVA Challenges for Safe Execution of STS-125

In May of 2009, the world-renowned Hubble Space Telescope (HST) received a suite of new instruments and a refurbished bus to enable science for many years to come. The restoration was conducted on-orbit by four space-walkers on five carefully scripted Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) days. Assuring the safety of the space-walkers and their crew-mates required careful attention to tool development, detailed procedures for every activity and many rehearsals with engineers and crew to ensure that everything worked together. Additionally, evolution of EVA requirements since the last servicing mission in 2002, and the broad scope of the mission demanded a much higher degree of safety participation in hardware design and risk acceptance than for previous servicing missions.

Dedalis, Robert P.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Shooting the Moon

This story is about an unlikely NASA mission to the Moon. It was unlikely because it was started with far too little time and too-little money to complete. It was unlikely because it was able to take chances to accept risk of failure. It was unlikely because it was searching for the unthinkable: water-ice on the moon... Figure 1-1: LCROSS Mission. The mission of the Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) was to investigate the possibility of water ice in craters on the Moon s poles. This is certainly an interesting scientific topic in itself, but I intend to focus on the compelling experience of managing the LCROSS Project in the context of this storied Agency. Perhaps most interesting are the implications this story has for managing any development effort, lunar or not, and working a balance to achieve success. NASA is by design a risk-taking agency within the US Government. It could be argued that NASA s purpose in the aerospace community is to take on the really big challenges that either the corporate world can t afford, are not yet profitable endeavors, or are just too risky for private corporations to entertain. However, expectations of the Agency have evolved. A combination of grim human tragedies and some very public cost and schedule overruns have challenged the public s and Congress s tolerance for risk-taking within the Agency. NASA, which is supposed to be in the business of taking risks to do bold, difficult things, has become less and less able to do so within its cost framework. Yet effectively replacing prudent risk management with attempts to "risk-eliminate" is completely unaffordable. So where does risk-taking fit within the Agency, or within private/corporate organizations for that matter? Where astronauts play there is clearly concern about risk. When an organization puts humans in harm s way, it is understandably going to take extra effort to assure nobody gets hurt. Doing so, of course, costs money - a lot of money to pay for labor and hardware which is attempting to assure nothing will go wrong. Sophisticated designs, with doubly- or triply-redundant systems, extensive testing to verify those systems, and numerous engineering test units built to learn and evolve a hardware design, all drive the cost and time required to implement. Human spaceflight is an expensive business because of the exceptional system complexity and levels of assurance required for human space travel. What about missions that do not involve human spaceflight? What about missions whose potential failure will not take a human life, whose costs are small and whose urgency and importance are limited by design? A portfolio consisting of this type of mission can be designed to be risk tolerant, not requiring large expenditures to guarantee against failure. With the money saved, the number of missions that can be executed within the portfolio grows, or the total cost of the portfolio can be reduced. The NASA LCROSS mission is a pathfinder example of a low-cost, quick turn-around mission which struck a balance on mission risk, while accomplishing big objectives, like defining how we understand the Moon.

Andrews, Daniel R.↗

NASA NTRS2014

The Evolution of System Safety at NASA

The NASA system safety framework is in the process of change, motivated by the desire to promote an objectives-driven approach to system safety that explicitly focuses system safety efforts on system-level safety performance, and serves to unify, in a purposeful manner, safety-related activities that otherwise might be done in a way that results in gaps, redundancies, or unnecessary work. An objectives-driven approach to system safety affords more flexibility to determine, on a system-specific basis, the means by which adequate safety is achieved and verified. Such flexibility and efficiency is becoming increasingly important in the face of evolving engineering modalities and acquisition models, where, for example, NASA will increasingly rely on commercial providers for transportation services to low-earth orbit. A key element of this objectives-driven approach is the use of the risk-informed safety case (RISC): a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence, that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is or will be adequately safe for a given application in a given environment. The RISC addresses each of the objectives defined for the system, providing a rational basis for making informed risk acceptance decisions at relevant decision points in the system life cycle.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

NASA NTRS2015

Conjunction Assessment Past, Present, and Future

Since 1957, humankind's reliance on the space domain for military, humanitarian, and commercial applications has continued to increase. 1960 first successful use of a meteorological satellite,1963 first use of a geosynchronous communications satellite, 1985 Block I of GPS fielded, 1998 first module of ISS, 2001 first satellite radio broadcast over North America. What you take into space, stays in space: launch vehicle, rocket-bodies, mission-related debris. Debris can also be generated on-orbit: fuel/battery explosions, collisions. Only naturally-occurring retarding effect is orbital decay due to atmospheric drag: some remediation measures available, active debris removal not yet viable option. Because of our reliance on space and the fact that space really isn't limitless, the Big Sky theory is no longer an acceptable risk posture. There have been eight (8) on-orbit collisions reported to date, half of which occurred in the last 10 years.

Assessment↗

NASA NTRS2015

NASA System Safety Handbook. Volume 2: System Safety Concepts, Guidelines, and Implementation Examples

This is the second of two volumes that collectively comprise the NASA System Safety Handbook. Volume 1 (NASASP-210-580) was prepared for the purpose of presenting the overall framework for System Safety and for providing the general concepts needed to implement the framework. Volume 2 provides guidance for implementing these concepts as an integral part of systems engineering and risk management. This guidance addresses the following functional areas: 1.The development of objectives that collectively define adequate safety for a system, and the safety requirements derived from these objectives that are levied on the system. 2.The conduct of system safety activities, performed to meet the safety requirements, with specific emphasis on the conduct of integrated safety analysis (ISA) as a fundamental means by which systems engineering and risk management decisions are risk-informed. 3.The development of a risk-informed safety case (RISC) at major milestone reviews to argue that the systems safety objectives are satisfied (and therefore that the system is adequately safe). 4.The evaluation of the RISC (including supporting evidence) using a defined set of evaluation criteria, to assess the veracity of the claims made therein in order to support risk acceptance decisions.

Safety Case↗

NASA NTRS2015

NASA Affordable Vehicle Avionics (AVA): Common Modular Avionics System for Nano-Launchers Offering Affordable Access to Space

Small satellites are becoming ever more capable of performing valuable missions for both government and commercial customers. However, currently these satellites can only be launched affordably as secondary payloads. This makes it difficult for the small satellite mission to launch when needed, to the desired orbit, and with acceptable risk. NASA Ames Research Center has developed and tested a prototype low-cost avionics package for space launch vehicles that provides complete GNC functionality in a package smaller than a tissue box with a mass less than 0.84 kg. AVA takes advantage of commercially available, low-cost, mass-produced, miniaturized sensors, filtering their more noisy inertial data with realtime GPS data. The goal of the Advanced Vehicle Avionics project is to produce and flight-verify a common suite of avionics and software that deliver affordable, capable GNC and telemetry avionics with application to multiple nano-launch vehicles at 1 the cost of current state-of-the-art avionics.

Guidance Navigation and Control↗

NASA NTRS2015

Big Software for SmallSats: Adapting CFS to CubeSat Missions

Expanding capabilities and mission objectives for SmallSats and CubeSats is driving the need for reliable, reusable, and robust flight software. While missions are becoming more complicated and the scientific goals more ambitious, the level of acceptable risk has decreased. Design challenges are further compounded by budget and schedule constraints that have not kept pace. NASA's Core Flight Software System (cFS) is an open source solution which enables teams to build flagship satellite level flight software within a CubeSat schedule and budget. NASA originally developed cFS to reduce mission and schedule risk for flagship satellite missions by increasing code reuse and reliability. The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, which launched in 2009, was the first of a growing list of Class B rated missions to use cFS. Large parts of cFS are now open source, which has spurred adoption outside of NASA. This paper reports on the experiences of two teams using cFS for current CubeSat missions. The performance overheads of cFS are quantified, and the reusability of code between missions is discussed. The analysis shows that cFS is well suited to use on CubeSats and demonstrates the portability and modularity of cFS code.

Open Source↗

NASA NTRS2015

Big Software for SmallSats: Adapting cFS to CubeSat Missions

Flight Software↗

NASA NTRS2017

Shape Effect Analysis of Aluminum Projectile Impact on Whipple Shields

The informed design with respect to hypervelocity collisions involving micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) is influential to the success of space missions. For an orbit comparable to that of the International Space Station, velocities for MMOD can range from 1 to 15 km/s, with an average velocity around 10 km/cu s. The high energy released during collisions at these speeds can result in damage to a spacecraft, or worst-case, loss of the spacecraft, thus outlining the importance of methods to predict the likelihood and extent of damage due to an impact. Through experimental testing and numerical simulations, substantial work has been conducted to better understand the effects of hypervelocity impacts (HVI) on spacecraft systems and shields; however, much of the work has been focused on spherical impacting particles. To improve environment models for the analysis of MMOD, a large-scale satellite break-up test was performed at the Arnold Engineering and Development Complex to better understand the varied impactor geometries that could be generated from a large impact. As a part of the post-experiment analysis, an undertaking to characterize the irregular fragments generated is currently being performed by the University of Florida under the management of NASA's Orbital Debris Program Office at Johnson Space Center (JSC). DebriSat was a representative, modern LEO satellite that was catastrophically broken up in a HVI test. The test chamber was lined with a soft-catch system of foam panels that captured the fragments after impact. Initial predictions put the number of fragments larger than 2mm generated from the HVI at roughly 85,000. The number of fragments thus far extracted from the foam panels has exceeded 100,000, with that number continuously increasing. The shapes of the fragments vary dependent upon the material. Carbon-fiber reinforced polymer pieces, for instance, are abundantly found as thin, flat slivers. The characterization of these fragments with respect to their mass, size, and material composition needs to be summarized in a form that can be used in MMOD analysis. The mechanism that brings these fragment traits into MMOD analysis is through ballistic limit equations (BLE) that have been developed largely for a few types of materials1. As a BLE provides the failure threshold for a shield or spacecraft component based on parameters such as the projectile impact velocity and size, and the target's materials, thickness, and configuration, it is used to design protective shields for spacecraft such as Whipple shields (WS) to an acceptable risk level. The majority of experiments and simulations to test shields and validate BLEs have, heretofore, largely used spheres as the impactor, not properly reflecting the irregular shapes of MMOD. This shortfall has motivated a numerical impact analysis study of HVI involving non-spherical geometries to identify key parameters that environment models should provide.

Carrasquilla, Maria J.↗

NASA NTRS2017

NASA Affordable Vehicle Avionics (AVA)

Small satellites are becoming ever more capable of performing valuable missions for both government and commercial customers. However, currently these satellites can be launched affordably only as secondary payloads. This makes it difficult for the small satellite mission to launch when needed, to the desired orbit, and with acceptable risk. What is needed is a class of low-cost launchers, so that launch costs to low-Earth orbit (LEO) are commensurate with payload costs. Several private and government-sponsored launch vehicle developers are working toward just that-the ability to affordably insert small payloads into LEO. But until now, cost of the complex avionics remained disproportionately high. AVA (Affordable Vehicle Avionics) solves this problem. Significant contributors to the cost of launching nanosatellites to orbit are the avionics and software systems that steer and control the launch vehicles, sequence stage separation, deploy payloads, and telemeter data. The high costs of these guidance, navigation and control (GNC) avionics systems are due in part to the current practice of developing unique, single-use hardware and software for each launch. High-performance, high-reliability inertial sensors components with heritage from legacy launchers also contribute to costs-but can low-cost commercial inertial sensors work just as well? NASA Ames Research Center has developed and tested a prototype low-cost avionics package for space launch vehicles that provides complete GNC functionality in a package smaller than a tissue box (100 millimeters by 120 millimeters by 69 millimeters; 4 inches by 4.7 inches by 2.7 inches), with a mass of less than 0.84 kilogram (2 pounds. AVA takes advantage of commercially available, low-cost, mass-produced, miniaturized sensors, filtering their more noisy inertial data with real-time GPS (Global Positioning Satellite) data. The goal of the AVA project is to produce and light-verify a common suite of avionics and software that deliver affordable, capable GNC and telemetry avionics with application to multiple nanolaunch vehicles at 1 percent of the cost of current state-of-the-art avionics.

space technology↗

NASA NTRS2017

Space Technology Game Changing Development: NASA Affordable Vehicle Avionics (AVA)

Common Modular Avionics System for Nanolaunchers Offering Affordable Access to Space Small satellites are becoming ever more capable of performing valuable missions for both government and commercial customers. However, currently these satellites can be launched affordably only as secondary payloads. This makes it difficult for the small satellite mission to launch when needed, to the desired orbit, and with acceptable risk. What is needed is a class of low-cost launchers, so that launch costs to low-Earth orbit (LEO) are commensurate with payload costs. Several private and government-sponsored launch vehicle developers are working toward just that—the ability to affordably insert small payloads into LEO. But until now, cost of the complex avionics remained disproportionately high. AVA solves this problem. Significant contributors to the cost of launching nanosatellites to orbit are the avionics and software systems that steer and control the launch vehicles, sequence stage separation, deploy payloads, and telemeter data. The high costs of these guidance, navigation and control (GNC) avionics systems are due in part to the current practice of developing unique, single use hardware and software for each launch. High-performance, high-reliability inertial sensors components with heritage from legacy launchers also contribute to costs—but can low-cost commercial inertial sensors work just as well?

Aquilina, Rudy↗

NASA NTRS2018

Cassini In-Flight Navigation Adaptations

In the nearly two decades of Cassini flight, adaptations to navigation processes were applied as characteristics unique to Cassini were identified and spacecraft configuration changes were implemented. Additionally, operational experience was leveraged into more efficient processes, better modeling, and more robust contingency strategies. Trajectory adjustments were implemented to allow further investigation of surprising science discoveries meriting more attention. Unique analyses were performed to determine how to best accomplish atypical science observations while maintaining acceptable risk levels. Descriptions of the most significant adaptations are organized according to the affected navigation subsystems: trajectory design, orbit determination, optical navigation, and maneuver design.

Wagner, Sean↗