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NASA NTRS2017

The Epic Chronicle of Designing Cassini's Titan Flyby Altitudes

The selection and optimization of Titan flyby altitudes for NASA's Cassini mission at Saturn has traveled a long, fascinating, and often torturous sixteen-year path - starting in 2001, when pre-arrival trajectory design decisions had to be made, through April of 2017 when Cassini's last, and arguably most critical, low flyby takes place. The chronicle of designing and updating the Titan flyby altitudes have twists and turns enough to satisfy a full-length novel or feature film, including: critical design decision-making before arrival with multiple atmospheric models, high uncertainties, and limited data; early flybys that seemed to show trends that weren't there; use and misuse of statistical analysis; unexpected surprises with limited reaction time; navigation of a scientific, engineering, and management community with a wide array of inherent biases; and consideration of a variety of project risk postures in a high-scrutiny, high-impact, high-reward environment.

Bittner, Molly↗

NASA NTRS2018

Ground Software Technologies – Embracing Change: Mission Drivers and Technology Opportunities to Enable Long Lived Missions

Mission lifecycles have proven to extend well beyond their original design. The benefits to this are countless but introduce challenges in today’s rapidly changing ground infrastructure and software technologies used to enable mission success. What remains constant is the risk posture missions maintain when accepting change and the use of new technologies. Larger missions are ready for change in early lifecycle development but near launch and especially in operations, few continue to evolve beyond what is set in place in phase C. This paper will discuss how the Advance Multi-Mission Operations System (AMMOS) intends to address, three driving missions concerns: Maintaining functionality (hardware/software) for decades, rapidly responding to security vulnerabilities in software, and finally the ability to quickly evolve infrastructure and software changes. These driving concerns are briefly described below: 1. Maintaining functionality (hardware/software) for decades. Hardware updates considerably faster than 10 years ago. Expectations that a system can remain in place for more than 10 years is no longer valid. Expecting to find hardware replacements for a system older than 5 years will increasingly become more and more challenging. How than do missions plan for hardware changes for long lived missions? Principle Objective: Provide abstraction by virtualizing and containerizing software abstract away any hardware dependencies and package up the application lightweight units. 2. Rapidly responding to security vulnerabilities in software. Cost is often the main impediment and largely driven by the revalidation and testing of system that undergo change. In todays, environment security updates are a major diver demanding systems remain up to date. How then do missions accept these changes and avoid large testing efforts? Principle Objective: Help reduce the cost of re-testing by automation of testing, deployment, and compartmentalizing change. 3. Ability to quickly evolve infrastructure and software changes. Responding quickly to change is similar to the second concern in this paper regarding security vulnerabilities. In this case, it address broader concerns of updating software and infrastructure on a more realistic timeline. How do missions stay up to date with the most recent versions of software and allowing for improved functionality? Principle Objective: Use continuous integration techniques at the system level to ensure rapid turnaround. This paper explores each of these concerns in more detail. It focuses the AMMOS’s current plans, challenges and current roadmap.

Giovannoni, Brian J.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Strategy for Maturing Active Radiation Shielding Concepts

Active shielding strategies for protecting astronauts on exploration missions has long been a dream that proved evasive. Study after study since the early 1970’s has shown that solutions are both mass and power prohibitive. This talk will give an overview of current NASA work aimed at making advancements in the area of active shielding. The basic project premise is that we may have a better chance at success if we: (1) remove the constraint of having to reduce the exposure to zero, and instead focus on how to increase the number of ‘safe’ days in space according to the current NASA risk posture; (2) sub-divide the proton and heavy ion energy spectrum to identify a starting point in energy that may yield a non-negligible reduction in ion flux at power levels achievable with current technology, and; (3) develop methods to use scaling to build, test and mature small-scale shielding structures on the ground as a pathway to identifying technology development investment strategies. A top-level overview of these strategies will be presented during this talk.

Radiation Protection↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Role of NDE and In-Situ Process Monitoring in Managing Risk of AM Space Hardware

The recently published NASA-STD-6030 defines the Additive Manufacturing (AM) Requirements for Spaceflight Systems. Key aspects of the certification approach include the development of a qualified material process (QMP) and material characterization determined by part classification. Nondestructive evaluation (NDE) of the full surface and volume is required for all part classifications except those with negligible risk. NASA is exploring the use of in-process monitoring data to improve risk posture and supplement post-build inspection for complex parts. Currently, the most challenging obstacle to overcome is linking the indications in the monitoring data to the physics of the process and the final material state of the finished part. NASA is undertaking studies to understand and quantify this relationship for various monitoring methods. The desired goal is to develop a protocol to establish this correlation for any monitoring method. Once this correlation is known, the critical defect size can be linked to a representative indication in the monitoring data, and the capability of the monitoring system can be tested using the 90/95 probability of detection requirement for NDE methods. This would enable the use of in-process monitoring as a defect screening activity for AM part certification. Many high-criticality components built with AM have high complexity and therefore limited inspectability, so using in-process monitoring can help address this certification gap. The use of adaptive, closed-loop monitoring systems that alter the locked process will require a new approach to the QMP.

additive manufacturing↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Role of NDE and In-Situ Process Monitoring in Managing Risk of AM Space Hardware

advanced manufacturing↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Phasing in COTS EEE parts in NASA

A number of activities within NASA and the space community, as well as growing technology needs and supply chain changes have accelerated the need to expand the use of COTS parts within NASA. While the use of COTS has been formally institutionalized and deemed acceptable for Class D space missions and those with greater tolerance for risk, there is still a lack of understanding of how to most effectively use COTS in such high risk-tolerance missions, and no apparent path towards broad use in missions with much less tolerance for risk. However, the reality is that the fundamental limitations of technology associated with the military specification system combined with the need to fly newer technologies in upcoming flagship robotic missions and human space flight missions will ultimately demand a more expansive use of COTS. The infinite nature of COTS gives rise to numerous challenges in the selection, acceptance, testing, and usage of COTS when reliable operation is essential. This presentation will highlight some of the current artifacts of a NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) study on the use of COTS parts, as well as many of the historical through current facts about parts assurance within Agency to provide a path forward for reliable use of COTS for a range of space applications and risk postures.

EEE parts↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Analytical Framework for Rodent/NHP Data Set Utilization to Inform Human CNS Risk Estimation

Objectives Review and inform on tactics to analyze & communicate data from animal research (e.g., rodents, mini-pigs, NHPs, et al) exposed to single and combinations of spaceflight hazards, using NASA’s Human System Risk Board (HSRB) process for the Behavioral Medicine Risk - To quantitatively inform Behavioral Medicine Risk posture - i.e., likelihood (L) and consequence (C) - To help inform estimation of crew health standards for operational task performance (i.e., Fitness For Duty, Space Permissible Exposure Levels, Permissible Operational Limits).

Brain↗

NASA NTRS2023

Risk Trade-Space Analysis for Safe Human Expeditions to Mars

We assessed the integrated safety, health, and performance risk to crews on long-duration missions, specifically to Mars. Using a systems approach rather than one focused on individual countermeasures, we examined the trade space around several such risks to identify high-potential risk mitigation strategies and characterize aspects of Mars mission architectures that could lower aggregated risk. Current Mars Design Reference missions would require durations well over two years and would increase crew exposure to radiation and microgravity well beyond ISS levels, likely resulting in significantly reduced performance beyond our current capability to mitigate that could jeopardize mission success. A “fast Mars transit” round-trip mission concept was studied using an innovative flight dynamics approach to quantify the minimum total mission energy required for a Mars transit with total mission duration less than 400 days. This approach holds promise for sending humans to Mars and returning them safely with acceptable, potentially mitigatable, exposure to microgravity and radiation using current or near-term technologies. The fast transit concept would also result in fewer time-driven vehicle failures and enable sustainable deployment of humans and infrastructure to Mars on a regular cadence, allowing steady exploration and colonization of Mars. Finally, we conclude that reliance on the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) mission operations paradigm – i.e., one of near-complete real-time dependence on experts at Mission Control to manage the combined state of the mission, vehicle, and crew – is high risk given the communication delays and limited resupply of any Mars mission, and this risk is not eliminated by the shorter missions durations of fast transit scenarios. Based on historical trends, it is highly likely that the crew will face a high-consequence problem of uncertain origin during Mars transit when ground support will be greatly reduced. While it may be possible to reduce anomaly rates through improved reliability analysis and testing, and to reduce anomaly impacts through added robustness, such mitigations address only known failure modes and known uncertainties. Therefore, a radical shift in the Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA) that defines the operational paradigm, systems design, and human-systems interactions is required to improve the risk posture to an acceptable level regardless of mission duration.

Mars↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Phasing COTS Part Into Low-Risk-Tolerant Missions

A number of activities within NASA and the space community, as well as growing technology needs and supply chain changes have accelerated the need to expand the use of COTS parts within NASA. While the use of COTS has been formally institutionalized and deemed acceptable for Class D space missions and those with greater tolerance for risk, there is still a lack of understanding of how to most effectively use COTS in such high risk-tolerance missions, and no apparent path towards broad use in missions with much less tolerance for risk. However, the reality is that the fundamental limitations of technology associated with the military specification system combined with the need to fly newer technologies in upcoming flagship robotic missions and human space flight missions will ultimately demand a more expansive use of COTS. The infinite nature of COTS gives rise to numerous challenges in the selection, acceptance, testing, and usage of COTS when reliable operation is essential. This presentation will highlight some of the results of a NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) study on the use of COTS parts, as well as many of the historical through current facts about parts assurance within Agency to provide a path forward for reliable use of COTS for a range of space applications and risk postures. In addition this presentation will dispel the myth that expanded use of COTS parts causes a new set of radiation threats to missions.

COTS↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

What You Need to Know about Planetary Protection Categorization for Your Mission

Planetary protection mission categorization helps to define the risk posture for requirements definition and implementation practices on space flight projects with planetary protection considerations. NASA has recently updated it’s planetary protection policy (NPR 8715.24), and with the update comes a major change in how the planetary protection categorization process is performed for NASA missions. Previously, projects would request the NASA Planetary Protection Officer (PPO) provide a categorization letter documenting the planetary protection category assigned to the proposed mission. Under the new policy the project manager (PM) proposes the planetary protection category for their mission. Depending on the level of the category, the PPO either concurs or recommends concurrence to the Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) before forwarding to the Mission Directorate Associate Administrator (MDAA) for final approval prior to the system requirements review (SRR). But what topics must be considered for categorization? This presentation will provide key considerations for planetary protection mission categorization including the target solar system body to be explored, the trajectory to get to the target body, and the operations to be performed at the target body. Additional unique scenarios such as secondary and auxiliary payloads, encountering other solar system bodies on the way to the target body, and sample return missions will also be discussed to share lessons learned from missions that have been through the new categorization process.

Elaine Seasly↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Phasing COTS Part Into Low-Risk-Tolerant Missions

A number of activities within NASA and the space community, as well as growing technology needs and supply chain changes have accelerated the need to expand the use of COTS parts within NASA. While the use of COTS has been formally institutionalized and deemed acceptable for Class D space missions and those with greater tolerance for risk, there is still a lack of understanding of how to most effectively use COTS in such high risk-tolerance missions, and no apparent path towards broad use in missions with much less tolerance for risk. However, the reality is that the fundamental limitations of technology associated with the military specification system combined with the need to fly newer technologies in upcoming flagship robotic missions and human space flight missions will ultimately demand a more expansive use of COTS. The infinite nature of COTS gives rise to numerous challenges in the selection, acceptance, testing, and usage of COTS when reliable operation is essential. This presentation will highlight some of the results of a NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) study on the use of COTS parts, as well as many of the historical through current facts about parts assurance within Agency to provide a path forward for reliable use of COTS for a range of space applications and risk postures. In addition this presentation will dispel the myth that expanded use of COTS parts causes a new set of radiation threats to missions.

COTS↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

OSIRIS-REx Screening Experience & Lessons Learned

On September 24, 2023, the NASA OSIRIS-REx spacecraft returned a sample of asteroid Bennu, approaching on a hyperbolic impact trajectory relative to Earth. At approximately 108,000 km altitude and four hours prior to hitting the top of the atmosphere, the Sample Return Capsule (SRC) separated from the spacecraft bus, targeting the Utah Test and Training Range. Twenty minutes later, the bus performed a large divert maneuver to fly by at a perigee altitude of ~780 km. Given the immense scientific value of the sample, substantial efforts were undertaken by NASA CARA and the OSIRIS-REx mission to ensure safe passage of the objects from GEO through LEO. This presentation provides an overview of collision avoidance maneuver (CAM) options, results of screenings, coordination with DoD for contingency observations, and lessons learned for screening future Earth flyby and entry trajectories. Two particular challenges included screening two objects using a much larger than normal 250 km spherical monitor volume and decision planning for a single CAM while the SRC was still attached that would alter both trajectories. The larger, non-standard screening volume resulted in custom procedures that CARA personnel had to run manually for each screening, and the initial long propagation times while the objects were more than a week out required significant computing resources. With a single CAM opportunity at 13 hours out, the decision to execute a maneuver had to consider the risk to both objects, where one could imagine a situation where the maneuver would clear a high-risk conjunction for one object and introduce one for the other – begging the question of relative risk posture between the SRC and bus. These among other unique aspects of Earth flyby and entry missions led to novel planning and implementation procedures to support future missions of this type.

Dolan E. Highsmith↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

X-57 Static Structural Requirements and Airworthiness Approach

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Armstrong Flight Research Center (AFRC) (Edwards, California, U.S.A.) has been flying various types of aircraft, including experimental ones requiring structural modifications. Many of these aircraft aren’t typically certified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or the Department of Defense (DoD), but NASA can provide its own airworthiness certification utilizing a riskbased approach. The AFRC has established review processes and procedures to identify hazards, manage risks associated with flight programs, ensure safe flight operations, and satisfy programmatic requirements. The Aerostructures Branch at AFRC developed guidelines for the structural safety of flight, covering experimental aircraft, new components, payloads, and modifications. These guidelines detail structural design, analysis, instrumentation, ground testing, and flight-test operational aspects. The guidelines are followed for defining the airworthiness plan throughout the life cycle of a project. The guidelines can be tailored to the risk posture of each individual project. This paper documents the details of the structural airworthiness plan for the X-57 aircraft, including existing, modified, and newly developed structures. Additionally, it covers the design requirements and load cases specific to the X-57 aircraft.

Wesley W. Li↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

BurstCube: Behind the Scenes of a Do-No-Harm I&T Production

BurstCube is one of the most recent 6-U CubeSats built and developed by NASA Goddard Spaceflight Center (GSFC). As an astrophysics mission, BurstCube will be a rapid detection alert end-to-end mission system for short astrophysical gamma-ray bursts with the aim of increasing the chance of coincident detection of gamma-ray bursts. In addition, the mission is intended to augment the current fleet of gamma-ray astronomy satellites. The payload instrument includes 4 scintillator heads read out by arrays of silicon photomultipliers which will detect short astrophysical gamma-ray bursts. BurstCube provides a high field of view previously unavailable to larger missions and is intended to provide rapid alerts for follow up observations with other assets, increasing the chance of a coincident detection of an event. From the design to the integration and test phases, the project aimed to provide realistic test plans and stimulus to help verify and validate reachable areas of this innovative payload/instrument system and even spacecraft performance. Typical robust integration and test phases for space missions are unaligned with the budget and risk postures of small satellite or CubeSat missions, often designated as “Do No Harm” projects where the primary requirement is not harming the host platform or other payloads. Despite this status, CubeSats are complex missions that mix new and prior technologies. Integration and test for these missions requires responsible engineering, creative collaboration, and careful observation to deliver a reliable mission. This paper will provide an overview of the payload instrument and mission system, areas of injected automation (current and future), environmental testing results, and lessons learned during the integration and test phase.

CubeSats↗

NASA NTRS2024

NASA Risk Management Handbook: Version 2.0, Part 1

The purpose of this handbook is to provide an in-depth reference for the practice of risk management in NASA, updating the guidance offered in its original version, NASA/SP-2011-3422 (November 2011), and closely aligning the updated guidance with the current NASA Procedural Requirements for Agency Risk Management, NPR 8000.4, and the parent NASA Policy Directive for NASA Governance and Strategic Management, NPD 1000.0. NPD 1000.0 introduces with emphasis the concept of “Risk Leadership,” making it a fundamental tenet and pillar of the risk management culture that it advocates for the Agency. NPR 8000.4 applies this concept and establishes Risk Management (RM) requirements for the Agency as an integrated enterprise, as well as the RM requirements for portfolio elements within the enterprise. Such elements include the various programs and projects that contribute to the Agency’s objectives and the various institutional activities carried out by entities that contribute to mission support. The present version of the handbook also emphasizes the integration of risk management processes across activity and project life cycles and their coordination and interaction with day-to-day programmatic and organizational functions. Areas of application of risk assessment and management that were not covered with specific guidance in the preceding version are addressed in this version with in-depth examples. The handbook is structured into two parts, whose chapters are in turn organized in a sequential order intended to facilitate a gradual and progressive introduction of the reader to risk management principles and practices. Part 1 of the handbook is dedicated to the introduction of the basic foundations of the NASA integrated risk management framework, the related fundamental risk concepts, the description of the risk management and decision processes that are to be implemented within the framework, the discussion of the risk assessment techniques that should be utilized in support of such processes, and the management and organizational interactions and interfaces that should be enabled to implement an effective integration of risk management activities within the Agency. Part 2 provides self-contained, end-to-end examples of application of the processes and techniques introduced in Part 1, in the context of both programmatic (i.e., project and/or mission related) and institutional activities.

Uncertainty↗

NASA NTRS2024

NASA Risk Management Handbook: Version 2.0, Part 2

The purpose of this handbook is to provide an in-depth reference for the practice of risk management in NASA, updating the guidance offered in its original version, NASA/SP-2011-3422 (November 2011), and closely aligning the updated guidance with the current NASA Procedural Requirements for Agency Risk Management, NPR 8000.4, and the parent NASA Policy Directive for NASA Governance and Strategic Management, NPD 1000.0 (January 2020). NPD 1000.0 introduces with emphasis the concept of “Risk Leadership,” making it a fundamental tenet and pillar of the risk management culture that it advocates for the Agency. NPR 8000.4 applies this concept and establishes Risk Management (RM) requirements for the Agency as an integrated enterprise, as well as the RM requirements for portfolio elements within the enterprise. Such elements include the various programs and projects that contribute to the Agency’s objectives and the various institutional activities carried out by entities that contribute to mission support. The present version of the handbook also emphasizes the integration of risk management processes across activity and project life cycles and their coordination and interaction with day-to-day programmatic and organizational functions. Areas of application of risk assessment and management that were not covered with specific guidance in the preceding version are addressed in this version with in-depth examples. The handbook is structured into two parts, whose chapters are in turn organized in a sequential order intended to facilitate a gradual and progressive introduction of the reader to risk management principles and practices. Part 1 of the handbook is dedicated to the introduction of the basic foundations of the NASA integrated risk management framework, the related fundamental risk concepts, the description of the risk management and decision processes that are to be implemented within the framework, the discussion of the risk assessment techniques that should be utilized in support of such processes, and the management and organizational interactions and interfaces that should be enabled to implement an effective integration of risk management activities within the Agency. Part 2 provides self-contained, end-to-end examples of application of the processes and techniques introduced in Part 1, in the context of both programmatic (i.e., project and/or mission related) and institutional activities.

Risk Leadership↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Proposed Reliability-Based Damage Tolerance Guidelines for Space Systems

Deterministic damage tolerance guidelines for highly reusable and efficiently designed launch systems can be challenging to meet and result in overly conservative assessments for tightly controlled manufacturing processes. Deterministic approaches may be unconservative when the structure is workmanship sensitive and there is a wide spread in fracture properties. Reliability-based damage tolerance assessments targeting a component reliability over the service life commensurate to mission risk posture is a promising alternative. Low production rates, short fleets, and lack of standards or guidance has slowed down widespread adoption of this method. Guidance for the robust application of reliability-based damage tolerance for space systems are proposed. These guidelines cover the treatment of uncertainty in damage tolerance analysis, the collection of data to develop probabilistic distributions, uncertainty propagation methods, and types of hardware.

Reliability-Based Damage Tolerance↗

NASA NTRS2026

Uranus Orbiter and Probe: Mission Challenges and Concept Updates Since the Origins, Worlds, and Life Decadal Survey

Origins, Worlds, and Life: Planetary Science and Astrobiology in the Next Decade identified a Uranus Orbiter and Probe as the highest-priority strategic mission for the decade 2023–2032, as it enables broad cross-disciplinary science in the largely unexplored Uranian system. The mission architecture evaluated by the Decadal Survey was a singular proof of concept demonstrating that a moderately instrumented mission could deliver Decadal-priority science with a reduced cost and risk posture by leveraging existing technologies to the maximum extent possible. With revised assumptions since the Decadal, we have explored a large trade space including launch vehicles, propulsion options, cruise trajectories, available power sources, viable concept of operations, and science data return for later launch dates without a Jupiter gravity assist. The most repeatable trajectory solutions employ either a commercially derived solar electric propulsion (SEP) transfer stage or the availability of a more capable launch vehicle under development, such as the SpaceX Starship. Orbit insertion has been moved farther from Uranus to acknowledge the remaining uncertainty in Uranian ring structure. A streamlined, SEP-adaptable, orbiter design was developed using two Next Gen Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators, and the probe design was matured, reducing the entry gravitational acceleration, and assuming the largest Decadal-recommended payload to provide margin for future instrument selections. With this updated design, we also constructed a detailed concept of operations for three representative science cases, returning 13–15 Gbit of science data and spacecraft telemetry per ∼34 day orbit.

Amy A Simon↗