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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2015

Big Software for SmallSats: Adapting CFS to CubeSat Missions

Expanding capabilities and mission objectives for SmallSats and CubeSats is driving the need for reliable, reusable, and robust flight software. While missions are becoming more complicated and the scientific goals more ambitious, the level of acceptable risk has decreased. Design challenges are further compounded by budget and schedule constraints that have not kept pace. NASA's Core Flight Software System (cFS) is an open source solution which enables teams to build flagship satellite level flight software within a CubeSat schedule and budget. NASA originally developed cFS to reduce mission and schedule risk for flagship satellite missions by increasing code reuse and reliability. The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, which launched in 2009, was the first of a growing list of Class B rated missions to use cFS. Large parts of cFS are now open source, which has spurred adoption outside of NASA. This paper reports on the experiences of two teams using cFS for current CubeSat missions. The performance overheads of cFS are quantified, and the reusability of code between missions is discussed. The analysis shows that cFS is well suited to use on CubeSats and demonstrates the portability and modularity of cFS code.

Open Source↗
NASA NTRS2015

Big Software for SmallSats: Adapting cFS to CubeSat Missions

Expanding capabilities and mission objectives for SmallSats and CubeSats is driving the need for reliable, reusable, and robust flight software. While missions are becoming more complicated and the scientific goals more ambitious, the level of acceptable risk has decreased. Design challenges are further compounded by budget and schedule constraints that have not kept pace. NASA's Core Flight Software System (cFS) is an open source solution which enables teams to build flagship satellite level flight software within a CubeSat schedule and budget. NASA originally developed cFS to reduce mission and schedule risk for flagship satellite missions by increasing code reuse and reliability. The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, which launched in 2009, was the first of a growing list of Class B rated missions to use cFS.

Flight Software↗
NASA NTRS2017

Shape Effect Analysis of Aluminum Projectile Impact on Whipple Shields

The informed design with respect to hypervelocity collisions involving micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) is influential to the success of space missions. For an orbit comparable to that of the International Space Station, velocities for MMOD can range from 1 to 15 km/s, with an average velocity around 10 km/cu s. The high energy released during collisions at these speeds can result in damage to a spacecraft, or worst-case, loss of the spacecraft, thus outlining the importance of methods to predict the likelihood and extent of damage due to an impact. Through experimental testing and numerical simulations, substantial work has been conducted to better understand the effects of hypervelocity impacts (HVI) on spacecraft systems and shields; however, much of the work has been focused on spherical impacting particles. To improve environment models for the analysis of MMOD, a large-scale satellite break-up test was performed at the Arnold Engineering and Development Complex to better understand the varied impactor geometries that could be generated from a large impact. As a part of the post-experiment analysis, an undertaking to characterize the irregular fragments generated is currently being performed by the University of Florida under the management of NASA's Orbital Debris Program Office at Johnson Space Center (JSC). DebriSat was a representative, modern LEO satellite that was catastrophically broken up in a HVI test. The test chamber was lined with a soft-catch system of foam panels that captured the fragments after impact. Initial predictions put the number of fragments larger than 2mm generated from the HVI at roughly 85,000. The number of fragments thus far extracted from the foam panels has exceeded 100,000, with that number continuously increasing. The shapes of the fragments vary dependent upon the material. Carbon-fiber reinforced polymer pieces, for instance, are abundantly found as thin, flat slivers. The characterization of these fragments with respect to their mass, size, and material composition needs to be summarized in a form that can be used in MMOD analysis. The mechanism that brings these fragment traits into MMOD analysis is through ballistic limit equations (BLE) that have been developed largely for a few types of materials1. As a BLE provides the failure threshold for a shield or spacecraft component based on parameters such as the projectile impact velocity and size, and the target's materials, thickness, and configuration, it is used to design protective shields for spacecraft such as Whipple shields (WS) to an acceptable risk level. The majority of experiments and simulations to test shields and validate BLEs have, heretofore, largely used spheres as the impactor, not properly reflecting the irregular shapes of MMOD. This shortfall has motivated a numerical impact analysis study of HVI involving non-spherical geometries to identify key parameters that environment models should provide.

Carrasquilla, Maria J.↗
NASA NTRS2017

NASA Affordable Vehicle Avionics (AVA)

Small satellites are becoming ever more capable of performing valuable missions for both government and commercial customers. However, currently these satellites can be launched affordably only as secondary payloads. This makes it difficult for the small satellite mission to launch when needed, to the desired orbit, and with acceptable risk. What is needed is a class of low-cost launchers, so that launch costs to low-Earth orbit (LEO) are commensurate with payload costs. Several private and government-sponsored launch vehicle developers are working toward just that-the ability to affordably insert small payloads into LEO. But until now, cost of the complex avionics remained disproportionately high. AVA (Affordable Vehicle Avionics) solves this problem. Significant contributors to the cost of launching nanosatellites to orbit are the avionics and software systems that steer and control the launch vehicles, sequence stage separation, deploy payloads, and telemeter data. The high costs of these guidance, navigation and control (GNC) avionics systems are due in part to the current practice of developing unique, single-use hardware and software for each launch. High-performance, high-reliability inertial sensors components with heritage from legacy launchers also contribute to costs-but can low-cost commercial inertial sensors work just as well? NASA Ames Research Center has developed and tested a prototype low-cost avionics package for space launch vehicles that provides complete GNC functionality in a package smaller than a tissue box (100 millimeters by 120 millimeters by 69 millimeters; 4 inches by 4.7 inches by 2.7 inches), with a mass of less than 0.84 kilogram (2 pounds. AVA takes advantage of commercially available, low-cost, mass-produced, miniaturized sensors, filtering their more noisy inertial data with real-time GPS (Global Positioning Satellite) data. The goal of the AVA project is to produce and light-verify a common suite of avionics and software that deliver affordable, capable GNC and telemetry avionics with application to multiple nanolaunch vehicles at 1 percent of the cost of current state-of-the-art avionics.

space technology↗
NASA NTRS2017

Space Technology Game Changing Development: NASA Affordable Vehicle Avionics (AVA)

Common Modular Avionics System for Nanolaunchers Offering Affordable Access to Space Small satellites are becoming ever more capable of performing valuable missions for both government and commercial customers. However, currently these satellites can be launched affordably only as secondary payloads. This makes it difficult for the small satellite mission to launch when needed, to the desired orbit, and with acceptable risk. What is needed is a class of low-cost launchers, so that launch costs to low-Earth orbit (LEO) are commensurate with payload costs. Several private and government-sponsored launch vehicle developers are working toward just that—the ability to affordably insert small payloads into LEO. But until now, cost of the complex avionics remained disproportionately high. AVA solves this problem. Significant contributors to the cost of launching nanosatellites to orbit are the avionics and software systems that steer and control the launch vehicles, sequence stage separation, deploy payloads, and telemeter data. The high costs of these guidance, navigation and control (GNC) avionics systems are due in part to the current practice of developing unique, single use hardware and software for each launch. High-performance, high-reliability inertial sensors components with heritage from legacy launchers also contribute to costs—but can low-cost commercial inertial sensors work just as well?

Aquilina, Rudy↗
NASA NTRS2018

Cassini In-Flight Navigation Adaptations

In the nearly two decades of Cassini flight, adaptations to navigation processes were applied as characteristics unique to Cassini were identified and spacecraft configuration changes were implemented. Additionally, operational experience was leveraged into more efficient processes, better modeling, and more robust contingency strategies. Trajectory adjustments were implemented to allow further investigation of surprising science discoveries meriting more attention. Unique analyses were performed to determine how to best accomplish atypical science observations while maintaining acceptable risk levels. Descriptions of the most significant adaptations are organized according to the affected navigation subsystems: trajectory design, orbit determination, optical navigation, and maneuver design.

Wagner, Sean↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Tools used in Space Radiation Operations

The goal of NASA's Radiation Health Program is to achieve human exploration and development of space without exceeding acceptable risk from exposure to ionizing radiation. The Space Radiation Analysis Group (SRAG) at NASA Johnson Space Center carries out this mission by following the philosophy of ALARA – As Low as Reasonably Achievable. SRAG utilizes a variety of tools to maintain awareness of space weather and to monitor the space radiation environment, both internal and external to the vehicle. SRAG develops and manages a wide variety of detectors that are located on the exterior and throughout the interior of the International Space Station and worn by crew. During Artemis I, SRAG provided detectors distributed within Orion’s interior and participated in the MARE experiment, which outfitted female phantoms with thousands of thermoluminescence detectors (TLD) and other dosimeters to better constrain the total dose accrued inside the human during a mission to the Moon. Motivated by the Artemis Exploration Class missions, SRAG and collaborators are developing forecasting capabilities for solar energetic particle (SEP) events and their biological impacts to crew. Tools that have come out of this work include the Acute Radiation Risk Tool (ARRT) and the SEP Scoreboards. This presentation will give an overview of the tools used in SRAG ops and currently under development to support our next steps in human space exploration.

space weather↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

LOFTID Aeroshell Thermal Response Uncertainty Analysis Utilizing the End-to-End Monte Carlo Approach

A probabilistic thermal margin process has been performed to design the flexible thermal protection system (FTPS) and select entry trajectory constraints given an acceptable risk level for the Low-Earth Orbit Flight Test of and Inflatable Decelerator (LOFTID) project. Uncertainties exist in atmospheric entry aeroheating environments and the predicted thermal response of thermal protection system (TPS) material. Entry vehicle TPS is often over-sized to mitigate uncertainty by combining conservative bounding scenarios together. The probabilistic thermal margin process allows engineers to make informed aeroshell design, flight design, and FTPS performance risk trades while preventing excessive FTPS margin from being applied. This paper describes the uncertainty analysis methodology used to carry out a probabilistic thermal margin process used for LOFTID’s aeroshell and explains how the calculated probability of exceeding flight allowable temperatures is used to design the FTPS and establish nominal flight design constraints. This probabilistic thermal margin process had never been applied to entry, decent, and landing design for a flown entry vehicle and it is one of the LOFTID project’s goals to demonstrate its merits.

Steven Andrew Tobin↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Pre-Flight Hazardous Gas Assessment Methodology for the Space Launch System

The complexity of the Artemis I liquid rocket propulsion systems produces many sources of hazards during the operation of the vehicle. Pre-flight hazardous gas leakages pose fire and explosion risks to rocket that could potentially lead to loss of the vehicle, mission, and crew. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) uses a probability risk assessment strategy to assess the likelihood of the hazard and the consequence should the hazardous situation occur. For high probability hazards that pose a potentially catastrophic consequence to the vehicle, the most effective strategy for reducing the risk is accomplished by engineering and implementing systems that actively mitigate the hazard. A hazards analysis is completed to determine the likelihood and severity of each hazard. These hazard analyses are informed using relevant empirical data and physics-based analytical models. Time-accurate Computational Fluid Dynamics models used to quantify and understand the risks posed to Artemis I due to expulsions of hazardous gas near the vehicle. Several sources of hazardous gas that posed a risk to Artemis I during nominal pre-flight operations are analyzed in this work. The results of the analyses were used to develop flight rationale and make risk acceptance decisions for the Artemis I launch.

Brian R. Richardson↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Benchmark Problem for Autonomous Urban Air Mobility

This paper introduces a Community Benchmark Problem (CBP) for Intelligent Contingency Management (ICM) for Urban Air Mobility (UAM) aircraft. The CBP aims to provide a common framework for measuring and comparing the progress of autonomy solutions for UAM aircraft in handling emergency situations. The paper proposes a methodology for defining and quantifying five measures of complexity that capture the challenges and requirements of ICM for UAM: Mission, Environmental, Autonomy, Decision-Making, and Mission Fault. In addition, it proposes a methodology for defining and quantifying mission risk acceptability with the same goals: Contingency Management, Mission Success, Operational, Mission Redefinition, and Environmental. We describe how to use these measures to track progress of the development of ICM capability, as well as to create scenarios and evaluate the performance of different autonomy solutions.

autonomy↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Pre-Flight Hazardous Gas Assessment Methodology for the Space Launch System

The complexity of the Artemis I liquid rocket propulsion systems produces many sources of hazards during the operation of the vehicle. Pre-flight hazardous gas leakages pose fire and explosion risks to rocket that could potentially lead to loss of the vehicle, mission, and crew. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) uses a probability risk assessment strategy to assess the likelihood of the hazard and the consequence should the hazardous situation occur. For high probability hazards that pose a potentially catastrophic consequence to the vehicle, the most effective strategy for reducing the risk is accomplished by engineering and implementing systems that actively mitigate the hazard. A hazards analysis is completed to determine the likelihood and severity of each hazard. These hazard analyses are informed using relevant empirical data and physics-based analytical models. Time-accurate Computational Fluid Dynamics models used to quantify and understand the risks posed to Artemis I due to expulsions of hazardous gas near the vehicle. Several sources of hazardous gas that posed a risk to Artemis I during nominal pre-flight operations are analyzed in this work. The results of the analyses were used to develop flight rationale and make risk acceptance decisions for the Artemis I launch.

Brian R. Richardson↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Community Benchmark Problem for Intelligent Contingency Management

This paper introduces a Community Benchmark Problem (CBP) for Intelligent Contingency Management (ICM) for Urban Air Mobility (UAM) aircraft. The CBP aims to provide a common framework for measuring and comparing the progress of autonomy solutions for UAM aircraft in handling emergency situations. The paper proposes a methodology for defining and quantifying five measures of complexity that capture the challenges and requirements of ICM for UAM: Mission, Environmental, Autonomy, Decision-Making, and Mission Fault. In addition, it proposes a methodology for defining and quantifying mission risk acceptability with the same goals: Contingency Management, Mission Success, Operational, Mission Redefinition, and Environmental. We describe how to use these measures to track progress of the development of ICM capability, as well as to create scenarios and evaluate the performance of different autonomy solutions.

autonomy↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Towards Computational Functional Hazard Assessment (CFHA): A Gap Analysis and Concept for Emerging Aviation Systems

Given the current evolution of the National Airspace and future trajectory towards novel and evolving operations with varying levels of autonomy, complexity, and acceptable risk, there is an opportunity to support safety assurance by extending existing methodologies, such as Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA). In response to challenges in performing FHA for novel aviation concepts, we propose a concept for Computational Functional Hazard Assessment (CFHA), which provides processes, methods, and tools for incorporating external data to facilitate further exploration of the hazard space iterativelty throughout the design process. The core components of CFHA involve knowledge capture from historical and operational data, functional architecture specification via a formal modeling language, and simulation for hazardous scenario analysis. Through this concept, we aim to adapt conventional safety assessment to address the increasingly complex hazard space generated from emerging operations.

Seydou Mbaye↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Towards Functional Hazard Assessment (CFHA): A Gap Analysis and Concept for Emerging Aviation Systems

Given the current evolution of the National Airspace and future trajectory towards novel and evolving operations with varying levels of autonomy, complexity, and acceptable risk, there is an opportunity to support safety assurance by extending existing methodologies, such as Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA). In response to challenges in performing FHA for novel aviation concepts, we propose a concept for Computational Functional Hazard Assessment (CFHA), which provides processes, methods, and tools for incorporating external data to facilitate further exploration of the hazard space iterativelty throughout the design process. The core components of CFHA involve knowledge capture from historical and operational data, functional architecture specification via a formal modeling language, and simulation for hazardous scenario analysis. Through this concept, we aim to adapt conventional safety assessment to address the increasingly complex hazard space generated from emerging operations.

Seydou Mbaye↗
NASA NTRS2016

Pitfalls and Precautions When Using Predicted Failure Data for Quantitative Analysis of Safety Risk for Human Rated Launch Vehicles

Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account risks attributable to manufacturing, assembly, and process controls. These sources often dominate component level reliability or risk of failure probability. While consequences of failure is often understood in assessing risk, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence will likely underestimate the risk. Managers and decision makers often use the probability of occurrence in determining whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. Due to the absence of system level test and operational data inherent in aerospace applications, the actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be appropriately characterized for decision making purposes. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.

Hatfield, Glen S.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Pitfalls and Precautions When Using Predicted Failure Data for Quantitative Analysis of Safety Risk for Human Rated Launch Vehicles

Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account system integration risks such as those attributable to manufacturing and assembly. These sources often dominate component level risk. While consequence of failure is often understood, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence may underestimate the actual risk. Managers and decision makers use the probability of occurrence to influence the determination whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. The actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be fully understood due to the absence of system level test data or operational data. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.

Hatfield, Glen S.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Acceptance of Safety and Mission Success Risks

NASA has developed an objectives based hierarchy for guiding Reliability and Maintainability (RM) activities. This presentation overviews the hierarchy and proposes to the international trilateral partners to formulate a task force to consider the elements of the NASA RM framework, as captured in the hierarchy of RM considerations, to identify commonalities and differences in the way RM is addressed by the flight projects among the partners.

safety↗